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Abstract
This dissertation delves into the legal and labour history of Hashemite Iraq (c. 1921-1958) to explore
the role international law and its institutions played in Iraq’s state formation, as well as, the imperial
control of the semi-peripheral region of the Middle East. By highlighting the historical specificity of
the semi-periphery in international legal history, it shows how Iraq was a laboratory for
experimentation with the concept of sovereignty. A unique doctrine of ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’
was skillfully developed by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in Geneva
and embedded in the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty to ensure Iraq’s ‘independence’ in 1932 maintained
geopolitical and imperial interests that were specific to the region, especially the extraction,
production and transportation of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.
The material effects of this international legal doctrine on the everyday lives of working class Iraqis
is traced by looking at how it intersected with British imperial law, land law, the transnational law of
oil concessions and pipeline agreements, criminal law and emergency law. The spaces and semicolonial enclaves of capitalist production and trade of the oil fields in Kirkuk, the railways in Baghdad
and the Port of Basra, and their corresponding governing structures are then detailed in microhistories with the aim of analyzing the manner in which the oil, port and railway workers organized
against

the

semi-colonial

and

imperial

legality

that

was

imposed

upon

them.

The dissertation ends with an analysis of the massive 1948 Wathba uprising against the revision of
the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The Wathba, successfully prevented the re-imposition of imperialism in
Iraq, and would turn into the seed of the July Revolution in 1958. It is situated here within the wider
history of decolonization in the Third World to advance a novel methodological approach of the
‘conjuncture’ to understand anti-colonial and labour agency in relation to international legal history.
This study illustrates that undertaking a ‘conjunctural analysis’ illuminates how the agency of the
ordinary peoples of the Third World influenced international legal transformation. The doctrine of
semi-peripheral sovereignty and all juridical forms of semi-colonialism would be unequivocally
rejected through the Iraqi contribution to the drafting of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This dissertation therefore reveals the unique
constitutive relationship between international law, imperialism, and capitalism in the semiperipheral Middle East, while maintaining the importance of integrating the history of ‘class
formation’, ‘agency’ and ‘labour’ into international legal history.
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Introduction

No country could owe more to imperialism than does Iraq.1
~ Sir John Troutbeck
Mesopotamia as a whole is so rich…yet so defenseless and tempting as to prescribe organized government
as the only means of guarding the riches it contains. We must expect therefore to find that
Mesopotamia…will impose order and civilization on those who hold it.2
~ Sir Mark Sykes
There are no miracles in nature or history, but every abrupt turn in history, and this applies to every
revolution, presents such a wealth of content, unfolds such unexpected and specific combinations of forms
of struggle and alignment of forces of the contestants, that to the lay mind there is much that must appear
miraculous.3
~ V.I. Lenin

I. The imperial lines of the law & the invisible lines of agency
In a meeting in 10 Downing Street in 1915, the young mid-level British officer and
advisor to the War Office, Sir Mark Sykes was asked by the foreign secretary Arthur Balfour
what kind of arrangement he envisaged with the French concerning the Arab territories of the
Ottoman Empire at the Great War’s end. He responded by pointing on a map he had brought with
him, ‘I should like to draw a line from the “e” in Acre to the last “k” in Kirkuk’.4 Herbert
Kitchener, the secretary of state, who was present, intervened, ‘I think that what Sir Mark Sykes
means is that the line will commence at the sea-coast of Haifa’.5 In less than twenty years,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA). FO 371/110991. VQ 1015/82. John Troutbeck
(British Embassy, Bagdad) to Anthony Eden (FO, London) December 9, 1954.
2 Mark Sykes. The Caliphs’ Last Heritage: A Short History of the Turkish Empire, (London: Macmillan
and Co, 1915), at 8.
3 V.I. Lenin. Letters from Afar, First Letter, “The First Stage of the First Revolution”, in Lenin Collected
Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), at 297–308.
4 TNA, CAB 24/1, “Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, on Thursday, 16 December at 11:30am,
Evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart, MP, on the Arab Question,” as quoted in James
Barr. A Line in the Sand: The Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, (London: W.W. Norton & Co,
2012), at 7.
5 Ibid.
1

1

analogous lines would demarcate the oil pipelines of the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company,
which originated in Kirkuk, transporting Iraqi oil westward through Syria, Lebanon and Palestine
and ending at the ports of the Mediterranean in Haifa and Tripoli. The drawing up of ‘lines’ on
maps and the ‘carving up’ of territories by European powers and oil cartels6 is a powerful image
that is commonly invoked when one thinks of the Middle East. It could be said that the modern
history of the geopolitical space known as the ‘Middle East’7 is a history of ‘lines’ – straight lines
drawn on maps by (white) European hands.8 Such a statement would not necessarily be a truism
if it did not intentionally disregard other ‘lines’ in the history of the region; living lines – the
conjunctural lines of agency, working-class movements, organizational anti-colonial struggle, and
revolutionary action.
This dissertation is an attempt to ‘redraw’ the historical narrative of the region above by
examining the history of Iraq in two interconnected ways: first, by emphasizing that the act of
imperial line-drawing is a juridical act par excellence. The law could be found paralleling these
imperial lines drawn on the maps of the region and must therefore be (re) traced in detail. In fact,
the underlying claim of this work is that imperialism and semi-colonialism were only able to
operate within this space as a result of international and transnational law and juridical
arrangements being assembled in certain ways. The law therefore played a significant role in the
production of unique geopolitical and economic spaces for imperialism to function in the Middle
East. Moreover, international law’s contribution to the formation of the Iraqi state itself had wide
repercussions for the entire region.

Another episode of line drawing on maps is that of the famous ‘Red-Line Agreement’ signed
between the partners of the Turkish Petroleum Company on July 31, 1928. The story goes that
Calouste Gulbenkian, the famous Armenian philanthropist, ‘took a thick red pencil and drew a line
along the boundaries of the now-defunct Turkish empire… Within the red line were eventually to be
found all the major oil-producing fields of the Middle East, save for Persia and Kuwait. The partners
bound themselves not to engage in any oil operations within that vast territory except in cooperation
with the other members of the Turkish Petroleum Company…It set the framework for future Middle
Eastern oil development…’ Daniel Yergin. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), at 204, 205.
7 See Michael E. Bonnie, Abbas Amanat, and Michael Ezekiel Gasper (eds). Is there a Middle East? The
Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), for a discussion on
the evolution of the concept of the Middle East.
8 Related to these simplistic historical accounts of the region are those who refer to individual
Europeans (such as Mark Sykes, Gertrude Bell or T.E. Lawrence for instance), as having ‘invented’ or
‘made’ the modern Middle East. This is not a merely highly orientalist version of history, but also
completely inaccurate in its description of the region as a tabula rasa for European agency, while the
local populations are portrayed as completely passive.
6
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Second, this study is essentially an attempt to retrace the invisible lines of resistance and
struggle in the region (specifically that of Iraq) and to demonstrate that these living lines of
revolutionary action, movement agency and their conjunctures played a lasting role on the history
of the region, the Third World and ultimately international law itself. This study is therefore one
that endeavors to use Iraqi history as a lens to understand the role of international, transnational,
and imperial law in the region. It is hoped that by situating the history of Iraq in such a manner,
one would in turn better grasp how agency could be written into the history of international law.

II. The specificity of the geo-political space of the Middle East & the economic logic of
Sykes-Picot
Soon after his visit to London, Sykes met with his French counterpart Georges Picot in
secret to negotiate and draft the scandalous Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916) between Great
Britain and France, which divided the region into spheres of influence.9 This document made
public by the Bolsheviks in Izvestia and Pravda soon after they came to power in 1917, included
a map, which showed the French portion marked as ‘A’ and the British marked as ‘B’.10
Although the agreement envisioned the existence of a Confederation of Arab states within its
spheres of influence, it was in direct contradiction with British assurances to the Sharif of Mecca,
Hussein Bin Ali in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (1915-1916), which promised Arab
independence in return for the Arabs waging a revolt against the Ottoman Empire.11
The Sykes-Picot Agreement ultimately failed to materialize as envisioned, and the
borders of the new states that settled after the war were different and in fact shaped by political
compromises and unpredictable post-war changes, such as the rising unformidable Arab
nationalism across the region, the discussions at the (more transparent) conferences in Paris
(1919), San Remo (1920) and Cairo (1921); and the emergent Turkish state. The discourse
surrounding Sykes-Picot, however, is alive and well and continues to creep into the historical
narrative of the region, presented as a kind of ‘originary moment’ of imperial intervention in the

See The Sykes-Picot Agreement May 1916, Oxford Public International Law, and Umut Özsu, SykesPicot: the treaty that carved up the Middle East, OUPBLOG (May, 2016).
10 See Figure 2. Britain’s sphere of influence included Basra and Baghdad in Mesopotamia, while
France included Syria, Southern Anatolia and Mosul. Palestine was designated as an international
zone.
11 See Elie Kedourie. In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: the McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its
Interpretations, 1914-1939 (Routledge, 2000).
9
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region and its corresponding post-war state formation.12 It is especially evoked to further the
argument that Iraq and Syria are artificial creations of European powers.13 One need not mention
how such a (orientalist) narrative of ‘line-drawing’ by Europeans on ‘empty maps’ ultimately
takes away from any agency of the local population and erases all traces of resistance. Sara
Pursley has already showed how this ‘artificiality thesis’ was a narrative concocted by the British
in the 1920s to legitimize their continued control of Iraq, and the reality was that both the Cairo
and San Remo conferences were responses to nationalist demands by the local inhabitants of Iraq
and Syria for independence, expressed in popular uprisings and armed resistance.14 Iraq therefore,
‘is no more artificial that any other country with borders drawn as a result of a variety of reasons
including wars, treaties, compromises, backroom deals, internal and external pressures, and plain
chance’.15
The Sykes-Picot Agreement would be more accurately perceived as one that denotes the
specificity of the geopolitical space of the Middle East as a whole. It was accordingly not
necessarily about the actual carving up and division of the region, but rather about the economic
exploitation of the entire Middle East. In this way it remains relevant to the subsequent Mandate
period in question. Although it was decided that the Mandate system would be the manner by
which these territories would be disposed of, making it seem that the nineteenth century
imperialist spirit of Sykes-Picot – sanctioning the old practices of annexation, colonial plunder
and secret diplomacy– were over. However, as will be shown in this study of Iraq, the economic
vision of Sykes-Picot continued to permeate deep in the impetus of the Mandate system and
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations16, except that now it was legal, transparent
and governed by international law. Karin Loevy has aptly made the point that Sykes-Picot
comprised new imperial imaginings of a regional ‘geospace’ of economic development. It
evoked, she writes, ‘a powerful imperial image of a region that is opening up for innumerable

Sara Pursley. ‘Lines Drawn on an Empty Map’: Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State’,
Jadaliyya, June 2 2015.
13 Ibid.
14Ibid.
15 Thabit Abdullah. Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos: Iraq since 1989, (London: Zed Books, 2006), at
2.
16 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of the Nations was the legal basis of the mandate system:
“To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the
sovereignty of States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied
the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples for a sacred trust of civilization
and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.”
12
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future possibilities for development and for the management of broad strategic concerns’.17
These economic concerns were reflected in its provisions that referred to ‘free ports’, the
establishment of norms for free trade, the transfer of water, lines of transportation,
railroads…etc.18
In his introduction to the American Journal of International Law Symposium on the
centenary of Sykes-Picot, Antony Anghie emphasizes these continuities when he makes the point
that inter-imperial arrangements were always concerned with free trade and navigational rights
and that therefore this illustrates that, ‘questions of governance and sovereignty…were
inextricably linked in such agreements with trade and commerce’.19 Edward Said has analyzed
Sykes-Picot by reference to its ‘peculiar epistemological framework,’ one whereby, ‘the Orient
was seen…as a geographical…entity over whose destiny they [i.e. the European powers] believed
themselves to have traditional entitlement’.20 Such ideological frameworks with regards to the
Orient and its corresponding economic logic went hand in hand with the ‘civilizing mission’ of
European imperialism in the Third World, and both were re-conceptualized and translated into the
language of international law and its new post-war institutions. As this study will show, despite
the novel rearrangements occurring in the international legal order at the time, these conceptual
frameworks with its economic linkage continued unabated in the semi-periphery. In fact, the
same economic preoccupations of free trade that imperial powers were concerned with in The
Treaty of Berlin of 1885 and which emanated in the spirit of Sykes-Picot continued in the
Mandate system in a very subtle way (especially within the guise of new forms of sovereignty
and ‘independence’) and it is these legal intricacies that this study of Iraq is concerned with.

III. Four underlying interventions & arguments
There are four major interventions and arguments that run throughout this work. The first
is that critical international legal scholars of the Third World have overlooked the semi-periphery

17Karin

Loevy. ‘The Sykes-Picot Agreement’s Regional Moment: Drawing Lines of Development in a
New and Open Space’ Symposium on the Many Lives and Legacies of Sykes-Picot, AJIL Unbound,
Vol.110, 2016, at 122.
18 Ibid.
19 Antony Anghie. ‘Introduction to Symposium on the Many Lives and Legacies of Sykes-Picot’,
September 28, 2016, AJIL Unbound, https://www.asil.org/blogs/introduction-symposium-manylives-and-legacies-sykes-picot at 106, emphasis added.
20 Edward Said. Orientalism. (NY: Vintage, 1978), at 221.
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and its significance in the history of international law and its institutions.21 In other words, the
literature has for the most part maintained a strict dichotomy between the periphery and the core,
while the semi-periphery, which has a unique history, has been ignored. It is only by exploring
the semi-periphery in historical detail that its specificity becomes clear and the operations of
international law in the Middle East can be understood.22 The analytic ambiguity associated with
the region demonstrates how the law – i.e. a combination of international, transnational and
imperial law – operated in a manner that obscured reality. The imperial powers, through the
Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) in Geneva, experimented with the concept of
sovereignty in Iraq. This was meant to allow for the making of a unique form of ‘semi-peripheral
sovereignty’ in international law for the region that would be compatible with the economic
exploitation not only of Iraq, but the entire semi-peripheral Middle East. Iraqi oil being the jewel
in the crown of the Middle East could only be exploited in this manner. In this sense, a focus on
the spatial and geopolitical characteristics of the semi-periphery makes it easier to understand
why it was that from an imperial viewpoint, necessary to designate the ‘A’ Mandates, where
‘independence’ was provisionally recognized, as such.
The semi-periphery was a laboratory for legal experimentation with the concept of
sovereignty with the hope that the advent of independence in the region, as upheld by the new
post-war international legal order based on Wilsonian notions of self-determination, would still
license imperialism through the uninterrupted flow of capital and oil extraction, ensuring its
continued operation in a subtle but legitimate manner. International law was therefore deployed in
the region for specific geopolitical purposes, in particular the maintenance of European influence,
imperial control and access to oil. Iraq was at the heart of this experiment. It would ultimately
become the only mandated territory that would be proclaimed as independent under the Mandate
process of international law. Of course, as this study will show, this ‘independence’ was a sham –
a mere figment that was maintained through the law. Only a deep historical analysis of the law in
the semi-periphery, and in Iraq in particular, can reveal how this figment was maintained, its
exploitative effects on the peoples of the region, and its implications for international law.
Antony Anghie for instance relies on a dichotomy of the periphery and the centre in his history of
international law without any reference to the semi-periphery at all. Antony Anghie. Imperialism,
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at
314.
22 The literature on the role of the semi-periphery in international legal history has only just begun to
emerge: See Umut Öszu, Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Arnulf Becker Lorca. Mestizo International Law, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Mai Taha. Nation and Class Subjectivity in International Law and
its Institutions in the Middle East (1919-1939), SJD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2015.
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The second argument of this study is that the history of international law must be
analyzed from a materialist perspective if one intends to uncover its connections with
capitalism. 23 Luis Eslava and Sundhja Pahuja have emphasized the need for a new
methodological turn towards an understanding of how international law operates in everyday life.
The point in this study is not merely to do this, but in addition to grasp its interconnected role in
the capitalist mode of production affecting the material lives of the peoples of the Third World. It
is for this reason necessary to incorporate the category and lens of class and its formation in this
analysis. This study is consequently a critique of the ‘cultural turn’ within critical international
legal scholarship, which mirrors the turn taken by scholars of subaltern studies in particular and
late post-colonialism in general.24 The materiality of international law emphasizes the manner by
which the peoples of the Third World were directly affected by the imperialism embedded in
international law and its institutions. It connects international law to the everyday lives of the
colonized. It emphasizes how international law and its institutions in the semi-periphery
contributed not only to state formation, but to the capitalist modes of production, which in turn
structured class formation.25
Consequently by inserting class as an analytic lens to understand the materiality of
international law, this study will elucidate how the unique capitalist spaces of production that
were produced by international law, its institutions and instruments in Iraq (the Mandate, the
Anglo-Iraq treaties, and the doctrines of sovereignty) violently impacted the Iraqi working class.
These workers would eventually unite and organize to fight against these constraints and the
violent effects of international law that they experienced directly in their workplaces and
everyday lives. My focus on labour as a site of agency is used here for several reasons, one of
which is that the Iraqi worker, similar to his counterparts in the region, at the specific conjuncture
of (early) decolonization and within these colonial and semi-colonial spaces allowed him or her to
experience the violent contradictions of capitalism, semi-colonialism and imperialism from a
Luis Eslava and Sundhja Pahuja. “Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of
International Law”, Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America - Verfassung und
Recht in Übersee (VRÜ), Vol. 45(2), 2012, at 195-221.
24 See Nathaniel Berman. Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and International Law
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), at 404; Martii Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia: The
Structure of International Legal Argument (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 7, 12.
25 A materialist understanding of international law has been undertaken by several critical
international legal scholars, the most prominent being China Mieville and his reinterpretation of the
work of Bolshevik legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis. China Mieville. Between Equal Rights: A Marxist
Theory of International Law, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006).
23
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unique location. 26 This consequently gave the worker a unique vantage point for struggle,
allowing him or her to connect his or her material conditions to imperialism. Tracing agency
through the question of labour therefore allows this study not to lose track of how agency moved
from these confined spaces of capitalist production to the wider spaces of anti-colonial nationalist
struggle, which were in turn transformed into a total rejection of the international legal order that
was imposed on Iraq. Hence, the imperialism and semi-colonialism of international law in Iraq
did have material effects on certain classes more than others, and scholars would be amiss to
ignore this fact. Putting it differently, the sovereignty granted to Iraq by international law, was a
(limited) sovereignty granted to a specific class. A focus on labour (and class analysis), then,
would clarify the constitutive connection between international law, imperialism, and capitalism
in a more grounded way.
Considering that this study is not only an international legal history of Iraq, but also a
labour history of Iraq (as it aims to connect the histories of agency of labour and anti-colonial
struggle to international legal history), it is not surprising that the second argument above is not
only aimed at international legal scholars who emphasize culture over social relations, but is also
a response to the principal arguments of the Subaltern Studies historians27 in their analyses of
labour in the history of India and Eastern societies in general. The history of the Iraqi working
class as presented in this study will demonstrate the continuing relevance of the concept of ‘class’
and will show that despite their tribal and peasant backgrounds, Iraqi workers formed (at certain
critical conjunctures) a unique class-consciousness and bonds of class solidarity in waging their
struggles against semi-colonization and imperialism. The subaltern approach, which discards
Marxist categories (such as class), and prefers a post-structuralist –cultural – notion of difference
(through its category of ‘the subaltern’) will be seen to be quite unsuitable for understanding the
history of Iraq and the Middle East. For culture on its own should never be the underpinnings of
any understanding of Iraqi (or Eastern) society.
Here I am referring to a narrow section of the Iraqi working-class, which is still a minority – the
more advanced sections of the working-class, who worked in the colossal industrial enterprises,
which were foreign-owned and administered. These were the most ‘proletariatized’ sections of the
working-class and are the focus of this study: the oil, port and railways workers. The point is that at
these strategic locations capitalism, semi-colonialism, and international law had a clearer
manifestation.
27The initial Subaltern group came together in the 1970s and consisted of Partha Chatterjee, David
Hardiman, Gyanendra Pandey, Sumit Sarkar, and Dipesh Chakrabarty. For good summaries of the
group’s history see: Ranajit Guha, “Introduction,” Selected Subaltern Studies (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988); Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Subaltern Studies and Postcolonial Historiography,”
Nepantla: Views from South 1:1 (2000), 9-32; David Ludden, “A Brief History of Subalternity,” in
Ludden, ed., Reading Subaltern Studies (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 1-39.
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The third underlying argument is that the imperialism and semi-colonialism of
international and transnational law in the semi-periphery would be better grasped by emphasizing
the significance of its spatiality, especially considering that the semi-periphery has continuously
been viewed as a highly geo-strategic location for imperial powers in the first place.28 Iraq’s
uniquely strategic location was one reason for the emergence of certain capitalist spaces and
enclaves that were essentially severed from the governing capacity of the Iraqi state. It was in a
way the existence of these spaces that characterized the (constricted) Iraqi semi-peripheral
sovereignty, which emerged out of the Mandate process. This study will not only explore these
spaces – namely the oil fields of Kirkuk, the railway workshops of Baghdad and the port of Basra
– in micro-histories, but also most significantly detail how Iraqi workers were affected by these
imperial and semi-colonial spaces, and in turn organized against them, at times producing their
own counter-hegemonic spaces. This argument of course relies on those scholars who have
developed economic analyses of space (and time) under capitalism, and who have maintained that
space is a social construct that must be taken seriously by disciplines other than geography.29
The point here, however, is to maintain the interconnection between international law,
capitalism, space and the human workers materially affected by these processes. As Tayyab
Mahmud has clarified in his work on indenture labour, ‘…international law [is] unavoidably
entangled with hierarchal positionings of bodies and spaces by global operations of capitalism.’30
It is however the specificity of the semi-peripheral Middle East that is most interesting to this
study as the region was itself a spatial construct, as we have seen above with the framework used
to draft Sykes-Picot with its underlying economic logic. It is therefore the semi-periphery’s

28

The connection between geography and imperialism must be made as well. It not merely the
drawing of lines that characterizes an imperialist action, but so is the production of maps. As Morag
Bell, Robin Butlin and Michael Heffernan have written, ‘the principal geographic tool was the map. By
representing the huge complexity of a particular physical and human landscape cartographically in a
single image, geographers provided the European imperial project with arguably its most potent
device.’ Morag Bell, Robin Butlin and Michael Heffernan (eds.). Geography and Imperialism 18201940, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), at 4.
29 See David Harvey. The Limits of Capital, (London: Verso, 1999); Harvey. Spaces of Global Capitalism:
A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development (London: Verso, 2006), and Henri Lefebvre. The
Production of Space, (London: Blackwell, 1978). Harvey spatializes Marx and demonstrates how
space is produced by and also shaped by capitalism. For an overall analysis of his work see, Eric
Sheppard. “David Harvey and Dialectical SpaceTime”, in Noel Castree and Derek Gregory (eds), David
Harvey: A Critical Reader, (New York: Blackwell, 2006).
30 Tayyab Mahmud. “Cheaper than a Slave: Indenture Labor, Colonialism, and Capitalism”, Whittier
Law Review, (2013), Vol. 34.2, 215-243, at 216.
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unique spatiality that is what makes it vital for imperialism. 31 It would only make sense then that
the corresponding juridical structures of international and transitional law that penetrated the
region, which is the concern of this study, would also approach it and manifest in such a spatial
manner. As will be shown, Iraqi (labour and anti-colonial) agency had to consequently use this
spatiality strategically in their organized struggles against imperialism and this is quite revealing.
Finally, the fourth and most central argument underlying this work is concerned with the
question of agency in international legal history. In other words, it is an attempt to answer the
following question: how could one write the history of the agency of the ordinary peoples of the
Third World into that of international law? It will be argued that a methodological approach
borrowed from Marxist theory of the international conjuncture needs to be inserted into critical
legal scholarship, so as to properly assess the question of agency in relation to international legal
transformation. This approach takes the ‘conjuncture’ as the starting point of any analysis of
agency, emphasizing that acts of resistance, especially revolutionary action, are contingent to the
international legal structures in question. The concept of the conjuncture refers to the
potentialities of action in the historical arena and it analyzes agency in relation to the structures in
question rather than in isolation from them. The point is that at certain conjunctures in history, the
specific alignment of political (domestic and international) forces and structures brings about
counter-hegemonic spaces where action becomes possible and where agency is more conducive
to historical transformation and development. Action and agency have more effect on historical
transformation in these cases. By making the correct connections, agency would be analyzed in
relation to these (historical) conjunctures and grasped more fully, while keeping the present
conjuncture in mind.
The argument here is a response to how some streams of Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) scholarship have theorized agency in their work by romanticizing the
plurality of law, its spontaneity and its non-violence. It is moreover a manifestation of the
‘cultural turn’ mentioned earlier. TWAIL analyses of anti-colonial agency or their preferred
notion of ‘resistance,’ discards revolutionary action, which has generally been violent, organized
and party-oriented. Such sanitization of the history of revolutionary agency also completely
ignores the fact that not every action is effective as it depends on its contingent relation to the
structure in question. It assumes that in the creative and cultural uses of law, movements could
Such as its significance in air communications, as a centre between East and West, the ‘route’ to
India, and of course its oil deposits.
31
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wage an effective struggle against imperialism and its manifestations in international law, at
anytime. This study of Iraqi labour agency, however, shows how structure and agency are in fact
interconnected, and so one must understand how a conjuncture containing revolutionary potential
of a counter-hegemonic space emerged in the first place – a conjuncture that allows a movement
room to wage an effective and organized struggle. To do this, a wider international perspective of
agency and action is needed, situating it more broadly in opposition to the (international, legal
and natural) unity of imperialism to understand why it is that targeting one location on the
imperial map at a certain time is effective, while another is not.

IV. Chapters’ overview
It is now appropriate to briefly outline the chapters of this study. Chapter 1 begins in rural
Iraq and describes how a system of semi-feudal capitalist production was established and
structured through the operations of British administrative techniques and imperial law. The
chapter looks at two interrelated narratives: the British invention of tribal customary law, and the
land tenure system that entrenched capitalist relations in Iraq. It illustrates how the British
imported certain legal colonial administrative techniques from their experience in India (and
elsewhere in the Empire) to secure their imperial interests and bolster the semi-colonial Iraqi
state. This created a fragmented positivist duality in Iraqi law, as the British institutionalized a
separate tribal legal system that was removed from the jurisdiction of the state. It will be shown
how this fragmentation in law served British interests and the Iraqi ruling class through the
consolidation of the semi-colonial Iraqi state. The second part of the chapter explores how
capitalist (semi-feudal) relations were established in Iraq through the British land policy and
corresponding legislation, which concentrated land into a small number of landowners,
transforming selected sheikhs into landlords, while their tribesmen became peasants and later
bonded serfs, and would ultimately flee to the cities to become wage earners. The main argument
of this chapter is therefore that the law played a significant role in capitalist transformation and
the structuring of underdevelopment in Iraq.
Chapter 2 moves to the city of Baghdad to explore the early history of the labour
movement, in particular the first such organization: the Jamʿīyat aṣḥāb al- ṣināʿa. The purpose of
the chapter is to contextualize the history of the Labour Law of 1936, arguing that it was passed
by the Iraqi state partly as a concession to pacify the working class and its movement due to their
first experiments in strike action in 1930 and 1931. It will be shown that despite the fact that the
11

Labour Law was to become merely black ink on paper, not to be applied for the next twenty-two
years until after revolution, both the early and later communist-led labour movement would
appropriate its language and use it as a reference point in making their demands in nearly every
strike to come. The main argument here is that the law – even a dead law of a semi-colonial state
– was a useful (but limited) tool to advance a counter-hegemonic struggle as it provided a
language for the workers to advance their demands.
Chapter 3 details the role of international law in the formation of the Iraqi state and the
making of a unique Iraqi sovereignty out of the Mandate process in Geneva – what I call ‘semiperipheral sovereignty’, which I define as a sovereignty that is constructed for geopolitical
purposes pertaining to the semi-peripheral region of the Middle East, in particular its economic
exploitation and especially to (legally) extract and transport Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. The
chapter begins by exploring the principles behind the Mandate system, moving to an examination
of the significance of the ‘A’ mandates. It then attempts to explain how British legal practices,
such as treaty-making, were used to reconcile certain aspects of international law, constructing
Iraqi independence and its sovereignty in 1932 through the ratification of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq
Treaty – which was to become the legal manifestation of imperialism in Iraq throughout the
Hashemite period.
The central argument of this chapter is that only by tracing the economic dimensions of
this semi-peripheral sovereignty could one grasp its relevance for the region. To do this, I analyze
how the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) in Geneva, who were making
international law in their sessions, reached the conclusion that Iraq was ready for independence. I
explore the contradictions in their reasoning, especially concerning the economic principle of
economic equality, also known as the ‘open door,’ which was meant to prevent monopolization
and exploitation. The Iraqi oil concessions, however, were intentionally differentiated and
separated from the discussion of political sovereignty. It will be shown that the economic aspects
of Iraqi sovereignty and its effects on the region are to be found in the PMC’s deliberations on the
oil pipeline agreements that dealt with the effects of the oil pipelines on the mandates of Palestine
and Syria. These discussions contained further contradictory logic in that the open door principle
was circumvented as oil was allotted exceptional status under international law. This legal
reasoning was necessary to legitimate the operations of imperialism in the region.
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Chapter 3 then shows how the pipeline agreements were intimately connected to the Iraqi
oil concession, and in turn, how the oil concession was intimately linked to Iraqi semi-peripheral
sovereignty. Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty would be accepted as a part of international law
until the unremitting struggle waged by the Iraqi people (first manifested in the 1948 Wathba
uprising) broke its fetters after the 1958 July Revolution, leading to the unequivocal rejection of
this legal figment on the international stage through the Iraqi contribution to the drafting of the
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
Chapters 4 and 5 are mini-histories that describe the spaces that were intrinsically linked
to capitalism and its modes of production, and depict the conditions of the workers who lived and
worked there. These imperial and semi-colonial enclaves were central to the operations of
capitalism and imperialism in Iraq: the oil fields of Kirkuk, the Iraq State Railways concentrated
in the Schālchīyyah workshops in Baghdad, and the port of Basra. I will begin with a description
of the legal structures that governed these spaces – through the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty and the
oil concession– which detached them from the Iraqi state. The oil fields were governed by the
British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) under a concessionary agreement. The company
was allotted wide discretionary powers to manage the space of the oil fields that it had significant
economic impact on the city of Kirkuk and its surroundings as a whole. The railways and the port
were semi-autonomous enclaves governed by British administrators. These chapters are therefore
meant to show how international law, transnational law and imperial law produced these spaces
and how they directly affected the lives of Iraqi workers, while describing how labour agency
operated to free the workers from its socio-economic constraints.
Chapter 4 describes the miserable conditions of the workers of the oil fields, where
colonial relations were maintained even after independence. I go on to describe how the workers
united to form a trade union with the guidance of the Iraqi Communist Party and organized
massive strikes against the company in 1946 (centered around the Gāwūrbāghī gardens) and later
in the K3 pumping station in 1948. I show how these strikes were violently crushed through the
complicity of the company, the British Embassy and the Iraqi state. I argue that the legal
arrangements at the intersection of the concession and semi-peripheral sovereignty permitted the
company, British officials and local police to collude to use violence against the workers in
Gāwūrbāghī. Iraqi law and justice were unable to penetrate the imperial concessionary space
governed by the oil company to hold anyone accountable for the cold-blooded murder of workers.
The chapter ends with a detailed analysis of the K3-pumping station strike (a major part of the
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Wathba uprising), whereby the workers used spatiality as strategy, disrupting the oil pipelines on
the imperial map of oil extraction to assert their material demands.
Chapter 5 details the struggle of the railway and port workers to improve their conditions
and challenge the legal structures of semi-colonialism that governed their workplaces. This
chapter illustrates the organizational strategies and tactics used by these workers in forming
independent trade unions to struggle against semi-colonial legality and for the implementation of
the labour law, waging organized strike actions in 1945, 1946 and 1948. I show how the Iraqi
state through the advice of British labour experts responded to these strikes by undermining the
workers’ efforts, but also by promoting certain social and labour reforms (such as replacing their
independent trade unions with workers’ committees) with the aim of upholding British semicolonial hegemony rather than allow for real structural change. The British labour experts’ views
of workers and trade unionism in Iraq will be explored through a detailed analysis of British
labour reports. The chapter argues that workers used the law inventively as a rhetorical and
strategic tool against the semi-colonial order, while British experts devised legal reforms as a way
to undercut any real structural change in Iraqi society.
Chapter 6 is an examination of the violence underlying semi-peripheral sovereignty. It
details how the Iraqi state used criminal law, martial law and the doctrine of emergency to crush
any form of dissent. After delving into the historical origins of the doctrine of emergency, the
chapter argues that the Iraqi state used this colonial method to institute a de facto permanent state
of emergency after the 1952 Intifāda, and maintain its hegemony and the semi-colonial order. It
was to become a technique of semi-colonial governance in Iraq. The doctrine of emergency was
ingrained into the institutions of the Iraqi state and the constitution itself. Furthermore, draconian
criminal legislation, such as the amendment to the Baghdad Penal Code of 1938, was analogously
used to suppress any form of dissent or any call for change. The military courts relied on the 1938
amendment to imprison thousands of protestors and strikers, while communist leaders were
executed after the Wathba uprising. This history of repression and the role of law in it will be
recounted. The chapter ends with the debates in and out of parliament, especially focusing on the
work of the renowned Iraqi legal scholar Hussein Jamīl revealing the limitations of his social
democratic liberalism. The point here is not only to show that semi-peripheral sovereignty and the
doctrine of emergency were two sides of the same coin, but also to emphasize that it was only by
defeating the entire semi-colonial order that the state of emergency finally ended and not through
the safeguarding of the rule of law per se.
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Finally, Chapter 7 is a recounting of the massive 1948 Wathba uprising, initiated by
workers and students and encompassing a wide stratum of Iraqi society, who came out to the
streets of Baghdad to protest the imposition of a revised treaty between Iraq and Britain. The
proposed revision of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty was meant to redefine the semi-colonial Iraqi
order to make it consistent with the newly emerging international order and the UN Charter.
However, the provisions of the revised Portsmouth Treaty in fact entrenched Iraq further into
imperialist control. This chapter is concerned with understanding how agency could be analyzed
and written into international legal history through a close analysis of the Wathba uprising. After
assessing the contents of the Treaty, the narrative moves to the streets to explain how workers and
students organized and just over three weeks successfully prevented the imposition of this treaty
before the uprising was violently crushed.
The central argument of this chapter is that the Wathba was a manifestation of a
conjuncture against the imperialism of international law. As mentioned earlier the argument will
be presented within the historical context of the Wathba to emphasize that critical international
legal scholars, especially TWAIL scholars, must undertake conjunctural analyses to grasp how
agency plays a role in international legal transformation. The Wathba is situated into the wider
history of decolonization in the Third World. The argument in this chapter therefore brings the
entire historical narrative of this study together. The oil, port and railway workers utilized their
previous experiences in strike action and sabotage within their confined workplaces for a wider
anti-colonial struggle. Organized people’s coordination committees sprang up. The workers’
consciousness of the connection between their material conditions and imperialism was conveyed
by the Iraqi masses during the Wathba, who displayed a clear understanding of how imperialism
functions through law and how law obscures reality.
Through their very actions, the Iraqi urban poor, students and peasants rejected the entire
semi-colonial order, in particular the doctrine of semi-peripheral sovereignty, denoting their
demand to control their own destinies. The Wathba would become the seed of the July Revolution
of 1958, as every uprising after it would call for its renewal until the revolutionary overthrow of
the semi-colonial order by the Free Officers a decade later.
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V. A note on sources & the limits of writing a legal & labour history of the Middle East
It should be mentioned that this historical work was the product of the painstaking
weaving together of the fragmented sources on Iraq. In other words, it was the best that could be
done considering the circumstances and so a lot of questions remain due to the problem of the
fragmentation and unavailability of sources on the region. The extensive archival research that
was conducted for this international legal and labour history of Iraq include the following: British
records from the National Archives at Kew; the company records of the Iraq Petroleum Company
located in the BP Archive at Warwick University’s Modern Records Centre in Coventry; the
reports of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations; and the Muḥātharāt
Majlis al-Nūwwāb (Iraqi parliamentary records) held at the Nami Yafet Memorial Library of the
American University of Beirut in Lebanon. Despite visiting other archives, such as the ILO
Archives in Geneva and the US National Archives in Maryland, I did not end up using these
records for various reasons. A future book project would certainly refer to these sources to paint a
more complete picture. To reconstruct Iraqi labour history, I relied on a variety of sources, in
particular memoirs of communist, nationalist and labour leaders; working class, nationalist and
communist newspapers (especially the communist al-Qāʿida and the social democratic Ṣawt alAhāli); communist pamphlets; Iraqi Marxist journals, such as the cultural ICP journal, al-Thaqāfa
al-Jadīda (‘The New Culture’) held at Yale University Library; and selected records from the
British Communist Party Archives, amongst others.
It is unfortunate that I was unable to go to Baghdad to delve into the Iraqi National
Archives, due to the security situation and the difficulty of getting access in the first place. The
possibility of conducting oral interviews was also regrettably grim, since a significant number of
the participants in the labour and communist movements of the period (if not executed by the
Baʿath party in 1963) have either long passed or were unable to meet for health reasons. I did,
however, get a chance to briefly correspond with several old Iraqi communists, including, Ara’
Khājādwr, ʿAzīz Sbāhī, and Ghānim Ḥamdūn. They have all since passed. I am ever so grateful
for their input and generous guidance.

Turning from the historiography of international law to that of labour, it has been said
that ‘it is nearly impossible’ to find the necessary primary sources to build a labour history of
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Iraq.32 Although it has certainly been quite difficult to write this history, I do not think that the
mere fragmentation of the primary sources should prevent scholars from at least attempting to
weave together a labour history of the region. Although this study is not a classic labour study, its
focus on international law and its institutions allows Iraqi labour history to be situated in a novel
way. Such a methodological shift in the study of labour could be argued to be in itself an original
contribution to the overall literature and labour historiography of the Middle East. Still, I hope
that I have contributed in some small way in weaving together a historical study of labour in Iraq
for future generations of Middle East scholars to build on.

Kevin M. Jones. “Unmaking the Middle Eastern working classes: labour and the politics of
historiography”, Social History, 2015, Vol. 40, No. 2, 145-156; at 150
32
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Chapter 1: The Semi-Colonial Uses of Positivist Duality in Law or How Law
Underdeveloped Iraq

[I]n Iraq the rule of law was the rule of two laws…one… for an ordinary civilized nation…the other for armed savages
given up… to the barbaric concepts of honour. 33
~ Caractacus
We have a bizarre law…called the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation … created by the occupiers… for the
purpose [of furthering] the politics of occupation…35
~ Maki Jamil
Oh Planter of fruit, full of hope for reward
Abandon your effort for its fruit is sadness
Uproot it, for the delicious fruit is forbidden
For the planter and permissible only for the strong.37
~ Ahmad al-Safi al-Najafi

I. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the role of the law in the underdevelopment of
Iraq. How was a system of ‘semi-feudal’ capitalist production established in modern Iraq? 39 The
history of Iraq and its colonization has generally been approached under the guise of different
broad economic theories, while the role of law in the narrative has been marginalized or entirely
Caractacus [pseudonym of Norman Daniel]. Revolution in Iraq: An Essay in Comparative Public
Opinion (London: Gollancz, 1959), at 37.
35 Makī Jamīl. Tʿlīqāt ʿla Nithām Diʿāwy al-‘shāʿir wa Tʿdīlātahu [A commentary on the Tribal
Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation and its amendments], (Baghdād: Matbaʿa al-Karakh, 1935), at
120-121.
37 Ahmad al-Sāfī al-Najafī, al-Amwāj (Bayrūt: Dar al-‘llm li al-Malayīn, 1961), 8-13.
39 The concept of ‘semi-feudalism’ is used in this study merely to illustrate that certain characteristics
that are not generally compatible with the capitalist mode of production (such as unfree labour
relations) could still exist in harmony with capitalism. It is therefore not meant to suggest that Iraq
was in ‘transitory’ state of pre-capitalism that was disrupted by semi-feudalism. On the contrary, the
concept of ‘semi-feudalism’ in Iraq suggests that capitalism could exist as such with certain
contradictory forms of ‘semi-feudalism’. As Jairus Banaji has argued, ‘…there might be historical
situations where in the absence of a specifically capitalist mode of production on the national scale,
capitalist relations of exploitation may nonetheless be widespread and dominant.’ J. Banaji,
“Capitalist Domination and the Small Peasantry: The Deccan Districts in the Late Nineteenth
Century”, in Theory As History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation, (Chicago: Haymarket,
2010), at 282. For an extensive critique of the concept of ‘semi-feudalism’ and its corresponding
thesis and an overview of the literature see, Tom Brass. “Rural Labour in Agrarian Transitions: The
Semi-Feudal Thesis Revisited” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2002), 456-473.
33
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ignored. The law however was a crucial instrument in the structuring and instituting of the
economic, social and power relations that emerged to constitute the modern Iraqi state. The
underlying claim here is therefore to emphasize that the law is not merely a ‘superstructure’ that
should not be taken as seriously as the economic ‘base,’ to use one Marxist terminology.
Although I am not claiming that law determined these economic relations, I am suggesting that it
played an essential role in the overall process that tends to be overlooked. My argument
concerning the law in the colonies (or more particularly the semi-colonies) will be made in the
context of two interrelated historical narratives in Iraq: the British tribal policy and the invention
of customary law on the one hand, and the land tenure system on the other. The British and the
Iraqi state used the law and certain administrative techniques to impose a (so-called) modern
‘semi-feudal’ system, which was advantageous to and served British imperial interests and the
capitalist world economy in general. This process led to a significant rearrangement of the socioeconomic structures of Iraqi society, as well as its tribal composition. Traditional property
relations were significantly altered, while the invention of customary law through the
institutionalization of a separate tribal legal system ensured the transformation of the social and
power relations of the tribes in Iraq, and the entrenchment of capitalism in the region.

II. The ‘invention’ of the customary law of the tribes of Iraq
The tribes of Mesopotamia have been the source of romantic fascination of many a
European traveler at least since the nineteenth century. It was no doubt the orientalist views
chronicled by these travellers of the bedouin that influenced the formation of tribal policy when
the British found themselves in control of this region in 1916-1917. Furthermore, the British had
to improvise in circumstances of limited financial assistance from London, while considering the
military weakness of the new Iraqi state that was run by a small number of ex-Sharifian40 officers
with the newly selected King Faisal in Baghdad.41 The British administration and later the Iraqi
state had no real control over its rural areas, which made up the majority of the country - its
borders and frontiers controlled by various heavily armed tribes. This multitude of nomadic and
The ex-Sharifian Officers were those officers who participated in the Arab Revolt against the
Ottoman Empire during World War I (1916-1918) and were led by the Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali. They
would later play a prominent role in the establishment of the Iraqi state. A ‘Sharif’ is one who claims
descendance from the Prophet Mohammad and holds a position in society on this basis. The term
commonly used in Iraq is ‘Sayyid’.
41 Hanna Batatu. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old
Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba‘thists and Free Officers, (London: Saqi,
2004), at 88.
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semi-nomadic tribal sections and confederations, which previously had an almost fluid character
in that they had been in constant movement throughout their existence, needed to be brought
under the purview of British administrative control and eventually Iraqi state control in an
efficient but inexpensive manner. As will be shown, this was done through several approaches
and strategies whereby the law eventually played a significant role. Although it is important to
realize that the ‘tribes’ were not homogenous in any way, but rather made up of a diverse
nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled groups that lived in differing topologies and environments –
whether it was from Kūt and ʿAmārah on the Tigris river to Muntafiq, or Dīwānīyah and Hillah in
the central and lower Euphrates. In that sense, one must avoid essentializing the ‘tribe’ qua tribe
as they were too diverse. So, although it would be wiser to study the specificity of a particular
tribe in question before making any wide generalizations, it is still necessary to make some useful
general observations about tribal organization for the sake of analytic argument, while
recognizing their heterogeneity and avoiding essentialism.42
Samira Haj has argued that the very dichotomy between the urban townsmen and rural
tribesmen that is so prevalent in Iraqi historiography was in itself an essentialism that is
misleading as the two have always overlapped and interacted throughout their existence.43 In fact,
the tension between tribal and state organization was much more intricate and dynamic than is
generally perceived; this has previously been understood by Ibn Khaldūn44 who emphasized the
cyclical character of early Islamic history, whereby tribalization and settlement were processes in
constant alternation and flux.45 As Richard Tapper has explained, (centralized) ‘government
control is clearly an important determinant of tribal political organization, but it is not simply an
external force; its impact depends on how it is internalized by the tribespeople and how they react
to it.’46 The tribe may for example internalize certain aspects of state centralization – ‘elements of
Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900-1963, (New York: SUNY Press, 1997), at 13.
See Samira Haj. “The problems of tribalism: the case of nineteenth-century Iraqi history,” Social
History, (1991) Vol. 16: No. 1, pp.45-58.
44 Ibn Khaldūn, ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn Muhammad (d.1406). An influential Arab historian,
historiographer, and social philosopher. He held numerous public positions in Tunis, and moved to
Cairo in 1392, where he taught and served as a judge until his death. His major work is the
Muqaddimah (Introduction to history), which traces his thoughts on sedentary and desert
populations, dynasties, and the caliphate. In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldūn stated that he had
established a new science, ʿilm al-ʿumran (the science of social organization); he is accordingly
regarded as the father of sociology. See Oxford Dictionary of Islam.
45 See Saleh Haider, “Land Problems of Iraq”, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1942),
at 22.
46 Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in
the Middle East,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the
Middle East (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), at 67
42
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state could be found within every tribe’ and vice versa.47 This as we shall see was precisely what
happened with the tribal policy that was institutionalized by the British administration. Ironically,
despite its intention of ‘preserving’ customary law and tribal tradition, this British policy turned
out to have somewhat invented something unique instead through the construction of a separate
tribal legal system that was sanctioned by the state and its institutions.
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the British tribal policy and its implications, it
is necessary to briefly explain the character of tribal organization – its basic structures and
institutions. The tribe, as the only socially organized unit in the desert and rural countryside,
functioned as a necessary safeguard for the nomad-tribesmen and the settled cultivator-peasant
alike. This was generally the case before the Ottomans attempted to strengthen the central
government based in the cities, intentionally breaking down the power of the tribes and their
cohesion in the late nineteenth century. Generally, under the tribal system the tribe held land
communally and although the Shaikh divided parts of the tribal land provisionally among the
families of the tribe, private ownership was not absolute.48 The division of land was done
according to certain principles and criteria that ensured that the land would always remain within
the tribal dīrah.49 Therefore, despite the existence of certain forms of private property, depending
on the shaikh’s (provisional and rotating) assignment of land, and although the tribesman’s
attachment to his tribal dīrah was strong enough that he was willing to die to defend it, he lacked
any sense of individual ownership of any particular plot of land in the dīrah.50 It is in this way
that the idea of absolute private property, including profit was alien to the tribe.51 I will return to
the complicated question of land in more detail in the second part of this chapter.
An important point that needs to be emphasized early on is that the migration of tribes
from Northern Central Arabia (Najd) or present-day Saudi Arabia eastward or southward into
Iraq and the coastal Arabian Gulf was a relatively recent phenomenon that could be traced to the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Hala Fattah has shown, certain clans and tribes
47Ibid,

at 68.
supra, ft. 45, at 88.
49 Doreen Warriner. Land and Poverty in the Middle East, (1948) (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs), at 18. The dīrah was an area of land which was ‘habitually occupied’ by the
tribe or which was ‘its preserve’ as long as it could militarily defend it.
50Haider, supra, ft.45, at 316. Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 71. As Paul Dresch writes, “The tribal term dīra,
in keeping with its Bedouin origins, conveyed more of a sense of the domain over which the tribe
exercised sovereign rights rather than exclusive ownership”; Paul Dresch, Tribes, History and
Government in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989), at 343.
51Batatu, supra, ft.41, at 73.
48Haider,
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dissociated themselves from their traditional tribal confederations whether by force or for
political or socioeconomic circumstances.52 Migrating, they re-formed themselves anew and
regrouped into more powerful tribal configurations in Iraq. In that sense, it should be kept in mind
that tribal custom in Iraq was certainly not in any way an ‘ancient’ tradition as the British
believed it to be, but rather partly formed out of a modern historical process of tribal
reconfigurations and movements. It was no wonder that the renowned Iraqi sociologist ʿAlī alWardī argued that this historical process was the root of a ‘cultural paradox’ that shaped the Iraqi
personality, and explained the common Iraqi’s general ambivalence to state authority.53 al-Wardī
argued that the Iraqi psyche contained an internalized tension between tribal and urban modes
that produced a ‘schism of the Iraqi personality’.54 This ‘schism’ would operate depending on the
circumstances – in times of war, Iraqi society reverted to tribal values of ʿasabīyya,55 while in
times of peace sedentary values prevailed. As I will detail below, it could be argued that the
British, consequently, took advantage of this ‘schism’ or duality in the ‘nature’ of Iraqi society,
and it was for this reason somewhat a effective strategy of colonial and semi-colonial control.
The position of the shaikh of a tribe was attached to his office rather than his person. In
other words, the sheikh himself was merely considered primus inter pares (‘the first among
equals’) with neither privileges nor authority.56 The shaikh’s responsibility was vast and included
conducting the tribe’s relations with outsiders, the declaration and undertaking of wars, and
dealings with (central) governments. He was also responsible for the maintenance of social
functions57 within the tribe, including the extension of hospitality in his mudhif (guesthouse) to
the tribesmen, which is considered the center of political deliberations, and where he exercises his

52Hala

Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf 1745-1900, (New York: SUNY,
1997), at 28-29. One major reason was the birth and spread of Wahhabi revivalist movement in the
late eighteenth century, which attempted to forcefully bring into submission townsmen and
tribesmen to the Wahhabi ‘aqida (credo), forcing certain tribes to migrate.
53‘Ali al-Wardī. Shakhṣīyat al-Fard al-ʿIraqi [The Nature of the Iraqi Personality]. (Amman: Dar alWarrāq, 2009), at 44-45.
54 Ibid.
55 ʿAsabiyya is a term that refers to ‘social solidarity with an emphasis on group consciousness,
cohesiveness and unity’. It was first coined and popularized in Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah. See The
Oxford Dictionary of Islam.
56 Clinton Bailey. Bedouin Law from Sinai & the Negev: Justice without Government. (2009) (New
Haven: Yale University Press) at 14. This is the reason that the shaikh traditionally viewed his office
as a burden as the proverb goes, ‘a shaikh is rag on which everyone wipes his dirty hands’.
57 A third or even half of the cultivated area of the dīrah was set aside as revenue for the mudhīf so
that the shaikh could discharge his functions. Ibid.
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judicial function of resolving disputes amongst his tribespeople. 58 Robert Fernea has
characterized the tribe as a ‘jural community,’ whereby the mudhif of the shaikh is the ‘center of
jural activities’: ‘[i]ndividual crimes which conspicuously violated the moral code of all
tribesmen…might result in physical punishment as described by the shaykh and ajāwīd (or
elders) of the tribe, or in banishment of the defendant and the kinsmen who supported him’.59 The
notion of justice for the bedouin is one that emphasizes the notion of ‘right’ as one of entitlement.
When an injustice has occurred a tribesman generally has a right to rectify that injustice
within the context of his tribe’s customary law. So, if murder occurs for instance the tribesman of
the victim could enforce his right by killing the murderer or the murderer’s clansmen with
impunity.60 In bedouin eyes, the restoration of justice could only occur in this way within the
difficult and dangerous environment of the desert where there is no central authority to protect
him. As for the settled tribesman not living in a desert environment, it was the restoration of the
honour of his tribe, which remained the paramount function of a vendetta. The bedouin concept
of justice therefore should be understood in relation to both the importance of security and
deterrence in a desert environment, and the importance of honour in tribal culture. It is in this way
that ‘bedouin law…seeks to deter violations by endorsing the principle of mutual liability,
according to which every man is accountable for the actions of his clansmen and is subject to
punishment for them.’61
The perfect example of this is that of the settlement of a blood-feud by giving a woman
of one tribe to another, what is referred to as faṣl. Although a cash payment is sometimes
permitted, it is the latter that is usually what ‘herald(s) real peace between the disputing
segments’ as the offspring of these marriages is real proof that the feud has truly been settled.62
The point to be made here is that while certain actions of tribesmen could be conceived as
Kamil Mahdi. State and Agriculture in Iraq: modern development, stagnation and the impact of oil
(2000), at 73. Shakir Salim writes that the mudhif serves as a ‘social center, political conference
chamber, and a court of justice’. Salim. Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta (1962) (University of
London: Athlon Press), at 72-82. It has been described elsewhere as akin to a ‘parliament’ for
tribesmen. al-Barāzī, Nurī Khalīl. al-Badāwa wa al-Istiqrār fī al-ʿIraq [The Bedouin and Settlement in
Iraq], (Cairo: Mʿhad Bihūth wa al-Dirāsāt al-ʿArabīya, 1969), at 100.
59 Robert Fernea. Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority Among El Shabana of Southern
Iraq, (1970) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), at 93
60 Bailey, supra, ft. 56, at 16, 17.
61 Ibid, at 18.
62 Fernea, supra, ft. 59, at 112. It is usually only after bearing a child from such a marriage that the
woman could return to her family if she so desires, although this is not always the case as it depends
on the custom of the particular tribe.
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evidence of ‘lawlessness’ in the deserts, this is an oversimplification and an incorrect
characterization, as the tribal system in fact comprised an intricate and effective system of
customary law, which performed specific social functions. Here, one could also refer to the
practice of raiding in the desert, which should not be confused with theft, for the bedouin resorts
to the collective act of raiding only as a means of sustenance in an environment that ordinarily
lacks rainfall, drinking wells and pastures. Raiding is therefore not equivalent to thieving or even
war, but rather is a part of the bedouin’s traditional way of life.63

III. The Tribal Criminal & Civil Disputes Regulation: its origins, juridical characteristics &
wide implications

The British approach to dealing with the tribes of Iraq was the complete reversal of the
detribalization policy of the Ottomans that was aimed at the destruction of the cohesiveness of the
tribes, with an attempt to render them under the control of the Ottoman state.64 The British
Political Officers sought to find the appropriate balance of ‘internal political forces’ by
consolidating a firm connection between the Sharīfian ex-officers running the state and certain
selected tribal sheikhs.65 They therefore began rebuilding the tribal system from the outset of
their occupation, selecting ‘official’ shaikhs, who were made responsible for peace and order in
their tribes to ensure the protection of British interests lines of communication and property.66
This strategy was based on the notion that entire tribes could be controlled through the influence
of their shaikhs. As Attiyah illustrates, ‘[i]n the long run, both policies [British and Ottoman] had
similar consequences – a schism in tribal institutions – but they arose from different sources: the
British alienated the Shaykh from his tribe, while the Turks multiplied the number of Shaykhs to
the detriment of tribal unity and solidarity…the Turks… tried to alleviate the position of his

Fuad Baali. Relation of the People to the Land in Southern Iraq, (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1966), at 5.
64 Albertine Jwaideh. “Tribalism and Modern Society: Iraq, a Case Study” in R.M. Savory, ed.,
Introduction to Islamic Civilization, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), at 165.
65 See David Pool. “From Elite to Class: The Transformation of Iraqi Political Leadership,” in Abbas
Kelidar (ed.), The Integration of Modern Iraq (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 63-87. Pool refers to this
as the ‘great bargain.’ (at 81). Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 88, 91.
66 Phillip Ireland. Iraq: A Study in Political Development (New York, The McMillian Co, 1938), at 94.
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tribesmen as against that of his Shaykh, but the British reversed the emphasis by upholding the
Shaykh’s interest against those of his tribesmen’.67
To institutionalize their policy, the British drafted and imposed the (legal) instrument of
the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR), extending it into ordinary state law
in 1924, and enshrining it in the constitution. The TCCDR was first issued during the British
occupation of southern Iraq in 1916. It was, in other words, initially drawn up as an instrument of
colonial administration and pacification, yet ultimately, ‘what may have begun as an
administrative expedient ended as political necessity’.68 The TCCDR constructed a separate
tribal legal system that was severed from civil and criminal courts of the state. The jurisdiction of
the national courts was therefore institutionally restricted. The TCCDR guaranteed that the
selected shaikh would dispense the administration of justice amongst his tribespeople according
to customary law and tribal tradition. 69 It therefore maintained ‘the tribal law as the law of the
tribal land,’ while ‘enhancing the jural role of the sheikh,’ reinforcing primacy in his person
rather than his office.70 The TCCDR defined a tribesman broadly as follows: ‘“Tribesman”
means a member of a generally recognized tribe or tribal section which has been accustomed to
settle its dispute by recourse to the arbitration of elders or shaikhs and not be recourse to the
Courts of the land as ordinarily constituted.’71 The authority of the selected shaikh (who now
gained political and economic power through tax subsides, land and seats in parliament) was now
dependent on British colonial power and particularly the Iraqi state rather than his tribesmen. This
had a tremendous transformative effect on the social and economic relations between the shaikhs
and their tribesmen, eventually opening the door for the institutionalization of capitalistic
exploitation and accumulation in rural Iraq and as will be shown the TCCDR transformed the
very customary laws that were intended to be ‘preserved’.
Before turning to the wide implications of the TCCDR in Iraq in more detail, it is
important for this analysis to trace the origins of this piece of legislation and colonial instrument.
The TCCDR could be directly traced to the administrative methods developed by Sir Robert
Ghassan Atiyyah. Iraq: 1908-1921. A Socio-Political Study, (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research
and Publishing, 1973), at 235.
68 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 88.
69 The shaikh would in turn select supposedly ‘neutral’ tribal elders or ʿarifeh who are familiar with
customary law. These elders were close advisors of the shaikh and so were not actually ‘neutral’.
70 Pool, supra, ft. 65, at 78.
71 TNA. Lt. Col. E.B. Howell, Revenue Secretary to the Civil Commissioner, “Land Revenue Demand:
Theory and Practice,” Administrative Report on the working of the Revenue Dept. for the year 1919;
CO 696/2, Iraq Administrative Reports, 1919.
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Sandeman in the North-West provinces (present-day Baluchistan –in Pakistan- and Afghanistan)
in the late nineteenth century, which were aimed at the pacification and in turn protection of
British interests in the frontiers surrounding India.72 Sandeman’s methods (which were first
successfully used in 1876) were not necessarily unprecedented, but were still a unique synthesis
of approaches of indirect rule applied elsewhere in the Empire.73 These were based on some basic
premises: first, know and befriend the tribes. Second, adhere to tribal custom as much as possible
and work with tribal leaders and chiefs. Third, bind the tribe to the government by payment for
tribal service. Finally, peaceful methods must prevail, although overwhelming force must be used
when necessary.74
In this way, Sandeman hoped to ‘knit the frontier tribes into our imperial system and
make their interests as ours… [so as to] certainly depend upon them being on our side’.75
Sandeman, therefore, believed in preserving and rebuilding the tribal system in Baluchistan that
he saw as being in decay. The aim was that by appealing to the tribes’ own customs and
traditions, they would perceive themselves to be under their own rule, and as long as this served
British imperial interests, this administrative system would cheaply run itself.76 As the Viceroy of
India, Lord Curzon once declared in a speech made in honour of Sandeman, ‘I want them [the
native leaders] to unite with the British Raj in the settlement of their feuds and in defense of their
own country… I want them to become … the trusted soldiers and feudatories of the Great Queen,
and to realize, that while there is no use of fighting us, because we are so strong as always to
defeat them in the end, their religion, their traditions, even their independence are most safe when
they enter into friendly relations with the British government…’ 77
These basic principles were indeed considered to be useful for other parts of the Empire
and were in turn diffused in such a manner. In a lecture given to The Royal Central Asian Society
in 1932, Colonel C.E. Bruce, argued for the universalization of the Sandeman policy, which he
saw as a method that should be put into practice around the world: ‘That Sandeman’s policy is
See T.H. Thorton, Col. Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier. A Memoir,
with Selections from His Correspondence and Official Writings (London: John Murray, 1895).
73 Approaches of ‘indirect rule’ include that of Joseph Gallieni in Senegal, Tonkin and Madagascar and
Fredrick Lugard in Asia and Africa.
74 Tripodi, Christian. Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the
North-West Frontier 1877-1947 (London: Ashgate, 2011), at 57-58.
75 R.G. Sandeman, Memorandum entitled Relations with Frontiers Tribes. See Thorton, supra, at 356359.
76 Tripodi, supra, ft. 74, at 58.
77 See George Curzon. Lord Curzon in India: being a selection from his speeches as viceroy and
governor-general of India, 1898-1905, (London: Macmillan and Co, 1906) at 411.
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equally applicable to every tribesman whether Baluch, Pathan, Arab, Kurd, or African; whether
he lives in Indo-China, Burma, Morocco, Tripoli, Aden, the Sudan, or East West, South Africa, is
I think, absolutely proved from the fact that every colonial administrator has, wittingly or
unwittingly, taken him as their example or followed in his footsteps.’78
The pillar of Sandeman’s system was based on the development and reliance on certain
customary legal structures and institutions, namely the tribal councils (also known as ‘council of
elders’) or jirgas. These jirgas, which were institutionalized in law under the Frontier Crimes
Regulation of 1887 (and later revised in 1901)79, ensured that the tribes were governed under the
tribe’s own legal customs (or ‘tribal usage’). Moreover, the jirgas did not apply the rules of
evidence of a colonial court (generally derived from British law), and were completely separated
from the general legal system of the colonial state. 80 The Regulation reserved the Deputy
Commissioner’s power to overturn a decision issued by a jirga, retaining the colonial
administrator as ‘ultimate arbiters of tribal tradition.’81 Nevertheless, almost all decisions of the
jirgas were beyond the right of appeal to ordinary courts.82
Marsden and Hopkins have argued that the Sandeman system and its implications shaped
a ‘traditionalizing modernity,’ which rather than integrate and ‘civilize’ the tribesman of the
frontiers as their imperial Indian counterparts, sought to ‘contain, conserve and traditionalize’
them in separation of the colonial state.83 Their argument goes on to describe these methods
(including the use of law in this context) as a form of ‘frontier governmentality,’ which created
order by excluding the tribesman from the laws and norms of the colonial state; administrating
rather than enforcing difference as defined by the colonial state: ‘Thus the ethnographic [colonial]
state was about control through division while frontier governmentality was about order through
exclusion.’84 What is interesting for our purposes is the fact that these administrative and colonial
78Colonel

C.E. Bruce. “The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-day,” (1932) in
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 19:1, 45-67, at 60.
79 This regulation was amended several times 1887 and 1901.
80 Sir William Barton. India’s North-West Frontier, (London: John Murray, 1939), at 59.
81 See Marsden, Magnus and Hopkins, Benjamin. Fragments of the Afghan Frontier (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011) at 69-70.
82 Willard Berry, Aspects of the Frontiers Crimes Regulation in Pakistan, (Duke University
Commonwealth-studies Center, Monograph number three, 1966), at 40.
83 Marsden and Hopkins, supra, ft. 81, at 63. The ideological underpinnings of the preservation of
traditional and tribal custom could be found in the works of Henry Main. See Karuna Mantena. Alibis
of Empire: Henry Main and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2010).
84 Ibid, at 64.
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methods that were devised specifically for the frontiers rather than an actual system of
government per se were later on used in a variety of contexts. In that sense, the essence of the
Sandeman system of frontier administration and governance as institutionalized by the Frontiers
Crimes Regulation was flexible enough to be diffused and implanted into other parts of the
Empire, extending well beyond its original intent of mere frontier administration.85
As will be shown, these imported methods allowed the Iraqi state to have political control
over the countryside despite having constricted its legal jurisdiction in the tribal areas. It therefore
maintained a juridically weak Iraqi state with a certain measure of political control despite
(theoretically) being unable to enforce its legal hegemony throughout the land. Such
fragmentation occurred in the context of a semi-colonial legal order that was clearly Western in
character despite the appearance of such a traditional form. In other words, the fragmentation of
the law (as state and tribal) occurred within an all-encompassing semi-colonial order that was
Western in form.
Most historians of Iraq tend to focus on the manner in which this dual legal system
allowed for a political bond to be established between the state and the tribes, while the British
were able to extend its control. The juridical implications of the TCCDR are not dealt with in
proper detail. However, my argument entails that the juridical implications of the TCCDR and the
dual legal system must be explored in detail to understand that it was in fact an illusory legal
separation. It was the inability to completely sever the townsmen and the tribesmen that led to the
political and economic tensions that would eventually explode in the form of unrest. Moreover,
this legal duality was a form of governmentality in itself; one that was used by the British to
maintain its indirect influence. The ‘frontier governmentality’ mentioned earlier was therefore
converted into a form of semi-colonial governmentality in the context of Iraq which, despite an
attempt to construct a duality in law through the separation of state and tribal jurisdictions, was
neither entirely successful nor efficient.
Sir Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner in Iraq at the time, who himself served in the
Northwestern frontiers (namely Baluchistan) between 1909 and 1911 under the Agent-General
A.H. McMahon, was a firm advocate of the Sandeman system of tribal administration, and so
Berry, supra, ft. 82, at 8. In Pakistan, the remnants of colonialism is still evident, considering that
this regulation is still in force today as it is used as a method of pacification in the frontiers, although
the legal ramifications of this have been quite significant, considering how this regulation contradicts
the constitution in Pakistan.
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strongly supported the application of the TCCDR to the extent that he sent H.M. Drower, the
Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, a circular on Baluchistan written in 1907 to ‘explain his point
of view’.86 Dobbs quoted directly from the circular the words of McMahon, who emphasized the
efficiency of the use of customary and tribal law as an ‘…instrument for the suppression of crime
which in simplicity and effectiveness can be surpassed by no other legal system which we can
invent, for the simple reason that it is based on the character, idiosyncrasies and prejudices of the
people among whom it has originated and by whom it has been evolved during long periods of
time to meet their own requirements and remedy their failings.’87 Therefore, on the one hand, a
tested strategy in the Northwestern frontiers was brought into the Iraqi frame for the same
intended purpose of pacification, and on the other hand, British officials believed that they were
in fact preserving a deteriorating ‘ancient’ legal tradition that was a ‘natural’ part of the tribes in
Iraq.
On the other hand, it was the idea that Western standards of justice could not be imposed
on the tribes in any direct manner that warranted the emergence of this separate tribal legal
system. Here, one is reminded of Arnold Wilson’s claim of the difficulty of imposing any notion
of Western law on the tribes of southern Iraq when he first arrived in Basra: ‘[t]o impose the rule
of law upon these dissonant and intractable elements was by far the most difficult of the many
problems of civil administration in Basra wilayat.’ 88 Of course, this process of legal
transformation must be understood within the broader historical context of the previous Ottoman
order, which locals were accustomed to, for the tribesman did not find the duality of law as a
foreign construct. There was already a ‘duality’ during the Ottoman period between Shar‘ia
(religious) law and Kanūn (secular state) law for instance.89 Competing legal systems, including

TNA. CO 730/103, Iraq 1926, vol. 12. Residency, Baghdad, 18 October 1923 to E.M. Drower,
Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, Baghdad.
87 Dobbs to Pulley (Interior) D.O., S.O. 2140 of 28 September 1924. Delhi, British High Commissioner
Files, New Delhi, Justice, File 8/4, as quoted in Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and
Country, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), at 171.
88 Arnold Wilson. Loyalties, Mesopotamia 1914-1917, (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), at 294.
89 Avi Rubin has questioned such a notion of ‘duality’ in Ottoman legal historiography suggesting that
the notion of legal plurality is better suited to understand the manner in which Kannun and Shar‘ia
law interacted during the Tanzimat period. He argues that Ottoman duality was merely, ‘a matter of
doctrine rather than praxis’. See A. Rubin. Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity, (New York:
Palgrave McMillan, 2001), at 56. The case of Iraq affirms this argument, as a positivist duality rather
than a more flexible Ottoman legal plurality was not present until the British arrived and constructed
it to further their interests. Hence, as Karen Barkey has shown, the legal order of the Ottoman
Empire, ‘powerfully contributed to a political culture of diversity and toleration,’ and in that way its
legal pluralism was ‘a tool for the management of diversity’. The British Order of legal duality, on the
other hand, was rather meant as an instrument of semi-colonial control. See Karen Barkey. “Aspects
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tribal custom, co-existed before the arrival of the British and so one should not exaggerate the
British role in bringing about a dual or plural legal order. For this reason, the tribesmen
considered some form of duality as a natural part of the order of things and therein lies the British
ingenuity in imperial and semi-colonial control: the British built on what was already there, while
infusing their own notions of justice and legal positivism. Nonetheless, the British strategy of
duality should still be considered as an invention, but it was melded quite organically onto the
layers of the preceding Ottoman order. In the end, however, the intention of keeping state law
based on ‘British ideas of justice’ removed from tribal customary law did not actually work as the
tribal legal order itself turned out to be a hybrid creation of the very hegemonic western legal
tradition that it was meant to be severed from.
A closer look at the provisions of the TCCDR illustrates how this piece of legislation led
to a significant amount of abuse. It was drafted in a way that ensured that the shaikh had wide
powers that were unchecked and provided no safeguard.

Just like its archetype in the

Northwestern frontiers, there was no recourse to or process to appeal an order made under the
TCCDR.90 Nor was there habeas corpus. Furthermore, the finality of any decision under the
TCCDR could be brought into question and revisited under sections 11 and 50 for up to two years
after it was made. Initially, the Political Officer responsible for the administration of the district,
and later the mutassarifs (governors) had very wide discretion under section 40 to elect to try a
citizen under the tribal system rather than the national courts.91 This infamous provision led to
considerable injustice and arbitrary effects. For example, dissident (non-tribal) townsmen were
occasionally tried under tribal law rather than state law, and subsequently put into a form of
‘internal exile’ by an administrative order specifying where one was to reside.92 It is not merely
the trying of a townsman under tribal law that was arbitrary and unjust, but even the removal of a
tribesman or an entire tribe93 from a specified district as a form of punishment.94 The role of the
of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,” in Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (eds.), Legal
Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850, (New York: New York University Press, 2013), at 85.
90 In theory, an appeal in the form of a petition to the Ministry of Interior is available, but this is not
an appeal per se and the Ministry rarely if ever interferes in such matters. See Mohammed Fadhil
Jamali. The New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education, (New York City: The International Institute of
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1934), at Appendix F at 143-144.
91 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 93.
92 The TCCDR was used in this manner to deal with those who agitated during the anti-Zionist
demonstrators against General Maude, as well as, the strikers during the 1931 General Strike, Ibid.
93 This could be compared to the Bengal Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 that essentially had the same
function in India.
94 The Iraqi state in such a situation was merely following the colonial practice of the British of using
certain aspects of customary law for their own political purposes. Here, William Barton’s reference to
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administrative official according to the TCCDR was to affirm a TCCDR order and ensure that it
was enforced. The fact that these officials had such wide discretion made them susceptible to
bribery from shaikhs who wanted to influence a certain outcome.95 It is for this reason that Batatu
has fittingly referred to the TCCDR as more of an ‘arbitrary administrative regulation’ in the
context of its uses and interpretation, especially in relation to the cities.96 The TCCDR has been
criticized, even at times by some shaikhs for giving too much discretion in the hands of these
administrators, who were neither trained in Iraqi (state) law nor tribal law and custom.97 In that
sense, the TCCDR was, using the words of Mamdani, referring to the customary legal institutions
enforced by the British in Nigeria, ‘the triumph of techno-administration under the guise of
indirect rule through customary law…[That is,] a retreat into legal administration’.98 The rule of
law turns into the rule of legal administration (i.e. a concern for ‘law and order’ in the tribal area),
as the whole purpose of such structures was the administering of (semi-colonial and imperial)
power through the enforcement of tribal custom and tradition.

IV. The positivist ‘duality’ of law in Iraq & its limitations
My main argument here is that the legal duality that was created by the British was in fact
quite illusory, not only because it was incomplete or did not reflect reality on the ground, but also
because the executive used the tribal system for its own advantage, often to avoid the implications
of Iraqi law. I have already shown how the TCCDR was used as an instrument of administrative
control and oppression by the Iraqi state. What is also interesting is that tribesmen did not hesitate
to use the national courts when it was in their interest to do so. According to one shaikh, the only
‘tribal responsibility’ in the frontiers is fitting. It illustrates that one could enforce a remedy against
an entire tribe rather than the responsible tribesman, while reminding the reader that, “It is their
own custom, not a British invention” (Barton, supra, at 60). The reality of course was that by
enforcing it in such a manner (through the Frontier Regulation), it ceased to be ‘their own custom’ as
such.
95Muhammad Tawfīq Husayn. Nihāyat al-Iqtāʿ fi al-ʿIraq: (The End of Feudalism in Iraq: A study of the
conditions of the Iraqi peasant & the Agrarian Reform Law), (Beirut: Dar al-ʿlim lil-malayeen, 1958), at
79.
96 Ibid. Willard Berry had a similar conclusion in relation to Pakistan’s Frontier’s Crimes Regulation:
“A total consideration of the Regulation reveals that it was neither derived from custom, nor
endowed with the guarantees of due process and equal protection which characterized the Western
system of adjudication, and it was the specific intent of the Government to bestow a large portion of
discretionary power upon local administrators. The Regulation cannot be conceived as an instrument
of justice in either the traditional or Western sense nor can it be considered a substitute for either.”
Berry, supra, ft.41, at 41.
97 Jamali, supra, ft. 90, at 144.
98 Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism,
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), at 125.
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reason why a tribesman preferred the tribal courts was that he hoped to receive the monetary
remedy (‘ransom’ was the word he used) that was owed to him under customary law.99 In reality,
however, not unlike the preceding Ottoman order, the tribesman found strategic ways to exercise
his rights under state law by disguising himself as a townsman when it was to his advantage to do
so. M.N. Kadhim (who started out his career as a deputy prosecutor, becoming a criminal court
judge and eventually a member of the Court of Sessions) argued that Iraqi state law was
continuously encroaching into the tribal legal system.100 Kadhim had the following to say from
his experience as a long-standing member of the bench: ‘[t]he author in his career has seen
tribesmen living in towns or near towns sue one another in civil as well as in criminal courts in
towns. When some of them raised the question of tribal customs for one reason or another and
asked that the case should be referred to the Administrator, the opponent would immediately
reject the suggestion and say that they had nothing to do with tribal customs: they had become
“civilized townsmen” and they wanted the “Government” to give them their “rights” or to punish
their opponents.’101 In the reverse situation, powerful townsmen would claim to have tribal roots
to get away with certain crimes, in particular murder.102 These instances are quite revealing as
they illustrate that the ‘dichotomy’ between the tribesman and the townsman in Iraq that was
constructed in law was not only misleading, but were both in reality encroaching into each other.
It shows that the tribesman was not ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilized’ as the British believed in the
sense that he was too attached to his tribal roots to rely on the state rather than his tribal customs.
The fact was that the tribal and state legal structures existed in tandem and in an overlapping
manner, for one reinforced the other (as they were interdependent) within an overarching semicolonial Iraqi state and order. It was therefore the function of such a positivist duality that one
should focus on, which was to further and strengthen the Iraqi state and in turn British interests
after all.
To what extent then was customary and tribal law ‘invented’ in Iraq? The literature on
the ‘invention of tradition’ and customary law is vast, especially in the context of the history of
Jamali, supra, ft. 90, at 144.
M.N. Kadhim, Reaction to Crime Under Tribal Law and Modern Codification in Iraq, (D.Phil. Thesis,
Oxford University, 1961).
101 Ibid, at 317-318.
102 An example of this occurred when Abdullah Beg al-Sani, Director-General of the Minister of
Interior was murdered in his office by Abdullah Falih Beg al-Sa‘dun. Although the murderer was
sentenced to death, on appeal he explained that he was defending the honor of his family as al-Sani
married the daughter of the late Prime Minister Abd al-Muhsin al-S‘adun under opposition from the
S‘adun family. He argued that he was entitled to be tried under the jurisdiction of the TCCDR and
customary law. His plea was successful and his death sentence commuted to a term of
imprisonment. See Sluglett, supra, ft. 87, at 172.
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colonial Africa.103 Terence Ranger who was the first to coin such an analysis, argued that what
was referred to as ‘customary’ tradition (including customary law) was an invention devised by
Europeans who believed that they were ‘respecting age-old African custom’.104 This analysis was
eventually expanded, influencing a plethora of legal scholarship (especially in legal
anthropology), in particular the work of Martin Chanock on customary law in Malawi and
Zambia; Sally Falk Moore’s work on colonial law in Chaggaland, as well as, Sally Engel Merry’s
study on law and colonialism in the context of the history of Hawaii.105 The overarching concern
in this diverse body of work was the effect that colonialism had on the legal structures of
indigenous societies – the general claim was that the customary law that emerged during these
periods of colonization was not a residue of the past (as was believed to be the case) but rather
emerged out of the colonial encounter itself. It is in this (strict) manner that it was ‘invented’
rather than ‘discovered’. 106 This line of reasoning was a direct challenge to the dominant
(evolutionary) understanding in legal anthropology of what has generally been termed as
‘primitive law’.107 Customary law is not primitive law, but rather (for the most part and at least
structurally) modern (semi-)colonial law in customary garb. Chanock for instance has argued that,
‘the law was the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the power of an alien state and part
of the process of coercion. And it also came to be a new way of conceptualizing relationships and
power within African communities, which were undergoing basic economic changes…The
customary law, far from being a survival, was created by these changes and conflicts. It cannot be
understood outside of the impact of the new economy on African communities. Nor can it be
understood outside of the peculiar institutional setting in which its creation takes place….’108
The main text that started this inquiry was: Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in
Colonial Africa,” in The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
104 Ibid, at 250.
105 See Martin Chanock. Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sally Falk Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications:
“Customary” law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Sally
Engel Merry. Colonizing Hawaii: The Cultural Power of Law, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2000); Francis G. Snyder. “Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of ‘Customary Law’ in Senegal”,
in Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, (London: Macmillan & Co, 1982), pp.90-121.
106 There are limits to the notion that customary law was ‘invented’ tout court. This has been dealt
with elsewhere, but the point here is that one must approach the word ‘invention’ with caution, for
customary law was never invented out of thin air. Moreover, the natives and tribes had a role to play
in its development, for it wasn’t merely a European invention per se, although it was used to the
benefit of Western hegemony and domination. My use of the term ‘invention’ is therefore made in
this strict narrow rather than literal sense. For a critique of the notion of invention, See: Thomas
Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa,” Journal of African
History, 44 (2003), pp.3-27.
107 See E. Adamson Hoebel. The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics,
(Harvard University Press, 1954).
108 Chanock, supra, ft. 105, at 4.
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Customary law was therefore a unique product of the colonial encounter itself and cannot be
explained otherwise. It must therefore be understood as being molded by the historical processes
of colonialism and capitalism. Nevertheless, it must always be emphasized that this British
‘invention’ was not applied on a tabula rasa, but rather molded into a preexisting Ottoman order.
The ‘customary law’ of the tribes of Iraq should be approached in a similar analytic
manner, for it emerged out of and was transformed by British colonial policies, rather than being
a restoration of an ancient tradition from the past. It is true that the ‘corpus of law’ that was
applied under the jurisdiction of the TCCDR was ‘uniquely Arab,’ 109 but one would need to
explore the underlying changes within the semi-colonial Iraqi order to expose the transformations
that these legal processes were both undergoing and stimulating. Historians of Iraq have generally
been aware of the fact that the customary and tribal law that was applied under the TCCDR was
somewhat different from what was there before the arrival of the British and their institutions. As
I have already mentioned, there are limits to the notion that the British ‘invented’ this customary
law tout court, for they contributed to this invention by molding specific features of such law so
as to make it compatible with their imperial agenda. By doing so they created a unique positivist
duality in Iraqi state law.
What was it exactly then that was different about British ‘duality’ as opposed to Ottoman
‘duality’? The law has generally been approached in a strictly functionalist manner, and what was
generally said (usually in passing) was that tribal institutions and law contained a ‘fluidity’ that
was ‘frozen’ and which was made ‘rigid’ by a process of institutionalization. To a certain extent
this is true, but a much more in-depth analysis of the law is needed here. One would need to ask
more specific questions, for instance: how did this process occur and what does it reveal about the
nature of colonial and semi-colonial legality? It was mainly modern legal positivism that the
British brought into the fold. It was surely this positivist characteristic of modern (Western) law
and its legal form that brought about such transformation (or even mutation) to indigenous legal
traditions. The positivist semi-colonial legality ensured that the social and political relations that
were altered would be reconciled with the capitalist system turning certain customs (as well as
non-customs110) based on practice and usage into systematized formal legal rules backed by a
coercive state. It is in this way that such ‘customary law’ was in fact a part from modern (state)
See Hanna Batatu, “Of the Diversity of Iraqis, the Incohesiveness of their Society and their
Progression…” in Hourani and Khoury (eds.), The Middle East: A Reader, (1993).
110 As Mamdani writes, ‘customary law consolidated the non-customary power of chiefs in colonial
administration’. Supra, ft. 98, at 110.
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law rather than a past (primordial) tribal tradition. Its function was (ironically) to strengthen the
centrality of the Iraqi state, while furthering British imperial interests. So, the duality that was
imposed in Iraq by these institutions and structures should be approached in such a rounded
manner – the TCCDR (including the corpus of tribal law that was applied and interpreted through
this instrument) was itself entirely apart of the general institutions of the modern (positivist) law
of the state. It did not necessarily bring about a space of suspension of law (through
administrative legality) per se, but rather following Esmeir it allowed for ‘positivist elasticity’.111
The positivist character of the modern (semi-colonial) law defined the parameters of the tribal
legal system and its institutions, and despite having no jurisdiction in tribal matters, the state
retained through such elasticity considerable influence. Consequently, the duality of law in Iraq
recounted above that has generally been perceived as a characteristic of British indirect rule turns
out to actually contain pervasiveness despite its fragmentation, which allowed the Iraqi state
room to maneuver and in turn invade the social/political spaces of townsmen and tribesmen
alike.112

V. Land tenure, property & the origins of capitalist relation in Iraq
I will now turn to the complex question of land tenure to explore the socio-economic
aspects of this historical narrative. An analysis of land tenure and its legal dimensions is
necessary if one is to grasp how the peasant was dispossessed of his tribal land becoming a mere
tenant (and later, a bonded serf), and the manner in which the shaikh became an absentee
landlord. In this section, I will briefly narrate this transformative process in the context of land
tenure in Iraq, which could be considered as the principal source of injustice and inequality
during this period in its history. Before dealing with the approach of the British and the Iraqi
state, I will begin by briefly describing the customary law relating to land, and the manner in
which the Ottomans intervened igniting the massive transformative changes to come. I will then
turn to an analysis of the significance of law in these processes and how it has been unfortunately
overlooked in the historiography of Iraq, while considering the wider implications of an approach
that would take colonial and semi-colonial law seriously.
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A tribe’s traditional attachment to their land rested on certain customary legal practices
that were varied and multiple depending on the region and environment in question.113 One thing
that these varied practices did have in common, however, was that they were based on very
distinctive indigenous notions of property. I have already mentioned earlier how land was
traditionally held communally by the tribe, and that absolute property was an alien concept to the
tribesmen.114 Instead, it was the tribal dīrah, a term that conveyed ‘the sense of the domain over
which the tribe exercised sovereign rights, rather than that of exclusive ownership,’ which was so
different from the notion of ownership and yet bore ‘a more profound sense of property’.115 A
good example of such tribal customary law relating to land was the lazma, which was a form of
corporately held real property by the tribe. It was claimed in perpetuity (as long as it was able to
defend it) and did not depend on the continuous maintenance of the land through pasture or
cultivation.116 As long as the land was either initially brought into production by its toil or
forcibly taken by conquest, the land became the communal property of the tribe.117 In this
manner, tribal lazma was ‘a form of collective holding paid for by either the toil or the blood
expended by the tribe rather than by a purchase price or its equivalent.’118 The land was
henceforth clearly as of yet outside the market and commercial transactions.119 The shaikh
commonly assigned the tribesmen a saham (or share) of the cultivated areas of the land in
accordance with the tribe’s needs, and so land tended to be distributed in a more equitable
manner. Furthermore, the rights attached to lazma allowed for more freedom of use, as it was not
dependent on continuous cultivation and remained valid long after the land was abandoned.120
The main policy of the Ottomans towards the tribes from the early nineteenth century
onwards was that of a policy of detribalization as the tribal order was considered as an obstacle to
its state authority, especially with regards to the revenue collection of its Empire. Customary laws
There are generally two main zones with very different agricultural conditions: the rain-fed zone
in the North and the irrigation zone in central and southern part of the country. This section will be
focused on the latter, as this is where the system of ‘semi-feudalism’ eventually became concentrated.
114 Haider, supra, ft. 45, at 316.
115 Albertine Jwaideh, “Aspects of land tenure and social change in lower Iraq during late ottoman
times” in Tarif Khalidi (ed.), Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East, (Beirut:
American University of Beirut, 1984), at 334. Jwaideh details these traditional customary practices
relating to land, such as talla‘iyya (‘choice-lands’) a form of tenancy widely practiced in the middle
Euphrates; and naqasha, which she describes as ‘possibly the oldest form of prescriptive right in
continuous practice known to man’, at 343.
116 Ibid, at 335.
117 Ibid, at 336.
118 Ibid.
119 Mahdi, supra, ft. 58, at 73.
120 Jwaideh , supra, ft. 115, at 337.
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and practices were never recognized by the Ottoman authorities, which considered all land as
being within the domain of the state. Nevertheless, Ottoman wālīs (governors) based in the towns
continuously failed to extend its authority into the rural areas due to vigorous tribal resistance.121
Hence, Ottoman legal structures continued to coexist with these traditional tribal customs until
the Ottoman (administrative, military and legal) reforms or the Tanzīmāt were initiated in the mid
nineteenth century. The Tanzīmāt began the process of integrating the three provinces of Iraq
(Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul) into the purview of centralization from Constantinople. It also
aimed at modernizing the state, while reforming the economy in line with expanding international
and foreign trade.122 Part of the reforms included the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, which aimed
at strengthening the financial viability and in turn the power of the Ottoman state.123 This Code
categorized landholding into several designations, the two of which concern us here are mīrī
(state un-alienated land) and mūlk (freehold land).124 The Code provided a framework for the
registration of individual land rights, granting taxpayers tapū sanads (title deeds), in turn creating
a new tenure over land (tapū). The main intention of this piece of legislation was to weaken tribal
institutions by connecting individual cultivators directly to the state, allowing them to obtain
rights to usufruct mīrī land on the condition of tax payment and cultivation, as well as providing
an incentive for higher production.125
The Code was clearly in direct contradiction with customary law and tribal principles,
which were based on the notion that a tribe held land communally as long as it could be militarily
defended against encroachment by other tribes, rather than dependent on the recognition of the
state. The Code, expressly forbade communal ownership, and only recognized prescriptive rights
of individuals who could prove possession and cultivation of a plot for at least ten years. It was
therefore generally almost impossible for a semi-settled cultivator (or a customary lazma holder)
to meet such an evidential threshold and gain a prescriptive (tapū) right. Moreover, a tribesman
Albertine Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq,’ (1963) in St. Antony’s
Papers Vol. XVI, Middle Eastern Affairs No. 3, pp. 106-137, London, at 112.
122 See Ebubekir Ceylan. The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and
Development in the Nineteenth Century Middle East, (IB Taurus, 2011).
123 Marion Farouk-Sluglet and Peter Sluglet. “The Transformation of land Tenure and Rural Social
Structure in Central and Southern Iraq, c. 1870-1958,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 15
(1983), pp.491-505, at 493. This Code was not put into practice in Iraq until 1869 during the
governate of Midhat Pasha.
124 The other categories were waqf (religious endowments); metruka (land for common use and
easements, such as roads for example), and mewat (uncultivated land, ownership of which was with
the government). See Herbret J. Liebesny. The Law of the Near and Middle East: Readings, Cases and
Materials, (New York: SUNY, 1975).
125 See Matti Moosa. “The Land Policy of Midhat Pasha in Iraq, 1869-1872,” Islamic Quarterly, Jul 1,
(1968); 12, 3, pp.146-159.
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not only saw no reason to pay to gain title to his traditional land, but also was highly suspicious
of the state, especially the potential of getting conscripted for its military. In this way, the
application of the Code brought about the unintended consequences of the distribution of tapū
sanads to city merchants, tax-farmers and a few tribal shaikhs, who went ahead and registered
their names to certain lands (often through fraudulent methods and bribery) as they realized the
value in ‘the possession of slips of paper’.126
Most bedouin tribesmen, however, did not understand the value of written law or the
power of contractual documents. This is reflected well in one response of a shaikh when asked
why he did not obtain tapu to formally define the boundary of his land in a legal document, “…he
drew his sword and said, ‘My sword is my boundary, and I don’t want a better one, yes that’s it a
sword is the thing and no nonsense about writings…’”127 Although the Code accelerated the
already ensuing detribalization process, it destroyed the military confederations, replacing them
with a ‘multitude of antagonistic tribal sections,’ creating a new socio-economic impetus that
altered the old tribal structure. This sometimes occurred in an atmosphere of violent resistance
from tribesmen, who were becoming consciously aware of how their ancient landholding
customary rights were slowly being taken away from them.128
The tribesman was now alienated from his land as this new legal tenure system turned
him into a mere tenant (at will) – an agricultural worker cultivating the land for his shaikh, who
now became a landlord (or an absentee landlord living in the cities). 129 Tapū grants were
eventually abolished in 1881 as the Ottomans realized the unintended effects of the Code, which
merely entrenched the powers of a new class of tapū-holders with no real incentive to pay taxes.
Farouk-Sluglet and Sluglet, supra, ft. 123, at 495. What consequently emerges was a ‘total
divergence between registered titles and actual possessory titles that could be supported at law by
the doctrine of prescription’. See Farhat J. Ziadeh. Property Law in the Arab World (London: Graham &
Trotman Limited, 1979), at 10.
127 J.S. Mann, An Administrator in the Making (London, 1921), at 202-203.
128 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 77. The best example where such violence manifested was in the Muntafiq
region where fragmentation of the tribes was rife, while tribesmen rejected the enforcement of tapū
registered rights of certain members of the Saʿdun family, who backed the Ottomans and acquired
wealth from increased rents. This made one British political officer describe the scene in the
following manner: “It should be realized that throughout the entire Mutafik country there has been a
sort of miniature French Revolution taking place… It has been nothing more or less than a revolt of
the serf population against the landed classes…’ (Iraq, Ministry of Interior File No. 48/47.
Administrative Report of Suq al-Shiyukh and District for year, 1916-17), as quoted in Atiyah, supra,
ft.67, at 244.
129 Atiyah, ibid, at 29. This sharecropping system meant that the cultivator or fellah did not work for a
fixed wage, but rather for a share of the crop. An absentee landlord generally relied on his sirkal (subshaikh) to manage the land.
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In other words, they recognized that granting such documents without an effective system to
enforce tax payments would only lead to their loss of control. Hence, although the process
described above was interrupted and reversed, it was this Ottoman intervention into the
customary legal practices of the tribes of Iraq that initiated the changes in the socio-economic
relations of the tribes, creating the advent of the first ‘wave of large landlordism’, and setting the
stage for the impending British colonial intervention to further accelerate such transformation,
eventually further entrenching these exploitative capitalist relations in law.130
When the British arrived, the state of land tenure was entirely confusing, contradictory
and unsettled. The preceding system and its interruption produced a situation whereby only 20
percent of all the land was tapū registered, while the rest of the 80 percent remained as mīrī
(state-owned) land.131 There were many competing claims (between tapū holders and customary
lazma holders for example). However, the mandatory administration did not attempt to settle
these claims. There was therefore no general policy dealing with land tenure during this transitory
period.132 The British initially approached the tribes based on the region in question, as their
concern was merely political and military expediency. Nevertheless, from the outset they realized
that supporting one shaikh against his rivals was an efficient way to control the tribes. The
selected shaikh would receive financial inducements, favorable land leases and tax breaks as long
as he supported the British presence and maintained order in his tribe.133 As A.T. Wilson recounts
in his memoirs, ‘[t]he Shaikhs… were for the most part reasonable men, of substantial means,
with many of the instincts of wealthy country gentlemen. They were in most cases directly
dependent on the Civil Administration for the positions they held; realizing that their positions
entailed corresponding obligations; they co-operated actively with the political officers in
suppressing offences against public order.”134 This method of expedient administrative control,
eventually emerged as, ‘a deliberate scheme of government,’ and the tribal policy was clarified
further in the favor of bolstering the power of collaborative shaikhs. 135 These shaikhs
consequently became government agents, with the principal role of maintaining order and
collecting revenue from their designated tribesmen. This led to the further alienation of the shaikh

Haim Gerber. The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East, (London: Mansell Publishing, 1987), at
75.
131 Warriner, ft. 49, at 145.
132 Ibid.
133 Wilson, supra, ft.88, at 77.
134 Ibid, at 95.
135 Atiyah, supra, ft. 67, at 234.
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from his tribe as his power was now derived not from the respect of his tribespeople but from the
British.136
As mentioned earlier, the British therefore reversed the Ottoman policy of
detribalization, strengthening what they saw as decaying tribal institutions. I have already
discussed this policy earlier in the context of the TCCDR, and its political and juridical
implications. Together with these tribal legal and political instruments, the British relied on the
shaikh to extract surplus from agriculture. In the mean time, the intention was to uphold the status
quo so as not to create ‘new’ rights in land where none existed. For this reason, the British
administration temporarily continued to apply (its interpretation of) the Ottoman Land Code and
briefly revived the Tapū department.137 In the Muntafiq region, for example, there were attempts
to settle title, but this only strengthened the landowners even further. Tapū sanads although
considered as defective legal documents were at certain instances provisionally considered as the
‘standard,’ and the British Political Officers were left as final arbiters on the merits of each
document until further considerations of the land question were made by the administration.138
However, this temporary arrangement which ‘accepted the legal rights of the landlord against the
traditional tribal right to a separate Dīra…perpetuated the injustices done by the Turkish regime
to the tribes,’ for the real question was not the legal interpretation of the sanad, but rather the
complete subjection of the tribes to landlords and the state.139 In this way, the (shaikhly) tapū
landholders claimed and at times were successful at receiving settlement of title from the
mandatory administration during this transitory period, for they readily used the state to further
oust the traditional prescriptive rights of the tribesmen. 140 Finally, with rampant absentee
landlordism came the widespread use of mechanical pumps as a novel method of irrigation,
which although in theory increased the crop areas, in fact merely enhanced the ability of pump
owners (who were mostly wealthy capitalist townspeople) to claim ownership of large tracts of
land, bringing about a another type of landholder into the fold. 141 The government further
Ibid, at 235.
Sluglett, supra, ft. 87, at 168. See E.B. Howell. “The Qanun Al Aradhi” (1922) in Journal of The Royal
Central Asian Society, 9:1, 21-39. Howell suggests that fraud in tapu sanads was ‘glaringly
apparent….nevertheless, these preposterous documents, unless fraud is proved…which is practically
impossible…are treasured by all the most influential men in the country, and generally regarded as
being unassailable in law’ (at 32).
138 Atiyah, supra, ft. 67, at 245.
139 Ibid, at 246.
140 Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A study of Egypt, Syria and
Iraq, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 145.
141 Mahdi, supra, ft. 58, at 99. Sassoon, Joseph. Economic Policy in Iraq 1932-1950, (London: Frank
Cass, 1987), at 143.
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ingrained these relations when it passed a law in 1926, which gave partial tax exemptions to these
pump owners.142 These developments during the mandatory period consequently continued the
processes of the dispossession of the cultivator-peasant.
It was not until 1932 that a legal framework for land settlement was established after
Ernest Dowson was commissioned by the Iraqi government to write a report and make
recommendations on land tenure.143 Dowson began his report demonstrating that a settlement of
rights to land ‘presupposes and requires some stable basis of land law or at least of legalized
custom on which such rights can be founded’ and none existed in Iraq.144 It was for this reason
that a proper and clear land survey was required that was not based on ‘mere academic
discussion,’ but practical policy and ‘local knowledge of the land’145 Although Dowson saw the
conditions of land tenure in Iraq as being ‘in various stages of divorce from innumerable
primitive practices, but still rarely wedded to law,’ and although he admitted that it was ‘very
difficult’ to focus ‘the whole kaleidoscope panorama into one generally intelligible picture,’ he
insisted that it was necessary to proceed with some form of a generalized plan of diagnosis.146
Dowson therefore made it clear that the state should make direct connections with the cultivators
rather than rely on individual landholders as intermediaries. This he argued was what the
Ottoman Tapū system was intended to do in the first place – ‘promote a body of industrious
peasant proprietors and taxpayers’.147 He argued that it would be ‘dangerous to public peace and
contentment’ if land were disposed of in an unrestricted manner. The cultivators and small
landholders must gain some form of economic stability and experience lest reform merely turns
into an ‘incitement to the piling up for unproductive debt’. 148 In this way, ‘the enormous
territories of mīrī land now existing’ which constituted the main capital of the nation should not
be handed over to individuals unless ‘accompanied by equivalent advantages to the public
purse’.149
Dowson’s final recommendations included the following: first, a complete survey of the
land must be done, as it is necessary for any settlement. Second, all departments relating to land
Great Britain, Special Report on the Progress of Iraq 1920-1930, at 209.
Ernest Dowson. An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions: Proposals for the Initiation of
Reform, (London: Garden City Press, 1931).
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tenure must be combined and coordinate their efforts. Third, settlement of title should be made on
the basis of beneficial occupational use. Settlement should be preceded by ‘impartial’ local
investigations undertaken by officers selected from the community itself. Finally, the state should
retain its rights of ownership and so land should not be registered in freehold ownership, but
rather ten-year leasehold tenancies.150
Despite the rational basis of his report, Dowson’s most important recommendations were
completely ignored. The new land tenure system, which was supposedly introduced on the basis
of his report, was in reality undermined by Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner at the time,
who obviously had considerable influence on the Iraqi government. Dobbs, who was also the
architect of Iraq’s tribal policy, disagreed with the report’s main recommendations.151 Dobbs’
objection, which was not published in the official report, emphasized that the position of the tribal
shaikhs should be reinforced by allowing them more access to land.152 Dobb’s goal was clearly to
empower a certain class of large landowners that would act as a bastion for the newly emerging
British semi-colonial order. Dowson, on the other hand, strongly disagreed with Dobbs, stating
that, ‘I do not myself think either simplification, or public peace or economic advance are to be
realized by a deliberate policy of establishing a series of large holders as intermediaries in dealing
with the mass small holders.’153 It was ultimately Dobbs’ approach that prevailed, for it was the
most politically expedient one after all.
The two most important pieces of legislation that were subsequently passed were the
1932 Land Settlement Law, which gave the government the power to settle land title disputes, and
the Law of Granting Land on Lazma Tenure, which established a new category of landholding –
mīrī-lazma. This ‘Lazma law’ specified that lazma tenure could be granted to any person who has
enjoyed the usufruct of land if he could prove that the land has been cultivated for over a period
of fifteen years preceding the date of settlement.154 As mentioned earlier, customary lazma was a
traditional form of customary prescriptive right. The new Lazma law effectively created a rigid
positivist ‘customary’ law that was recognized by the state, and that conferred absolute ownership
(mūlk), similar to tapū. 155 The purpose of passing such a law was to recognize a certain
150Ibid,
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customary law and tribal practice, and to supposedly ‘preserve tribal solidarity’.156 It therefore
seemed to be drafted as a compromise, suggesting that certain tribal rights needed to be
acknowledged in law. In practice, however, its effects were the complete opposite, as what ended
up happening was precisely what Dowson predicted in his report when he warned against merely
‘the passing of bills into law’ without ensuring that they were workable on the ground.157
The Lazma Law and its strict interpretation eventually allowed for the newly emergent
stratum of pump-owners to acquire ownership of lands in which they installed pumps, at the
expense of the prescriptive rights of tribesmen.158 This occurred according to some because of the
bias and incompetence of those presiding over settlement courts, which often accepted proof of
only one year of cultivation, instead of the expressly requisite fifteen.159 The president of the
Department of Settlements, Hasan Ali, for instance, highlighted that ‘with inexperienced land
settlement officers, and with the doubtful integrity of the administration, influential people and
shaykhs were able to get such grants by presenting even more tenuous evidence as proof of
prescriptive claims.’160 Although this was true, it was in fact the very nature of the Lazma Law
that ensured that customary rights would be overridden as it was based on notions of property
relations that were completely foreign to tribal customary law. As mentioned earlier, the
traditional customary lazma was not only incompatible with such property relations, but did not
recognize land as a commodity. It was the insertion of such foreign notions of property into this
traditional prescriptive right and its rendering into a positivist form that ensured its use by the
pump-owners and capitalist townsmen for their benefit. The law conferred title on whoever was
able to make the land in question productive (in the context of capitalist relations) rather than as a
mere tribal right per se. It is this fact (and not mere corruption and incompetence that was, as
Warriner states, ‘not surprising’ considering the political circumstances), which ultimately
explains the fact that proof of only one year of productive crop cultivation was sufficient
Ibid, at 148.
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evidence for the settlement courts to recognize title (entirely free of charge), while tribesmen
whose ancestors lived on their traditional land for hundreds of years were denied any form of
ownership or legal rights. In the end, as we will see, the law imposed only obligations on the
fellah, stripping away all his rights.
A certain understanding of individual property rights relating to land and the importance
it attaches to the function of surplus production was reflected in the parliamentary debates on the
Lazma Law. The main concern was the definition of ‘lazma-holder’. After one member objected
to the possibility that this law would override certain customary rights in his region (such as the
ancient right of naqsha161), the member from Hila, Salman al-Barrak, responded by warning
against making any peasant (fellah) a lazma-holder. He claimed that, ‘if we made each fellah a
lazma-holder, we might as well wish peace upon the land [i.e. wish it farewell]… and if all Iraqis
become lazma-holders…then the land would become a desert. For as long as there is nothing
driving the fellah, then he would not cultivate [a thing]...’162 It was clear from the latter debates
that the fellah was interpreted as being precluded from the definition of a lazma-holder in law
from the very beginning. The law was ultimately passed unanimously in both houses, and this
explains the manner in which the commodification of land was primarily contemplated as the
only way to make land more productive – the application of capital on land was considered a
necessary precondition to acquire its ownership.
The legal framework to settle land was therefore in actuality meant to make permanent a
specific understanding of property relations – a ‘rule of property’ as Ranajit Guha called it163–
that was not only compatible with but also made to serve the capitalist system in toto. As one
African legal scholar suggests land tenure reform in a colonial context plays a unique role as ‘the
implication of tenure reform is that it represented a form of progressive transfer from one
normative order to another’.164 In our case, a ‘semi-feudal’ capitalist order displaced a tribal
customary one. The law played a significant role in this process, which amounted to a transfer of
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property rights, ironically and once again with the use of ‘customary law’.165 A specific legal
form was evoked ensuring the permanent dispossession of the tribesmen and peasant from his
traditional land. The British, however, did not consider that this framework was greatly upsetting
to the status quo, for as one commentator maintained, criticisms of the settlement committees
were ‘commonly exaggerated’ as its members ‘created no rights, they [merely] recorded what
rights they found to exist’.166 The reality of such meandering in law nonetheless could not be any
different. The new system of land settlement brought about the destruction of an already
disintegrating tribal order, permanently displacing it with a modern capitalist ‘semi-feudalism’
that endured for another two and half decades until the revolution broke.
It is worth quoting Warriner who similarly refused to hold the British responsible for
what occurred in Iraq. She wrote (in the distressing year of 1948): ‘land tenure is mainly a
controversial subject because it has been linked with British administration, and its abuses
attributed to British mistakes. The difficulty has been that the British influence was only advisory,
and the Government did not control an administration efficient enough to carry out
recommendations of expert advisors…’167 I have already shown how the government did not
follow the most important recommendations of the so-called experts, but what is more interesting
is the assertion that the British advisory system did not in fact have any influence on realizing the
intended policies on the ground. The record does not support such a claim. In fact, British
advisors to the Ministry of Justice were giving legal advice on how to evict peasants from their
lands, as the TCCDR did not contain a provision to allow for such an outright action, and an
eviction was only legal under a TCCDR administrative order.168
In one instance, a British advisor argued that it was possible to take a defendant to civil
court in such a situation if the provisions of the TCCDR were inadequate to ensure the peasant’s
eviction from the land! Not only does this contradict the supposed existence of a ‘duality’ in law
and jurisdiction (supporting my previous argument above), but it also illustrates that the intention
behind the law and its subsequent interpretation was clearly to support the landowners against the
peasant. This advisor wrote a letter to the ministry of interior where he detailed such legal
maneuvering: ‘If B wanted to evict G, he had to first make a [TCCDR] application on the basis
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that the latter has no right [referring to the new lazma law] to reside on the land…and request his
eviction. If G did not have a deed to support his presence [on the land], an order would be issued
against him. However, if he produced a contract to support his presence, then B would have to
request [in civil court] for the annulment of the contract [under civil law] presenting his reasons
and evidence, and once the contract is annulled, G would be considered as trespassing on the
land’.169 As al-Jawāhirī exclaims, a reader would probably be astonished by such instruction, as it
plainly shows that British advisors were ‘conspiring’ with their Iraqi counterparts against ‘the
poor peasant’ living in his ‘miserable hut’ to evict him from his land, in his own country.170
Before moving on, one must mention the one piece of legislation that ‘promised genuine
serfdom for the peasant,’171 and which introduced a trend of further concentration of landlordism
during the ‘independence’ era of Iraq – namely, the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of
Cultivators No. 28 of 1933.172 This law rigidly defined the labour relations between cultivators
and the lazma-owners of the farms (whether pump-owners or sheikhs). The fellah had an
obligation under severe penalty of law to follow the demands of the farm-owner relating to the
methods of cultivation (relating to the choice of crops, seeds, waters supply and harvesting)
(Article 3 and 18). Whatever advances given to the fellah would be considered ‘agricultural debt,’
which would incur high interests and penalties if not paid on time (Article 10). If a fellah failed to
pay his debt (which was impossible to repay in the first place) he would be prevented from
leaving the farm, and could have his crops and hut confiscated and possibly destroyed by the
farm-owner. Moreover, an indebted fellah was prevented from working elsewhere (Article 15).
The fellah was held negligent under the law for ‘virtually every disaster’ that might befall the
crop – something that cannot be controlled in the unpredictable Iraqi environment.173
In this way, the fellah was consequently turned from a tenant-at-will with some freedom
of action to a bonded serf tied to the land.174 One former British official admitted that ‘one is
obliged to regard the fellah’s rights as theoretical only,’ 175 and that ‘the fellah under the
Advisor to the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, No. C/1634, Baghdad, 1 June, 1931, as
quoted in Ibid, my translation.
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provisions of the present law, is doomed to perpetual indebtedness…[and is] in reality, reduced to
the status of a slave’.176 The law was drafted to the benefit of the large landholders, who with
their political positions and seats in parliament ensured its passage into law, despite the
opposition of a few members to it for its clear injustice towards the peasant.177 It was this law
(and its revisions) in combination with the TCCDR detailed earlier- that ensured that the tribal
fellah, now living in extreme poverty, in perpetual debt and enduring serf-like conditions would
eventually decide to leave the land and migrate to the urban cities in search for a better life.178 It
would furthermore contribute to his extreme affliction of a disease-ridden state, conditions which
Michael Critchley, a professor of public health and social medicine at the Royal College of
Medicine in Baghdad, described in a lecture in March 1954 in the following manner: ‘It is not
exaggerating to state that the average agricultural worker (fellah) is a living pathological
specimen as he is probably the victim of ankylostomiasis, ascariasis, malaria, biharzia, trachoma,
bejel, and possibly of tuberculosis also.’179 It should by now be quite clear that this ‘pathological
specimen’ was not only the product of the foreign capitalist forces that swept the country, but also
the embodiment of its unequal relations through the very mechanisms of the law.

VI. How law underdeveloped Iraq: the necessity of law in the history of semi-colonialism
The history of land tenure and customary law that I have described above is plainly a
narrative about legal transformation as much as it is about political, social and economic changes
in the context of colonialism in Iraq. Nevertheless, historians of Iraq have never really taken the
law seriously. The role of (colonial and semi-colonial) law in the transformation and the
imposition of underdevelopment or what has been referred to as ‘semi-feudalism’ of Iraq is of
vital importance to grasp the manner in which it happened, and yet most explanations tend to
privilege a purely economic or political narrative, whether it is reliance on modernization theory,
dependency theory or its critique of ‘Political Marxism’ a la Robert Brenner. Let us take one
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example from the classic Marxist work of Hanna Batatu, who seems to view the law as of mere
secondary importance to social and economic ‘forces’ in understanding the transformations that
occurred in Iraq. In referring to the 1932 land policy and the land settlement law, he wrote the
following, ‘This policy amounted to a legal recognition of a process that had been taking place
for a good many decades in Iraq’s countryside: the usurpation by the shaikhs and aghas of the
communal tribal domain, their disposition of weaker neighbors, and their encroachments on
virgin state land.’ 180 Considering Law No. 28 of 1933 he wrote, ‘…fortunately for [the
peasant]…it has never been the custom in Iraq to enforce laws wholeheartedly, and anyhow legal
enactments could not in the long run have checked a movement that social reality itself
impelled’.181 First, it is clear that Batatu’s definition of law is narrowly defined as a ‘legal
enactment’ of certain political and economic processes occurring in social reality that could only
be considered effective if properly enforced. Furthermore, law is treated as merely auxiliary to
such historical transformation. In other words, his definition is confined to an instrumental and
functionalist understanding of law. 182 But what is more interesting for our purposes is his
suggestion that what happened in rural Iraq could have happened without the law. This is an
astonishing assertion considering the prevalence of law in the overall historical narrative that I’ve
described above.
Batatu seems to believe that law should be considered as being separate from the social
and political processes of transformation in history. However, law is so much more complex and
nuanced than he suggests, for as E.P. Thompson emphasized in his study of the Black Act of
eighteenth century England, ‘law was deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive
relations, which would have been inoperable without this law’.183 In the same way, I would argue
that the entire transformative process in Iraq described above and the imposition of a semi-feudal
system of large landlordism (especially in the South and referred to as the ‘iqta system) could not
have occurred and would have been ‘inoperable’ without the law. Moreover, the law was a part of
the processes of transformation from the very beginning, whether it was during the Ottoman
period or afterwards when the British arrived. In this sense, the law is more than merely an
instrument of class (or state) power or mere ideology (which of course it is), but returning to
Thompson, ‘class relations were expressed, not in any way one likes, but through the forms of
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law; and the law…[therefore] has its own characteristics, its own independent history and logic of
evolution.’184
The role of law in analyzing Iraqi history therefore must not be dealt with as ancillary to
other ‘forces’, for the fact that law is a part of the superstructure does not preclude its significance
in relation to the economic base. The law might not be determining per se, but it is surely
structurally and ideologically pertinent to the transformation in question, especially when it
comes to the colonies and I would argue even more so in the semi-colonies, like Iraq. As Peter
Fitzpatrick has argued, ‘law and state have a role that is more structurally central and structurally
enduring in the third world,’ that is, in the colonial and semi-colonial context.185 This is because
it is the law that ensures that the traditional mode of production is preserved and kept somewhat
intact within a capitalist system, which if left to its own devices would completely destroy it. In
other words, since these two modes – the traditional and capitalist – cannot be integrated
‘naturally,’ they must be integrated into ‘an operative combination’ by law and the policies of the
state.186
The Iraqi economist Mohammed Oboosy has argued that the underdevelopment of Iraq
emerged from the ‘primitive and semi-primitive methods of production,’ which in turn caused the
economic structure to become overly ‘inflexible,’ further afflicting the economy with scarcities,
‘bottlenecks’, and ‘retarding’ any development plans.187 If one were to extend our analysis into
this economistic argument, it becomes clear that a study of the law would certainly explain how
this structural inflexibility was initiated, extended and maintained in Iraq on the ground. An
extensive analysis of law in these circumstances of underdevelopment must be taken more
seriously and given its proper due if one intends to get a complete understanding of the
transformative nature of colonialism and imperialism in the semi-colonial Middle East.
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VII. Conclusion
This chapter was generally an attempt to put the law at the center of the early history of
socio-economic and political transformation of Iraq. The British imported certain colonial
administrative and legal techniques from the North-Western Frontiers to secure their imperial
interests and produce a semi-colonial Iraqi state. In so doing, they constructed an unstable
positivist duality in Iraqi state law, which divided the country into two legal jurisdictions, one for
the townsman and another for the tribesman. This in turn brought about the invention of a unique
and modern tribal and customary law. Moreover, this duality, alongside a British land tenure
policy, which institutionalized capitalist relations of production, contributed to some enormous
changes in the countryside, structuring deep inequality in Iraqi society. First, it created a specific
class of shaikhs who would become dependent on British patronage for their power, while their
tribesmen were transformed into bonded serfs. Second, it ensured that land would be concentrated
into the hands of a handful of landowners, contributing to the making of a highly exploitative
(semi-feudal) capitalist system of production, and eventually forcing many of these miserable
peasants to migrate into the slums of the urban cities and become wage earners. It is therefore
quite clear from the narrative above that without the British uses of the law and certain legal
techniques and instruments, most of these structural changes would not have emerged in the way
that they did.
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Chapter 2: A Brief History of the 1936 Labour Law & The Formative Years of the
Early Iraqi Working-Class Movement

I. Introduction

I will now shift the historical narrative from rural Iraq to the city of Baghdad to give a
sense of the formative years of the Iraqi working class and its early movement. The main task of
this chapter is to contextualize and historicize the labour law of 1936, and to argue that it was
partly passed as a concession to the working class due to their pressures and initiation of strike
action. I will then examine the provisions of the labour law and explore its limits. Although this
piece of labour legislation was meant to pacify the movement and was drafted in such a manner
that heavily constricted workers’ collective action, its provisions would eventually be
appropriated into the discourses of both the early and the later labour movements. It was
continuously used as a reference point and integrated into workers’ demands until the end of the
monarchy.
The labour law was appropriated as a rhetorical tool by the working class’ (counterhegemonic) movement to legitimize their demands. It had a specific ideological function in
relation to the movement that was ‘educative’, which contributed to the expansion of their classconsciousness. In other words, the labour law did exactly the opposite of what it was intended to
do in that rather than pacify or appease the workers, it actually expanded and broadened their
class-consciousness. Although the early labour movement believed that legal reform was possible
and looked to the incipient Iraqi state to provide the necessary reforms to address their concerns,
there was within the next decade a radical shift towards a more revolutionary approach, which put
emphasis on structural change rather than mere reform. The suppression of the early labour
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movement would eventually allow for communist ideas to become popular among the majority of
workers in the next decades.

II. The formative years of the Iraqi working class movement
Legality was a contested space in the semi-colonial state. The law was more than just an
instrument in the hands of the ruling class. Rather, it was continuously contested and occasionally
appropriated by the workers in their struggle against the state and in their imaginings of a
democratic future Iraqi polity. In this way, the first comprehensive labour law passed in Iraq in
1936 cannot be explained in isolation from the previous years of intensified strike activity that
culminated in a general strike in 1931. The 1931 general strike (the first of its kind in the
country188) opened the door for the eventual passing of labour legislation in 1936. This is
significant because it highlights that the formation of the early working class on the ground
occurred in conjuncture with legal changes that they had a part in shaping. The laws of the Iraqi
state should not therefore be seen as merely legal enactments passed from the top by legislative
bodies or the executive, but rather were often shaped in reaction to the actions of those who
expressed themselves on the streets. I intend to therefore intentionally displace and shift focus
from the agency of ministers or opposition leaders, towards those workers who were organizing
in the factories and demonstrating on the streets.
The emergence of the labour movement in Iraq begins with the establishment of the first
organization that advocated for workers – Jamʿīyat aṣḥāb al- ṣināʿa (translated as the ‘Artisans’
Association’). The Jamʿīyat was officially formed on July 26, 1929, around a month after the
Law of Associations of 1929 was passed, legalizing the formation of ‘associations’.189 It was one
of the first organizations that represented and tirelessly advocated for workers’ rights, and in the

There were strikes before 1930, in particular in 1922, 1923, and 1924 at the railways that called
for the freedom to form associations and arguably led directly to the 1929 law of associations.
Nonetheless, these strikes were still ineffective in uniting workers and confined to the workplace. See
Majid Salmān Hussein. “al-Haraka al-ʿumāliya fi al-ʿIraq: dirāsa fi itijāhāt al-sīyāsīya,” [The Labour
Movement in Iraq: A study in its political trends,” Basra University, Iraq Scientific Journal, Issue 19,
January 2015, at 388.
189 Kamāl Muzhir Ahmed, al-Ṭabaqa al-ʿumāliya al-ʿIraqiyya: al-takkawwn wa bidāyāt al- ḥaraka [The
Iraqi Working Class: Its formation and the beginnings of its movement], (Baghdad, Dar al-Rashid,
1981), at 123. Ahmed’s book is one of the few works that details the early formation of the workingclass movements using primary sources and interviews. He explicitly critiques the historiography (in
particular al-Hasani) for ignoring the early history and formation of the Iraqi working class.
188

52

short period of its existence became one of the most respected labour organizations in the
country. At this point in Iraqi history, trade unions in the common meaning of the term did not yet
exist. The Jamʿīyat was more of a hybrid between a trade union and a guild.190 There was
certainly a more radical element of workers within its ranks, represented by the majority of its
membership, the railway workers. This was what gave the Jamʿīyat certain characteristics of a
trade union. 191 This also differentiated it from its counterpart organizations, such as the
Shopkeepers’ Association and the Barbers’ Association, which were closer to professional
associations or craft guilds. Still, as Iraq was largely an agricultural country and industrialization
was slow at the time, one could not really say that there was a fully industrialized or
‘proletariatized’ working class as of yet. The workers did not differentiate their interests from the
artisans and small business owners. The Jamʿīyat was therefore in reality an alliance between the
petty bourgeoisie (artisans, small business owners) and the industrialized workers (railway and oil
workers, and factory workers, such as the tobacco workers).
The Ministry of Interior was reluctant to accept the Jamʿīyat’ s application for a license,
but it eventually accepted the application, and the organization was legally instituted. Elections
were subsequently held and the founder of the organization, Mohammad Sālih al-Qazzāz was
elected as its first president.192 al-Qazzāz, a mechanic and a descendent of a silk tradesman, is
regarded as Iraq’s first labour leader.193 He came from a comfortable middle class background,
which allowed him to gain a broad education and eventually worked several government jobs.
He joined the ‘Artisans’ Office’ in 1917, and for several years took night classes at the School of
Commerce in Baghdad. 194 al-Qazzāz was considered fairly educated for someone of his
generation - fluent in several languages, including English, Turkish and Urdu. Despite this
background, he identified himself as a ‘worker.’195 He was nonetheless clearly closer to the
artisans of the petty bourgeoisie. Politically, he was a liberal (rather than a Marxist), and a
Ahmed argues that the organization had a workers’ platform rather than an artisan character. Ibid,
at 144. The fact is that the leadership was composed of artisans (petty bourgeoisie), while the
majority of the members were workers. In that sense, these associations should not be regarded as
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nationalist.196 He took the plight of the workers as his own and fought for them like no other
leader in Baghdad at the time. For this reason, the workers respected him and considered him one
of their own – their representative in the political and international arena.
The formal goals of this novel organization were detailed in its internal documents,
which explicitly avoided any indication of political aims and used language that implied the
cultivation of education and reform. 197 The main reason for this vague language was its
attentiveness to the necessities of getting certified by the authorities, which were reluctant to give
out licenses due to fears that any form of politicization, especially of an organization with such a
wide base, would be a threat to the state. In any case, the Jamʿīyat was indeed a reformist
organization merely seeking economic and legislative reforms.198 al-Qazzāz insisted on this
narrow goal stating that this organization was founded to ‘defend the rights of workers and
kafihīn (‘toilers’) who were unable to voice their demands, and to fulfill their interests’ within the
confines of the law.199 There was therefore no attempt at this point to connect the problem of
labour to the capitalist and semi-colonial structures of the Iraqi state, and the workers
consciously avoided turning their labour struggle into a political one. This reformist
approach, as will be shown later, was starkly different from the later revolutionary
(communist-influenced) years where the workers regarded their struggle as principally a
political one. It was assumed that once the state gained its independence that it would be able to
advance legislative reforms that would solve the problems faced by the working class.
The influence of the early Marxists and socialists should not be overlooked, as they were
naturally allied with the Jamʿīyat at the time. In fact, Marxist-influenced intellectuals, such as
Mahmoud Ahmed al-Sayed, Hussein al-Rahāl and Abdullah Jadou’ had a strong impact on
workers at the time, and enthusiastically supported al-Qazzāz and his organization.200 Most of
these educated intellectuals gave weekly public lectures on workers’ rights, and other pertinent
topics. They also edited and wrote for the working class press.201 Despite its financial difficulties,
the Jamʿīyat organized massive social and illiteracy programs, developing an entire system of
support for the poor and laboring masses.202 Physicians opened a free medical clinic for the poor,
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and lawyers took workers as their clients pro bono.203 The emergent Iraqi state was unable to
provide these basic services for the majority of laboring and working classes, who were in a
desperate condition. It was no wonder that the membership of the Jamʿīyat grew rapidly, and
within one year of its founding, it boasted a membership of 3,000 workers.204 Branches surfaced
all over the country – in Basra, Nasiriya, Hila and other cities.205
The role of the early working class press206 was an important space in developing
workers’ class-consciousness. While the government press constantly attacked the working class
and its leaders, the working class press allowed the workers a space to communicate amongst
themselves, as well as to articulate their grievances, expressing their plight. Moreover, it was
within its pages that novel and modern ideas were disseminated to the workers. The inaugural
issue of a newspaper entitled al-ʿĀmil (‘the Worker’) addressed the workers in the following
manner:
O Iraqi Worker: This is your newspaper that carries your honorable name in its breast. And it is
your literary weapon, which you have the right to treasure in your sustained struggle to claim your trampled
rights and defend your cause, which is a part of the workers’ cause in the Arab World. It is your crying
voice that will be heard throughout the world, so that they know that you are alive and aware of your
injustices; aware of the loss of your rights; aware of the responsibility towards yourself and towards your
brothers […] Propose what you think would be useful to the worker, from your opinions and ideas – and
say with it - always and forever: this is our motto…WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE!207

Here, one could certainly notice the influence of Marxist and socialist ideas as the more radical
intellectuals wrote or edited most of the working class press. It was the first time that the phrase,
‘workers of the world unite’ appeared in Iraq, but soon it recurred elsewhere.208 This was a clear
turning point for the working class as it showed that the a movement was emerging that was
ready to organize this class to better its conditions.209 The leftist novelist and intellectual,
Mohammed Ahmed al-Sayyed wrote an article for the same issue of al-ʿAmil, where he ends by
Ibid. al-Qazzaz stated that there wasn’t a workers’ conference or meeting that was not
significantly attended by lawyers. See Ahmed, Ibid, at 235.
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Naseer Said; Musāhama fi Kitabat Tarīkh al-Haraka al-ʿAmālīya fi al-ʿIraq hata 1958 (‘An attempt in
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claiming that the only way the worker could receive all his rights is if all the associations and
unions united under an umbrella organization ‘to strive for the introduction of special legislation
for the protection of their rights.’210 The working class press, therefore, cultivated and spread
these ideas of unity and organization to pressure the state for the passing of labour legislation.

III. The Railway Strike of 1930: the workers’ ‘school of struggle’
It was the massive general strike in 1931 against the Municipal Fees Law, which
increased taxes by threefold, which may be regarded as the moment that the question of labour
was irrevocably forced into the national and political sphere. This general strike, which quickly
turned into a national one, attracted around 8,000 workers and artisans, and 3,000 oil workers.211
It was however the preceding railway strike of 1930 which created the active momentum for the
massive general strike. The years between 1929 and 1933 were very difficult years in Iraq and in
the world. The Great Depression led to a crisis in Iraq, especially since its economy was
completely dependent on the capitalist market and Britain. The Iraqi government laid off public
sector workers from ministries, and passed a law to reduce the salaries of pensioners.212 However,
the wages of British workers were untouched, and only a few foreign workers were let go.213 To
raise revenue, the government began increasing taxes. This had a very detrimental impact on
workers, farmers, artisans and small business owners. Foreign companies, such as the IPC,
however, were relieved from these tax obligations.214 In fact, the government even lowered the
IPC’s tariffs.215 The tax increases were the main vehicle for social mobilization in the cities as
every part of the Iraqi commoner’s life was affected. However, the seeds of urban working class
discontent were actually sown several months earlier in the railway strike of 1930.
The Iraq Railways, which were still under British ‘executive control,’216 laid off a vast
number of workers on the pretext of the need for restructuring. 217 This was followed by
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significantly lowering workers’ hours, which, in turn, meant the lowering of wages.218 The
Jamʿīyat began organizing against these measures, and used the working class press to publicize
their grievances.219 Another matter in dispute was the unequal manner in which the Directorate
treated British workers compared to Iraqi workers – for example, a British worker’s salary
amounted to that of 150 Iraqi workers.220
This dire situation led the Jamʿīyat to call for a strike, which commenced on December
30, 1930. Around a thousand railway workers assembled in the courtyard of the station in west
Baghdad.221 Management eventually made promises to meet their demands and the workers
returned to work.222 This event was one of the first strikes of its kind – in terms of size,
organization and results.223 It soon became clear that the promises made were empty ones.
Management was not genuine about meeting any of the workers’ demands and continued to lower
workers’ hours. A second strike was called, which attracted more workers, who gained the
sympathy of the Baghdadi public. 224 The opposition and nationalist newspapers strongly
supported the strike and this broadened their support by the Iraqi public, a pattern that would
remerge in future labour strikes.225 The Iraqi government was clearly threatened by the widening
support of the strike, and eventually requested the Directorate to look into the workers’
demands.226 This pressure compelled management into accepting and signing an agreement,
which ensured the layoff of all non-expert foreign workers and the payment of all workers’ wages
‘without exception’.227 The working class and nationalist press presented this resolution as a
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victory for the workers228, and this further strengthened the Jamʿīyat’s reputation, attracting more
workers into its ranks.229
This episode was an important victory for the workers, as they grew bolder and confident
in their ability to collectively organize and to bring some changes into their labour conditions and
their lives. Despite the fact that management eventually breached the agreement with the
complicity of the government barely two weeks after it was signed, it would still be inaccurate to
treat this strike as a failure or as being ‘ineffective.’230 The reality was the opposite as the Iraqi
workers learned important lessons from these experiences, in particular the effectiveness of their
unity and the weapon of the strike. It was no coincidence therefore that less than a month after the
strike, a petition signed by over a thousand workers was submitted to the government asked for
‘the rapid provision of a labour law to protect the rights of workers.’231
The Iraqi communist historian, Azīz Sbāhī describes these successive railway strikes as
being analogous to madrasa nidhālīya or ‘a school of struggle’ that had a significant impact on
the development of Iraqi working class consciousness.232 Strikes have a very significant impact
on the development of class consciousness, as it is through collective action that workers grasp
the power of their own agency and their ability to change their conditions. Workers broaden their
consciousness, recognizing the role of the state and specifically the law in maintaining their
oppressive conditions. They experience their own empowerment through collectively organizing
to bring change into their lives, and they begin to identify with their fellow workers as a class
based on their shared experiences. V.I. Lenin described the transformational character of strikes
in the following manner: “a strike…opens the eyes of the workers to the nature, not only of the
capitalists, but of the government and the laws as well…The workers begin to understand that
laws are made in the interests of the rich alone; that government officials protect those interests;
that the working people are gagged and not allowed to make their own needs; that the working
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class must win for itself the right to strike, the right to publish workers’ newspapers, the right to
participate in a national assembly that enacts laws and supervise their fulfillment”.233
The railway strike of 1930 was the beginning of a prolonged process whereby the
workers’ eyes opened to the (direct) causes of their miserable conditions, especially discerning
the role of the state and the law in sustaining these conditions. It also proved the workers’ ability
to organize collectively to bring about pressure for change. It was the first time that the Iraqi
working class acted in a unified and organized way even though it was still in its early stages.
Although it was surely this illuminating experience that led the workers to actively demand the
government to pass a labour law to protect workers’ right, it was in fact the massive 1931 General
Strike that further kindled their capacity to connect their immediate labor conditions to the Iraqi
state and its laws.

IV. The General Strike of 1931: the entry of the working class into the political arena
The intensity of the railway strike had a significant impact on the next episode of the
early history of the Iraqi working class – the 1931 General Strike against the Municipal Fees
Law. This event transformed the apparent setbacks of the railway strike into more concrete results
cementing them further into the broader context of the early nationalist struggle. The general
strike lasted for fourteen days bringing Baghdad to a complete halt. It was described by British
officials as ‘a frenzy’ and ‘a fanfare of riffraff,’234 while the Iraqi historian and chronicler Abdul
Razzāq al-Hasani captured the feelings of the Iraqi plebian when he called it ‘the silent revolution
of the people.’235 As mentioned earlier, the government hastily passed a law in June 1931
increasing municipal taxes by threefold. Debate in Parliament was overridden by PM Nuri alSaīd, and the law was ultimately passed after its third reading.236 The law itself was bordering on
the absurd as it affected everyone from the laboring masses. Not one craft, industry or profession
was spared. A revised scale of around 119 different taxes was levied on all aspects of everyday
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life.237 All workers had to pay a percentage from their income. The taxes were so high that it was
impossible to expect any worker to pay them and still have enough for his daily needs.238
The Jamʿīyat began to organize against this law, and after a petition led nowhere, a
general strike was called on June 30, 1931.239 The Baghdadi public responded enthusiastically to
this call and workers stopped working – all the coffee shops, artisan workshops, and pharmacies
shut. Public transportation came to a complete halt. There was a deafening silence in the
ordinarily busy streets of Baghdad.240 The government baffled by this unprecedented course of
events responded with threats reaffirming the individual’s liberty in operating his business, while
cautioning that it would not allow anyone to ‘threaten the freedoms of others’ with their
actions.241 The government deployed the police (some on horseback) to the streets of Baghdad to
intimidate people to get back to work.242 The main demands of the strikers were not merely the
annulment of the current law, but the reduction of the taxes in the previous law, coupled with the
workers’ demand for dealing with the issue of unemployment and the release of all those who had
been imprisoned for striking.243
The leaders of the strike, including al-Qazzāz, Mohammed Makī al-Ashtārī244, Abdullah
al-Badrī245 and others were all arrested for incitement under the Baghdadi Penal Code.246 Yet the
authorities began negotiations with them in prison, where al-Qazāzz insisted that the annulment
of the law was a precondition for ending the strike.247 The government made a promise that it
would eventually revoke parts of the law, which the strike leadership ultimately endorsed.
Nevertheless, the strikers, weary of empty promises, refused to end the strike that rapidly spread
to other cities, including Basra and Nasiriya.248 It was at that moment that the strike was
transformed into a much broader ‘national movement,’ that called for the fall of the government
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and the end of social injustice.249 The British High Commissioner described the anger on the
street in a memo to London: ‘Republican cries have been openly raised in the streets … there has
been no sign of loyalty to King or support for the Government.’250 The government turned to
repressive tactics to quell dissent and violence ensued, especially in Basra.251 A Royal Decree
amended Article 83 of the Baghdadi Penal Code making it a criminal offence for a gathering of
five or more people in public.252 Police armed with machine guns guarded ‘sensitive’ areas in the
city, and the military was put on emergency alert.253
As King Faisal and Prime Minister Nurī al-Saīd were both abroad in Europe during the
strike, the viceroy warned that if they did not return immediately, the general strike would most
likely turn into ‘a great revolution.’254 So, Nurī decided to return to Baghdad, released the strike
leaders from prison, and began to negotiate with them directly. The government ultimately agreed
to rescind taxes on nineteen different groups of workers but refused to resign.255 Moreover, a
statement was made in a government newspaper that directly addressed the workers, claiming that
the government plans to “[m]onitor the conditions of labour…for the acheivement of the workers'
well-being, and monitor the implementation of the provisions of laws relating to the organization
of work.”256 The reality however was that Nurī blamed the strike on a ‘handful’ of ringleaders
and ‘secret associations’, an obvious reference to the Jamʿīyat and other trade union
associations.257 The 1931 General Strike was the first attempt by the Iraqi working class to
directly confront the state using the economic weapon of strike action with the attempt to reform
state policies and shape the law. The workers brought their specific labour concerns into the
national and political arena. This explains why the parliamentary opposition felt that they had to
rally behind them if they were to gain any credibility.
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The narrative above refutes the analysis in the historiography that disregards the role of
the workers in leading the strike, preferring the explanation that it was the parliamentary
opposition that sustained the strike. Workers were generally presented as being led, influenced or
organized by oppositional parties and interests. There has been no attempt to focus on the
workers’ own independent role in organizing against the state. A good example is Peter Sluglett’s
claim that the opposition joined the strike, because it was the only way that the cabinet could be
ousted at the time, as there were no ‘legal’ mechanisms to do so in Parliament.258 Sluglett seems
to suggest that it was in reality the party leaders who ultimately ‘took charge’ of and organized
the strike, coordinating its spread into other cities, rather than the workers themselves. Even
Hanna Batatu inexplicably remarks that the opposition party, al-Ikha’ al-Watanī ‘led’ the 14-day
General Strike.259
This type of analysis reduces workers’ struggle to political maneuvering between
oppositional parties and the cabinet, and neglects Iraqi workers’ agency. The reality was the
complete opposite – it was the workers and their leaders who planned, organized, executed and
ended the 1931 strike. It was the workers and their leaders who were put on trial and imprisoned
– not the leaders of the opposition. Although some MPs resigned after the strike broke, they did
so for strategic purposes. Politicians took advantage of the situation. This was evident in the
manner by which they politicized the strike in advocating for the necessity of overthrowing the
cabinet rather than dealing with the specific underlying issues that concerned the workers.260 Abū
al-Timman, on the other hand, could be considered as an exception; especially seeing that alQazzāz himself continuously consulted him during the strike.261 However, his party did not have
a leadership role as is generally assumed, for it lacked the necessary popular base needed to make
a long-term contribution to the working-class struggle.262
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In that sense, even if the workers and the opposition were coordinating at times, it would
be far from the truth to argue that the opposition led rather than guided certain aspects of the
strike. The opposition did make an attempt after the strike to co-opt the labour movement. This
occurred when the leaders of the Ikha’ party approached al-Qazzāz with the suggestion that he reopen a permanent association under their auspices. al-Qazzāz refused the offer realizing that this
new association ‘would have put the labor movement under the control of the opposition
leaders’. 263 This was one reason why this general strike did not accelerate further into a
revolutionary moment, for the so-called ‘nationalist movement’ was still under the clout of the
(bourgeois) oppositional parties. 264 The fact was that the Jamʿīyat did not have a wide or
comprehensive political program nor did it see itself as a political organization, but merely as a
labour union with a narrow economic and social reformist agenda.265
The slow demise of the Jamʿīyat began when the government instigated its campaign to
shut it down soon after the strike ended by bribing some of their members, who in turn accused
al-Qazzāz of rigging the elections of its administrative committee.266 Based on this fabricated
accusation, the government ordered the Jamʿīyat shut down. 267 al-Qazzāz was arrested on
allegations of rigging the elections of the Jamʿīyat.268 At this point, there was an attempt to co-opt
the working-class movement by manufacturing a complicit leadership and an alternative
organization – Jamʿīyat ʿUmmal al-Mīkanīk (Mechanic Workers’ Association). However, this
tactic eventually failed as most workers refused to join this organization and instead called for the
release of al-Qazzāz and the reopening of their union.269 After al-Qazzāz was released from
prison, he succeeded in reclaiming this organization from its government-sponsored leadership by
overwhelmingly winning the elections in 1932; after which he decided to merge it with the (now
illegal) Jamʿīyat, forming the Itihād al-ʿUmmal fi al-ʿIraq (the ‘Iraq Labour Union).270 This new
trade union continued the same work that the Jamʿīyat was known for271, and in particular
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continued to call for the provision of special legislation for the protection of workers’ rights.272
The Iraq Labour Union was permanently shut down by the government in 1935, and the labour
movement remained underground, disorganized and fragmented until its revitalization by the
communists in the 1940s and the 1950s.273

V. The appropriation of legality by the working class: the Labour Law of 1936 & its
significance
The first piece of labour legislation in Iraq – Labour Law No.72 of 1936 —was passed by
the al-Hashimi cabinet.274 The argument I will furnish here is that this law was significantly a
product of working-class pressure from below. It should not therefore be analyzed in isolation
from the strikes of 1930 and 1931 described above. Moreover, despite its unenforceability by the
state, this law should be considered as a (partial) victory for the working class. It was the
culmination of the 1930 and 1931 strikes described above that eventually pressured the Iraqi state
to make these concessions. Although the main intention was clearly to slow down the momentum
of the movement by (formally) capitulating to some of their demands, the effect was the complete
opposite as this law ended up enhancing the workers’ understanding of their rights, educating
them to appropriate the language of legality into their struggle. As will be shown throughout this
study, it was in fact this consistent appropriation and reinvention of legality, which made this law
quite significant in Iraqi working-class history.
Even though the labour law was quite basic in its provisions and contents (it consisted of
6 parts and 39 sections), it was a close reflection of what the workers had been calling for in the
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past. 275 It stipulated that ‘in every industrial undertaking, such special precautions as are
reasonable to secure the safety of the worker shall be taken.’276 It made a provision for medical
treatment for injured workers. It made a provision for a rest period of one hour, and ‘a rest period
of at least 24 consecutive hours after each six days of work’. There was a provision for ‘ordinary
leave’ with full pay of ten days a year, as well as, sick leave with pay for 15 days for each year. It
explicitly forbade child labour.277 Moreover, it empowered the Ministry of Interior to set up a
conciliation/arbitration body for the purpose of settling disputes between employers and workers.
Finally, Article 23 (the core provision of this law) provided that workers had a right to form trade
unions, ‘in order to care for their special interests, to spread the spirit of co-operation…between
them, to effect improvements by educational, cultural, social and moral means to develop the
industries in Iraq.’ Articles 24, 25 and 26 presented the procedures required to form and certify a
trade union, and the holding of elections of the administrative committee of a trade union.278
Although it represented a turning point in Iraq’s labour history, the law was practically
ineffective as the increasingly authoritarian government of al-Hashimi did not enforce or
implement any of its provisions, especially Article 23 above concerning the recognition of the
right to form trade unions. 279 The social democratic National Democratic Party, which
temporarily came to power in the fall of 1936 were adamant on the application of the provisions
of the law, and furthermore passed some important amendments to improve it, the most important
of which was limiting daily working hours to eight.280 Unfortunately, with the failure of their
reform program, the labour law would remain in the books without being consistently applied.
However, even if the government endeavored to apply its provisions, the reality was that
combined with the laws regulating strikes, it would have been nearly impossible to enforce its
Mansūr, Shāb Tūmā. Al-Wajīz fī Qānūn al-ʿAmal: Dirāsa Muqārana, al-Juzu’ al-Awal [A brief
comparative study of the labour law, volume one], (Baghdad: Sharīka al-Tiba‘ wa al-Nashir al-Ahlīya,
1965), at 30.
276 Labour Law No. 72, supra, Chapter 2, Article 2.
277 See TNA. CO 730/168/1. (1931) ‘Outline of a Law Limiting Hours of Work and Regulating the
Employment of Women and Children’. This regulation was the first to be passed before the
consideration of drafting of a comprehensive labour law. It is interesting how such ‘civilizational
discourse’ surrounding the protection of women and children was considered the most important
aspect of an ‘enlightened’ labour law and policy at the time, and which was satisfactory for the PMC
in Geneva.
278 Ibid, Chapter 4, Articles 23-31.
279 Sassoon, supra, ft. 141, at 257.
280 See TNA. Clark to FO, 23 Mar, 1937. FO 371/20795, E 2417/14/93. A further amendment that
year stipulated that workers were entitled to annual leave and sick leave with full pay. See Scott to
FO, 26 Oct. 1937. FO 371/27096, E6573/14/93.
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provisions. The Iraqi state learned its lesson after the General Strike of 1931 and quickly
introduced legislation the next year that made it practically impossible to undertake collective
strike action legally.281 So, for example, a strike that was in any way seen as unconnected to a
specific labour dispute or somehow politically motivated would be considered illegal. Moreover,
the Minister of interior had to be given notice of a strike; in other words, spontaneous action was
illegal. Picketing or spreading information that encouraged other workers to initiate sympathy
strikes was also criminalized.282
As one British official admitted, trade unions or associations referred to in the law would
be ‘subject to very close official supervision, and [so] it is unlikely that they will be allowed to
attain any great political importance,’ and that ‘most of the…provisions are merely permissive.
The decision whether or not these provisions are to be put into force will rest with the Minister of
Interior.’283 Therefore, while the law granted the workers the right to organize, it also gave the
Minister of Interior wide powers to arbitrarily cancel the licenses of unions. It was, in other
words, the executive and not the judiciary that was the final arbiter on the interpretation of the
law, and especially on workers’ grievances against the cancellation of these licenses.284 In that
sense, there was very little room to maneuver within the law when it came and that was certainly
one reason why the Labour Law was ineffective as it was already stripped of any teeth.285 It is no
wonder therefore that Joseph Sassoon would write that the 1936 Labour Law did not have ‘any
significant effect on the development of trade unionism…’286
My contention, however, is that a closer analysis of this law would suggest a very
different conclusion: that despite its unenforceability, it had a unique significance and
consequence for the labour movement, which was positive for the over-all counter-hegemonic
See Article 4 of the ‘Law Relating to Maintaining Security during Strikes Number 70 of 1932’
published in the Iraqi Gazette #115, June 30, 1932. This law was annulled in 1959. See al-Saīd, Sādiq
Mahdī. Munāzaʿāt al-ʿAmal al-Jamāʿya wa Hismaha [Collective Labour Conflicts and their Resolution],
(Baghdad: Mutaba‘a al-Ma‘arif, 1961), at 28.
282 Ibid. The penalties for breaching this law were either six months imprisonment or the payment of
a fine of no more than 20 liras.
283 TNA. FO 624/7/623 (1936): ‘Labour Law 407/IT36. Sgd C.H. Bateman, British Embassy, Bagdad,
to Anthony Eden, Foreign Office, London; April 25, 1936.
284 See Fu’ad Hanna Tellew. “Labour Unions in Iraq.” (Unpublished Master’s dissertation, University
of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1954), at 238-239.
285 It should be noted that the definition of ‘worker’ in the law was significantly narrow as it was
defined in a manner that excludes government workers, who were in turn prohibited from striking
for any reason. See Article 109 of the Baghdadi Criminal Code (the penalty was two years
imprisonment or a fine or both).
286 Sassoon, supra, ft. 137, at 257.
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struggle. Firstly, it should be noted that this law was primarily drafted so as to be presented as
evidence of the Iraqi government’s ‘enlightened’ labour policy, with the purpose of convincing
the PMC that Iraq was ready for independence or in the words of Albert Thomas, DirectorGeneral of the International Labour Organization (ILO), its ‘eagerness to co-operate fully with
other nations of the world in the sphere of social progress’.287 An ILO representative was tasked
to advice the Iraqi government and the newly formed parliamentary labour committee288 on the
specific ratification process and adherence to certain international conventions, especially relating
to the employment of women and children in factories.289 Moreover, an Iraqi delegation was sent
to the ILO in Geneva to undertake enquiries concerning labour legislation. Based on this visit and
proposals given by Mr. Thomas, a draft law was submitted to Parliament. Even before the law
was passed, the Council of Ministers informed the High Commissioner F. Humphrys that the
PMC should be informed that the recommendations were accepted in principle and would be
applied to the new labour legislation. This ‘civilizational’ approach towards labour issues was
common elsewhere in the Third World as the ILO spread its conception of ‘industrial life’ and
‘social justice’ to other parts of the world.290 In that sense, the labour law did play a role in the
juridical construction or at least in the justification of Iraqi ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’, which
will be detailed in Chapter 3.
Yet, the argument in this chapter is that there was another (unintended) ideological
feature to this law. The labour movement would put emphasis on the core principles of this law to
TNA. Albert Thomas, ILO, Geneva to Nuri As Saīd, PM of Iraq, Baghdad. 14th July, 1931. [9552]. CO
730/168/1. Iraq: Labour Conditions (1931). See ‘Abdul Qadir Rashid, Secretary to the Council of
Ministers to The Legal Secretary to H.E. the High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad, 3rd November,
1931.
288 This committee included a British lawyer, H.I. Lloyd, who was recommended due to his
international legal experience with the Mosul Frontier dispute; ibid.
289 Ibid. In March 1933, the ILO sent a delegate, C.W.H. Weaver to Iraq to give an account of labour
conditions in the country. He wrote a report entitled, “Impressions of a Visit to India, Iraq, Persia, and
Turkey”, International Labour Review, Vol.XXVIII, No.4, October 1933. After visiting some factories, he
made the following conclusion: “[t]he fragmentary impressions of conditions of labour in Iraq that I
was able to gather during a four days’ stay in Baghdad were sufficient to show the need for a small
labour department and for simple labour legislation even in a country at an early stage of industrial
development…It is hoped…that the Government will succeed in carrying out its labour legislation
programme as early as possible, both for the correction of existing defects and as a means of
preventing abuses as industry further develops” (at 487). What was peculiar about this visit was that
Weaver did not meet anyone from the labour movement even though he admitted that he was aware
of their presence: “…I was unfortunately unable to get into contact with the leaders of these
organizations. The Association of Mechanical Laborers of Baghdad [which at this point was headed
by al-Qazzaz] is particularly active, and would appear to have a definite organization and
programme.”(p.484-485). Also, see Sassoon, supra, ft. 141, at 257.
290 See Guy Fiti Sinclair. To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern
States, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), at 82.
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its fullest, using it as a rhetorical tool in every one of its lists of demands. If one would consider
that the labour law was itself a product of direct pressure exerted by the workers (from below) on
the state, it would make sense why they would later appropriate its language, for they interpreted
it as their law or at least one which spoke to their aspirations. The workers were quite consistent,
as shown in the above accounts of the 1930 railway strike and the subsequent 1931 general strike
in their demand for a piece of legislation that adequately protected their rights. Moreover, by
March 1931, a few months before the general strike, al-Qazzaz submitted a proposal for a draft
labour law to the government with the hope of lobbying for exactly what was needed by the
working class. There were clear parallels in this draft and the labour law that was eventually
passed.291 Consequently, it is not difficult to make a direct connection with what the workers and
their unions called for on the ground and the piece of legislation that was passed in 1936.
Finally, the fact was that al-Qazzāz was in direct contact with the ILO as well as several
international labour organizations in Europe.292 He clearly had confidence in the principles of
international law and its institutions and believed that the ILO would pressure the Iraq
government to change its labour policy. 293 He did not consider how these international
institutions in fact contributed to the making of the semi-colonial Iraqi state, and in turn to the
very conditions that Iraqi workers were suffering from. This was something that the successor
communist-led labour movement would understand well. In any case, the young Iraqi labour
movement made its presence felt on the international stage, and it was this relentless pressure put
on the Iraqi state (domestically and internationally) that ensured that the basic labour law of 1936
would finally be passed four years after independence.
The Labour Law of 1936 could therefore be understood as a victory (albeit a partial one)
for the Iraqi working class, even if the workers would spend the next twenty years fighting for its
enforcement and application. It should be interpreted as a forced concession won by the workers
from the semi-colonial state. It surely affirmed the success of the working-class movement in
Iraq. The workers continued to assert their own interpretation of the law (beginning with the call

‘A draft project of an Iraqi labour law submitted by Mohammed Sālih al-Qazzāz, the president of
Jamiʿyat Ashāb al-Sanāʿa, to the Prime Minister and ministers of interior, justice, and economy and
public works, dated 31/3/1931,’ See Ahmed, supra, Appendix 3, at 268 for the full text.
292 TNA. FO 622/1/155. Labour Organizations in Iraq (1933); Extract from Sawt al Iraq, 7th Feb 1933.
293 Al-Qazzāz for instance sent the internal regulation and constitution to the ILO asking the Director
for his views and whether it should be amended to comply with international standards. Local Press
Extracts, 6th February, 1933, ‘The International Labour office, Geneva, makes Enquiries about Labour
in Iraq’, Sawt al ʿIraq. FO 622/1/155.
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for its revision and enforcement) every time they went out on strike. It was through these illegal
strikes and acts of civil disobedience that they ended up gradually bringing changes to the law.294
The labour law’s gradual development as shaped by the pressure of workers throughout the years
is evident by the eventual enactment of Law #36 of 1942, which permitted workers to organize
legally, and Law #18 of 1954, which developed a detailed arbitration scheme to settle workermanagement disputes, as well as, raised the minimum wage.
How then could this labour law (or law in general) be explained as useful to a counterhegemonic struggle in a semi-colonial context? This is an interesting question, which will be
revisited throughout this work. It is useful here to refer to Antonio Gramsci’s conception of law
in the context of his famous concept of hegemony. Gramsci contended that the ruling class does
not solely use violence to assert its control, but mostly uses ideology to develop a hegemonic
culture that is propagated until it becomes ‘common sense’ to all classes in society.295 Hegemony
is how the working class identify their own interests with those of the ruling class. The law then
is one instrument that the ruling-class uses to materialize its hegemony.
The law, for Gramsci, works coercively and consensually within the state apparatus. This
has been referred to as the ‘double face of the law.’296 On the one hand, the law secures the
economic interests of the ruling class by force. On the other hand, it has an ideological function
whereby it disciplines the subaltern classes in every level of social and private life solidifying
their conformity. Gramsci approaches law by referring to it as the ‘juridical problem,’ which is
“[…] the problem of assimilating the entire grouping to its most advanced fraction; it is a problem
of education of the masses, of their ‘adaptation’ in accordance with the requirements of the goal
to be achieved. This is precisely the function of law in the State and in society; through ‘law’ the
State renders the ruling group ‘homogeneous’ and tends to create a social conformism which is
useful to the ruling group’s line of development.”297
The main function of law for Gramsci is therefore its ‘educative’298 function– the law
disciplines and persuades all classes in society into believing that the current governing
See Chapter 4, 5 and 7.
See Antonio Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Hoare, Q (ed.), (New York:
International Publishers, 1971), at 325.
296 Benney, M. “Gramsci on law, morality, and power,” International Journal of Sociology of Law, 1983,
11(2), at 205.
297 Gramsci, supra, ft. 295, at 195.
298 Ibid, at 247.
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establishment has a cohesive unity that renders it effective and efficient.

Furthermore, the

educative function of law could be understood when the subaltern classes are constantly being
told what is legal and what is illegal. This, in turn, establishes the ruling class’ views and values
in society, crystalizing them as “common sense.” As Duncan Kennedy explains, ‘[t]he idea of the
legal and the illegal is something which, if you can manipulate it skillfully, you can use to
exercise great power over people who believe it.’299 This hegemonic power, then, generates
among the subaltern classes a particular conception of the right way to live, authorizing ‘a
particular form of life.’ 300

The hegemonic function of the law, hence, allows for the

naturalization, rationalization and universalization of the dominant ideology of the ruling class.301
One could extend Gramsci’s analysis of law to what has been detailed above in the
context of the labour law’s appropriation by the Iraqi counter-hegemonic movement. In other
words, the ‘educative’ function of the law could go both ways and the labour movement was
aware of this as its organic intellectuals302 (a lot of whom were lawyers themselves) would use
the labour law as a way to educate the workers on their rights. As will be shown throughout this
work, the law would be utilized in such a fashion throughout the monarchial period even by the
more radical communist-led labour movement, who did not cease to take the law seriously
despite knowing that the real struggle lay outside the confines of the law. In this way, one could
argue that although the law was always contested, this did not mean that it was a neutral arena of
class struggle, for it was merely one front whereby the workers exerted their vision of the future.
As Issa Shivji emphasized in his own study of the Tanzanian working class:

Duncan Kennedy. “Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System,” American Legal Studies Forum, (1982),
6(1), at 36.
300 Buckel, S and Fischer-Lescano, A. “Gramsci Reconsidered: Hegemony in Global Law,” Leiden
Journal of International Law, 22, (2009), at 447.
301 Litowitz, Douglas. ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law,’ Brigham Young University Law Review, 2000,
No. 2, 515-551, at 522.
302 Organic intellectuals are, ‘…directly related to the economic structure of their society simply
because of the fact that “every social group that originates in the fulfillment of an essential task of
economic production” creates its own organic intellectuals. Thus, the organic intellectual “gives his
class homogeneity and awareness of its own function, in the economic field and on the social and
political levels.”’ See Valeriano Ramos, “The Concepts of Ideology, Hegemony, and Organic
Intelelctuals in Gramsci’s Marxism”, Theoretical Review No. 27, March-April 1982,
https://www.marxists.org.
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It is undoubtedly true that state and law ultimately serve the interests of the ruling dominating
class. But this comes about in the process of complex social struggles. As a result of these struggles,
undeniably the law comes to embody certain partial successes and concessions won from the dominated
classes. But this should not be taken to mean that the law has no class character or that it is a neutral arena
of class struggle. Neither law nor legality per se is in the interests of the oppressed classes. Rather, it is the
social struggles of the oppressed classes themselves which lend content to law and legality.303

Hence, despite the fact that law was an ‘instrument of the ruling class’, more so in a colonial or
semi-colonial context, it remained one (limited) locus of working-class struggle. This indicates
that the law was malleable enough to be imagined by the workers in their visions of the future
that they were struggling for – uniting them to move towards some form of ‘proletarian
hegemony’.304 Consequently the very passing of the 1936 Labour Law did in fact have some
impact on forging the working-class struggle ahead.
The appropriation of legality by the labour movement would reappear in the next decade
when the communists would quite ingeniously use this (dead) law (while referring to the Iraqi
constitution) to advance their counter-hegemonic struggle, as they knew the value of law in
educating the masses. A good example is the secretary-general of the ICP, Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf’s
essay entitled ‘The Trade Union is the Motto of the Worker Today,’ published in 1944 in the
communist paper, al-Qāʿida (‘The Base’), in which he stresses the importance of extending the
labour movement’s use of the trade union to all sectors of the economy, so as to include all
workers across sectoral lines.305 Calling for the creation of a unified trade union representing all
workers in Iraq, he refers to the law as a tool that should be appropriated by the workers in their
struggle: ‘it is necessary to include in the trade union movement all categories of workers, and for
the word ‘trade union’ to be the slogan of the workers today…and [while carrying] in their
pockets the labour law and the charter of one of the unions, so as to explain…[to their comrades]
the benefits of the union and its necessity in workers' lives ... and it should not leave the worker’s
mind that their route is not furnished with flowers and basil, as their mission does not end when
they submit their application nor when they are granted a license to establish a union, but they

Issa G. Shivji. Law, State, and the Working Class in Tanzania, (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1986), at
241, emphasis added.
304 Bryan Palmer suggests that by focusing on the ‘ruptures and reformations’ of the law, one could
examine its ‘reciprocities with resistance’, and this explains how it is remade by civil disobedience
(that is, from without rather than within the law). Palmer, B. “What’s Law Got To Do With It –
Historical Considerations on Class Struggle, Boundaries of Constraint, and Capitalist Authority,”
Osgoode
Hall
Law
Journal,
41.2/3
(2003):465-490.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol41/iss2/16
305 Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf a.k.a. Fahad. Al-Qāʿida, Number 4 and 5, April 1944 in Mu’alafāt al-Rafīq
Fahad [‘The Works of Comrade Fahad’], (Baghdad: al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda Press), at 291-297.
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have to bring to their union the majority of the workers of their industry… to educate them… [on]
… the union based on the charter and Labour Law No. 72...”306 Yūsuf believed that the Labour
Law of 1936 had a role to play in the working-class struggle despite (and especially considering)
the fact that it was not being enforced by the state, and so he asked that the workers keep the
labour law ‘in their pockets’ to serve as reminder of their rights.
Here, the workers’ appropriation of the ideological force of the law in their struggle had
its advantages, although it also had its limits, for as will be shown later the Iraqi workers’ struggle
was a not a legal one per se. It was largley waged outside the confines of the law, as it was more a
structural question of conflicting visons of social orders, which in the end legal reform could not
address. However, this did not mean that legality was not ideologically pertinent for the workers
in the assertions of their demands and their overall struggle. Although this continuous reference
to the law and the use of legality was a powerful arsenal for workers’ struggle, it also had its
limits especially in a semi-colonial context, and this should not be overlooked. The colonial and
semi-colonial state did not allow for too much elbowroom where law and legality became an
arena of class struggle. This was quite different from the Western liberal state, where legality was
continuously used as ‘a modality for shaping relations between labour and capital’.307 The early
Western liberal state found it essential to use the law to institutionalize conflict between
employers and workers, while attempting to avoid violent repression as much as possible. The
colonial or semi-colonial state, on the other hand, did not find it necessary to do so, and was
instead more prone to use violence to suppress workers demands. The workers’ struggle in Iraq
was therefore mostly waged outside the law out of necessity.

VI. Conclusion
In this chapter, I detailed the history of the formative years of the Iraqi working class in
Baghdad, while contextualizing the first labour law passed in the country in 1936. I argued that
despite the fact that this law was not enforced by the state, it was in reality a forced concession
given to the workers because of their unrelenting strike actions, in particular in 1930 and 1931. I
then make the contention that the principles embedded in this law were later appropriated by the
labour movement as it was denoted in nearly every lists of demands, even so by the later
communist-led movement in the next decade. This fact illustrates that the law and its ideology
306
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was a useful tool for counter-hegemonic movements in the semi-colonial context, as it had an
educative function, expanding workers’ class-consciousness by allowing them to understand their
conditions in the overall semi-colonial capitalist system. In a sense, therefore, this chapter has
shown that the ideology of the law provides those who are struggling against the entire social
order with a language to articulate their demands, as well as, the imaginations of their alternative
futures.
The demise of the Jamʿīyat in 1935 and its reformist social-democratic vision permitted
more radical and revolutionary ideas, which were merely in the margins previously, to emerge at
the forefront of Iraqi working-class culture and politics. Communism was to become so
widespread amongst the working class and Iraqi society that it organically evolved into an
indigenous movement, while being entrenched into working-class culture and its political
imagination. Although this is not the place to delve into a detailed history of the Iraqi Communist
Party and its sophisticated organizational and political underground structures, as will become
clear later, the party was not only a genuine ‘Iraqi’ party308 that represented all sectors of the
population, but its popularity would soar as the struggle for national independence intensified. It
is enough to say that once communism arrived in Iraq, it was difficult for it not to spread the way
that it did, especially considering the socio-economic transformations described in Chapter 1
were gradually constituting extreme inequality in Iraqi society. Moreover, it was the manner in
which the communists explained in everyday layman language the important connections
between the economic and political character of the working-class struggle that was what made
their approach persuasive and effective.309 As the chapters on the oil, railway and port workers
will illustrate, the communists maintained that British imperialism and the social, economic and

The ICP was an indigenous party that was not in any way controlled from Moscow. It is true that
its internal rules were organized in Marxist-Leninist fashion and the famed secretary-general Fahad
was trained in the Comintern’s University of the Toilers of the East in the 1940s. However, there is no
evidence either by Iraqi, British or US intelligence of any financial or organizational ties with foreign
parties or states. As Batatu makes clear after examining the documents used to prosecute communist
leaders, ‘…there is no evidence that [the party] was propped up by the Comintern in any…way’.
Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 576. This did not preclude the fact that certain factions of the party looked to
Moscow for guidance. Of course, the Iraqi government and the British tried their best to make these
connections with the intention of delegitimizing the party and to spread the idea that foreigners were
behind the people’s uprisings, such as the Wathba.
309 Communism in the region would be articulated to the masses in a explicit anti-imperialist manner
that was within ‘the ideology of national liberation’. In other words, it was to be conceived in a
specifically geopolitical manner, what Anne Alexander referred to as, ‘communism as geopolitics’.
This was not surprising considering the geo-strategic nature of the semi-periphery. Anne Alexander.
“Communism in the Islamic World,” in Smith, S.A. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of
Communism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), at 270.
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political conditions of the working class were intertwined, and that therefore they must be dealt
with together.
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Chapter 3: The Making of Semi-peripheral Sovereignty in International law – A
Doctrine of Independence for the Exploitation of Iraqi Oil

Oh dancers to the prospect of a new era
That contains all the old and ragged things
What is the difference between the Mandate
And its genitals on the body of Independence?310
~ Mohammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlūm
The occupation of Iraq, [the imposition of] the mandate on it, the treaty alliance with it, and then its “independence”
and entrance into the League of Nations; all this was done to secure the flow of the politics of the Black Liquid [i.e. oil]
to the shores of British influence.311
~ Yūsuf Ibrahīm Yazbak
“…Iraq had now become a main centre of world power…[It] holds a key position in modern strategic thinking and
…her oil is held to be essential for the needs of the Western world…”312
~ Sir John Troutbeck

I. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to assess the role of international law in the formation of the
Iraqi state, specifically the juridical construction of its ‘independence’ in 1932. I will describe the
Iraqi experience of the Mandate system, and the institutions and mechanisms of the changing
international legal order during the inter-war period. This analysis will elucidate the relationship
between international law and imperialism in Iraq, and its impact on the lives of the Iraqi working
class. It is important to understand exactly how the Mandate functioned in Iraq, and how it
overlapped with British imperial policy, which reacted to nationalist claims. I will use the Iraqi
experience as a lens to illuminate certain aspects of the workings of the mandate system in the
semi-peripheral region of the Middle East.

Muhammad Sālih Bahr al-ʿUlūm. Diwan Bahr al-ʿUlūm (Baghdad: Matba‘at Dar al-Tadāmun,
1968), 1:59. As translated by Kevin Jones in ‘The Poetics of Revolution: Cultures, Practices and
Politics of Anti-Colonialism in Iraq, 1932-1960’ PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2013.
311 Yūsuf Ibrahīm Yazbak. al-Nift Mūstʿbid al-Shʿwb [Oil, the Enslaver of Peoples], (Damascus:
Manshourāt wizārat al-Thaqāfa, 1990).
312 TNA. FO 371/110991. VQ 1015/82. John Troutbeck (British Embassy, Bagdad) to Anthony Eden
(FO, London) December 9, 1954.
310

75

The British used certain instruments from its past colonial experiences reconstructing
them in the context of the mandate system and the new international legal order emerging at the
time. Most historians of Iraq have considered the Mandate merely within the context of the
Mandatory power’s actions – not taking into account the role of international law in enabling
these actions. This is unfortunate considering the fact that it was the international legal order that
was emerging during the interwar period that allowed the Mandatories the ability to manoeuver in
maintaining their imperial control. An analysis of the role of international law in the
subordination of Iraq to imperialism has therefore been quite lacking. In focusing on the Iraq
episode, I will detail the history of treaty-making, revealing the manner in which it was utilized in
relation to the development of international law so as to illustrate the unique Iraqi experience
within the Mandate system. I will turn to a detailed description of how Iraqi semi-peripheral
sovereignty was constructed by the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva. I will end, with
a focus on the narrative of oil concessions and agreements that would bring some important
insights on the characteristics of Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty – a sovereignty that turned out
to be more than a matter of granting Iraq its independence, but rather about controlling access to
the region as a whole for economic exploitation, especially that of oil.

II. The principles behind the Mandate system under international law and the significance
of the ‘A’ Mandates

The Mandate system of the League of Nations has its origins in the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference after the end of World War I, which endeavored to establish a lasting peace, and
settle the ‘colonial question’ in an orderly manner under the rule of law.313 The Allied Powers,
who at that point occupied all the German colonies in Africa, Asia and Oceana, as well as the
Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, eventually came up with the idea of the Mandate system
as a compromise between the ‘liberal’ internationalists and the ‘imperialists,’ who were still in
favor of the old practice of annexation, whereby enemy territory was seen as ‘booty’ or ‘legally
The ‘colonial question’ refers to the manner by which European powers have approached the
‘question’ of the territories and peoples that were colonized. So, for example previous to the
emerging of the international legal order in the twentieth century, European states saw themselves
as ‘civilized Christian nations’ with the ‘right to discovery’. In other words, they had the right to
occupy ‘uncivilized’ nations under international law. The colonial question was therefore dealt with
under international law in a certain manner that emphasized full and unqualified control, whether it
was through occupation, subjugation, cession, and prescription or through bilateral treaties. See
Ruth Gordon, “Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion”, 12 American University
Journal of International Law and Policy 903 (1997), at 938.
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disposable property to be acquired by victors as spoils of war.314 These old colonial practices led
to extreme violent exploitation and plunder despite being justified as beneficial to the native
peoples.
The South African soldier-statesman General Jan Smuts (who was also a lawyer trained
in Roman-Dutch law) was the first to propose a ‘practical scheme’ for the creation of a Mandate
system based on international trusteeship in a pamphlet published in December 1918.315 Smuts
proposed a system of trusteeship based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, specifically the principles of
‘non-annexation’ and ‘self-determination’. He saw the League as the ‘reversionary’ of these
conquered Empires. The main task of the League was that of ‘nursing’ the ‘destitute’ peoples left
behind ‘towards economic and political independence’.316 Wilson based his final draft (the
‘Hirst-Miller draft’) that he submitted to the Conference on Smut’s plan, making several
adjustments by expanding the mandatory idea.317
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reflected these ideas, providing that
the Mandate system undertook a ‘sacred trust of civilization,’ so as to promote the well being and
development of these colonies that were ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’. 318 The main goal was therefore the
protection of native populations from abuse, pillage and exploitation, which was the consequence
of ‘the unfettered discretion of sovereign states’.319 It was this ‘gross disregard of the material and
moral welfare of the natives’ that put the old system of formal colonialism in a moral crisis,
forcing the Great Powers to re-conceptualize the ‘civilizing mission’ into a new form.320 The

Quincy Wright. The League of Nations, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1930), at 24. For the history
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secondary goal was the promotion of the ‘well-being and the development’ of the native
population.321
To understand the innovative character of the Mandate system and its significance, one
would need to deconstruct its legal principles and concepts. This would uncover its genealogies
(underlying its continuities) with past colonial concepts and practices. As Aaron Margalith
observed, the term ‘mandate’ is misleading and was the cause of ‘many a misconception’. Some
regarded it as a ‘new conception of colonial administration and international law’.322 Alfred
Milner, the British statesmen who participated in the drafting of the Covenant, for instance,
believed that they were breaking from the past when he said, ‘we are opening a new chapter in
International Law’.323 Others believed that it was merely old (British) colonial policy and practice
‘internationalized’ by the Mandate system. 324 Both these views if unqualified are doubtless
inaccurate, for although the Mandate system was truly an innovation, it was not necessarily a
complete break from past formations either. For it was theoretically created as a compromise after
all.
Hence, to analyze the legal and political principles of the Mandate is necessary if one is
to be attentive to the contradictory features that lie at the heart of this idea. The three main
concepts of the Mandate system: the ‘trust’325, ‘guardianship/tutelage’ and the ‘mandate’ were
technically borrowed from both European private law and British law.326 Nonetheless, these
concepts have much longer histories, especially in the colonies.327 Edmund Burke referred to a
‘sacred trust of civilization’ in his passionate speech in the House of Commons on Fox’s India
321 B.
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Bill in 1783.328 Similarly, US Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall referred in his decision to
the Indian natives as being ‘in the state of pupillage’ and characterized their relation to the US as
that of ‘a ward to his guardian.’329
The main principles underlying the foundations of Article 22, in particular ‘nonannexation’, ‘international supervision’, and (economic) ‘non-privilege’, have also been used in
the past in different colonial contexts.330 Perhaps the best example was the Berlin Conference
1884-85, which was an attempt to formalize colonial administration, setting down the rules and
procedures for ‘international administration’ (exercised through sovereign rights) of the Congo,
under the guise of ‘preservation’ and ‘well-being and improvement’ of native African tribes.331
The purpose of the arrangement was to minimize inter-state rivalries and allow for free trade.
However, it ultimately collapsed leading to the violent ‘African scramble’.332 Of course, this
international institution was in reality created merely to provide the legal cover to legitimize and
justify European authority over Africa.333
If accordingly the main concepts and principles underlying the Mandate were not new,
then what was it that made the Mandate system an innovation? It was certainly the profound turn
to the ‘international institution,’ as a way to supervise the execution of the Mandatory’s
obligations.334 Although this was attempted at the Berlin Conference, it was ineffective, mostly
because of the lack of accountability. It was in other words (in theory) the addition of the
principle of ‘international accountability’ that differentiated it from its predecessors. 335 The
Mandatory state was consequently considered ‘a protector with a conscience,’ which assumed
obligations towards the native population and the ‘society of nations’.336 It acted according to
‘definitive principles’ that were publicly laid down in the instrument of the mandate, on behalf of
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and in the name of the League (rather than its sovereign right as was the case in the Berlin
Act).337
The organs of the League were the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), the League
Council and the Permanent Court of International Justice. The PMC, composed of ‘experts’ with
previous experience in colonial administration was considered the ‘center of mandatory
supervision’. This body was tasked with supervision through its scrutiny of the annual reports
submitted by the mandatories, advising both the mandatory states and the Council on their
international obligations.338 In fact, it is revealing that the majority of the members of the PMC
were lawyers and jurists, for they saw their function in ‘legalistic terms’ and tended to take a
‘strictly legal approach,’ at times fusing the law with their administrative functions.339 In that
sense, the PMC reflected the legal character of the Mandate system, which was entirely based on
‘legal norms and gave rise to justiciable legal obligations on the part of the mandatory’.340
Our narrative of the Iraqi mandate will remain focused on the PMC. This is to make the
point that the new institutions of the Mandate were based on international law and cannot be
explained otherwise as some scholars have done. Susan Pedersen in her recent book on the
history of the Mandate system, for instance, completely disregards the role of international
law in the mandate system and its legal character, including in her chapter on Iraq. She
refers to ‘international law’ no more than a dozen times in her book, and merely in
passing.341 However, the reality was that PMC were constantly struggling with international law,
for they were aware that they were making international law in their sessions. In that sense, it is
impossible to understand Iraq’s emergence as an independent sovereign state without assessing
the changing dynamics within international law and its order. The story of modern Iraq is
accordingly a story of international law.
The Mandate system was classified based on the stages of development of each territory
compared to the European ‘standard’: the ‘A’ Mandates were designated as the territories of the
former Arab provinces of the Turkish Empire, which were said to have ‘reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized,
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339 Anghie, Imperialism, supra, ft. 21, at 151.
340 Ibid at 153.
341 Susan Pederson, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire, (Oxford university
Press, 2015).
337
338

80

subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the Mandatory until such time
as they are able to stand alone’.342 The ‘B’ Mandates were designated as the territories of Central
Africa, which were considered as requiring a number of years (perhaps decades) of tutelage under
their Mandatories, who were in turn given wider powers for the administration of these territories.
Finally, the ‘C’ Mandates were designated as the ‘primitive’ peoples of the Pacific, who were to
be governed as part of the mandatory territory, considering their remoteness from the metropole
and sparseness of their populations.343
Despite the obvious racial dimensions of such a classification, my argument in this
chapter is that at the heart of such a classification was more a concern for geopolitics and
economic questions of capital accumulation in the region (especially oil in the case of the Middle
East). In other words, the ‘A’ Mandates were classified as such for reasons that were not
primarily because Arabs were seen as actually being ‘more civilized’ than African peoples. The
‘A’ Mandates were carved out in the Near East for several reasons, such as to fulfill previous
promises concerning independence made by the British, but especially for the necessity of
appearing as though colonial exploitation of the old variety was not continuing there. It was also
meant to be a laboratory for experimentation with the concept of sovereignty –searching for the
proper legal ‘ingredients’ needed for the eventual construction of a non-European sovereignty
that was specifically compatible with the geopolitical designs over the semi-peripheral Middle
East as a whole and which ensured the continuous flow of capital and oil.
The main characteristics of the ‘A’ Mandates were that the wishes of the peoples as to the
selection of their Mandatory power would be taken into account, as well as the Mandatory
power’s supposedly limited role of ‘administrative advice and assistance’ in its tutelage of the
territories’ ‘provisional’ independence. As will be shown, however, the reality on the ground was
that the people’s preferences in the region (typified by all out revolts in Syria, Palestine and Iraq
against the Mandate system itself) were eventually disregarded, while the supposedly loose and
limited supervisory structures were forcefully imposed on the region, contributing to the
emergence of a semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq.
Many legal scholars have generally avoided any overall analysis of the ‘A’ Mandates,
which were not only differentiated from the ‘B’ and ‘C’ Mandates, but also as between each
342Covenant
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other. The ‘A’ Mandates were generally regarded as ‘special cases’ that should be studied
separately. Margalith, for example, emphasized that, ‘although there are some important features
that are common to all these territories, there are many others, not less important, which are
peculiar to each area and which give to it a unique character; so that in order to understand clearly
the political situation in the Near Eastern mandates each territory will have to be separately dealt
with’. 344 Nevertheless, the ‘A’ Mandates were in fact all connected and should be so considered,
especially if one is to grasp the political, social and economic background of the region. Although
I am merely concerned with the case of Iraq here rather than making a comparative analysis, I
approach my analysis contextually in the context of the region, as this is the only way to
comprehend the significance of the ‘A’ mandates, while identifying their distinct characteristics
as they relate to international law.

III. The concept of the ‘semi-periphery’ & its significance to international law
What is meant by the ‘semi-periphery’ in this study? The concept of the ‘semi-periphery’
emerged from historical sociology and was famously coined by world-systems theorist, Immanuel
Wallerstein.345 It is used here as an analytic tool to refer to those states that were free from
traditional and formal colonialism, but still subject to informal imperial control. The concept
already contains a certain elasticity that may explain why it is difficult to define, but it essentially
denotes an ‘intermediate’ status of economically and politically weak states that nevertheless had
a limited amount of agency and therefore mediated between centres of economic power,
production and distribution, and underdeveloped zones that supplied raw materials. 346 This
intermediate role contains a unique historical specificity that must not be overlooked by
international legal scholars. Wallerstein himself emphasizes that semi-peripheral states have
‘special political properties’.347 This entails that its juridical and legal properties are likewise
unique. What this study seeks to do is to contribute to the emerging literature in international
legal scholarship that finds this concept very useful in describing the dynamism and uniqueness
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of such ‘intermediate’ role in international law.348 The semi-periphery could be found in notions
of the ‘semi-civilized’ in international law for instance, and this suggests that the concept of the
semi-periphery has a juridical as much as an economic dimension and function. It is this notion of
the ‘semi-civilized’ that is reflected in the ‘A’ Mandate designation in relation to the ‘B’ and ‘C’
Mandates. As Umut Özsu argues, taking the semi-periphery seriously, ‘…simply forces us to
confront the reality that the international legal system is inseparable from a global capitalist order
with a largely Euro-American infrastructure…’

349

It is also inseparable from questions of

geopolitics. The ‘semi-periphery’ is, in other words, the perfect analytic tool to elucidate the
economic dimensions of certain juridical formations and this is the main task at hand.
There has been an unfortunate and ‘remarkable’350 lack of focus on the semi-periphery in
international legal scholarship, in particular those scholars of the TWAIL variety. TWAIL
scholars, who have been at the forefront of exposing how colonialism and imperialism are
constitutive of, and at the very foundation of the history and discipline of international law, have
approached international law based on a strict dichotomy between the periphery and the core.351
They have as a consequence overlooked the role of the semi-periphery in the development of
international law. Moreover, they have not made clear distinctions between the periphery and
semi-periphery in relation to international law, in particular the Mandate system. As Duncan Hall
correctly warns, to theorize the Mandatory system in the wrong historical and political context
could lead to numerous errors, one of which is ‘obscuring’ the relationship between the mandate
systems to other species of imperial governance.352 Moreover, to assume that the ‘A’ Mandates
were ‘special cases’ that should be distinguished from the overall system ‘minimizes the great
importance of the Near East Mandates’. The ‘A’ Mandates should not be considered exceptional
‘special cases’, but rather ‘the main range itself,’ while ‘the African mandates were the lesser
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ridges branching off from it’.353 It is in this way that the semi-peripheral region of the Middle
East could be considered as a (legal) laboratory, especially with regards to the concept of
sovereignty.
Tony Anghie argues that it was the ‘displacement and reconfiguration’ of the location of
sovereignty by international lawyers that allowed for the construction of a novel form of
sovereignty situated within the international institution of the mandate and its processes.354 That
is, the characterization of the mandatory territory as possessing ‘latent sovereignty’ gave the
Mandatory power the space and legitimacy to penetrate the interior of the territory in question,
considerably transforming its character and society.355 Anghie however did not consider how his
analysis, which works well for the periphery (the ‘B’ and ‘C’ Mandates), would work for the
semi-periphery (the ‘A’ Mandate), where sovereignty was conditional and expressly provisional,
rather than (temporarily or permanently) postponed.
In this case then the question (from an international law perspective) becomes – why was
there a need to have a situation where sovereignty appears to be provisional in the first place?
How would the Mandatory power actually have ‘complete access’ to the territory if sovereignty
were not fully suspended as in the periphery? The answer I think lies in the necessity for legal
experimentation with this provisional sovereignty for the future geopolitical control of this oilrich strategic region. That is, the aim of this experiment was to construct a sovereignty that
appeared whole in international law, while the territory remained under the economic influence
of the European powers. It was consequently an attempt to push the concept of sovereignty to its
limits in international law, while preserving and serving the (economic and geopolitical) crux of
imperialism.
I want to therefore suggest that this experimentation in Iraq (at the behest of the
international institution) with the use of certain legal technologies (such as plebiscites, treaties,
organic laws, and minority protection regimes) and certain legal reasoning and logic developed in
Geneva, were essential for the manufacturing of a non-European sovereignty that was unique to
the semi-peripheral Middle East – a semi-peripheral sovereignty that although allowed the newly
‘independent’ state to join the international society of nations, ensured that its sovereignty
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remained both constrained and economically valuable at the same time. It is in this way that what
emerged when Iraq became independent was not only a model for other states in the region,
reflecting the manner in which imperialism remained embedded within the emergent international
legal order, but it also contributed to the imperialist control of the entire region.

IV. Iraq as ‘model mandate’: the instrument of the treaty and its uses in international law
The British decision to invade and occupy Mesopotamia was primarily made to secure
the route to India during the Great War. It was during this short period of British military
occupation that a civil and legal administrative system based on the Indian Raj was established.356
A debate ensued between British officials in London and India; the latter hoping to annex it as a
part of the Raj’s sphere of influence.357 Only following the devastating consequences of the 1920
Revolution, which was the categorical rejection by the native population of the imposition of the
mandate (seen as a veiled form of colonization), did the British consider installing an Iraqi selfgovernment. Following the defeat of the revolution through aerial bombardment of tribes and
villages (with poison gas), the British turned to the idea of creating an outwardly national selfgoverned polity with institutions that would allow them to remain under ultimate control. The
Hejazi Emir Feisal was chosen at the 1921 Cairo Conference as the new King of the incipient
state.358 The British ensured his ascent to the throne, legitimating it through a sham referendum.
Although it was the principal aim of the British to find a way to adhere to the emerging
international order (represented by Wilson’s Fourteen Points and institutionalized in Article 22 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations), while establishing its hegemonic position under the new
Mandatory regime, I would like to shift the focus from the Mandatory state’s actions to the role of
the international legal order itself. Historians of Iraq tend to describe Britain’s approach of
‘indirect rule’ through introducing the treaty as the main reason for the supposed ‘success’ of the
Mandate in Iraq. The British approach, described as a ‘masterstroke’ has generally been credited
with the direction the Iraqi narrative took.359 It was, in other words, their pragmatic outlook, and
the manner in which they brought their past experiences from other parts of the Empire that
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determined the course of events.360 Of course, such an argument is problematic in that it assumes
Iraqis were not a part of this narrative. This is untrue, considering that Britain was in fact reacting
to Iraqi nationalist claims in the first place.
What is more interesting for our purposes is the role of the international legal order and
international law in this narrative, in particular the different interpretations of international law
respecting non-European sovereignty. It is unfortunate that this part of the narrative has usually
been neglected.361
Barely a year after the 1921 Cairo Conference, the British decided to utilize the
instrument that they were most familiar with in colonial contexts – the instrument of the treaty, so
as to express their mandatory relationship. 362 Iraqi nationalists, who the British viewed as
increasingly ‘dangerous’ and ‘irrational’, were vehemently opposed to any form of Mandatory
relationship, demanded nothing less than complete independence. The first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty
was eventually signed in 1922.363 The treaty was written in the contractual language of mutuality
and reciprocity, skillfully reproducing the Mandatory relationship in a more ‘acceptable’ form,
while deliberately avoiding any use of the term. The cornerstone of ‘indirect control’ in the
Treaty was the requirement that the Iraqi government appoint British advisors at every
governmental post. Ministers were required to consult with a British advisor on all courses of
action before coming to any decision. The High Commissioner himself was the advisor to the
King. This parallel British advisory system was generally considered as the backbone of the Iraqi
state. Supplementary agreements ensured that key military, foreign relations, judicial and
financial posts were held in British hands.
Although the whole point of the arrangement was to avoid the appearance of a Mandatory
relationship, the Council of the League of Nations only approved the treaty, in September 1924
after it was confirmed as embodying the Mandate in ‘form and substance.’ 364 The treaty
maintained British dominance of the new Iraqi state and its institutions, limiting the state’s
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constitutional structures. It was consequently intertwined with the 1925 Iraqi Constitution or
Organic Law, enshrining wide executive powers and constricting parliamentary sovereignty, so as
to allow the King and Cabinet (through the influence of the High Commissioner) to uphold the
provisions of the treaty.365 For instance, Article 26(3) gave the King the power to override
constitutional procedures by dissolving parliament and issuing ordinances that had ‘the force of
law’ for the fulfillment of ‘treaty obligations’.366 Moreover, any measure pertaining to the treaty
did not require the approval of parliament. Finally, the King had an absolute veto over all laws
and ministerial orders. 367 The Constitution, therefore, ensured that the entire relationship
between the Iraqi state and Britain remained outside the constitutional order, wholly governed by
the treaty, which was at that point emanating from international law and its order. 368 This
arrangement allowed the British wide room to influence the King and pressure him not to deviate
from the treaty, and in turn British imperial policy.
To trace the evolution of treaty-making by the British in the context of international law
would be useful so as to grasp the way this instrument functioned in the case of Iraq, and the
nature of the emerging international legal order at the time. The British brought past colonial
practices from their long experiences in colonial administration, in particular India and Egypt, to
the Iraqi plane. The American international lawyer, Quincy Wright made such an observation,
suggesting that the British tradition of colonial administration, which allows for the subordination
of form to substance was developed in India and Egypt and imported to the case of Iraq: ‘If
British administrators can make the government run the way they want,’ he wrote, ‘they are
willing to dispense with the appearance of power’.369
The instrument of the treaty was used in the nineteenth century to create ‘native states’ or
Indian princely states that were defined by a unique ‘quasi-sovereignty’ that was differentiated
from international law. As Lauren Benton has shown, Foreign Office officials at the time were
elaborating this treaty law (as well as other colonial legal instruments) as being a separate type of
‘imperial law’ that should be distinguished from international law.370 Several international legal
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scholars, in particular C.H Alexandrowicz, have shown that during the nineteenth century, a
universalizing positivist international legal order emerged replacing the previous more pluralist
order, which was based on natural law.371 This positivist order was based on the exclusion of all
‘uncivilized’ nations from the ambit of international law, which was defined as exclusively
western and ‘civilized’. The ‘universal’ was hence ‘located in Europe,’ while ‘there was a shared
willingness to apply [western] standards of political and legal practice universally as well as a
readiness to deny admission to the international community to these states that fail to meet these
required standards’.372 This shift to positivism led treaties that were signed with non-European
states to be interpreted to the latter’s detriment, as positivists ignored the circumstances in which
these treaties were signed.373 Consequently, ‘the history of violence and military conquest which
led to the formation of these treaties plays no part in the positivist’s approach to the treaty’.374
Therefore, in the case of the Indian princely states, the instrument of the treaty was utilized to
exclude these states from the ambit of (civilized Western) international law and the society of
nations.
It also led to the construction of the notion of ‘divisible sovereignty,’ which asserted that
sovereignty could be held in degrees with full sovereignty reserved for the imperial power.375 In
this way, these Indian princely states were given a certain degree of internal sovereignty and even
considered as independent, although they lacked international personality and were excluded
from the society of nations. Furthermore, Britain had the right to intervene and disregard their
obligations under the treaty whenever they saw fit. This was a very similar arrangement to the
Persian Gulf States, which also had signed treaties with the British government. These treaties
similarly gave the Shaikhdoms internal autonomy, in return for the surrendering of their external
sovereignty and the maintenance of British ‘paramountcy’ in the Gulf.376 The Gulf treaties were
likewise differentiated from the ambit of international law. The tracing of the evolution of these
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instruments within other colonial contexts emphasizes that ‘the politics of sovereignty within
empires generated new legal practices,’ that I would argue did not entirely disappear after the
emergence of the new post-war international legal order, as the very concept of sovereignty (as it
relates to non-Europeans) was shaped by these practices.377
While the instrument of the treaty was utilized to exclude the non-European from
international law and its order in the nineteenth century, in the case of Iraq, the treaty was brought
in to do the opposite: to express the Mandatory relationship that would eventually create Iraq as a
‘sovereign state,’ and lead to its eventual membership in international society. My argument,
however, is that the legal experiment that ensued in Iraq brought about novel legal practices (or
refined old instruments, such as the treaty itself) ensuring that Iraq’s inclusion into international
society would still be an exclusion. This exclusion, however, would now occur within the ambit
of international law rather than without it. It is therefore ironic that the treaty was brought in so as
to avoid using the Mandate directly but to do so indirectly (i.e. to exclude to include), and yet the
inclusion of Iraq into the society of nations as will be shown below was constrained by a new
treaty and by the imperialism embedded within international law (i.e. to include to exclude, so as
to include to exclude again).
The 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty brought about some confusion as to the British proposal that
the Mandatory relationship was to be expressed in treaty form rather than the mandate itself. This
was because it created the ambiguous position, whereby the British had ‘a mandate for Iraq vis-àvis the League, and not one vis-à-vis Iraq’.378 This was reflected in Lord Palmer’s speech before
the Council where he said that ‘Iraq has advanced too far along the path laid down in Article 22
of the Covenant for the particular form of control contemplated in that article to be any longer
appropriate…[t]he treaty and connected documents place the British government in a position
vis-à-vis Iraq to discharge their obligations toward the League…’379 The Council, as mentioned
earlier, approved the treaty as reflecting the mandatory relationship in substance rather than in
form.380 The decision of the Council stipulated that the purpose of the treaty was ‘to ensure the
complete observance and execution in Iraq of the principles which the acceptance of the Mandate
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was intended to secure.’381 Although the mandate was not ratified, it remained the operative
document, defining the obligations of the British government towards the League and its
Covenant.382 The PMC, which also had some doubts, eventually came to the same conclusion that
a Mandate existed in Iraq despite this unusual arrangement. 383 Similarly, although certain
international lawyers had some misgivings maintaining that it was possible to argue that a
Mandate did not exist in Iraq,384 most scholars were eventually convinced that not only was there
a mandate in Iraq, but that ‘the form of the documents seem to comply more accurately with the
terms of Article 22…than is the case with any other class A mandate’.385 Lindley, for instance,
maintained that Iraq was a ‘sovereign state’ that was subject to treaty conditions and advice from
British advisers and experts.386
The treaty provided that an Organic Law (a constitution) and an Electoral Law would be
passed by a Constituent Assembly. Iraq was to maintain its indivisible sovereignty as a
constitutional monarchy with a representative government.387 The instrument of the treaty was
therefore used in this instance to distance Iraq from the mandate, while at the same time
constructing a limited sovereignty in form, which would give Britain some control and indirect
influence in the same manner that it did in India and Egypt. The difference here was that the
sovereignty given was not divisible, but rather indivisible with constraints imposed by the treaty.
The instrument of the treaty remained a subjugating one even with the presence of
(formal) indivisible sovereignty that allowed the ‘high contracting’ parties to come to a
‘contractual agreement’. However, my argument goes further to claim that subjugation and semicolonialism was not only maintained by the instrument of the treaty, but also by the newly
Ibid. Bentwich claims that the instrument is purposely referred to as a decision rather than a
mandate with intention of avoiding the hated word. See Bentwich, supra, ft. 320, at 57.
382 O.J., V, at 1217
383 P.M.C., Min, VII, 10-14, 123.
384 The other viewpoint that appears to have been prevalent at the time was that the Iraqi people
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misunderstood the legal significance of the ‘mandate’ and confused it with actual ‘sovereign’ control
(either because the legal niceties of the mandate were mistranslated or unable to be translated into
the Arabic language). The catch-22 logic of this is evident: Iraqis were either ignorant of the facts or
unable to grasp the facts due to their inferior culture. Moreover, this notion that Iraqis were
somehow ‘tricked’ into the mandatory relationship is not only a reflection of the racist orientalist
idea that assumes that Iraqis were unable to ascertain their own conditions in a critical manner, but
also completely disregards the role of violence (whether the crushing the 1920 revolt that rejected
the mandate or the use of martial law) in the imposition of the mandatory relationship.
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emerging international legal order itself, which was receptive to this old instrument of colonial
administration. I am therefore proposing that the Iraqi arrangement should not be merely
understood as a pragmatic reaction to a mere coincidence of events. It was no coincidence that the
1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty was sanctioned by the Council as an international instrument that
embodied the principles of the Covenant, in turn becoming a part of international law rather than
differentiated from it as a form of imperial law as in the case of the nineteenth century. Hence,
whether Iraq was granted independence in 1932 or several years later, did not make any
difference, for the international legal order in place at the time only allowed for a specific
(narrow) sovereignty to emerge, and this is what tends to be misapprehended by many scholars of
Iraq and the Mandate system. I will return to this point when discussing the manner in which Iraq
became independent or ‘emancipated’ from the mandate, and the unique semi-peripheral
sovereignty that arose thereafter.
I want to end this section by focusing on one particular episode whose significance I
believe tends to be overlooked by historians, but it elucidates the nature of the treaty and
international law. This episode occurred when the treaty was stalled in the Constituent Assembly
(the body that was tasked to pass the Iraqi constitution -or Organic law- and ratify at treaty in the
same time). While the treaty was signed in October 1922, it was only ratified in June 1924. The
circumstances of ratification were tense as opposition to the treaty was building not only on the
streets, but also amongst nationalist political parties. When the King, who was trying to appeal to
public opinion refused British advice to arrest the leaders of the anti-treaty movement, the High
Commissioner, Percy Cox, took matters in his own hands when the King fortuitously fell ill with
appendicitis to swiftly declare martial law, arrest nationalists and dissenters, closing down antitreaty newspapers and banning political parties and trade unions.388
The Assembly ended up ratifying the Treaty (by a narrow majority of 13 votes) after it
was forced to form quorum, as it was given the ultimatum to either accept the treaty or allow for
the possibility of reverting to the Mandate, ‘in its original form’.389 The final wording of the
resolution that was passed unmistakably implied the reluctance that was predominant: ‘This
Assembly considers that many of the articles of the Treaty and Agreements are so severe that Iraq
would be unable to discharge the responsibilities of the alliance desired by the people of Iraq.
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But it relies upon and trusts the honour of the British government…and is confident that it will
not agree to burden Iraq nor to prejudice the aspirations of the people. It is only this confidence
and trust on the part of Iraq which has induced the Assembly to accept the statements which have
been received from His Excellency the High Commissioner on behalf of the British Government,
to the effect that the British Government, after the ratification of the Treaty, will amend with all
possible speed the Financial Agreement…’390
It was therefore through martial law that the instrument of the treaty and the Mandate was
eventually ratified, and the legal structures that would govern the Iraqi state were legitimized.
This fact tends to be overlooked as a mere tactic by the British to enforce the treaty, but there was
surely more to it than that. As Chapter 6 will show, this episode reveals that semi-peripheral
sovereignty could only be maintained through the violence of emergency law. In other words,
these were in fact two sides of the same coin. The imposition of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty through
martial law illustrates that ‘civilizing’ violence remained at the heart of the new international
legal order and the mandate system.391 In that sense, martial law would reappear throughout the
period in question, in fact peaking after Iraqi independence in the 1940s and 1950s. This could be
explained by the fact that martial law (and the laws of emergency) were already by now a regular
feature of the institutions of the new Iraqi state, but also at the heart of the treaty relationship
itself, and in turn, the mechanisms of the international institution of the Mandate and its order.

Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration of Iraq for the period April
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V. The manufacturing of Iraqi independence & the obfuscation of the economic dimensions
of semi-peripheral sovereignty

I will end this chapter with a detailed analysis of how Iraq was construed as having
reached independence through the processes of the Mandate system and under international law.
This will allow for an analysis of the sovereignty that emerged, identifying its unique features in
the context of the semi-periphery. To reiterate, my argument is that the semi-peripheral
sovereignty that emerged when Iraq was proclaimed as an independent state was instrumental in
creating the structures that perpetuated its subordination, including more broadly the control of
the semi-peripheral Middle East and its integration into the markets of the world capitalist
economy. It is for this reason that Iraq was considered a ‘model’ mandate for other states in the
region, and this explains its significance as the proudest achievement of the Mandate system and
the League.
The ‘A’ Mandates were drawn up so as to bring about an interconnected economic block
in the Middle East whereby the Great (mandatory) Powers would have continual economic
influence, specifically through access to oil resources. The fundamental purpose of this
arrangement and the ensuing doctrine of semi-peripheral sovereignty was to ensure that an
‘independent’ Iraqi state was voluntarily – through the juridical forms of the ‘equality’ and
‘reciprocity’ embedded in contracts and concessions – providing access to its oil deposits for the
world economy. Granting Iraq a form of sovereignty, justified under international law, would
make this possible as long as the oil concessions and agreements were resolved separately (as
was the case) in the interests of both the Mandatory power as well as the other Great Powers.
To substantiate this assertion, I will examine the PMC deliberations on both, the question
of the admission of Iraq into the society of nations, as well as those relating to oil concessions and
agreements in the region. The PMC reports reveal some interesting and contradictory views on
the meaning of independence in the context of the Mandate system and international law. It will
be evident that a closer look at the PMC discussions suggests that questions relating to the
economic implications of independence were vital. By focusing on the economic dimensions of
these discussions, it will be more apparent how the question of political sovereignty related to the
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wider economic principle of ‘open door’, while the question of oil concessions was intentionally
separated from the overall analysis. Although the economic dimensions of the Mandate system
tended to remain in the background of the PMC discussions dealing with Iraq’s political
sovereignty, my argument is that they were the most important and should be considered as its
most significant characteristic. I will end this section by turning to the controversial discussions
relating to the oil pipeline agreements that were meant to connect Iraq, Palestine and Syria with
the purpose of getting Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean and ultimately to the world. This will
illuminate the significance of Iraq’s sovereignty to the region as a whole. It is therefore my
intention to reveal the crucial connections between the oil concessions and pipeline agreements,
to the question of the sovereignty of Iraq in the broad context of the semi-colonial Middle East.
On September 1929, Britain agreed to support Iraq’s entry to the League of Nations and
in turn its formal independence by 1932.392 There was hence the need for a new treaty detailing
the arrangements of the relations between the two states after formal independence. The ‘AngloIraqi Treaty of Alliance’ was ratified in 1930 only after the most trusted and unscrupulous of the
King’s court, Nurī al-Saīd headed the cabinet and used his infamous firm tactics to stifle any
parliamentary opposition. The treaty’s contents maintained a ‘close’ alliance between the two
states, providing that the British were bound to assist Iraqi forces when necessary. Although Iraq
would finally attain control of its own military, it was obligated to receive training and equipment
from Britain, and in return the Royal Air Force (RAF) would maintain two military bases rentfree by the government, while preserving its privileges and immunities.393
Iraqi sovereignty, according to the treaty, was therefore clearly conditional and riddled
with constraints – especially the British right to move troops over Iraqi soil, and the continued
employment of some British judges.394 As for the matter of British ‘advisors’ and ‘experts’, the
treaty stipulated that this arrangement would remain intact. The economic dimensions of the 1930
treaty were intentionally vague and couched in military terms, so as not to excite any suspicion
that the British were using their mandatory position for the purpose of capitalist exploitation. 395
A separate financial annex attached to the Treaty ensured that the major national and strategic
assets in the country, in particular, the Port of Basra and the railways ultimately remained under
See Pederson, Susan. “Getting Out of Iraq – in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to
Normative Statehood,” American Historical Review, (2010): 975-1000.
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British administrative control despite partial transfer of legal ownership.396 In that way, the
Treaty was not merely the basis for ‘serving Britain’s political and military interests in Iraq,’ but
also provided ‘the means for protecting and widening British economic interests there’.397
The PMC 398 was convening its sixteenth session in Geneva when it received word from
the British representative of its intention to recommend Iraq for admission to the League of
Nations.399 At the afternoon meeting, the chairman swiftly invited the PMC to determine the
procedure that would need to be followed in the case of the emancipation of Iraq from the
Mandate, as well as the independence of the ‘A’ mandate states in general. He stated that
members would need to consider whether Iraq had reached the ‘degree of maturity’ that was
acceptable for their independence.400 This would also include agreeing on the required guarantees
to protect the interests of members of the League.401 The PMC eventually decided that it would
‘welcome entry of Iraq to the League if and when certain conditions were fulfilled, in particular
that it becomes apparent that Iraq was able to stand alone, and that effective guarantees be
secured for the observance of all treaty obligations in Iraq for the benefit of racial and religious
minorities and of the members of the League of Nations’.402 In the mean time, the PMC would
take the opportunity to question the accredited representative regarding Iraq’s ability to govern
itself. Upon receiving this observation from the commission, the Council adopted a resolution on
January 13, 1930, which requested the PMC to submit any suggestions that might assist it in
coming to a conclusion.403
By the eighteenth session in June 1930, the PMC appointed a subcommittee (including
members Van Rees, Rappard, Palacious, and Count de Penha Garcia) to study the general
conditions that would need to be fulfilled rather than merely deal with the case of Iraq.404 Count
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de Penha Garcia was appointed as rapporteur.405 He subsequently submitted his preliminary
report, where he decided that questions pertaining to general principles of law should be dealt
with first (i.e. the general conditions of admission) and not the particular case of Iraq.406 He went
on to claim that ‘there is one primary and incontestable principle – that a mandate must terminate
when certain conditions are fulfilled’.407 It was the ‘maintenance of peace’, he said, that was the
primary factor in the development and termination of the Mandate.408 Moreover, he made it clear
that this was connected to the preservation of the ‘continuing rights’ of the Mandatory powers:
‘…all States members of the League…were guaranteed by the mandatory power the peaceful
enjoyment of a number of rights. Consequently, when a Mandate comes to an end this position
must be adapted to the new state of affairs’.409
Finally, termination of the Mandate would depend on the welfare of the native
population, as well as, the consent of the Mandatory power, which retained a ‘moral
responsibility’ for the consequences of the termination.410 The Count then moved to list the
factors that needed to be considered to determine the extent of ‘maturity of the country
judged…from a technical [and] juridical standpoint’.411 These were as follows: conditions of
internal and external security, the social and moral conditions of the population, the spirit of
existing legislation, economic and financial conditions, obligations arising out of agreements with
the mandatory, obligations assumed towards members of the League, guarantees for freedom of
conscience and religion, guarantees for the protections of minorities, guarantees for an adequate
judicial system, guarantees for safeguarding the moral and material interests developed under the
mandate regime, and lastly the adoption of the principle of economic equality to the new situation
created by the termination of the mandate.412
The preliminary report above demonstrates how the PMC were in fact making
international law by formulating the conditions of sovereignty through the Mandate process that
would later be applied to the case of Iraq. It was considered a purely legal question, which was
distinct from the political and economic questions. It was in other words, a positivist analysis that
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emphasized neutrality and legality. The fact was, of course, that such a separation in international
law was in reality an impossibility, for these principles and standards were being formulated and
‘set’ in the words of the Count himself by [and one should add in the interests of], ‘the rich and
powerful States’. 413

It is consequently by focusing on the economic dimensions of the

discussions that the true nature of this novel semi-peripheral sovereignty becomes clear. It is no
surprise that the principle of open door or economic equality was considered by the Count to be
the very basis of the mandate system.414 It was also clear that the mandatory power, including the
members of the League, expected the continuation of certain economic rights, and it was on this
specific question of ‘economic equality’ that disagreements arose as it was obviously
contradictory and so challenging to resolve an obligatory open door with independence.
By the twentieth session, which was held in June 1931, there were three separate
memoranda on the points in question written by Van Rees, Lord Lugard, and Count Garcia. These
memoranda raised some interesting issues regarding the different interpretations of independence
under the Mandate system. Van Rees attempted to make the argument that the readiness of a
people for independence, ‘is a question of fact and not of principle, and the answer could be
found only in local conditions as a whole, connected with political and administrative
organizations and their working with the economic and social development of the territory.’415
Moreover, when the mandate of the territory in question lapses, an entirely new state comes into
being. For this reason, Van Rees emphasized that, ‘you cannot say that the mandate is abrogated
and at the same time use the mandate as the legal basis for the establishment of conditions which
must be fulfilled by the emancipated territory’.416 Although special conditions should be imposed
on the new state, these conditions must have their basis on ‘considerations foreign to the
mandate’. If these conditions, ‘which the civilized world have the right to make on the new state’,
are not accepted, then the territory in question would not be worthy to take its place among the
society of nations.417 Van Rees then turned to the principle of economic equality and admitted
that to re-establish this obligation would ‘gravely impair the sovereignty of the territories
declared independent.’418 So, there must be a way to square this circle as it were and as will be
clear this was done by emphasizing the notion of ‘reciprocity’419 after independence – i.e. that the
Ibid, at 206.
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newly ‘independent’ state would be able to negotiate freely on the basis of reciprocity with the
former Mandatory powers on issues relating to the economic sphere and this would suffice. The
reality was that this resolution did not take into account that the international legal order served
the interests of the powerful imperial states and real ‘reciprocity’ was not possible in such a
situation.
The British member, Lord Lugard’s memorandum dealt with the meaning of the term
‘standing alone’.420 He argued for a liberal interpretation of the words ‘to stand alone,’ and
expected a slow transition, whereby a state may need to stand alone, ‘with the aid of a prop, or
buttress to lean on’.421 Lugard ended with a summary of what was essential for the internal and
external conditions of withdrawal of the mandate. Regarding the former question of internal
conditions, the Council must be satisfied that the new state could maintain internal order and
efficient government; the welfare and just treatment of racial, linguistic and religious minorities
must be assured; the new State must be able and willing to fulfill the obligations it undertakes;
that it has functioned for a certain time with success, and that there is an adequate prospect of
economic and financial stability.422 As for the question of external conditions, Lugard listed the
following: that the state must accept ‘the general principles of international law’; where the
redisposition of the capitulations are stipulated in the mandate, it would also have to accept the
obligations therein; religious freedom and justice must be assured to foreigners, and finally
treaties made by the mandatory on behalf of the territory must remain in force unless denounced
by the new state.423
Lugard believed that these conditions were necessary and justified, because
‘emancipation from a mandate is something more than independence, as is shown by the fact that
Iraq, though subject to the mandate regime, is already independent.’424 As for the principle of
economic equality, Lugard did not find it as an essential part of the mandate system.425 This was
not surprising considering that Britain already had their economic interests secure in Iraq – there
was no need to insist on this point as the other members. The notion that ‘emancipation’ from the
mandate process was ‘more than independence’ reveals a lot on the characteristics of the
emergent semi-peripheral sovereignty, for concrete sovereignty on its own was unacceptable.
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What was required was sovereignty that was incorporated into the international legal order on the
terms of the imperial powers.
Finally, turning to Count Garcia’s memorandum, it was reiterated that withdrawal from
the mandate should not affect the maintenance of peace. With regards to the question of the
conditions, he argued that to require an emancipated territory to give equality of economic
opportunity to members of the League would be unreasonable, but that this privilege may be
granted voluntarily upon condition of reciprocity by the new state.426
The members subsequently discussed these three memoranda in the twentieth session.
Orts believed that with the combination of these three reports, one would be able to draft a reply
to the Council. The PMC ultimately agreed that that the list of obligations to be imposed by the
mandated territory at the time of its emancipation from a mandate, as well as, the criteria by
which independence would be granted should both be dealt with by the Council. Orts reminded
the members that the commission’s job was a legal one – that of laying down the legal principles
for emancipation from the mandate, and it was not its place to take political action, which was for
the Council to do.427
A topic that was discussed at length was the question of economic equality and its
perpetuation as a guarantee. One argument that was made by Orts was the impossibility of
imposing this principle on a truly independent state, as it would amount to an impairment of
sovereignty.428 The chairman’s response was that this principal should be safeguarded as its
existence amounted to, ‘an acquisition on the part of the League…in that its application could not
but contribute…to the maintenance of world peace’.429 Merlin added that the principle was
necessary precisely to protect the mandated territory from a situation where the ex-mandatory
power would take advantage of its position and dominate the new state economically or to set a
‘price for its emancipation’.430 The principle of the open door was therefore, according to this
argument, a protection from the potential of future exploitation from the ex-mandatory power. It
was eventually agreed by members that economic equality was to be extended through the ‘mostfavored-nation-treatment’ to members of the League, which should be granted on condition of
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reciprocity for a transitional period.431 In other words, it was not to be an obligation, but rather
voluntarily given by the new state. This assumed that the principle of ‘reciprocity’ in international
law was by itself enough to protect the new state from the economic domination of the powerful
ex-mandatory, which was far from reality in Iraq, where Britain dominated nearly every aspect of
its economy.
The PMC concluded its findings to the Council by listing the conditions needed to be
fulfilled before a mandated territory could be released from a mandated regime.432 The Council
approved the PMC’s report on September 4, 1931. It was only then that the question regarding
Iraq’s case was refereed to the PMC in its twenty-first session to advise whether it has been
fulfilled based on the general principles previously laid down.
The PMC ultimately but reluctantly came to the conclusion that Iraq satisfied the general
conditions above. In assessing the de facto conditions they examined The Special Report…on the
Progress of Iraq, 1920-1931, which was submitted by the British and painted an auspicious
picture of the progress of the Iraqi state and its institutions. The report claimed that Iraq had, ‘all
the working machinery of a civilized government.’433 Britain asserted that it has appropriately
fulfilled its Mandatory obligations. The High Commissioner at the time, Henry Dobbs argued that
Article 22 of the Covenant, which required that a Mandate could only be terminated when a state
was able to ‘stand alone without the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the
Mandatory,’ should be interpreted narrowly; Iraq was able to ‘stand alone’ administratively – not
militarily or economically, but that was sufficient.434
By June 1931, the PMC, skeptical throughout its deliberations, while noting that certain
provisions of the treaty were ‘somewhat unusual’, nonetheless unanimously agreed to admit Iraq
after a declaration confirming Britain’s continuing ‘moral responsibility’ to the implications of
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Iraq’s independence was made.435 On October 1932, Iraq became the first (and ultimately only)
mandated state to gain formal independence through the processes of the Mandatory system.
The PMC’s deliberations above reveal an attempt to construct within international law a
specific form of sovereignty that would ensure the imperial powers’ geopolitical and economic
dominance of Iraq and accordingly the semi-peripheral Middle East as a whole. One could notice
that although questions pertaining to economics were considered as paramount concerns that
should be taken into account, they were purposely set aside as either secondary or technical in
nature. Yet, it is my argument that if one were to focus on the underlying economic aspects of
these deliberations that the purpose of the mandate system, in particular, the ‘A’ mandates of the
Middle East would be clear. As one commentator observed, although the ‘A’ Mandates were
clearly made to be transitory, they were likely to leave behind ‘a permanent economic monument
in the shape of a new overland route across the desert from Europe to India to Persia’.436 The
Mandate system as it relates to the semi-periphery was hence approached in a specifically
geopolitical and spatial manner that was (ironically) quite similar to the economic framework that
defined the Sykes-Picot agreement.
An examination of the oil concessions and pipeline agreements thus illuminates the
specificity of the form of sovereignty that emerged in Iraq. The ‘A’ mandate system linked the
three mandated areas economically by an oil pipeline from the Mosul oilfields to the ports of
Haifa in Palestine and Tripoli of Syria. Moreover, the British government surveyed the route for a
railway from Haifa to Baghdad, ‘that would pass by what is today British mandated territory, and
thus bring the peoples of Iraq and Palestine into one trade orbit’.437 Bentwich considered these
vital economic links to be such a defining characteristic of the ‘A’ Mandates that he believed that
they would eventually bring about the political integration of the Arab states.438 Before moving
forward with this analysis, the economic principles of the Mandate system must be identified and
described.
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VI. The principle of economic equality, the ‘open door’ or the freedom of capitalist
accumulation under international law
The principle of economic equality, which is also known more generally as the principle
of the ‘open door’, was one of the most important economic principles of the Mandate system. It
ensured that the mandatory territory was (legally) open to world markets, essentially allowing its
natural resources to be exploited by the members of the League. It was this principle, along with
rapprochement439, and rationalization440 that made up the economic principles underlying the
League.441 The idea behind this principle was that, ‘the Mandatory must be discouraged from
deriving exclusive economic and other advantages from the performance of its task’.442 This
(theoretically) removed the ‘international friction’ that would naturally arise from the
‘monopolization of commerce and resources’ by any one power.443 The reputable Polish-British
international lawyer and jurist, Hersch Lauterpacht considered that based on the travaux
preparatoire preceding the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the principle of
economic equality was ‘admittedly modeled after the pattern of the Berlin Treaty of 1885 relating
to the Congo and the treaty of St Germain of 1919 which revised it’.444 However, the difference
between this principle and its earlier uses at the end of the nineteenth century was that it
prohibited any ‘position of unilateral advantage’ for Western powers, because ‘permanent
inequality of the Mandated Territory in the field of international trade must…be rejected
as…contrary to the intention of the framers of the Mandate.’ ‘The regime of the Mandate,’
Lauterpacht continues, ‘was not conceived as a system of economic exploitation of the Mandated
Territories by all the Members of the League as distinguished from exploitation by the Mandatory
only.’445
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The principle of economic equality (and the open door) was therefore interpreted under
international law as not amounting to exploitation in any way, but the reality as the case of Iraq
exemplifies, was that economic exploitation continued unabated. The only difference was that it
was now justified under the new post-war international legal order, and operated under the mantle
of development and the cloak of a new and justified form of sovereignty.
The ‘open door’ emphasized that the preservation of free trade and investment was
necessary for the (semi-peripheral) sovereignty that would emerge after a mandate had run its
course. Even the ‘maintenance of peace’, which as we saw was referred to throughout the PMC
deliberations, actually meant the maintenance of peace for the very purpose of free trade with the
members states of the League.446 Hence, in theory, the open door’s purpose was to avoid the
possibility of war by permitting the Great Powers a share in the access to resources of the newly
acquired territories rather than the maintenance of the old approach of ‘economic fortification’
around one’s territories – a policy known as the ‘sphere of influence’. In addition, the open door
was generally justified on the basis that the free market through competition would ultimately be
beneficial for the development of native society (driving up wages) and its economy. The open
door policy was therefore maintained to be favorable for all parties involved.
New research on the economic functions of the League generally lacks analysis of the
link between the political and juridical aspects of the Mandate system and exactly how it was
connected to its underlying economic features (particularly in the semi-periphery), and how it
furthered capitalism.447 The fact was that a specific form of political order and a corresponding
legal ideology/doctrine was essential for the principle of the open door to work in the semiperiphery. It is for this reason that the US government was satisfied with Britain’s ultimate
control over Iraq, for as long as the semi-peripheral sovereignty that emerged would ensure, ‘the
kind of political order receptive to capitalism and foreign investment,’ preserving ‘the proper
climate for business activity,’ the US government would not oppose British designs over Iraq or
the region.448
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Semi-peripheral sovereignty therefore could not be understood without an examination of
the economic principles that were meant to be reconciled with it, and effectively maintained in
the region. Benjamin Gerig, an American member of the League Secretariat and a proponent of
free trade, wrote one of the most important studies on the principle of ‘open door’ in 1930 in
which he highlighted the significance of this link when he concluded his book by stating that ‘the
Mandate system is undoubtedly the most effective instrument yet devised to make the Open Door
effective’.449 It is exactly this link between the economic principle of the open door to the semiperipheral sovereignty that emerged in the case of Iraq that should be studied, as the
subordination of the mandated territory of the semi-periphery to the world economy was meant to
remain intact and sustained in another form after the termination of the mandate.

VII. The independence of oil pipelines: semi-peripheral sovereignty in relation to oil
concessions in the Middle East

To understand this link further, I will explore the discussions regarding the IPC oil
concessions in Iraq and the (1931) pipeline agreements with Palestine and Syria, to explore how
they overlapped with Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty. This analysis will illuminate the unique
characteristics of semi-peripheral sovereignty. It will also reveal its effects on the emergent
spatial configuration and in turn on the workers in Iraq, which will be dealt with in Chapters 4
and 5.
Oil was always at the backdrop of Iraq’s modern history, although it has sometimes been
deliberately overlooked. One notices this in the PMC deliberations– oil concessions in the case of
Iraq were merely discussed in the context of economic equality and even then, only dealt with in
detail in relation to the mandated territories that were affected by the construction of a new
pipeline that was intended to allow access of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.450 It will be clear
how although the ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ discussed above was intended to make the open
door policy function on the ground, the question of oil was ultimately distinguished from it by
certain legal reasoning. Instead, the open door policy that was meant to (in theory) protect the
interests of the Iraqi government by allowing competitive tenders from various prospects on the
Benjamin Gerig. The Open Door and the Mandate System: A Study of Economic Equality before and
since the establishment of the Mandates System, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930), at 199.
450 PMC Minutes, 20th session, at 144-9,168-77.
449

104

market, and prevent monopolization, was in reality evaded through the use of an innovative
instrument of the oil consortium. This instrument allowed the (legal) principle of open door to be
satisfied (at least as far as the PMC were concerned) partially and only in theory, while
effectively circumventing it in practice. Hence, in the end, the open door policy was differentiated
by the PMC in every legal question that arose on the ‘A’ Mandates, whether in Iraq or the region.
My intention in this part of my argument is to emphasize that only by bringing this oil narrative
closer to the question of ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ could one would grasp its unique features.
The ‘A’ Mandates were not confirmed nor allocated (as the ‘B’ and ‘C’ mandates) until
Anglo-French negotiations over Mesopotamian oil (mostly concentrated in the province of Mosul
and described by a German technician as ‘a veritable lake of petroleum of almost inexhaustible
supply’451) were resolved and formalized in the San Remo Conference in Italy in April 1920. The
complementary oil agreement secured a 25 percent share of the oil output for the French
government, but made it clear that ‘the petroleum company shall be under permanent British
control’.452 The British justified taking control of the oil fields in Mosul by reference to the
London-based Turkish Petroleum Company’s (TPC) unratified pre-war concession agreement
with the Ottoman government of 1914, which secured the British Anglo-Persian Company (later
to be renamed BP) 50 percent of the share of the concession, while promising the ‘native
government’ up to a 20 percent share.453 Despite denials that the British were attempting to
devise a monopoly, US protests over their exclusion from the agreement, alleging a violation of
the open door principle were eventually conceded, leading to a revised agreement in 1923. The
US-owned Standard Oil Company was consequently promised a 25 percent share of its monopoly
concession in the exploitation of oil in Iraq.454
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Following this understanding, the Turkish Petroleum Company (later renamed the Iraq
Petroleum Company [IPC] in 1929) began direct negotiations with the Iraqi government.
Although the Iraqi government with the help of the British negotiated certain terms that would
prevent the TPC from intentionally delaying production for the purpose of inflating oil prices on
the market (such as a timeline for the construction of a pipeline and a minimum level of
production), the most important demand which would have ensured the implementation of these
terms – an actual share of ownership, did not materialize. The oil companies refused to budge on
this issue, and the Iraqi government finally capitulated, signing the concession in March 1925.
The oil companies were therefore successful in establishing an exclusive TPC [IPC] concession,
which included exclusive rights of exploration in all of Iraq (with the exception of the province of
Basra), while fully removing Iraqi part-ownership.
These negotiations occurred while the question of Mosul was still looming. 455 The
territorial dispute over Mosul, the province in which the bulk of these oil fields were located, was
yet to be determined. The League of Nations Commission of Inquiry that was appointed and sent
to investigate the validity of Turkish claims over the province eventually recommended that
Mosul remain attached to the state of Iraq.456 Although the commission chose not to mention the
recent extensive and exclusive concession in their report, there was a clear correlation between
the two affairs, 457 especially if one were to consider that the British inferred to the Iraqi
government that resolving the oil negotiations swiftly would safeguard Mosul, and would in turn
open the door for British support for Iraqi independence at the League of Nations.458 Moreover,
the commission made an argument that Mosul must remain a part of Iraq from ‘the purely
economic’ point of view, as it cannot be separated from ‘its natural hinterland’. 459 The
Commissioner’s interpretation of ‘purely economic point of view’ was in fact the view of the
multinational corporations and foreign investors, especially the oil companies, who ensured
See Sara Shields, ‘Mosul Questions: Economy, Identity and Annexation,’ in Reeva Simon and
Eleanor Tejirian, eds, The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, (NY: Columbia University of Press, 2004);
Quincy Wright, ‘The Mosul Dispute,’ American Journal of International Law 20:3, July 1926: 453-64.
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access to the most valuable natural resource of the province.460 The British subsequently (as per
the Mosul determination) amended the Anglo-Iraq Treaty to extend the mandate to a further
twenty-five years, while including a provision that immediately terminated the mandate once Iraq
advances to the stage of political development that qualified it for membership at the League. The
oil concession could therefore not be understood in isolation from the semi-peripheral sovereignty
that emerged in Iraq and vice versa.
The arrangement between the oil companies and the Great Powers that was made to
ensure that economic equality (at least in theory) was to be satisfied was in reality more of a
compromise. It has for this reason been described as a ‘slowly opening door’ rather than an actual
‘open door’461 It has similarly been argued that the open door principle was effectively ‘diluted’
in this particular case, because of the fact that in reality, American companies were not permitted
to bid freely for concessionary right; instead one exclusive American group, and this group alone
was absorbed by a monopoly.462 This explains why some members of the PMC made the
observation that the Iraq government appeared to have agreed to a policy of monopolization after
all.463 In that sense, what emerged was a special arrangement, which Gerig called a ‘practical
open door’ in the form of a consortium: ‘a new experiment in international co-operation’.464 This
new mechanism should be analyzed in relation to ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty,’ as it was a part
of the overall legal arrangement that was intended to be a model for the manner in which the
natural resources of the ‘A’ Mandates (in particular Iraqi oil) were to be exploited within the
ambits of the new international legal order. The usefulness of this mechanism in legal reasoning
would remerge in PMC deliberations in Geneva.
The complex arrangement described above remained controvertial, and Geneva was
turned into an international ‘arena for publically contesting’ the strategic interests of the great
powers, especially oil claims.465 These disputes generally occurred within the confines of the
open door principle, and the PMC was called upon to consider petitions that alleged that this
sacred principle was violated.466 It was clear that the principle of the open door needed to be

460Ibid.

Gerig, supra, ft. 449, at 149.
William Stivers, “International Politics and Iraqi Oil, 1918-1928: A Study in Anglo-American
Diplomacy”, Business History Review, Winter, 1981, 55:, pp.517-532; ’ at 533.
463 16 PMCM, at 41-44.
464 Gerig, supra, ft. 449, at 184.
465 Pederson, The Guardians, supra, ft. 341, at 272.
466 Ibid.
461
462

107

addressed and eventually reconciled with this new reality through legal reasoning by the PMC. In
1927, Kastl who was the committee member assigned by the PMC to write a report on whether
the 1925 IPC concession was compatible with the principle of open door (already enshrined in
Article 11 of the 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty), concluded that there was no violation. However, he
made sure to voice his apprehension to the fact that Iraq’s interests would have been better served
if there was open competition, stating that ‘there is no doubt that the extension of the Concession
implies a very great advantage for the Company.’467
The interesting legal reasoning for our purposes was first put forward by Van Rees, who
pointed out that the Iraq Treaty was silent on the point of ‘industrial concessions’ and it could
therefore be inferred that the Iraq government was ‘free to act on its own discretion’ with regards
to the extension of the concession by thirty-five years.468 The point was that there was no
violation of the open door, because oil concessions were an exception. Orts’ responded with a
hint of irony that the Iraqi ‘…people would learn with surprise that the clause [in the Treaty]
referring to economic equality did not apply to Iraq’s principle industry’.469 It was this sort of
legal reasoning that distinguished oil concessions, which would reappear in later PMC
deliberations, in particular those regarding the pipeline agreements with the mandatory
administrations of the other ‘A’ Mandates – Palestine and Syria.
After the IPC began drilling, the company discovered a vast oilfield stretching to the
North of Kirkuk, and decided to use this as an excuse to delay production for further
reconnaissance. It was a longstanding strategy of oil companies to delay and sabotage production
for the purpose of increasing global oil prices, and this was tactfully used against the Iraqi
government, who were demanding the immediate construction of a pipeline to begin production
as per the agreement. The Iraqi government, however, was crippled with a high deficit, and so
had no alternative after prolonged and intense negotiations but to agree to sign a revised
concession in 1925 in exchange for a modest cash advance in 1931. The agreement was later
described by the US State Department’s oil expert as ‘one of the worst oil deals that has ever been
signed’. 470 The revised concession eliminated all taxation of the company’s profits, removed the
minimum production obligation, and the company’s relinquishment of undeveloped plots. It also
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extensively expanded the area of the concession from 192 square miles to 32,000 square miles.471
The subjugating structures within this concession would extend to the entire region through the
conventions signed by the other ‘A’ Mandate states (Palestine, Syria and Lebanon).
The construction of a pair of (bifurcated) oil pipelines were planned to transport Iraqi oil
to the Mediterranean – one branching south to Haifa (Palestine) and the other north to Tripoli
(Syria). These were not only the biggest pipelines in the world at the time, but they were to
increase global oil production fourfold (from 20,000 to 80,000 barrels a day) despite only
representing a fraction of Iraq’s oil production capacity.472 To make this a reality, two identical
pipeline agreements (or conventions) were signed between the IPC and the Palestine and Syrian
mandatory administrations.
The PMC never actually discussed the revised 1931 IPC concession in Iraq, nor was the
issue of whether this concession violated any of the Mandatory provisions of the Anglo-Iraq
Treaty ever raised. There was no need to raise any issue as long as the initial 1925 concession
was established not to have violated the open door principle. Besides, Iraq was close to attaining
‘independence’, and it was ironically this gained ‘sovereignty’ that was to ensure that these
crucial issues were resolved in international law. It is for this reason that one would need to
follow the PMC deliberations elsewhere to get some clues as to the nature of the semi-peripheral
sovereignty that was attained by Iraq. It is within these discussions regarding the pipeline
agreements between the IPC and the two other mandated territories in the region that one would
find some insights on the role of semi-peripheral sovereignty on the entire region.
During the twentieth session, the PMC had lengthy discussions on the pipeline
agreements between the IPC and the mandate administrations of Palestine and Syria. Although
the PMC eventually decided not to denounce the British and the IPC, it was clear that several
members were highly critical of these agreements. The two ‘closely related’ but ‘quite distinct’
issues in these discussions were whether the question of economic equality was violated by the
(pipeline) concessions, and whether the interests of the territories in question suffered by the
concessions in violation of the mandates.473 The agreements appeared to provide the company
with considerable benefits at the expense of the native populations of the mandatory territories:
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the company paid no import tax on oil used for its own works or on construction material used for
its operations, the oil in transit was not subject to export tax, the lands required for the pipe-line
was rent-free, and the company was not liable to taxation by the mandatory administration.474
The questions that arose could be understood in the context of certain provisions in the
Palestine mandate. Article 18 of the mandate, which reproduced the principle of economic
equality, prohibited any discrimination, in matters concerning taxation in favor of the nationals of
any state members of the League (or its companies). Advantages that were precisely those
granted to the IPC. Article 18 also made it clear that the Mandatory administration, ‘may impose
such taxes and custom duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think
best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the
interests of the population.’475 The question for the PMC was whether the pipeline agreement (the
Convention of 1931) violated Article 18 of the Palestine Mandate.
The arguments that arose were interesting.

The members, who believed that the

concession did not violate the provision in the mandate, generally emphasized how the pipeline
concessions would greatly benefit from the development of the mandated territories in question.
The British Lord Lugard was the member who argued vigorously to emphasize this point. He
claimed that the privileges and exemptions were ‘small in comparison with the benefits,’ that
arose from the concession, such as the influx of capital, employment of labour, and the increase
of shipping in its ports.476 Merlin similarly claimed that the concession would in fact directly lead
to, ‘changing completely the economic aspect of Iraq, Palestine and Syria…[especially through]
the establishment of oil ports,’ where ‘many vessels would put in at those ports, and as a result,
money would be spent there, and a commercial port would certainly develop….’ and these were
very important factors from the stand point of the development of these territories.477 Besides,
Lugard stated, the committee already questioned the representatives of the mandatory powers of
Palestine and Syria earlier, who were clear that the agreements would greatly benefit the
territories.478
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Van Rees made an alternative argument agreeing that the concession should be exempted
from both the application of the provision of the mandate and economic equality. He argued that
this concession had a ‘special character’, which covered a vast program of works that should be
recognized as ‘being of public utility’.479 In other words, although it was a private company that
bore the expense of these works, the nature of the works remained of public utility! Van Rees
actually went so far as to make the claim that it ‘was not engaging in commerce, but was dealing
with Governmental affairs’.480 The principle of economic equality therefore, did not apply in this
case as it was a case of ‘essential public works’, and the concession did not therefore infringe on
the mandate.481
These arguments above were (slightly) rejected by the other members of the PMC, who
were openly critical of the pipeline agreements (in particular Orts, Ruppel, Rappard and de Penha
Garcia). Orts responded to Van Rees that admitting an exception such as the one proposed would
eventually lead to ‘a class of privileged concessionaires exempt from ordinary law,’ opening up
further disregard of the principles of the mandate.482 Moreover, it appeared that the territory was
actually paying the whole cost of the scheme in the form of exemptions from taxation and custom
duties, and that this was ‘the unpleasant feature of the scheme’.483 Ruppel rejected Van Rees’
reasoning, emphasizing that the concession was in reality ‘exclusively private in character’ and it
was not intended for public use as the use of the pipeline was reserved for the company.484
Rappard was the member who was the most critical, appearing to almost denounce the
mandatory power and the company when she said: ‘Here was a British company exploiting for its
own advantage the natural resources of Iraq. The company had found it advantageous to bring its
pipeline through Palestine. But…the concession given it by the mandatory Power…granted it
exemption from all the rules of common law… therefore it seemed that… [the mandatory Power]
had subordinated the interests of the country under its mandate to the interests of a company of its
denounced a mandatory power. A good example occurs in the case above when Rappard, who was
overly critical of the pipeline agreement, had to later emphasize that, ‘if in the course of the
discussion, he had himself used vigorous language in putting his points, he had never meant to accuse
the Mandatory power,’ ibid, at 170.
479 Ibid, at 145.
480 Ibid, at 146.
481 Ibid.
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own nationality.’485 Although Rappard stressed that the company actually had a ‘British legal
personality,’ Lugard insisted that the company was a consortium composed of four nations, and
that Britain had no advantage in this arrangement.486 Here, one notices how the novel legal
mechanism of the consortium was used (especially in legal reasoning) for the very purpose of
avoiding any allegation that economic equality was being violated.
The PMC’s deliberations regarding these oil concessions (or conventions) concluded with
the members unable to reach an agreement on the issues, and it was decided that it was not
necessary to formulate observations to the Council, which would require a vote. The PMC’s deep
division could not possibly allow for an unprecedented denunciation of a mandatory power,
although one could easily interpret this calculated move as a partial denunciation by
implication. 487 The statement submitted to the Council affirmed that the provisions of the
mandate ‘did not constitute an obstacle’ to the granting of the advantages conferred by the
concessions for the construction of a pipeline in Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon, but the
PMC made sure to mention the disagreements on the issue by stating that, ‘during its
discussion…doubts were expressed by certain of its members as to whether some of the clauses
of the agreements in question kept the necessary balance between the advantages and privileges
granted to the concessionary company and the advantages that would accrue to the two
territories’.488
Therefore, the fact that the pipeline agreements were a ‘natural corollary’ to the Iraqi
concession illustrate that the subjugating structures within this concession extended to the entire
region. The legal reasoning made a distinction between the principle of economic equality and oil
concessions in that the latter were allowed to violate the principle of open door – they were made
to be exceptions to the ‘A’ mandates in question. This is why these discussions are revealing, as
they illustrate quite clearly the actual function of Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty in its
intersection with the oil concessions. As Lugard admitted, ‘[t]he oil came from Iraq. Surely that
country was entitled to obtain access to the sea by the shortest route.’ He went on to refer to ‘the
principle underlying the Navigation Act of Vienna of 1815 and the Berlin Act of 1885’.489 As
Bonné, explains ‘the antecedents of the Pipe-line Concession are inseparable from the actual
Ibid, at 147, emphasis added.
Ibid, at 148, 171.
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[Iraqi] concession for the exploitation of oil…[as]…without the assurance of unhindered
transport, the possession of oil wells is useless…’490 It is apparent that the legal reasoning and the
principles of international law in these discussions were advanced to ensure that the flow of Iraq’s
oil was to gain access to the shortest route to the sea. Here my argument comes full circle: as the
pipeline agreements cannot be explained without reference to the Iraqi oil concession, so the
concession cannot be explained without Iraqi semi-peripheral (political) sovereignty.
Semi-peripheral sovereignty turned out to be more than just about the granting of
independence to Iraq, but about the economic exploitation and geopolitical control of the region
as a whole, especially through the access, extraction, production and transportation of oil to the
world economy. The importance of oil to the world market was so vital that it was allotted
exceptional status to the principles of international law of the time, as even the sacred open door
principle of the mandate system was contradictorily circumvented by the mandatory powers, the
oil companies and by the PMC in Geneva through complex legal mechanisms and sophisticated
reasoning as was shown above.

VIII. Conclusion
The main point of this chapter is to illustrate the role of international law in the juridical
formation of an ‘independent’ Iraqi state in the Middle East in the context of the Mandate system.
My argument is that the ‘A’ mandates were designated in the semi-peripheral Middle East with
imperial considerations in mind that were exclusive to the semi-periphery (such as geopolitics
and access to oil). The purpose of the juridical construction of semi-peripheral sovereignty must
consequently be directly linked to the economic principles of the Mandate system, in particular
the open door policy. I have also shown how the oil concessions that were negotiated in Iraq were
intrinsically connected to the question of Iraqi independence, and the semi-peripheral sovereignty
that emerged. It was only after the question of oil was settled that Britain sought Iraq’s
independence in the League of Nations. The PMC in Geneva, who as jurists were knowingly
making international law in their sessions, eventually confirmed the viability of this semiperipheral sovereignty and welded its doctrines in the context of the international legal order. My
main argument was not only that Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty was required for the Great
Powers to gain access to Iraqi oil, but further to (economically) control the region as a whole. By
Alfred Bonné. “The Concession for the Mosul-Haifa Pipe Line,” The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 164, Nov. 1932, 116-126; at 116.
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analyzing in detail the contentious discussions relating to the pipeline agreements between the
IPC and the other ‘A’ Mandate states, the role of semi-peripheral sovereignty in the entire region
becomes clear.
The tracing of these legal mechanisms and instruments reveal that international law was
continually present in the history of the Mandate system in the Middle East, and one could not
ignore its significance. The shifting international law necessitated the juridical construction of a
semi-peripheral sovereignty within international legal doctrine to be granted to Iraq. This was the
only way that Iraqi oil was to be legally extracted and transported to the Mediterranean and to the
world. An entire legal edifice (whether mechanisms, technologies, structures or instruments)
followed this narrative – I have discussed several in detail, such as the treaty and the consortium.
It is ironic how Iraqi sovereignty, especially through the oil concession (and the 1930 Anglo-Iraq
Treaty) actually further subjugated the other mandated territories in the region, notwithstanding
the fact that these administrations looked to Iraq’s independence as a hopeful development. Iraq
would be governed by the semi-peripheral sovereignty that it gained in 1932 and its
corresponding Treaty for another two and a half decades until the revolution broke.
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Chapter 4: The Oil Workers’ Struggle Against the Legal Spatiality of Imperialism
in the Iraqi Oil Frontier

Why are the people hungry unable to get sustenance
And the children of the toiler perish from starvation?
Oil pipelines, the property of the people, and they pass through
All its profits into the pockets of thieves.491
~ Zāhid Mohammad
The natural resources [of this country] have become a curse upon it through which the colonizer gains strength, [while]
the suffering of the people surges.492
~ ʿAbdul Fatāh Ibrahīm

I. Introduction
The previous chapter revealed the manner in which the oil concession and pipeline
agreements were intrinsically linked to the juridical construction of semi-peripheral sovereignty
and the making of ‘independence’ in Iraq. My purpose in this chapter is to analyze the
implications of this concessionary agreement and the emergent semi-peripheral sovereignty on
the socio-economic conditions of the working class, in particular by examining the micro-history
of the oil fields in the provincial city of Kirkuk. This will be done by examining why the oil
workers of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in Kirkuk and the surrounding areas, organized
against the legal structures of imperialism that were imposed upon them, and how their actions at
specific points in space and time forced the company, the British and the Iraqi government to
reassess their labour arrangements. I will then move to detail and analyze the Gawurbaghi strike
As quoted by Iraqi communist and legal scholar, ‘Abdul Hussein al-Sha‘bān; in Tawfīq al-Tamīmī,
ḥiwār mʿa al-Akadīmi wa al-Mufakir Dr. ʿAbdul Hussein al-Shaʿbān’ [A conversation with the
academic and thinker Dr. ʿAbdul Hussein al-Shaʿbān]; al-Nour Foundation for Culture and Media,
(30/3/2012). al-Sha‘bān recalled when he went to a mass demonstration against the Israeli-BritishFrench attack on Egypt in 1956, as a young boy, he joined the crowds in reciting these verses from
Zahid Mohammad’s poetry. Mohammed was a popular poet, who was a port worker and active in the
labour movement. http://www.alnoor.se/article.asp?id=148176
492ʿAbdul Fatāh Ibrahīm. ʿAla Ṭarīq al-Hind [On the route to India], first published in 1935, (Dīmashq:
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of 1946 that was violently suppressed. I will critique the ‘official’ company narrative of the strike
and use the archive against itself to expose the limits of this narrative. The company’s ultimate
response, which was to shift its ideological approach to one of social development, will then be
examined, in particular its attempt to impose a specific ideology and alternative institution of
trade unionism. Finally, I will argue that law played a significant role in the production of the
space of the Iraqi oil frontier; concluding with an examination of the legendary K3 pumpingstation strike of 1948 to further advance my analysis.

II. Urban migration & the labour question in post-war Iraq
Although Iraq’s population was mostly rural, by the end of the 1940s the urban
populations of the cities grew at a rapid pace – increasing from only 25% in 1930 to 37% in
1947.493 Of course, one of the main reasons for this ‘mass exodus’ was what was described in
Chapter 1: the intolerable conditions of the agricultural worker (fellāh), who took every
opportunity to flee from his serf-like conditions, seeking a better life in the cities. No longer tied
to the land, he became a wage earner. However, when he reached the city, he found that
conditions were not so much better. Most rural migrant workers became the bulk of unskilled
work force, taking on precarious work, inhabiting and squatting in small mud huts (or sarifas) at
the outskirts of the cities. Living at near starvation levels, when unable to find work, they
sometimes had no recourse but to turn to theft.
One significant factor that contributed to the fast changing labour conditions of
underemployment in the 1940s arose directly from the winding up of the war effort that employed
a bulk of the Iraqi working class. The Middle East Supply Centre494 commissioned a British
academic (Peers) to write a report to study the question of labour and advise on solutions
regarding the anticipated mass layoff of local workers that were to be discharged from the service

Sassoon, supra, ft. 141, at 3. For detailed statistics on this rural-city migration see, M. Salman alHasan. Tattawur al-Iqtisādi for al-Iraq, at 71. According to Hasan, this migration began as early as
1918 and 1920, when the police and military institutions were formed as the majority of these had
their origins in the rural areas.
494 The Middle East Supply Centre was an agency set up in Cairo in 1941 during World War II as a
clearing-house for all matters of civilian supply and transport in the region. Its goal was to regulate
and control shipping and commerce among the countries in the region to aid the war effort. See
Martin W. Wilmington. The Middle East Supply Centre (NY: SUNY, 1971).
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of the British Army by the end of the war.495 Peers made several proposals that entailed that
‘surplus labour’ could be reabsorbed into certain sectors, in particular the ‘modal points of
movements, [communications] and trade’ (the railways, the port of Basra and road
transportation).496 Other than the apparent development of irrigation and agriculture schemes, the
expansion of public works (with the help of British ‘technical experts’) would allow for the reemployment of those discharged, although he admitted that certain unskilled workers (especially
what he referred to as ‘black-coated laborers’) would be difficult to absorb in the peacetime
economy.497 The increased output of oil, a valuable ‘exportable commodity’ was regarded as
promising outlet that would help in this regard.498
Despite having a somewhat positive outlook on the prospects of labour in post-war Iraq,
Peers was cognizant of some of the difficulties that would arise. ‘It is wrong to assume,’ he wrote
‘that the entire body of unskilled laborers recruited for the war effort will easily and automatically
return to their villages, to be reabsorbed into agricultural pursuits…’499 It was clear that there was
now ‘an uprooted class’ emerging that would not return to agricultural pursuits, especially
considering that there was absolutely no security for the small cultivator and the fellah. After
Peers’ initial report, the labour committees that were formed during the war with the purpose of
framing labor policy in the country, had to finally address this issue of a transition.500
This chapter will study the role of IPC in the city of Kirkuk by examining what Joseph
Sassoon referred to as the ‘triangular relationship’ between the Iraqi government, the IPC and the

TNA. FO 921/302. ‘Labour, Middle East: Report on Iraq by Professor Peers’ (1944). This report
was considered as the ‘first of its kind’ as it directly dealt with the question of labour, emphasizing
the urgency of dealing with it before the war comes to an end.
496 Ibid, at 11.
497 Ibid.
498 Ibid, at 17.
499 Ibid.
500 See TNA. FO 921/300. Director of Pioneers and Labour to Peers, 829/PL. 26 May, 1944. There
were at least three labour committees and sub-committees in Iraq at the time. These committees
were generally composed of representatives of the R.A.F, R.O.C., I.P.C., and the Iraqi government
amongst others. Their function was to monitor and fix wage scales and ensure that labour provisions
were adequately met. The question of ‘civilian labour discharge’ was eventually brought up on June
of 1945 and a special committee was formed to revise wages in relation to the cost of living, and
more importantly to discuss the transition to peacetime with the establishment of labour exchanges
‘to the social advance and re-employment of workers discharged by the army’. Although the
responsibility was left for the Iraqi government, the British were prepared to advise on the matter.
See FO 371/45304. E4789/216/93. 22 June, 1945. ‘Disposal of Civilian Labour discharged in Iraq by
British forces’.
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British.501 The labour movement (in particular the oil workers) influenced and exposed this
‘triangular’ relationship and I will bring their narrative to the fore. I will begin by describing the
economic and political influence of the IPC in the city of Kirkuk by focusing on how the legal
structures imposed by the concession in conjuncture with the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty allowed it
to wield its power on the local economy of the city and on Iraq as a whole. The semi-peripheral
sovereignty gained by Iraq described earlier brought about a somewhat ambiguous legal or
jurisdictional space that allowed for such (rather fragmentary) hegemonic control to emerge,
while contriving at least the appearance of an arm's length relationship between the three actors.
So, despite the fact that the company and the British government kept in regular contact,
coordinated and exchanged intelligence, British officials emphasized that the IPC was ‘quite
separate from His Majesty’s Government’.502 The fact was that their relationship was more
harmonious, as the IPC were willing to assist the British government in their political and
imperial aims in the country and vice versa.503 One of the arguments in this chapter is that the
ability to claim that there was a separation between the interests of the British and the IPC was
partly made possible because of the juridical instruments at the intersection of the concession and
the 1930 treaty, and this juridical component of this history is something that needs to be taken
more seriously in the current scholarship.

III. Everyday life in an oil company & the miserable conditions of the Iraqi oil worker
The economic power welded by the IPC (with the support of the British Embassy)
arguably made it somewhat function like a de facto ‘state within a state’ or at least allowed it to at
times function in a governing capacity, particularly in its impact on the every day lives of
Kirkukis and Iraqis. Consequently, its labour policies made a considerable impact on the city of
Kirkuk, affecting the labour policy of the country as a whole. As described in Chapter 3, the 1931
agreement was favorable to the IPC as it eliminated the Iraqi government’s power to tax the
company’s profits and removed the minimum-drilling obligation. By expanding the concession
area from 50,000 hectares to 8 million hectares, the IPC (which was technically a British firm)
Sassoon, supra, ft. 137, at 252.
TNA. Comments by Beckett (Treasury), 29 May 1942. T 160/1157/17859, as referred to by
Sassoon, supra, ft. 141, at 251.
503 One British official in London made it quite clear in his minutes that there should be closer
coordination between the British government and the oil companies in the region, because ‘His
Majesty’s Government and the oil companies are all in it together and…the more mutually helpful
they can be to each other the better’. TNA. Minute by E.A. Berthoud, 18th May 1948, FO/371/68479,
E6413/620/93/G.
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would eventually gain a monopoly over the entire topographical area of the oil fields and in turn
oil production in Iraq (initially excluding Basra).504
Although oil was not yet directly vital to the development of the country (which would
only occur after 1950 with the renegotiation of the oil agreement to increase royalties to the Iraqi
government), it still significantly contributed to the finances of the government and its budget.505
The fact was that the Iraqi government regularly turned to the IPC for direct loans, which were
never given unconditionally.506 Furthermore, as will be seen throughout this narrative, the central
government in Baghdad seldom interfered with the IPC’s operations in the city of Kirkuk and the
weak municipal government in many ways preferred to protect the company’s private interests
(even violently if need be) as opposed to that of its constituents. One company report described
the IPC’s power in freely welding political influence, stating that; ‘in Iraq…we are fortunate in
having more freedom of action, with our operations not subject to the dictates of restrictive
legislation…’507
From the moment that oil volcanically erupted out of the drill at Baba Gurgur in June
1927 (which was to become the coronary artery of the Kirkuk oil fields and the Kirkuk-HaifaTripoli pipeline), Iraq was transformed from a potential prize to, ‘one of the most valuable
concessionary areas in the world’.508 Considering the significance of oil for British strategic,
economic and military interests, it was no surprise that the British government would choose to
eagerly put their administrative and diplomatic resources at the service of the company, especially
when it came to controlling labour unrest that certainly took its inspiration from broader concerns
of anti-imperialism, communism and nationalism.509 The IPC, therefore, had characteristics of

By 1938, it would acquire the only other competitor in the country, the British Oil Development
Syndicate (BOD), which had an Italian majority shareholding interest. A subsidiary of the IPC, the
Basrah Petroleum Company, would acquire the BOD’s 75-year concession, and so the IPC would
finally succeed in establishing its monopoly over Iraqi territory (except the small district of
Khanaqin). See Zuhayr Mikdashi. A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil Concessions: 1901-65.
(London: Frederick Praeger, 1966), at 73.
505 For details on these negotiations and the agreement see Penrose & Penrose. Iraq: International
Relations and National Development, (London: Ernest Benn, 1978).
506 Sassoon, supra, ft. 141, at 249.
507 ‘Comments on: Report on Employees Housing Programme,’ 23 June 1952. BP 135818.
508 J.H. Bamberg. The History of the British Petroleum Company: Volume 2, The Anglo-Iranian Years,
1928-1954, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), at 157. It should be noted that this work
is the ‘official’ history commissioned by the company.
509 TNA. FO 371/61673. E 3045/1492/IG. ‘Strategic Importance of Kirkuk oilfields’ (9 April, 1947);
The Chiefs of Staff still did not consider the Kirkuk fields in Iraq as more strategically important as
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both, an (political) imperial and (private) corporation as it operated inside a newly ‘independent’
state (that is, within ‘sovereign’ territory that belonged to Iraq). This situation elucidates, as
James Ferguson has suggested how ‘new forms of disorder and order’ accompanied such
‘selectively territorialized’ mineral-extraction enclaves (such as the oil company), which allowed
capital to flow and ‘hop’ freely in-between wide geographic spaces.510 For this reason, Nelida
Fuccaro argues that, as an oil city with a turbulent history, Kirkuk should be located, ‘at the
intersection of the complex corporate, imperial, national and international politics that marked the
development of oil production in the Middle East after the First World War.’511 It was at this
intersection, where contradictory tensions were located, did urban violence and industrial unrest
manifest.
The IPC’s arrival at Kirkuk considerably altered its urban landscape and demographic
characteristics, as it attracted diverse rural-urban migration of those seeking work from rural areas
and surrounding cities.512 These rapid changes would result in an increase of Kirkuk’s urban
population from around 25,000 in the 1920s to 68,000 in 1947, nearly half of which were to be
employed by the company.513 Within the next two decades, Kirkuk was developed not merely as
a modern ‘oil city,’ but as a focal pipeline town or terminus where from Iraq’s ‘Third River’
emanates.514
The IPC would go on to build a network of pipelines across the desert to reach the ports
of the Mediterranean in Palestine and Syria. Twelve mini-company towns were eventually
erected along a parallel network of 12-inch pipelines functioning as pumping-stations.515 Four of
these stations were in Iraq: K1 was the first station built adjacently to the Kirkuk fields; K2 was
the fields in Abadan, Iran since they were only ‘partially owned’ and anyway they were confident that
the Iraqi government could suppress any disturbances.
510 James Ferguson. “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal
Africa,” (2005) American Anthropologist, Vol 7, Issue, pp. 377-382.
511 Nelida Fuccaro. “Reading Oil as Urban Violence: Kirkuk and its Oil Conurbation, 1927-58,” in
Freitag, Fuccaro, Ghrawi & Lafi, Eds. Urban Violence in the Middle East: Changing Cityscapes in the
Transition from Empire into Nation State, (New York: Berghahn, 2015), pp.222-242; at 223.
512 For a detailed discussion on the effects of the IPC on Kirkuk’s urban landscape see, Arbella BetShlimon. (2012). Kirkuk, 1918-1968: Oil and the Politics of Identity in an Iraqi City, Ph.D. dissertation,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 148-158.
513 Ibid, at 161.
514 Fuccaro, supra, ft. 511, at 225. The propaganda film entitled ‘the Third River’ presented the oil
company as producing the river of wealth that would flow into the world transforming everything it
touches. Accessed at BP Archive, July 2016. See Mona Damluji. “The Image World of Middle Eastern
Oil,” Hannah Appel, Arthur Mason & Michael Watts (eds.), in Subterranean Estates: Life Worlds of Oil
and Gas, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), pp.147-164.
515 S. Longrigg. Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development, (London: 1969) at 179.
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25 miles away; K3 was located in the small town of Haditha in the Upper Euphrates and was the
point of bifurcation (i.e. where the pipeline diverges in two directions, one going towards Tripoli
and the other Haifa), and finally T1 was located not far from the Syrian border.516 One British
exploration geologist at the time described the complex infrastructure that complemented the oil
pipelines: ‘There was a whole infrastructure to support the [pipe] lines: twelve pumping stations;
100 wells and 320 kilometers of water pipelines in the desert, serviced by twelve smaller
pumping stations to provide drinkable water; terminals with eight underwater lines to moving
berths 1.5 kilometers from the shore; a network of telegraph, telephone and wireless connections
to support operations; an air transport system; four main rail heals workshops, offices and a
labour force…’ 517 These interconnected towns would be central for the IPC’s propaganda
discourse in Iraq and the region as they were presented with their new residential buildings,
facilities, schools and supermarkets, as being a part of the larger effort of development and
modernity of the ‘new’ Iraq and Middle East.518
However, concealed beneath the surface, reality could not be any different, as the
majority of daily wage earners (who although lived relatively better than those living in the urban
slums of Baghdad, Kirkuk and Basra), were subject to intense exploitation and arrogant racism.
Desmond Stewart and John Haylock, two British schoolteachers described the K3 pumping
station as an ‘oil cage’, denoted by ‘a military abbreviation,’ it was more ‘a nightmare settlement
from science fiction’ as it was based on a system of extreme class exploitation:
Nearly three thousand people live on the station, and they are rigidly segregated into castes.
British employees and a few Iraqis compromise the first class; school teachers are included with the clerks
in the second; labourers are, of course, in the third…The cool, thickening [British] officials give the Iraqis
the impression that they regard themselves as superior beings, angels of technology with messages and
orders, to be delivered in office hours... In K3 [they conclude] even in politeness the class system prevails.
The “first class” do not salute the “third class,” the “second class” can only go into the first-class club by
invitation.519

Fuccaro, supra, ft. 511, at 225. See Iraq Petroleum Co. An Account of the Construction in the years
1932 to 1934 of the Pipe-line of the Iraq Petroleum Company, limited, from its oilfield in the vicinity of
Kirkuk, Iraq to the Mediterranean ports of Haifa (Palestine) and Tripoli (Lebanon), (London, St,
Clements press, 1934).
517Michael Quentin Morton. In the Heart of the Desert: The Story of an Exploration Geologist and the
Search for Oil in the Middle East, (Aylesford: Green Mountain Press, 2007), at 11.
518 Henry Longhurst describes the private company jets (named the IPC’s ‘Doves’) as ‘flying like
clockwork between headquarters, the oilfields and the pumping stations’. Henry Longhurst.
Adventure in Oil: The Story of British Petroleum (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1959), at 204.
519 Desmond Stewart and John Haylock, New Babylon: A Portrait of Iraq (London: Collins, 1956), at
181-190.
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This ‘caste-like system’ was a characteristic of colonial relations, which remained sharply
rampant, openly visible and in may ways unbroken within these oil enclaves.

Although the Company controlled the supply of labour within the fields, a bulk of local
workers were daily wage earners, who were directly hired from Bedouin contractors.520 An
exploitative system of tribal ‘racketeering,’ was in place and it expanded due to the lack of trade
unions at the time; it often put the worker in debt, forcing him to borrow money from local
moneylenders to pay the high employment fees.521 The IPC did not contest this system of labour
recruitment, but was rather complicit in its perpetuation by regularly using it to hire a significant
number of its daily wage earners, at least until the early 1950s. It was this system of labour
recruitment that was heavily relied on in the construction of the pipelines described above and it
continued thereafter.522 Tribal sheikhs sold the labour of their tribesmen on a daily basis to avoid
the provisions of the labour law, which did not protect daily workers. Yet, the company was
always careful to emphasize that their workers were paid a higher wage than any other industrial
establishment, and that they were given subsidies and benefits, such as a rent allowance.523
IPC workers were hired on the basis of a hierarchal grade system – that is, there were at
least five grades of workers with different wage scales. For instance, the company hired ‘coolies’
and ‘unskilled labour’ as daily wage earners, as opposed to skilled laborers who would have
receive a higher monthly wage. A labour sub-committee report indicated that the lowest daily
wage paid in October 1946 was 310 fils524 (or 260 without rent allowance) and the minimum
living cost index for a small family (or the ‘labourer’s basket’) in June 1946 was 379 fils.525 As
the labour advisor of the British Middle East Office in Cairo, M.T. Audsley reported two months
after the 1946 Kirkuk strike, despite the fact that the oil companies paid higher wages compared
TNA. LAB 13/674. ‘Notes on Labour Expert’s visit to K3 & K2,’ on 11th to 15th Jan, 1952, by Labour
Advisor of Iraqi Government.
521 Ibid.
522 See Iraq Petroleum Co. An Account of the Construction, supra.
523 TNA. FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July by M.T. Audsley’ (1
November, 1948).
524 The Iraqi dinar was on par with the British pound and so 1 fils was equivalent to 50 shillings (the
British currency in the Empire at the time).
525 TNA. Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird (Bagdad) to FO, 29/10/1946. FO 371/52456. E1094/3860/93.
‘Labour Conditions in Iraq’. See ‘Labourer’s Basket – man, wife and 2 children as revised by Central
Labour Sub-committee ref. Minutes of Meeting of Dec. 22, 1942, Part 1(b)’.
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to other large employers, because of growing inflation, no wage was able to keep pace with the
rising cost of living index.526 Hence, he argued that any increase in wages would only lead to an
increase in rents and foodstuff and this would not have a favorable impact on the community and
so he recommended increased amenities rather than cash wages as a more appropriate response.527
By comparison the average wage of semi-skilled labour in other large undertaking (such as the Railways)
was 230 fils. This wage wrote Audsley meant that ‘vast numbers of workers are very nearly half
starved’.528 This was in July of 1948 when the cost of living increased by six times due to inflation. This
was only a few months before the Wathba uprising.

The labour conditions in the oil fields were ominously harsher than the company and
most British officials would admit. It was not merely the question of the differences of wages
between the ‘grades’ of workers and the visibly large gap between the wages of officials and
skilled workers (mostly British) and non-skilled or semi-skilled workers (mostly Iraqi), but there
were other concerns, which would in time transform the oil fields into the center of labour strike
action and anti-imperial struggle.
As already mentioned, the company operated in a socially segregated manner, not merely
in the remoteness of the workers’ quarters from the fortified company camp, where higher paid
British company officials and their families resided, but in everyday company life.529 One British
Embassy councilor noted, ‘I found that there was almost completely no intercourse between the
IPC and the local inhabitants…and [not even] Iraqi officials ever seemed to be invited to the
[company] camp’. 530 Warning of the repercussions, the councilor advised the company to
collaborate with the British Institute (a cultural organization) to invite Iraqis to such things as a
cinema showing, as even if they ‘do not understand a word of the film’ it would foster a good
relationship.531
A perceptive British Embassy official (F. Wells) touring the IPC stations for the first time
wrote an astoundingly candid account of what he encountered:
TNA. FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July by M.T. Audsley’ (1
November, 1948). See p.9 for details of wage scales.
527 TNA. Stonehewer to FO, 25 Oct 1946, ‘Labour Conditions in Iraq’, E10773/3860/93.
528 Ibid.
529 This was the case with other oil fields. Robert Vitalis has brilliantly exposed how ARAMCO
established a Jim Crow system -imported from the Southern US- within the Dhahran oil camps in the
1930s. See Robert Vitalis. America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Frontier, (London: Verso,
2009).
530 TNA. FO 624/105. ‘Oil: IPC Labour Welfare’, 25 October, 1946.
531 Ibid.
526

123

Sometime ago a British businessman…said to me, “Iraq is just like a British Dominion”. I was
reminded of this remark during the tour which I just made of the IPC Pipe line stations…These foreign
concessionary installations are directed by a handful of Europeans, mostly British, and the distinction
between management and labour rather shocked me…It is difficult to make precise criticisms of the
workers’ conditions…they are well fed and are for the most part housed in Nissan huts, which are certainly
far superior to the mud hovels of their villages…But the relation between management and labour is
outwardly that of “sahibs” and “niggers” and this aspect is accentuated by the luxury in which the
management and British staff live, and their remoteness. There is no unofficial social contact between
British and Iraqis; in fact I gathered that such contact is discouraged…In brief, my impression was what
our Russian friends would call capitalism at its worst, and foreign capitalism at that. It is rather a shock to
anyone who sees it for the first time...532

Here, one could clearly see how the ‘higher wage rate’ that the company often referred to served
more as propaganda tool to fend off criticisms as calculation of a wage could not in itself explain
the shockingly humiliating conditions of the Iraqi workers in these camps and the indignity they
felt.533 The company was generally oblivious to these conditions before the eruption of the strike
in 1946.534
The extraordinary social tensions of semi-colonial ‘foreign capitalism’ and imperialism
described above were reflected in the manner in which workers were being discharged, usually
without notice. One company response to press criticisms that workers were being unjustly
discharged was scribbled on the side of a British report in the following way: ‘the statement that
“anybody who dares to disobey is discharged immediately” is of course…correct. You could
hardly expect to run any undertaking…on any other basis, could you?’535 Despite the fact that
Iraq became an ‘independent’ state nearly two decades before the above report was written,
colonial relations remained fully intact, especially in the concessionary enclaves of the semicolonial and imperial spaces of oil production. This was certainly due to the juridical intersection
between the private oil concession and the semi-peripheral sovereignty given to Iraq. As we will
see, these racialized colonial relations and the indignity that they produced would guarantee the
detonating of the massive strike to come.

TNA. FO 624/130, Minutes by F. Wells, 7 April, 1948.
One veteran Iraqi communist who worked at the IPC in his youth describes in his memoirs how
every Iraqi (whether a worker or staff member) was expected to respond with the phrase ‘Yes, sir’
when addressed by a British company official. Obviously, Iraqi workers considered this insulting.
Tomā Tomās, “Awrāk Tomā Tomās” (1) (The Papers of Toma Tomas -1-), al-Nnās, 10/15/2006,
(http://al-nnas.com/THEKRIAT/15jsf1.htm).
534 Arbella Bet-Shlimon. “The Politics and Ideology of Urban Development in Iraq’s Oil City: Kirkuk,
1946-58,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol.33, No.1, 2013, at 29.
535 TNA. FO/624/176. ‘Oil: IPC Labour’, 10 Aug, 1949.
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IV. The Gāwūrbāghī strike & the limits of Iraqi law in penetrating imperial spatiality
Communist parties around the world were generally given some freedom to operate
during the Second World War536 , and the ICP took advantage of this by organizing workers into
trade unions. This had an effect of opening up some freedoms in Iraqi society, and it was around
that time that an amendment to the labour law was passed that made further improvements in
compensation, overtime and vacation terms.537 It was also around that time that the al-Pachachi
government legalized several trade unions – between 1944 and 1945, sixteen trade unions were
licensed. Of these sixteen, communists led twelve, while the others were led by those affiliated
with the left, such as the social democrats.538
One of the first unions licensed in 1944 was the Railway Union. It was this union that would
organize the 15-day Schālchīyyah strike in 1945, which was a precursor of the Kirkuk oil strike of
1946.539 This strike would produce a cadre of labour organizers and worker-communists that
would later lead the workers in the Kirkuk oil fields. One of these leaders was a young
communist by the name of Hannā Ilyās Kohārī (Abū Tilʿat),540 an ex-member of the Supervisory
Committee of the suppressed Railway Union, who was discharged from the railways after the
suppression of the strike, and eventually found his way into the employ of the IPC.541
The Iraqi Communist Party was a vast complex organic network that was organized in
branch, district and local committees. The smallest unit in the network was the cell (al-khaliyyah)
that was made up of two and five members who worked in a common place. It was the center of
organizing action – the main point of contact with the masses.542 Workers, peasants, and students
were organized in local factory, rural and school committees. It was this type of organizational
structure that made the party quite effective. The main characteristic of communist organizing
amongst the working class at the time was that of penetration – with the intention of organically
This was due to the fact that the Soviet Union was a major ally in the fight against Fascism.
Law No.36 of 1942.
538 Sbāhī, supra, ft. 191, at 255.
539 The Schālchīyyah railway strike will be detailed in Chapter 5.
540 See Hirmuz Kohārī, “Tahiya Ijlal wa Kībār li shūhadā’ al-Tabaqa al-‘āmīla” [A homage to the great
martyrs
of
the
working-class],
in
al-Hīwār
al-Mutamadin,
5/3/2006
(http://m.ahewar.org/s.asp?aid=63746&r=0). After the Kirkuk strike, Hanna Kohārī, a Christian
Chaldean, spent his days in prison until the 1958 revolution, but would later be imprisoned again,
tortured and killed by the Ba‘athists during the bloody month known as ‘Black February’ of 1963. His
comrade dedicated a long poem to him, where a reference is made of Ilyās’ ‘journey of struggle in
Kirkuk: ‘the battle of the garden’‘ [i.e. the Gawurbaghi garden].
541 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 622.
542 Johan Franzen, Red Star Over Iraq: Iraqi Communism before Saddam (London: Hust & Co), at 40.
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making communism a part of the ‘flesh and blood’ of the labouring masses.543 The party planned
to target the ‘colossal enterprises’ fully or partially managed and/or owned by the British – the
railways, the Port of Basra and the oil refineries. Although, the aim was to convert these
economic hubs of imperialism into ‘Communist fortresses,’ it was rather the ability of a handful
of communists to guide and influence workers to articulate their demands that eventually made
their strikes effective.544
Returning to the central narrative in Kirkuk, learning of the successes of their fellow
workers’ strike in the IPC terminus in Haifa (Palestine),545 the oil workers of Kirkuk (especially
the daily workers) began sending a series of petitions. One pamphlet, which was circulated
among IPC workers in January 1946, described their miserable conditions in detail, stating that
‘our standard of living…have become so low that it cannot be considered fit for any free and
civilized man in the age of the Atomic Bomb’. 546 It goes on to claim that, ‘[t]his
Concessionaire… [and the] imperialistic foreigners seek nothing but to augment their own profits,
and we, the human-beings, are left…as a cheap commodity, subjected to those imperialists who
cannot sympathize with us, simply because they have come to rob us of everything – our
wealth… independence… [and] freedom’.547 The workers go on to criticize their extremely low
wages, lack of food, shelter, transportation, and their severe working conditions; ending their
appeal with a call for collective organized action: ‘organize yourselves rank and file’ through the
formation of a union.548 The moment that the IPC received this petition, the fields’ manager, Mr.
Wheatley, contacted the head of the Kirkuk police, giving him permission to set up a base of
operations from within the oil fields and the company camp.549

Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 605.
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545 See Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), 232-34, 327-32.
546 BPA. ‘The Miserable State of the Iraq Petroleum Company’s Workmen at Kirkuk,’ translated in
English and enclosed in ‘Iraq During the Year 1946,’ File 162461, BP.
547 Ibid.
548 Ibid.
549 Iraq National Archives. ‘Report by the administrative investigator Saīd al-Qazāz’ in a file entitled,
‘Workers’ strike of the IPC’ 17/Kirkuk/6; as refereed to in, Ja‘far Abbās Ḥumaidī. al-Tatwurāt alSyasīsya fī al-‘Iraq, 1941-1953 [‘the political developments in Iraq, 1941-1953’] (al-Najaf: Matb‘a alNi‘man, 1976), at 431. This is consistent with British records that suggest that the fields’ manager
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The IPC flatly rejected the workers’ demands. Instead, they permitted the formation of a
toothless ‘workmen committee’, after expelling several so-called ‘agitators’ and ‘troublemakers’.550 Even though Hanna Ilyās was still elected to the committee, he considered it ‘an
imperialist device aimed at crippling the struggle of the workers and their basic rights.’551 The
workers then decided to meet at a local coffeehouse on June 13 and agreed on the following list
of demands rather than participate in the company committee: the recognition of their legal right
to form an independent trade union; the increase of their cost of living allowance from 80 to 250
fils; an end to arbitrary dismissal of workers; the arrangement of transportation to and from work,
the granting of a war bonus (equivalent to that of the IPC workers in Haifa), and the introduction
of sickness, disability and old-age insurance. 552 The mutasarif (governor), who acted as a
mediator between the company and the workers, subsequently made a statement ensuring his
sympathy with the workers, and promising that he would convince the company to fulfill their
reasonable demands within the provisions of the labour law.553
The workers then decided to give the authorities a two-week window until July 3 to fulfill
their demands before calling a strike. On July 1, the company agreed to a mere 50 to 100 fils
increase of the high-cost-of-living allowance, and rejected all other demands.554 The company
point of view, according to Mr. Wheatley, was that the members of the workmen committee
‘seemed satisfied’ with this offer and only changed their attitude because of the intimidation
tactics of ‘political agitators’ who ‘harangued their colleagues’ that they have been ‘swindled’.555
This account was maintained throughout, and the IPC insisted that they have always been ‘the
best employers of labour in Iraq’.556
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The next day, a Higher Strikers’ Committee was formed, which constituted four workercommunists (including Hanna Ilyās), a Committee-in-Reserve of five, and five subordinate
strikers’ committees of four to six members each, representing a variety of workers, including,
the workshop, motor and mechanical workers.557
When the two-week window ended, a strike was called on July 3. The response was
instantaneous. Around 5,000 oil workers responded, ultimately leading up to a massive
demonstration in the streets of Kirkuk the following day, whereby workers marched with their
banners that bore their demands, chanting: ‘Long live the working class; long live the oil
workers’ union’558; ‘we demand the right to organize our trade union!’ and ‘we demand the
improvement of our labour conditions!’559 Picket lines were formed around the entrances of the
oil fields.560 The strikers would assemble daily in what became the focal point of the strike in
Gāwūrbāghī, a large garden in the western outskirts of Kirkuk, not far from the company camp.
There they would hold meetings, listen to speeches and poetry delivered in all local languages,
representing the diversity of Kirkuk.561 In one speech, a communist strike leader explained to the
workers the semi-colonial character of the company: ‘we are all confronting one enemy. It is not
only the oil workers by themselves who are the victims of the company, for the octopus spreads
its tentacles into every aspect of our affairs; they stand behind the Iqtāʿīn (feudalists) who exploit
the fellahīn…and the mutasarrif threatens the workers in defense of the interests of the company
and the government persecutes the people…so that the company may continue to exploit our
oil…and so that the boots of [British] soldiers remain defiling our land… You say you hate
colonialism, but what is colonialism? It is the monopolistic oil company precisely.’562 There was
Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 623
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the history of the Nationalist Movement], (Baghdad, 1975), at 151. It should be noted that Iraqi
communist and nationalist intellectuals who were active in organizing the oil workers at the time
carried in their pockets Yūsūf Ibrahīm Yazbak’s seminal book, entitled: al-Nift Mustaʿbid al-Sh‘wb [Oil,
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Arab author on the politics and imperialism of oil in the region. Yazbak was a Lebanese communist
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no doubt that the Kirkuki workers were at that moment united in class solidarity like they never
were before. In the words of the novelist Fadhil al-Azzawi, ‘the strike was a thrilling song
fest’.563 The entire city was attracted to the garden, opening their doors to workers, while
coffeehouses refused payment from any striker.564
On July 8, a new mutassarif, Hassan Fahmī, was appointed undoubtedly due to his
predecessor’s slightly sympathetic approach towards the strikers. On July 10, the British Embassy
councilor, Mr. Busk, urged the PM of the importance of ‘strengthening the hand of the
mutassarif’ so that he could more effectively deal with the strike, and was told by the foreign
minister that ‘new regulations’ were being drawn up to provide mutassarifs with wide executive
powers ‘to arrest agitators without legal formalities’. 565 Busk would later receive personal
assurances from the PM that ‘any threat to the IPC’ would be dealt with ‘firmly’.566 Meanwhile,
the new mutassarrif released a statement, in which he was dismissive of the workers’ demands,
maintaining that the current labour law already provided them with protection and that the IPC
already made ‘concessions’ that would only be released once the workers returned to work
immediately. 567 The workers refused to end their strike until all their demands were
unconditionally met. It was at this point that Fahmī decided that he would no longer tolerate the
‘illegality’ of the strike. He consequently dusted off an old Ottoman law still in the books
(No.131 of 1910) that allowed the authorities to use force to disperse a crowd for the ‘protection
of the public’.568
On the evening of July 12, while the workers were congregating in the Gāwūrbāghī
garden, the police commander inaudibly ordered them to disperse. The workers, who did not hear
his request, began chanting for the fulfillment of their demands. The commander then whistled
and the police, who surrounded the garden from all sides, began to forcefully, disperse the
crowd.569 The police ended up shooting at the crowd. As many as eighteen workers were killed
liberator and your enslaver…it is your life and your death, so know “something” of its politics so that
you may know what [state] you are in and where you have arrived!” Yazbak, at 19.
563 Fadhil al-Azzawi. The Last of the Angels, (tr. William M. Hutchins), (New York: Free Press, 2007), at
52. This is an autobiographical novel where the Gāwūrbāghī strike and its aftermath are vividly
described.
564 Khayrī , supra, ft. 562, at 150.
565 TNA. FO 371/52456. E7931/3860/93. ‘Strike at Kirkuk’. Busk to FO, No. 637. 10 Aug, 1946.
566 Ibid.
567 TNA. FO 371/52456; E6576/3860/93. ‘Strike at Kirkuk’ July 15, 1946; Humaidi, supra, ft. 549, at
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568 Humaidi, supra, ft. 545, at 437.
569 CP/CENT/INT/17/01.‘The Slaughter of Kawer Baghi’, 31 Oct, 1946.
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and twenty-seven wounded. 570 As news spread of the massacre, there was public outrage
throughout the land: it became clear that ‘the Iraqi government was prepared to kill Iraqi workers
to defend the interests of a colonial company!’571 The communists argued that there was ‘a highcombination of government and company,’ emphasizing the imperialistic character of the
company and the Iraqi state’s collusion with it.572 This was certainly not a far-fetched conspiracy
as the records show.573 The Iraqi state was clearly acting on the advice of the British Embassy,
which in turn were guarding the interests of the company. The workers were no longer dealing
with a sophisticated abstract analysis given to them by the communist intelligentsia – the bullets
that rained on them that day was all the proof they needed to grasp the semi-colonial character of
the Iraqi state, its complicity in maintaining their conditions, and the effects of imperialism on
their lives.
As a massive demonstration broke out the next day, where the crowd carrying the dead
on their shoulders, demanded the resignation of ‘the government of bullets’ and to bring those
responsible to court, 574 the British government in London confirmed in a dispatch of their
satisfaction with the actions of the local authorities that acted ‘wisely in defense of public
security,’ and praised the ‘satisfactory attitude’ of the IPC throughout the strike.575 One of the
workers in the demonstration rose up and said, ‘these dead are the victims of foreign influence
and imperialistic interference’. 576 The oil workers were now clearly consciousness of how
imperialism and its legal manifestations created a space for such slaughter to occur. The British
government, on the other hand, accepted the company narrative that the strike was ‘principally
the work of political agitators,’ and ‘not the spontaneous result of discontent’ among the workers,
with little to no scrutiny.577 Shortly thereafter, responding to a question in the House of Commons
on the effects of the ‘stoppages of work’ at the IPC oil fields, the Secretary of State for Foreign
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Affairs, Phillip Noel-Baker, without any mention of its violent suppression, affirmed that the
strike has come to an end and assured his colleague that the ‘output of oil was not reduced.’578
At a press conference in Baghdad, the PM insisted that it was only due to the efforts of
the government who negotiated with the company that certain ‘concessions’ were subsequently
made and that strike action itself did not amount to anything.579 The Gāwūrbāghī massacre
eventually led to the fall of the ʿUmarī cabinet, while the IPC decided to increase the minimum
basic day wage from 80 to 140 fils and the total minimum basic day wage from 200 to 310 fils. 580
However, the company refused to reopen the union. The IPC immediately embarked on long-term
urban development projects (beginning with a housing scheme for IPC workers) endeavoring to
shift its policy towards what was termed a ‘sociological’ approach for ideological and propaganda
purposes.581
The battle rapidly moved from the Gāwūrbāghī gardens to the streets of the large cities
and finally to the courts, which were transformed into theatres of struggle ‘for the defense of the
rights of the people.’582 At least 150 lawyers came out in solidarity to the trial of the nearly twodozen workers who were detained.583 They were all eventually released by order of the Kirkuk
Penal Court.584 The new government ordered an investigation of the massacre, and a report was
eventually released that found that the police were unprovoked, the workers were unarmed and
that all the vicitms were shot in the back. The report also acknowledged that there was no security
risk on the public as was alleged by the police, since the gardens were far from the city-center.585
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The Minister of Interior, convinced of these conclusions, requested the resignation of the police
commander of Kirkuk. However, the PM refused and the commander was merely suspended.586
Workers representing fourteen trade unions subsequently submitted a petition to the PM
demanding that the IPC and their administration be held accountable in Iraqi court.587 This did
not happen. Iraqi law and justice were unable to penetrate the semi-colonial legal structures
(maintained by the 1930 Treaty) that were shielding the company. I will return to this in due
course, but first I will briefly examine certain aspects of the narrative described above concerning
the question of political agitation and the ideology of trade unionism.

V. A critique of a company narrative & a semi-colonial ideology of trade unionism
The company’s narrative of the strike, which was accepted by both the British Embassy
in Baghdad and the Foreign Office in London, was that it was contrived by outside political
agitators. However, as our narrative above suggests the causes of the strike were evidently based
on genuine grievances of economic exploitation by the company in an extreme environment of
semi-colonial subservience. The strike could not have been singlehandedly instigated by external
political agitators, but it was rather a strike initiated by the workers themselves.
A close reading of British records reveals the contradictions inherent in the company
narrative. The IPC official, Mr. Wheatley, refused to consider that the company was at any fault,
preferring the explanation that the arrival of a handful of outside communist ‘political agitators’
from Baghdad, supposedly in one swoop (in a mere couple of days) got the workers to strike.588
This he argued happened thanks to their use of ‘a weapon, which was not customary in England,
namely, intimidation’.589 Spontaneity was therefore rationalized as actual evidence of political
agitation and violence rather than illustrating the workers’ own organizational efforts. For this
reason, Wheatley was convinced that in fact ‘practically the whole of our local staff and labour
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did not wish to strike’.590 In addition, he went so far as to claim that the ‘undoubted support’ of
the Russian delegation in Baghdad was at play. 591 More interestingly, he rationalized the
solidarity between the workers that emerged during the strike as a result of ‘Arab resentment’
over Palestine. The ‘question of Palestine,’ he said, ‘was a very serious matter for the company,’
as it was the one issue that united all workers (Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians) and the agitators used
it to manipulate the workers to strike.592
The complete dissection of the economic grievances from the political aspects of the
strike was a reoccurring feature of the dispatches to London. Company statements were recycled
uncritically throughout: the IPC workers described as being the best-paid workers in the country,
and the company referred to as the most ‘enlightened’ employer in Iraq. These claims, and in
particular that of definite political agitation, were so overstated in the dispatches that some British
officials in London could not help but question this narrative. Even the Secretary of State, Ernest
Bevin, for instance, a former trade unionist, was shocked to learn that the strike was not analyzed
as an industrial dispute in any way. Asking for more information on whether the workers were in
fact treated fairly by the company, he emphasized that ‘men do not strike for political reasons
unless they have also real [economic] grievances’.593 The responses to these criticisms tended to
be that even if economic grievances existed, they were surely exploited by political agitators.
The other line of reasoning in the company narrative that was generally accepted by
London was that political agitation was clear because the workers were given a ‘substantial
increase in their cost of living allowances’ (which was not an actual wage increase)594 only two
days before the strike was initiated.595 The workers’ rejection of this offer was seen as being
completely irrational. As is evident from the counter-narrative, the IPC workers did not merely
strike for a wage increase or quantifiable benefits, but were insistently concerned with regaining
their dignity, which was a matter of principle.596 This was clear from their most significant
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demand, which was their continuous assertion that the company adhere to the law, in particular
the labour law. This for them could only materialize if they were allowed to form their own
independent trade union. Finally, the ending of the common practice of discharging workers at
will (in a manner that circumvented the labour law) was another significant demand. This
practice, which occurred in the context of a marked racist environment was a very sensitive issue
for the workers indeed.597
Wheatley’s conception of Iraqi workers was not merely one that was dehumanizing in
that it took away from the workers’ agency, but it was also based on the orientalist and racist idea
that Iraqi workers were unable to think for themselves as to what was good for them, and that
they were easily manipulated en mass by a few political saboteurs. There tended to be two
explanations given for such an analysis throughout the British records. First, the Iraqi is often
described as being governed by a certain irrational and emotional temper that makes him prone to
external agitation. This is best reflected by one British official’s statement that ‘the Iraqi is like a
gypsy dancing girl who when she hears the voice of the drum must dance. In other words, Iraq is
a fertile field for agitation’.598 Any sober organizational and strategic planning on the part of Iraqi
workers was therefore completely discounted as an explanation for effective strike action. Even
the ‘leftist’ and communist pamphlets that were in circulation at the time were seen as impossible
to have been ‘drawn up by an Iraqi mind’.599
Second, this denial of Iraqi agency was generally conveyed in parallel with reference to a
vague subversive (external) invisible hand that continuously overshadowed Iraqi agency. There
was no way that Iraqi workers were acting on their own and for their own specific interests. This
could not possibly have been a sound explanation for analyzing the Middle East, the land of
endless mystery and subversive intrigue. This denial of agency reverberates in what Priya Satia
has argued in her description of the underpinnings of British thought in Arabia: ‘[a]ll Middle
Eastern avowals of nationalism [or anti-imperialism] were degraded and delegitimized by
absorption into a grand conspiracy of indeterminate authorship’.600 This conspiracy theory was
indeterminate as there could not be ‘a single mastermind’ behind them, because ‘Orientals did not
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posses individual minds as such,’ but rather ‘a collective existence, made possible by the magic
information network’ of spies and subterfuge.601
By way of contrast, as one veteran Iraqi communist who experienced the event pointed
out, what made this strike unique was precisely the workers’ participation in the administration of
their own strike action.602 It was only natural that the communists would guide the workers in
matters of strategy and tactics, but it was the workers’ own agency of organization that steered
the strike and theirs alone.

The IPC as well as the British learned some vital lessons from the events of the
Gāwūrbāghī strike and as mentioned earlier the company immediately began to undertake a shift
in their policy to what one British diplomat referred to a ‘sociological’ approach towards their
workers and the city as a whole; that is, one that would put more emphasis on social and urban
development, in particular housing schemes and educational projects for their workers. As
significant was the appointment by the British Embassy in Baghdad of a labour attaché, and by
Iraqi government of a full-time labour advisor.603 The escalation of labour troubles and strikes in
the coming years would lead the IPC to eventually appoint a Chief Labour Officer,604 as well as,
Information Officers a few years later with the task of keeping in contact with the Baghdadi
press, so as to directly respond to criticisms of the company in the press.605 These defensive
measures had some significant ideological motivations, including countering the influence of
communism, but especially urgent was the demonstration that Britain (with its commercial and
industrial enterprise) was ‘the world’s pioneer in the promotion of social justice’.606
The IPC’s ‘sociological’ effort was meant to bring about some changes in workers’
conditions providing them with transportation, hospitals, maternity and infant welfare centers,
cinemas and above all housing.607 The housing scheme in particular was meant be a ‘tangible
Ibid, at 223-224.
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manifestation’ of the IPC’s ‘goodwill’. 608 By 1950, according to a British report, 246
‘bungalows’ were built on the new Arrapha Estate for Iraqi staff, and within five years that figure
rose to over 450 houses.609 The Company would develop a home-ownership scheme for the very
purpose of furthering this ideology and so as to appear to be contributing to Kirkuk’s economy
and development.610 The hope was that such an approach would prevent more labour strikes from
happening, allowing the company to appear favorably to the public. The supply of electricity to
the municipality, for instance, led one pro-British Iraqi newspaper to praise Kirkuk, describing it
as the ‘the city of black-gold’ where ‘the company [IPC] supplies electricity from which all is
benefiting’.611
The company would later refer to this tailored approach in a confidential and exhaustive
report, commissioned and released in 1955 (partly as a result of the nationalization ‘crisis’ in
neighboring Iran) as the ‘integration approach’, which was aimed at integrating the company
(including its subsidiaries the B.P.C. and the M.P.C.) into the Iraqi economy, on the one hand,
and making the company ‘more acceptable to the Iraqi way of life’ and community on the
other.612 The overall goal of the approach was to ‘secure the position’ of the company, ‘beyond
disturbance in any event’ and to prevent nationalization at all costs.613 In terms of the noneconomic aspect of the approach, the point was to break out of the ‘physical and mental
compounds, the imperium in imperio which they [i.e. company officials] tended in the past to
inhabit’.614 This approach was therefore a pre-emptive measure that came out of the experience
of the Gāwūrbāghī strike. I will not get into all the details of this important report, but rather
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focus on the section that deals with the company’s treatment of workers,615 in particular the
question of trade unions. Despite taking a similar view with regards to the role of communist
political agitation as mentioned above this time with regards to the Basra Strike of 1953, the
author stressed that ‘a foreign company…cannot afford to treat its Iraqi personnel worse than its
foreign ones’.616 Consequently, the company, he emphasizes, must treat its workers ‘so obviously
good’ that people ‘merely laugh’ at any ‘propaganda’ that claims otherwise.617 One of the
primary efforts focused on was the development of ‘joint consultation’ committees as a substitute
for independent trade unions and its relation to the law.
After the suppression of the Gāwūrbāghī strike and the trade union that organized it, the
IPC reintroduced the ‘joint consultation’ worker committees, which were considered as adequate
substitutes for independent trade unions. Despite the fact that the British Embassy encouraged the
formation of ‘genuine trade unions’ amongst the oil workers of Kirkuk, this really meant unions
(and committees), which were pro-British and anti-communist. 618 This was therefore, a part of a
broad top-down ideology of trade unionism that was aimed at the Iraqi labour movement.
In fact, the British government was constantly concerned with establishing new devices
to co-opt the labour movement in Iraq. ‘We should endeavor,’ a Foreign Office official in London
wrote, ‘to put into control of labour unions in Kirkuk…labour leaders who are known to have
anti-communist views.’619 Another official reiterated this position by arguing that ‘medical rather
than surgical measures’ must be used to treat communism, and this could only be done by
‘jockeying’ into control of the labour unions in Kirkuk ‘a non-communist labour leader’.620
Similarly, the 1955 company report suggested that government unions should be encouraged, as
they would form at once, ‘a safety valve and a point of contact’.621 Referring to the assessment of
the IPC’s Personnel Adviser, the author illustrates the manner in which government-sponsored
rather than independent trade unions would function:
It is possible that they [i.e. government unions] may not be effective for some time; but, in the
words of the Personnel Adviser, “it is the Communist-inspired ad hoc ‘union’ that is to be feared at this
Ibid.
Ibid. at Chapter XII, at 4.
617 Ibid.
618 TNA. Bagdad to FO, 12 July 1946, FO 371/52459.
619 Ibid.
620 TNA. Minutes by RMA Honkey. FO 371/52459. E6246/5857/93. ‘Communism in Iraq’, 4 July
1946.
621 BPA. John Murray, supra, ft. 612, at 11.
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stage and not a Government-organized union. The latter frequently provides a harmless outlet for the
aspirations of potential trouble-makers who become so preoccupied by the internal organization and
politics of the union that they forget the purpose for which it was formed”. This is a useful, if slightly
Machiavellian, point.622

The government-sponsored unions would therefore function in the same way as the company’s
joint consultative committees – to insulate and depoliticize the workers and ultimately pacify any
form of genuine struggle against the company. A Machiavellian technique if ever there was one.
The IPC established an administrative machinery to deal with disputes in the form of
joint consultative committees (as well as general welfare committees) as a way for workers and
management to communicate on issues of mutual interest. These committees were ultimately
unsuccessful, as all the ‘best workmen’ considered them as having been discredited by the recent
strike, especially seeing that those who led the former committees were opposed to the strike.623
It did not help that dialogue in these committees was heavily restricted by management, who did
not allow any discussion on matters covered by the labour law or which concerned wage rates.624
This was the same criticism made by the author of the 1955 company report, who argued that
these committees were supposed to address questions of production, but this was rarely done.625
Instead, the committees’ merely acted in an ‘advisory’ capacity and became a forum where
workers could make suggestions on efficiency, welfare and educational issues.626 The company
acted like a ‘benevolent paternalist’ in the settlement of disputes.627 There was therefore more
than a general lack of interest in joining these committees, for most workers did not want to be
seen as ‘stooges’ of the company.628
In any case, the ideology of trade unionism that emerged at the IPC after the strike was
clearly advanced to undermine the workers’ ability to run their own unions. It was therefore not
out of genuine concern for the workers that they were put into place, but rather to control and
‘keep tabs’ on them.629 Furthermore, the new IPC fields’ manager, Mr. Mainland, who was hired
after the strike, was described by a British Embassy councilor, as ‘a nervous individual’ who was
Ibid.
TNA. FO 624/105, supra, ft. 607.
624 Albert Badre & Simon Siksek. Manpower and Oil in the Arab World, (Westport: Hyperion Press,
1960), at 183.
625 BPA. Murray, supra, ft. 612, Chapter XII, at 13.
626 See TNA. LAB 13/1634. Hull, ‘Iraq Labour Memorandum No. 4’ August, 1950; for details on the
workings of these committees; Albert Badre & Simon Siksek, supra, ft. 624, at 184.
627 Albert Badre & Simon Siksek, supra, ft. 624.
628 Ibid, at 187.
629 TNA. FO 624/105. ‘Oil: IPC Labour Welfare’, 25 October, 1946.
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‘preoccupied by the dangers of subversive elements’ and was determined to cleanse the company
of political agitators.630 After visiting the oil fields, the councilor explained the ideological basis
of this new developmental policy, referring to it as ‘Calpurnian,’ that is, one that would ensure
that the company was ‘above suspicion’.631 This he wrote could only be done if they endeavored
to achieve ‘occidental [labour] standards’ in Iraq.632 In other words, if the company would at least
appear to be treating their workers on the basis of (‘civilized’) ‘western standards,’ they would be
beyond reproach and no one would be able to criticize them for not following the (‘uncivilized’)
labour law of the state. Even in the midst of the strike, the British Ambassador, Stonehewer-Bird,
suggested that the company did not have to ‘stick strictly’ to the Iraqi labour law as long as it
treated its workers by what it regarded as Western or British standards.633
Here, one could see that this so-called new policy as it was applied to trade unionism was
merely meant to reinforce the company by putting it in an ‘invulnerable’ position634, as it allowed
it to once more avoid the labour law whenever it pleased by reference to its ‘enlightened’
occidental standards. These colonial double standards were precisely what the workers were
opposed to when they decided to strike. In many ways, this strategy was effective as the newly
appointed labour attaché, A.T. Audsley, visiting the IPC a couple of years later would cme to the
conclusion (again) that the company provided ‘more favorable conditions than the labour law’.635
As an alternative to this narrative, a ‘law and space’ approach provides a more coherent
explanation for why it was that Iraqi law was ultimately unable to penetrate into the
concessionary space of the company by holding it accountable for what happened at Gāwūrbāghī.

VI. Law & Space in the Iraqi Oil Frontier: the pipelines of law in a desert space
Returning to the overarching argument of Chapter 3: the semi-peripheral sovereignty
granted to Iraq under international law which was discussed in a previous chapter, functioned in
tandem with the (1931) oil concessionary agreement, contributing to the specifically tense social
conditions in Kirkuk. In fact, I went further to suggest that semi-peripheral sovereignty was
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634 TNA. FO 624/105, supra.
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constructed for that very purpose – that is, to allow the oil company to function with a certain
amount of operational freedom. Hence, the already expanded powers that the company received
from the concessionary agreement were further bolstered by the weak sovereignty of the Iraqi
state. This surely had a hegemonic influence on the social and economic dynamics of Kirkuk and
Iraq as a whole. Vast material socio-economic transformations occurred in the city, which in turn
had an impact on the laboring classes as I have already described in detail above. Furthermore, it
was precisely because the company was somewhat shielded by an assemblage of these legal
structures that it was able to completely evade any liability for the murder of workers by their
local henchmen at Gāwūrbāghī.
Here, the law played a significant role in the social production of the space of the oil city
of Kirkuk. This space as a part of the Iraqi oil frontier and its international dimensions could not
have operated without the unique legal infrastructure put into place and the streamlining of all its
parts in tandem. Hence, following from those scholars who have highlighted the constitutive
connection between law and space, the analysis becomes clearer; it explains why the tensions
described earlier manifested in such a way culminating into violence.636 It also explains the
spatiality of law and how it shielded the company, contributing to its power and impunity in its
operations.
In fact, the law of concession is itself a perfect illustration of how law could completely
alter the geography and space that is its subject.637 A ‘concession’ has been defined as a grant or
license granted by a state to a private individual or a corporation (‘the concessionaire’) to
undertake works of public character extending to a considerable period of time, and involving the
investment of substantial capital and expertise.638 An oil concession is one that is generally
granted as an exclusive right to ‘search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade,
carry away export and sell petroleum’.639 Despite having an international character, a concession
See Nicholas Blomley. Law, Space and the Geographies of Power (New York and London: Guilford
Press, 1994); Tayyab Mahmud. “Law of Geography and the Geography of Law: A Post-Colonial
Mapping” Jurisprudence Review, vol. 3.064, (2010), pp.64-106; Andreas PhilippopoulosMilhalopoulos. “Law’s Spatial Turn: Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear of Space” Law, Culture and
the Humanities (2010), XX(X) 1-16.
637 As Simon Siksek illustrates, the operation of an oil concession in particular possess unique
characteristic since, ‘it destroys the very substance of the concession’ attacking the very substance of
the mineral resources for which the concession is granted. Simon Siksek. The Legal Framework for Oil
Concessions in the Arab World (Beirut: The Middle East Research and Publishing Centre, 1960), at 7
638 Simon G. Siksek, ibid, at 4-5.
639 Henry Cattan. The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa, (New York:
Oceana Press, 1976), at 2.
636
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contract is recognized as being governed by the municipal law of the local jurisdiction and not
international law.640 However, in this case, whereby a foreign company was granted wide powers
in a concessionary agreement by a weak state (which was itself dependent on the company for its
finances), it is clear how the law of the state cannot truly be enforced on the company.
In any case, concessionary agreements had a very specific function, as they were
instruments initially used by the oil industry to effectively generate ‘transfers of sovereign powers
over vast tracts of land’ to foreign companies for long periods of time, for payment of a fixed
royalty calculated by the quantity of oil produced.641 As Sonarajah states, only an arsenal ‘web of
power’ exerted by the home state alongside ‘a concentrated dominance exerted within the
international system by the dominant powers’ could ultimately maintain these concessionary
agreements.642 The concession therefore contributed rather violently to the production of this (oil)
space. It is in this context that the IPC caused certain social tensions within its space, for
unregulated by the state; it was instead ruled by what could be referred to as the international law
of primitive accumulation.643
To clarify further, Kirkuk, as a part of the oil frontier where oil extraction occurred at a
‘specific, focal point of its location,’ constituted a uniquely situated space in the international
machinery of imperialist oil production in the region and the world capitalist economy.644 It was
this specificity that made it both the center of imperialist capitalist exploitation, as well as, the
very beating heart of anti-imperialist struggle in Iraq. The oil frontier is, as Michael J. Watts has
shown, already a unique space in that not only does it function on its ‘own temporalities and
spatialities’ of global capitalism,645 but also operates within ‘an astonishing spatial patchwork, a
quilt of multiple, overlapping, and intersecting spaces of territorial concessions, blocs, pipelines,
risers, rigs, flow stations, export terminals… [It is, in other words] a cartographer’s dream-space:
a landscape of lines, axes, hubs, spokes, nodes, points, blocks and flows.’646 The IPC in the oil
This was firmly established in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Jurisdiction) Case (1952).
M. Sonarajah. The International Law of Foreign Investment: Second Edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), at 40.
642 Ibid.
643 Mark Neocleous. “International Law as Primitive Accumulation; Or, the Secret of Systemic
Colonization” European Journal of International Law, (2012) Vol. 23, no.4, 941-962.
644 Thad Dunning & Leslie Wirpsa. “Oil and the Political Economy of Conflict in Colombia and Beyond:
A Linkage Approach” Geopolitics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp.81-108; at 82
645 Michael J. Watts. “Securing Oil: Frontiers, Risk, and Spaces of Accumulated Insecurity,” in Hannah
Appel, Arthur Mason & Michael Watts (eds.), Subterranean Estates: Life Worlds of Oil and Gas, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2015), pp.211-236; at 221.
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city of Kirkuk operated on similar lines. Its space was a dynamic and multilayered network,
which was ultimately connected across pipelines and pumping stations to the ports and cities of
the Mediterranean. As Iraq’s gateway to the world – the point where the ‘Third River’ of ‘black
gold’ flows from; it was also where order and disorder manifested; where violence ultimately
broke, and where the tensions of capitalist modernity were reproduced.
In parallel to and constitutive of this spatial specificity was a legal specificity, which
made all this a reality in many ways, for before pipelines could be designed and erected, one
would need to construct the legal space for this to even be a possibility – the ‘primordial straight
line’ drawn on the map if you would. The law and its structures played a prominent role in
bringing all this about. For example, semi-peripheral sovereignty allowed for the triangular
relationship between the company, the British and the Iraqi government to appear to be
functioning at a certain arms-length, when in fact this was not the case as we have seen in our
narrative, where their processes were so much closer and at times entirely interconnected – the
Gāwūrbāghī strike and massacre being a perfect illustration of this. The British government
frequently evoked Iraqi (semi-peripheral) sovereignty to continuously put the blame on the Iraqi
government for all its shortcomings in its dealing with the labour question, diverting from their
own responsibilities. Iraq was an ‘independent’ and ‘sovereign’ state after all, notwithstanding the
influence the British had through its advisors.

Only a couple of years after the Gāwūrbāghī strike, after the Wathba uprising in 1948, the
labour attaché to the British Embassy, M.T. Audsley, released a report whereby he used the same
inconsistent and contradictory line of reasoning in that, on the one hand, he severely criticized the
‘feudal reactionary character’ of the Iraqi government in its dealing with the working class, while,
on the other hand, he recommended the following ‘security’ measures when dealing with any
labour troubles in the IPC: “If the Government is unwilling or unable to put its house in
order…we must always have a strong and pro-British Mutasarrif, Commandment of Police, and
G.O.C. 2nd Division who have instruction to make it clear at all times that the IPC is a vital Iraqi
interest, and that incitement of our labour ranks is a crime against the state. At the same time,
care should be taken in the appointment of judges to Kirkuk, and the Ministry of Justice should
instruct the President of the Courts that no lenient treatment is to be given to cases of incitement
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of labour to strike.”647 This is a remarkably candid recommendation and in many ways illustrates
exactly how the complicity of the triangular relationship functioned during the Gawūrbāghī strike
in 1946. The labour attaché (who acted more like the labour strike ‘fixer’) was therefore merely
conjuring up an already tried and tested method of labour suppression.

VII. Pressure Points of Oil Imperialism & Capitalism; or how to use space to sabotage law

The concluding angle in this narrative invokes another episode in the labour history of
Iraq that advances my argument about the spatiality of law, namely the massive strike of the oil
workers at the K3 pumping station in the isolated desert town of Hadītha, which took place
during the revolutionary period of the Wathba uprising in April of 1948.648 As mentioned earlier,
the K3 pumping station was one of the most important pipeline stations whereby oil flowed
through the desert out to Mediterranean ports and to the world – it was the critical point of
bifurcation.
Although the idea of a strike there originated with the communist party, it was only after
organizing a mass meeting of 3,000 workers when a resolution agreed to undertake wildcat strike
action. Led by a charismatic communist labour organizer by the name of Shanwar Oūda,649 the
strike began the following day on the 23rd of April. Almost immediately, a series of ad hoc
committees emerged: a strike committee, which kept out of view was considered the ‘living brain
of the strike’; a negotiating committee, which although a façade of the strike committee was also
its ‘chief lever;’ an organizers’ committee tasked to select orators and poets; and a strike’s
prefects led by the chief of the guard.650 The prefects were tasked to oversee meetings and
gatherings by preserving order and discipline. Station patrollers took shifts to enforce the strike.
A picket guard controlled those who entered or exited the station, ensuring that, except with the
written permission of the strike committee, ‘not even a pint of gasoline’ would leave the station.
TNA. FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July by M.T. Audsley’ (1
November, 1948); Appendix D, ‘The Security Situation in Iraq as it Affects the Company,’ at 3.
648 The Wathba will be dealt with in detail in a following chapter.
649 Oūda was a former schoolteacher who was dismissed by the authorities for spreading communist
propaganda in 1946. He found his way into the employ of the IPC as a mechanic to make ends meet.
He was later imprisoned, tortured and killed by the Ba‘athists during the 1963 coup. See Fāyez
Haīdar. “Meḥdi (Shanwar) Oūda : Qa’id ʿUmālī Salib wa Masīra Yathkurūḥa al-Tārīkh” (“Mehdi
(Shanwar) Ouda: A steadfast labour leader and a March remembered by history”), al-Hiwār alMutamadin, 2009/6/5, (http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=174173).
650 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 625.
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The entire K3 pumping station, which at that point was in full workers’ control, came to a
complete standstill.651
The main demands of the workers encompassed the following: a wage raise of 25% for
workers of grades (0-1) and 50% for those of grades (3-5); the enforcement of the labour law;
providing K3 workers the same amenities as those given to the Kirkuk (K1) workers; adequate
housing and transportation; making Saturday a half-day; ending the constant overseeing of
workers during the day by security guards; ending the practice of dismissals at will and fining;
and dismissals for taking strike actions.652 The company’s response was not only to regard the
strike a ‘breach of the law,’ but also to make the typical accusation that it was not a genuine
industrial dispute, but rather ‘a subversive movement’ concocted by the communist party.653 The
British Vice-Consul in Baghdad seemed rather astonished when he admitted that, ‘the strike was
from the outset organized with remarkable efficiency. The strikers took over the whole plant and
picketed the ferry across the river Euphrates near Hadītha and all roads leading to the camp’.654
The exceptional organizational capacity of the strikers was attributed, as it was earlier, as actual
evidence of outside political influence rather than stemming from the actions of the workers
themselves.
Although the company eventually conceded to some minor demands, it rejected the key
demand of a wage increase. The strike committee refused to back down, and the workers’ spirits
remained high. By May 5th, a squadron of nearly 30 armored police cars arrived on the scene,
circling the station and workers’ quarters with machine guns. Shortly thereafter, the celebrated
poet, Mohammed Mahdī al-Jawāhirī, furiously wrote in a newspaper in Baghdad: ‘Do they want
to repeat the Gawūrbāghī massacre!’655 The strike committee, who at first unsuccessfully tried to
‘enlist the sympathy of the [police] rank and file’, then ordered the workers to stay away from the
police and avoid confrontation at all costs.656 The British Vice-Consul, who considered Oūda a
communist ‘fanatic’, wrote of his organizational methods, that he maintained firm discipline,
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‘repeatedly impressing upon the strikers the necessity for avoiding violence whilst at the same
time showing that they were effectively under control’.657
A couple of days later, the police cut off food rations, water and electricity from the
station. Realizing that they could not rely on the local bread offered by the neighboring villagers
for long and insisting on avoiding what would be a certain violent confrontation with the police,
the workers held a meeting where they decided to march to Baghdad, 250 kilometers away to
present the government with a petition comprising of their demands. Therefore the next morning
on the 12th of May, the workers of K3 began their long journey to Baghdad. At the head of their
column they carried a banner that read: ‘We the Oil Workers Have Come to Claim Our Violated
Rights’.658
By the time the workers crossed twenty-four kilometers to Hurān valley, they were
exhausted and fatigued from the scorching heat. Taking shelter in the closest village of alBaghdadi, many of them lost consciousness. As rumors spread, eight trucks carrying food and
water arrived for them in solidarity from the people of Hīt. Their brethren drove them back to Hīt
where they took repose. The next day on May 13th, the K3 workers left Hīt on foot. Enduring
their journey, only to be knocked by the desert sun at noon, at which point they were offered
hospitality from the tribe of the al-Muhamadī, who fired rifles and chanted tribal songs in their
honor. When the sunset, they returned to the sandy road, sightlessly trailing in the dead of night.
In the morning, they realized that they arrived in a place called al-Warrār, one kilometer north of
Ramadī and 126 km west of Baghdad. Mounting on small handmade boats, the workers began
traversing the Euphrates to get to Ramadī. When they reached the other side of the river, still
raising their large banner, they continued to march until they approached a bridge that led to
Fallūjah. There the police were waiting for them.

It was a trap. The K3 workers were

apprehended approximately 60 km from their destination. Although some were returned to
Hadītha, Oūda and the strike leaders were all arrested and charged under martial law.659
This heroic episode of labour struggle, which would later be known as ‘al-Masīra alKubrā’ (The Great March), was to assume legendary significance in the annals of Iraqi and labour
historiography. I have recounted the entire narrative so as to make several points to illuminate my
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argument on legal spatiality. It was only after the K3 workers decided where in the unique
imperial map they were situated in to undertake strike action, were they able to very effectively
interrupt the operations of oil production and hit imperialism where it hurts, while they asserted
their normative demands, which they regarded as their legal rights. The workers used spatiality as
a strategy so as to counter the legal spatiality of imperialism itself. It was their grasping of the
spatial map of the Iraqi oil frontier – the network of oil pipelines and the manner in which they
were all interconnected in the whole region – that allowed them to assert their interpretation of
the law. In fact, they were directly challenging the legal structures that were imposed upon them;
the semi-peripheral sovereignty which was maintained by the Anglo-Iraq Treaty that was months
earlier challenged in the streets of Baghdad during the Wathba, was the same legal configuration
that was challenged by them during their strike in an isolated town in the middle of the desert.
This narrative and the workers’ control of the pumping-station is a great example of the
spatiality of law– that is, how legal structures are spread out in a spatial configuration. Timothy
Mitchel has implicitly emphasized this link between spatiality and law in the context of the oil
frontier in the region when he wrote: ‘in building the infrastructure of oil, the petroleum
companies were also laying out the infrastructure of political protest. The points of vulnerability,
where movements could organize and apply pressure, now included a series of oil wells,
pipelines, refineries, railways, docks and shipping lanes across the Middle East. These were the
interconnected sites at which a series of claims for political freedoms and more egalitarian forms
of life would be fought.’660 Here, Mitchel was suggesting that organized action on a specific
‘vulnerable’ point in a spatial arrangement would bring certain pressures to the everyday
operations of the world capitalist machinery. However, he should have added that this
‘infrastructure of political protest’ was conceivable because of the existence of a corresponding
legal infrastructure that was a part of the spatial configuration in question, and so applying
pressure on these sites had an effect on the law as well. The K3 workers were simultaneously
rejecting their role in the operations of an exploitative system of capital accumulation, while
asserting and even constructing their own imaginative legal order. This explains why one worker
considered that the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’661 was established at K3 that day, while
workers would refer to the station as ‘the State of Shanwār Oūda’.662
Mitchel, supra, ft. 451, at 103.
His statement was: ‘[I]n a word, the dictatorship of the proletariat was established at K3 on the
23rd of April, if the comparison is apt”. Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 625
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The strike and the beehive-like organizing capacity of the K3 oil workers in controlling
the station is a remarkable illustration of how precise organized action that takes into account
space and spatial configuration affects and eventually transforms law and governance. More so,
the workers’ very determination to assert their rights after being forced out of their station was
itself replete with meaning. For unlike the oil pipelines that they operated under the desert sun
that pumped a lifeless commodity into the machinery of the capitalist world economy, the
workers were determined to materially impress that their natural rights and living demands
through their very actions would traverse the space of the vast desert all the way to the seat of
state power in Baghdad, and explode into a revolutionary mode to shake up the despotic order
that oppressed them. This of course did not happen. Not yet. Their unwavering movement was
tragically blocked. Although the strike failed in that none of the workers’ demands were fulfilled,
this legendary effort in worker organization and agency would reemerge in a radical way after the
revolution in 1958.

VIII. Conclusion
This chapter has detailed the socio-economic conditions of the oil workers of Kirkuk,
examining the micro-history of the IPC oil fields. The main point is to show that the legal
arrangements described in Chapter 3, had a material effect on the ground by ensuing capitalist
operations were established in Kirkuk. The concessionary agreement and semi-peripheral
sovereignty produced a unique space where the company had a wide discretion to operate, in turn,
creating a certain colonial capitalism. The chapter then moves to uncover the triangular
relationship between the company, the British Embassy and the Iraqi government in violently
crushing the Gawūrbāghī oil strike of 1946, which was initiated by the oil workers to resist the
imperialist constraints imposed on their lives. This strike demonstrates how the imperial and
capitalist spaces that emerged from international and transnational law insulated Iraqi law and so
prevented the Iraqi people from pursuing justice against the company for the murder of Iraqi
workers. The chapter consequently critiques the company narrative of the strike and its responses
to it. Finally, the famous K3 pumping station strike is detailed to illustrate how spatiality was
used as a strategy by the oil workers in their anti-imperial struggle and to assert their own
proletarian legal order.
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Chapter 5: The Railway & Port Workers’ Struggle Against the Semi-Colonial
Legality of the Iraqi State

The Port soars when it hears the call
Yielding an echoed response
And the heroes of the trade union how they
Taste humiliation and suffering
Guilty when it is said to us that the bearers of
Rights want what was snatched [from them]?
And just for every freeman to endure [at]
The hand of the colonizers in pain and vex
…
So cry to your ‘ally’ on our behalf:
We do not want neither a treaty nor a mandate.663
~ Badr Shākir al-Sayyāb

I. Introduction
The other advanced sectors of the Iraqi working class at the time were the railway and
port workers. The previous chapter dealt with the micro-history of the oil workers and showed
how they struggled against the ‘triangular’ complicity between the IPC, the Iraqi state and the
British Embassy. This chapter will expand this analysis, moving from the provincial city of
Kirkuk and its surroundings into two other sites of labour struggle at the time: the Iraq State
Railways, concentrated in the workshops of western Baghdad, and the Port of Basra in the South.
Both the railways and the port were arranged as semi-autonomous entities —administratively and
functionally separated from the Iraqi state. This was the direct effect of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty and Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty. After detailing these legal structures, I will turn to
The entire poem quoted in Jasim al-Matīr, “Bayna ʿam 47 wa Thukrā 74 Afʿāl Kathīra Tuthīr al-Da
ḥsha,” [Between the year ‘48 and the memory of ‘74 a lot of actions that astonish], Basrah al-Ahāli,
25/3/2008. Al-Sayyāb, who was a port worker at the time, recited this poem on the day of the 1948
port strike, the strikers carried him on their shoulders. The poem illustrates how the strikers tied
their conditions to the Anglo-Iraq treaty. My translation.
663
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explore the conditions of the railway and port workers and then analyze their various
organizational efforts to improve their conditions, while simultaneously challenging the
repressive semi-colonial legal structures that were imposed on them through collective strike
action. I will end with an analysis of the manner in which British experts –especially the labour
attaché to the British Embassy and the labour advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour
– influenced the institutions of the Iraqi state. I will show how the British expert’s approach
conceived of trade unionism and the working class in Iraq. The argument in this chapter is that
while the railway and port workers were structurally challenging the semi-colonial legal order,
British experts were devising top-down social and labour reforms to ensure the maintenance of
this order and British hegemony. I will then critically examine the limitations of their analyses in
their reports to explain their failure in preventing revolution in the end.

II. The Iraq State Railways as imperial arteries of communications
The Iraq railways were envisioned for a specific purpose that has always been at the
center of imperial considerations. This goes back to the tense conflicts that emerged between
imperial powers over the strategic ‘Berlin-Baghdad Railway’ that was initially obtained as a
concession by the German-controlled Anatolian Railway in 1902.664 By the time the First World
War began in 1914, and the British occupied Iraq a few years later, only a 74-mile section of
standard-gauge railway between Baghdad and Samārra was under construction. 665 It was
consequently only as a result of the war that the British Army was to extensively build the
railway system in Iraq.666 As the Director-General of the Iraqi State Railways wrote in one of his
reports in 1947, ‘the railway [system] is virtually a product of two wars’.667 The British, who
always regarded the railways as essential to their strategic communication network in the

The literature on the Baghdad-Berlin Railway is vast. For a more recent study see, Murat
Ozyuksel. Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Industrialization, Imperial Germany and
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665 Naval Intelligence Division. Iraq and the Persian Gulf (B.R. 524, Geographical Handbook Series,
September 1944), at 579.
666 Ibid, at 580-581. , During the war effort the following lines were constructed: the Basra-Nasiriya
line; the Basra-Qurna-Amara line; the Shaikh-Saad-Sinn-Atab line; the Kut-Baghdad line; the
Baghdad-Baquba-Mansur line; the Baghdad-Fallujah line; Baghdad Hilla line; and Sammara-Baiji line.
Most of these lines would be dismantled after the war, while a single line between Basra and
Baghdad would be deemed sufficient for post-war purposes.
667 Iraqi State Railways. Report on the Administration of the Railways, 1945-46, (Baghdad: September
1st, 1947).
664

149

region,668 ensured the safeguarding of their interests in what Longrigg and Stoakes considered the
‘arteries of Iraq’s communication’669 after independence. Hence, it is for this reason that the
railways were to be explicitly addressed in the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, fundamentally
influencing the institutions of an ‘independent’ Iraqi state.
The main lines of the railway system, were divided into two sections, standard gauge
north of Baghdad to Baijī along the Tigris, and meter gauge from Baghdad to Basra, along the
Euphrates, and from Baghdad to Jalūla on the Diyāla, where it branched eastwards to Khanaqīn,
and northward to Kirkūk.670 In 1939, the Baghdad-Baiji was extended through Mosul to Tell
Kochek on the Syrian frontier, and after 1945 the Kirkūk was extended to Arbīl.671 For the
purposes of this chapter, the most important part of the entire railway system lay in the
workshops and stores of Schālchīyyāh in Baghdad (a working-class district situated 2.5 miles
north-west of Baghdad West station). The headquarters of the Railways were located in the west
side of the Tigris in Baghdad.672

During the first war, between 1914-1918, those employed by the Railway Directorate
were entirely British and Indian. By 1940, the total staff numbered 8,863 (32 of whom were
British, 31 Indian, and the rest were Iraqis).673 After the second war, in 1946, according to a
railway administrative report, the total staff numbered 14,522 (14,461 of whom were Iraqis). The
majority of Iraqis were employed as labourers (11,211), while the others were for the most part,
low-grade or junior officials. Only 43 Iraqis were in some sort of middle and ‘senior positions,’
compared to 59 British officials served in senior or higher technical and ‘expert’ positions.674
This composition of employees at the Railways was a reflection of the fact that the institution was
juridically separated from the Iraqi state and administered in such a manner. These legal
structures were embedded in the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty and finalized later in a separate 1936
Railway Agreement that I will discuss in detail below. This therefore rendered the Railway
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671 Ibid, at 133. For a detailed description of the railway lines see, Hugh Hughes. Middle East Railways
(Kenton: The Continental Railway Circle, 1981), at 89-90.
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Directorate as having a special status under law, for although its ownership was transferred to the
Iraqi state (in 1936); it was in reality administered under the authority of a British DirectorGeneral, who had semi-autonomous powers under statutory law. It was in that sense that most
Iraqis considered the Railway Directorate as ‘an alien [semi-colonial] body’.675

III. The legal structures that govern the institutions of the Railway Directorate
As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance would govern the
relations between the newly ‘independent’ Iraqi state and Britain. I have already argued that this
treaty in fact ensured that Iraqi sovereignty would be constricted as it gave Britain significant
room to influence the vital functions of the Iraqi state. Furthermore, this treaty gave way for the
development of a novel form of sovereignty – semi-peripheral sovereignty – under international
law, as the jurists of the PMC in Geneva considered it quite adequate for the termination of the
Mandate. In an annex of the treaty, it was stipulated that a ‘close’ alliance between the two states
would be maintained, especially relating to the military, as two bases were to be maintained rentfree inside Iraq, while British troops had a (virtually unlimited) right to move troops over Iraqi
soil. Article 7 of the annexure stated that Iraq would, ‘…afford, when requested to do so by His
Britannic Majesty (HBM), all possible facilities for the movement of British forces of HBM of all
arms in transit across ‘Iraq and for the transport and storage of all supplies and equipment that
may be required by these forces during their passage across Iraq. These facilities shall cover the
use of roads, railways, waterways, ports and aerodromes of Iraq and HBM’s ships shall have
general permission to visit the Shatt-al-Arab.’676
A separate financial annexure, which was likewise attached to the treaty, dealt with the
railways. It was stipulated that the ownership of the railway system would be transferred by
British government to the Iraq government and registered under its name, while full beneficial
ownership shall be vested by lease at a nominal rent in a special body or corporation having a
separate legal personality to be constituted by special Statute of the Iraq Legislature.677 This
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corporation would be wholly responsible for the administration and management of the railway
system, subject to limitations imposed by the statute.678 The Board of the corporation would
consist of five members, two of whom would be appointed by the government of Britain and two
by the government of Iraq; the fifth who would be the Chairman would be appointed by both
governments in agreement.679
It took a longer time than anticipated to subsequently negotiate and finalize an agreement
by which the railway was to be transferred to the Iraqi state. The disagreements were mostly
regarding the actual amount to be paid for purchase, and the composition of the Board mentioned
in the treaty, and its statutory powers. E.G. Hogg, the British Advisor to the Ministry of Finance,
explained the difficulties in negotiations in a Note where he wrote, ‘in the case of the
Railways…[the] Iraqi [government] feel that operations are conducted inside a wall which they
cannot see through and can only to a very limited extent look over. They are told that the
existence of the Board will make all the difference, since they will have their representation on
the Board, which will be composed of reasonable men…[who] will listen to their views. On this
they are skeptical…’ considering that they would become ‘a permanent minority’ on the
Board.680
Eventually, the Railway Agreement was concluded in March 1936. A law was passed to
create a corporation that would govern the railways.681 It was agreed that the Iraqi state would
take over ownership of the railways (including its material assets and Reserve fund) for a nominal
sum of 494,000 British Pounds Sterling.682 The Iraqi Government was to accept all liabilities
relating to the railways. Furthermore, it was agreed that for twenty years from the date of the
transfer, the management of the railways would be entrusted to a five-member Board of
Management appointed by the Iraqi Government, only one of whom would be a British subject.
However, the agreement made it clear that British subjects would hold all key positions of
administration, such as General Manager, Inspector-General of Traffic and Chief Engineer. In
that sense, the Railway Agreement and the Anglo-Iraq Treaty ensured that the railway system
was to remain under British administrative control, although it was legally owned by the Iraqi
Ibid, Art. 4(b).
Ibid, Art. 4(d).
680 TNA. CO 730/172/4. Note by Mr. E.G. Hogg, C.M.G., Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, (Baghdad,
7th August, 1932).
681 Ibid, ‘Railway Corporation Law’ (1932).
682 The text of the Railway Agreement is in TNA, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to FO, 1 April, 1936, FO
371/19998, E2117/25/93.
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state. This was one of the legal instruments that were innovatively used to dismember the
strategic parts of the country, turning them into semi-colonial enclaves, with the purpose of
safeguarding British interests. As I will show later, a similar approach was used when dealing
with the Port of Basra. It was no wonder that these spaces would eventually become important
sites of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle.

IV. The first communist ‘experiment’ in strike action at Schālchīyyāh & its significance
I have earlier recounted the role of the railway workers in the formative years of the
history of the labour movement in the early and mid-1930s in a previous chapter. So, it should be
kept in mind that the railway workers had a considerably longer history in labour organizing and
it is for this reason not surprising that the communists would decide to begin their involvement
with labour in the railways, leading to the 15-day Schālchīyyāh strike that would have a
significant contribution to the overall history of labour movement in Iraq. The communists’
strategic approach was to gradually organize cells in different railway stations throughout the
country (such as Ma’qīl, Sāmāwah, Diwanīyyah, Baghdad West, Baghdad North, Baghdad East,
and Kirkūk).683 However, they focused their energies on the Schālchīyyāh workshops, as they
considered it as the ‘most fundamental point in the entire system’, where they would be able to
affect the most damage if strike action was called.684 The workers of the Schālchīyyāh workshops
numbered 1,265 in May 1945 (compromising about 12 percent of all railway workers).685
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Figure 3: Map of Baghdad showing the railway workshops in the Schalchiyyah neighborhood.
(Naval Intelligence Division, Handbook, supra, ft. 665, at 511).

Most of the railway workers (like their counterparts in the huge industrial enterprises)
were uneducated, had rural origins, and remained attached to their tribal roots.686 It was therefore
a difficult task for the urban communist intelligentsia to shake their consciousness as their
peasant-outlook and tribal affiliations made them less susceptible to notions of class solidarity,
and appeared to fragment their ability to unite under class or even nationalist lines.687 Yet, despite
these misgivings, the railway workers were successful in finding a form of unity at pivotal
moments, under notions of class solidarity. The communists were sensitive to recruit the workers’
most respected leaders into their ranks (in particular Alī Shukur and ʿAbd-Tamr) and this
686
687
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eventually made the party quite attractive. In time, the communists succeeded in becoming an
intrinsic part of the railway workers, providing the workers with the analytic language and
conceptual tools they needed to understand the world around them.688
The Railway Union received its license from the Ministry of Social Affairs in September
1944.689 Its first congress was held in Baghdad on November 7, 1944.690 Hāshim Jawād, the
well-respected Iraqi member of the ILO chaired the elections, which gave it a certain
legitimacy.691 Sixty-four delegates representing 1,692 members of all railway workers were in
attendance.692 The assembly elected a supervisory council of twelve (ten of which were members
of the ICP), and an administrate bureau of seven members (four of which were members of the
ICP). Alī Shukur, a charismatic and well-respected communist-worker693, was elected as the
president of the union, and Abbūd Hamza as secretary.694 The union charter emphasized that it
would seek improvements in wages and working conditions strictly by ‘legal’ means,
discouraging any confrontation with the state.695 It called for workers’ education (to teach them
how to read and write), the raising of their technical skills, ‘to cultivate brotherly ties amongst
themselves in the interest of the working class, their Iraqi homeland, and ‘international
democracy’’.696 Within a month of its establishment a third of the railways workers (around
11,000 workers) joined the union.697 In fact, the licensing of this union was such an important
event that its headquarters was transformed into the epicenter of far-reaching labour organizing
and solidarity across sectorial lines, bolstering the labour movement as a whole.698
At the congress, the new president of the union, Ali Shukur made a speech in which he
emphasized that the union’s main role was to advocate for the legal rights of the railway workers
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and to resolve all their problems.699 He then turned to identify some of the main problems facing
the workers, mentioning their drastically low wages which were inadequate to live on. He
recommended that wages should be fixed on a yearly rather than daily basis.700 He also addressed
the question of hours of work, stating that workers worked overtime to the detriment of their
health.701 One of the main issues that he tackled related to dismissals-at-will and the manner in
which management abused their powers, often fining workers in a punitive manner.702 Shukur
insisted that this needed to be regulated and clearly defined within the law so that it was not
abused. Finally, although he agreed that open communication channels and full cooperation
between management and the union was a necessity – even suggesting the formation of a special
committee to look into workers grievances and educating them on their rights under the labour
law – he made it clear that an independent trade union must be recognized by management as the
sole bargaining agent for the railway workers.703
From the very beginning, the attitude of the British Director-General of the Railways,
Major Smith, was hostile towards the formation and licensing of the union. Rather than
recognizing its elections as a democratic process, he saw it as being instigated by communist
agitators who were ‘political opportunists’ rather than genuine railway workers.704 Smith would
keep a close eye on these developments, privately encouraging workers to ‘squeeze out’ those
undesirable (elected) leaders from their ranks.705 Even the British Embassy councilor, who agreed
that the new union was for the most part promoted by ‘political busybodies’, would go on to
criticize Smith’s uncompromising approach, writing in a dispatch to London: ‘“political
opportunists” or not, leaders with some education and independence will be necessary if workers
in this country are to improve upon their miserable status. They are unlikely in my view to make
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such progress if merely organized into “company unions” which is evidently what Smith would
like to see’.706
As one would expect from a semi-colonial enterprise, the British Embassy believed that
the numerous allegations regarding the working conditions of the railway workers made in the
circulating communist pamphlets were exaggerated, at one point it was claimed that that
conditions of railway workers were much higher than other industries. Moreover, the
contravention of the Iraqi labour law by the railway administration, which was one of the main
allegations made by the workers, was astoundingly admitted, but it was claimed that this
contravention was done ‘to the advantage of the workers’.707
On April 11, the railway union submitted a petition to the railway administration which
listed the demands of the Schālchīyyāh workers, which were raises of 50%, 40% and 30% on day
wages of less than 200 fils,708 between 200-300 fils, and of more than 300 fils, respectively.709
The question of higher wages was the most important concern for the workers, because if one
were to calculate the wages of the workers at the time and compare it to the cost of living index, it
would be obvious that they were utterly inadequate. The lowest wage for day labourers at the
railways was 150 fils710, while the ‘labourer’s basket’ for one family to live on in December 1945
was calculated at approximately 405 fils.711 In other words, wages were less than inadequate to
live on, especially considering the continuing rise of the cost of living. In fact, even by 1948
when some increases in wages were applied, while living costs rose to six times before the war,
the labour attaché to the British Embassy wrote in his report that ‘the purchasing value of these
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wages was much below the lowest subsistence level,’ and that therefore a wage of about 230 fils a
day meant that workers were ‘nearly half-starved’.712
The conditions of the railway workers could also be ascertained from the descriptions of their
living quarters, which were tiny mud huts surrounding the workshops. A communist lawyer,
Sālim al-Nūʿmān described one of these huts, where the administrative bureau of the union would
sometimes meet, in the following manner: ‘the hut…was made up of one room [and] built from
mud… its space was no more than thirty square feet; [and] a family of five lived in it…[T]hese
were the conditions of the railway workers’.713 Even when the labour attaché, was given a tour of
these quarters in 1948, he described them as ‘nauseating’.714 Azīz al-Hājj, one of the foremost
communist intellectuals who was assigned the task of coordinating union activities with the party,
described how a railway worker portrayed his conditions in a union meeting as he was weeping:
Describing ‘the unaffordable rents, dismissals-at-will, high costs and black housing, the police
chase, the abuse of the British administration … [It is clear the worker concluded that] the
[British railway] administrator Smith and his kind were the ones running these [Iraqi]
governments.’715
The Railway Directorate’s response to the union’s demands was an unqualified refusal,
and Shukur consequently had no choice but to order a national strike four days later.716 The
response was instantaneous. The Schālchīyyāh workshops came to a complete standstill for ten
consecutive days. This naturally put a great strain on the entire railway system, as strike action
spread to other stations in Basra and Mosul.717 On the third day, Major General H.C. Smith cut
off water supplies to the workers’ mud hut dwellings surroundings the railway workshops.718

712TNA.

FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July by M.T. Audsley’ (1
November, 1948).
713al-Nūʿmān, supra, ft. 580, at 299.
714 TNA. FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July by M.T. Audsley’, supra.
715 al-Hājj, Azīz. Dāfatir al-Shakhis al-Ākhir, [Notebooks of the Other Person] (Beirut: Mu’sasa alʿArabīya lil-dirāsāt wa al-Nashir, 1985), at 104.
716 al-Nūʿmān recounts how Shukur as the president of the administrative bureau of the union
approached Comrade Fahad the secretary-general of the ICP to try to convince him of the necessity to
call a strike shortly after the congress ended. Fahad cautioned against this as he felt that it was not
the correct move in terms of strategy and tactics. He argued that waiting for the right moment was
decisive for a successful strike, eluding to the fact one must take into account the wider political
implications and its effects on the nationalist movement as a whole. al-Nūʿmān, supra, ft. 580, at 123124.
717 Humaīdī, supra, ft. 549, at 154-55.
718 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 619.

158

On the 17th, the mutasarif of Baghdad ordered the suppression of the union, arresting the
members of the administrative bureau. The justification for the revocation of the union’s license
and its suppression could be found in a letter sent to Parliament from the Minister of Social
Affairs, which claimed that Iraqi workers were ‘socially and intellectually immature’ to form a
union, as they were easily prone to manipulation by political agitators, in turn, threatening the
‘peace of the Monarchy.’ 719 The Minister urged that the union’s license be revoked, and
Parliament agreed. During the strike, the Railway Administration formed a spineless ‘Labour
Committee’ that called for an end of the strike before any demands were met. The workers aware
of this strategy boycotted it, and mockingly referred to it as ‘Smith’s Committee.’720 General
Smith, consequently warned the strikers to resume work by the morning of the 21st, or be
considered, ‘as having left the service of the railway without notice.’721 The workers remained
firm for the most part. At this point, Smith appealed to the workers: ‘Your interests are our
interests. Therefore, return to work and have confidence that your Administration…will improve
your condition as far as is possible.’722 There was no response. On the 24th, Smith threatened to
import Indian labour. Five days later, the strike subsided after a promise by the Ministry of
Social Affairs to increase wages to a certain extent.723 After the 28th, worker disintegration spread
for fear for their jobs, and the strike eventually ended.724 The railway union was permanently shut
down and would not reemerge until after the fall of the Monarchy.
The significance of the 1945 railway strike in the history of the labour movement could
not be overstated as it was in the words of Sbāhī the first ‘experiment’ in organizational strike
action in post-war Iraq.725 It was in other words, the beginning of a pattern that would reoccur
elsewhere, where a union would be democratically formed by the workers, then violently
suppressed by the government, leading to the emergence of a (hidden) ‘strike committee’ that
would undertake a more offensive militant strategy of wildcat strike action. This pattern
continued sporadically until the advent of the revolution.
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As Batatu illustrates the railway strike demonstrated that the communists did not actually
have unlimited influence or control of the workers. That is true, however Batatu did not fully or
explicitly acknowledge the independence of the trade union and its administrative bureau from
the ICP. In other words, his narrative assumes that the party was the prime mover of every aspect
of the strike, including the union itself, which was not the case. The union was influenced by the
communists and very closely coordinated with the party, and its president was a communist, but
he took the workers’ concerns to the party leadership rather than imposed party instructions on
them.726 The fact was that the leadership of the union was democratically elected for a reason and
that was that they were trusted to further the workers’ interests while keeping wider political
questions in mind. Close coordination and guidance does not necessary mean full control
(although it could surely at times imply strict discipline), and that was never really the policy of
the party in the first place.
The communists were successful in broadening the workers’ perspective and allowed
them to practice all-embracing solidarity. In other words, they were able to see the larger picture.
Hence, the strike actually brought workers from different industries together to defend the very
idea of trade unionism, which was being attacked by the government and the railway
administration. Numerous sympathy strikes were initiated by mechanic, carpenter, electrical,
cigarette and printer workers.727 One petition submitted to the government made it clear that, ‘this
attack on the railway workers is considered as directed towards all the workers of Iraq’.728 The
other consequence of the strike was the gradual radicalization of the working class as labour
issues were now understood in the context of the nationalist movement and its political discourse.
In other words, the role of the labour movement in the overall nationalist movement was further
clarified, and workers were able to grasp how ‘workers solidarity’ came hand in hand with
nationalist ‘popular solidarity’.729 This allowed for the escalation in the popular ‘hatred towards
British colonialism [and imperialism]’ within and beyond the Iraqi working class.730 So, for
al-Nūʿmān writes on this issue that Shukur was loyal to the communist party, and was careful to
follow party policy. However, he was aware of his role as the leader of a large union and as an ardent
trade unionist many times made his own decisions without consulting the party. Fahad trusted him
and did not interfere with any of these decisions, but only asked him to consult the party when the
issue in question had broader political implications that went beyond trade unionism. Supra, ft. 52, at
298,.
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example, the Iraqi Federation of Students organized sympathy strikes in support of the railway
workers’ struggle, referring to the Railway Directorate in their petition to the government as a
‘colonial entity’.731 The significance of the formation of this bond between the students and the
workers would be one of the most important and effective relationships during the Wathba.
More significantly for our purposes, the communists exposed the manner in which Iraqi
law was being undermined by the semi-colonial legal structures that governed the railways. The
response of the British railway administration of violent suppression of the union and its
replacement by what workers would later refer to as the ‘colonial Smith Committees’
demonstrated how the Anglo-Iraq treaty and its legal structures had a direct effect on the workers.
The ICP were central in contributing to the broadening the worker’s consciousness in this regard,
allowing them to learn from their experiences. This is clear in a communist declaration written by
Fahad and addressed to the railway workers in February of 1946 that called for the re-initiation of
strike action, and directly critiqued the neo-colonial legal structures of the railway administration
and its restrictive influence on Iraqi law:
... Comrades! … We understand why you want your trade unions [rather than the ‘workers
committees’]…you want them because they represent you and because you struggle under their banner to
implement the labour laws, and to improve your living…conditions, and to respond to the assault and
injustices that you are exposed to by the Colonial Smith Administration. And we understand why Smith
and the Iraqi government want to strip you and strip [all] the workers of Iraq from the trade unions and
replace them with ‘worker committee[s];’ because they want the labour law to remain – like the Iraqi
constitution – a dead law, and because they want to exploit the Iraqi worker like an animal without any
rights to raise his voice or respond against any injustice perpetrated against him…732

The struggle therefore moved from one generally concerning a wage increase to one dealing
specifically with the very existence of trade unionism in Iraq, the recognition of an independent
railway trade union and (quite explicitly) the implementation of the labour law. The workers were
aware that through their actions, they were injecting real content into the empty shells of the
labour legislation that was in the books, and this had an important effect on their nationalist
resistance against the legal structures governing the Iraqi state.
In that sense, the 1945 strike would in fact later continue under a new form of offensive
action with the 1946 strike (and later in massive successive 1948 strikes during the Wathba),
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which was now not only more political, but brought to further prominence the organizational
institution of the ‘higher strike committee’. Therefore, as the democratically elected trade unions
were systematically suppressed by the Iraqi state and their British administrative overlords, the
higher strike committee which tended to operate underground would emerge as an important
organizational structure for the labour movement; whereas the tactic that would eventually
distinguish this change in strategy (as was already detailed with the actions of the K3 oil workers)
would become offensive wildcat strike action. This happened hand in hand with the development
of a cadre of worker-communists, who would gain and hone unique organizational experiences in
the strategies and tactics of strike action, and who would move to coordinate their efforts into
other industries, in particular the oil fields and the Port of Basra.

V. ‘To Balsara’s Haven’733: The struggle of the Port workers of Basra & their victory
One of the most important sites of labour struggle that would emerge on similar lines as
the railways was the Port of Basra. The history of the city of Basra (at one point dubbed the
‘Venice of the East’ due to its narrow canals and waterways) could not be understood without its
port734, which for centuries, as the only ‘sea-gate’ to the city and ‘the Land of Two Rivers,’735
was so central to the trade routes of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, and later on would become
vital to linking Iraq to the world economy.736 Naturally, most of Iraq’s export and import trade
passed through this port. Basra, situated on the right bank of the Shatt al-Arab, 70 miles by river
above Fao, is in fact an agglomeration of three towns: Basra City; Ashar; the modern port of
Maqil; and several large villages: Jubaila (on the river front); Manawi and Rubat Saghir.737 The
British first entered the city in 1914 and occupied it thereafter, eventually turning it into ‘an

From Milton’s Paradise Regained
Mohammed Khudayyir illustrates this well in his book Basrayatha, which is an autobiographical
portrait of Basra, when he writes, “Had it not been for the date palm, there would have been no
baskets for harvesting dates. Had there been no baskets for harvesting dates, there would have been
no date pickers. Had there been no date pickers, there would have been no ships. Had there been no
ships, there would have been no port. Had there been no port, no city would have been built.” One of
the most important long established industries in the city was the date-packing industry.
Mohammed Khudayyir, Basrayatha: Portrait of a City, William Hutchins (tr), (Cairo: AUC Press,
2007), at 5.
735 Cecil Byford. The Port of Basrah Iraq, (Published under the authority of the Port of Basrah
Directorate, London: Waterlow & Sons, 1935).
736 See Hala Fatah. The Politics of Regional Trade, supra; Thabit Abdullah. Merchants, Mamluks, and
Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in Eighteenth-Century Basra, (NY: SUNY Press, 2001).
737 Naval Intelligence Division, supra, ft. 665, at 505-506.
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appanage of British India’.738 Of course, even before their military expedition, by the early
twentieth century, trade in Basra was already ‘almost entirely in British hands.’739
The British army gradually began constructing the modern port of Basra during the first
war, using its access as the main supply base for their two military bases in Habbānīyyāh and
Shū‘aybāh. Once the military effort was over, the port reverted to its commercial function and
officially opened in 1920 – its new commercial status affirmed in the Port of Basra Proclamation
1919 (Provisional) – considered as ‘the Port of Basra Code’740- which would eventually be
incorporated into the constitution or Organic Law in 1924. 741 The Basra Port Directorate
remained under British ownership, although it was placed under the control of the new Iraq
government and subsequently administered by the Ministry of Finance.742

By the time the Anglo-Iraq Treaty was signed in 1930, the port would be governed by
very similar legal structures as the railways– that is, as a semi-autonomous institution. The
financial annexure of the treaty set up an autonomous Port Trust, whereby the property of the port
would be (legally) transferred to the Iraqi government.743 The Port Trust had its own ‘legal
personality,’ and this legislation could not be amended without the agreement of the British, as
long as Iraqi government owed debt with respect of the port.744 The Iraqi government would
consequently confer ‘full beneficial ownership’ upon the Port Trust.745
The Iraqi government ultimately paid a nominal sum of 540,875 British pounds
sterling. 746 Hence, by the Second War, the port would become the property of the Iraqi
government, although it was administered by an independent Port Authority, headed by a British
Paul Rich (ed.), A Voyage in the Gulf: C.M. Cursetjee’s The Land of the Date (1918) (Cambridge:
Allborough, 1991), at 157.
739 A.C. Wratislaw. A Consul in the East (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1924), at 139.
740 Byford, supra, ft. 735, at 36
741 Ibid.
742 The Ministry of Finance was created in 1927 and directly attached to Parliament. It was separated
from the executive under law. Its functions were to examine all accounts of the state, including the
railways, the port and industrial factories, and it was empowered to take broad discretionary action
to remedy any deficiencies. See Sassoon, supra, ft. 141, at 51.
743 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, Annexure to the Treaty of Alliance
744 Ibid.
745 Ibid.
746 Naval Intelligence Division, supra, ft. 665, at 508.
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Port Director and a Director General of Navigation (including British senior administrative
staff). 747 Furthermore, the finances and budgets of the port, like the railways, were fully
separated from that of the Iraq government.748 The port was therefore one of the strategic sites
that was so important for British imperial interests that it had to be (practically) dismembered
from the governing functions of the Iraqi state, turning it into a semi-colonial enclave governed
by a separate semi-colonial legality. This was once more the effect of semi-peripheral
sovereignty, which as discussed earlier, was characterized by a fragmented and constricted
sovereignty at its core with merely the appearance of a legally conferred sovereignty.

The port workers were differentiated into numerous categories according to their
functions in the port – they were not merely skilled, semiskilled and unskilled, but also marine
ratings, monthly labourers, day labourers, labourers on contract and labourers on piecework.749
Furthermore, according to Batatu, the bulk of these workers came from rival tribes –Nassār and
Bahrakān – which made them even more difficult to unify under class or nationalist lines.750 The
communists and their allies therefore had a difficult road ahead in ‘loosening the workers from
their old tribal moorings and fastening them to new proletarian anchors’. 751 The national
campaign for a Port Workers’ Union began in 1944. As will be shown, one of the main
characteristics that distinguished the struggle of the port workers was the uncompromising
attempt to unify all the fragmented port workers and to guarantee that the Iraqi labour law was
applied systematically to all port workers rather than only some.
In one revealing petition to the authorities during the campaign, which was published in
the working-class press, the manner in which the Port Administration intentionally avoided the
application of Iraqi law (namely the 1936 Labour Law) was described in colorful language, and
the miserable conditions of the port workers compared to the ‘slave-workers of Pharaohs’. It is
worth quoting in part below:

Ibid.
Cecil Byford, supra, ft. 735, at 24.
749 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 621.
750 Ibid.
751 Ibid. Nāsir ʿAbbūd, a communist trade union leader described the difficulty of educating illiterate
port workers. He would personally undertake one-on-one sessions with workers, reading and
explaining the communist newspaper, al-Qa‘ida in detail. “Nāṣir ʿAbbūd. Munādil Fatha wa Shīū‘i
Ṣāmid,” Majala al-Ghadd, Basra, 17 July 2011.
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Our [port] workers have lived under the shadow of the British directorate that controls the Port, a
life of misery and despair and slavery […] representing the cruelest form of colonial exploitation, […] a
life that…does not fit with [the principles of] human rights of our age today… [The port administration]
have taken away […] our rights […] Yes we have built the pyramids of the Pharaohs of the Port with our
empty stomachs and our bodies half naked but we will not lose our conscience, as honorable workers and
as citizens, we rose like other workers [before us] of our dear Iraqi nation to demand for our legal right to
establish a trade union, we seek to resurrect the labour law [of 1936] from under the layers of accumulated
neglect throughout the years… [we demand for the establishment of]…[a] trade union that seeks to raise
our standard of living and improve our conditions of work. However, the foreign directorate of the Port
has…attempted to intervene - to prevent us from acquiring our right to establish a trade union […] The
workers of the Port want to […] enforce Iraqi laws [and] their rights. However, the masters of the Port see
in the extension of the provisions of Iraqi laws into their independent directorate –which they consider as
their own personal state- a danger that threatens their independent entity […] and the loss of their control
over this directorate...752

The petition made it clear that one cannot understand the conditions of the port workers without
grasping the reality of the port as a semi-colonial enclave and the legal structures that govern it in
the first place. In a way, the workers once again brought a dead Iraqi law in the books to life by
using it in their petition and connecting it to what they consider as their violated rights. The use of
the law in such a way could be considered as a strategic arsenal of resistance under their sleeves –
the appropriation of legality and legal rhetoric to further their cause. In many ways, what they
were asking for was not radical at all but rather quite moderate. However, for a semi-colonial
administration and an authoritarian government, this was too much to ask for.
The Port Workers’ Union ultimately received its license from the Ministry of Social
Affairs despite several setbacks on 15 August 1945. The first congress was held on 12 October in
a local coffeehouse, leading to the election of a Council of Thirteen Supervisors (which included
seven communists), and an Administrative Bureau of eight led by the worker-communist, ‘Abd
al-Husān al-Jabbār, who was elected as president.753 Around 3,125 workers (60 percent of all port
workers) subsequently joined the union by April 1946.754 According to a prominent labour
organizer and port workers’ leader, Nāsir ʿAbbūd,755 despite gaining the legal license, the port
administration rapidly waged its own repressive campaign against the union, with the goal of
disrupting its activities at every move, especially with increasing its outright dismissals of any
worker suspected of organizing for the union.756 A small strip of land in the port was chosen as
Quoted in Zakī Khayrī and Suʿād Khayrī. Dirāsāt fī Tarīkh al-Hizb al-Shīūʿi al-ʿIraqī, [Studies in the
history of the Iraqi Communist Party, Vol. 1], (Baghdad: al-Yūbil al-Thahabī, 1984), at 134.
753 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 621.
754 Ibid.
755 Nāṣir ʿAbbūd, “Liqa’ Mʿa al-Rafīq Nasir ʿAbbūd” [‘An interview with Comrade Nasir Abbud’] in alThaqāfa al-Jadīda (Issue 152, 1984), at 51.
756 Ibid, at 52.
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the official headquarters of the union and a mounted structure erected, while workers were
assigned to guard its entrances night and day, as meetings and heated debates were held,
especially regarding the role of trade unionism and the importance of worker solidarity.757
The union decided to organize its first strike on 21 May 1947 – a higher strike committee
was formed.758 The Union’s list of demands included the recognition of the union by the port
administration, the application of the labour law to all port workers regardless of their grade, the
reinstatement of those dismissed for their trade union activism, and the raising of wages.759 This
first experiment in strike action failed as police swiftly arrested the strike leaders and two-dozen
workers.760
According to ʿAbbūd, those arrested were ill-treated by police and then taken to appear in
front of the courts, which took on a popular significance as their trials were ‘transformed into a
political demonstration against [police] terrorism and the defense of trade union rights and
political freedoms’ and especially ‘the right to strike’ which the workers consistently fought for to
be enshrined into the 1936 Labour Law.761 Several communist and left-leaning lawyers appeared
in court in defense of those arrested, in particular the prominent communist lawyer, Mohammed
Hussein Abū al-ʿīs, who with his distinctive oratorical voice denounced the violent tactics used
against the working class.762 Despite the fact that this first experiment in strike action by the port
workers was a failure in that none of the workers’ demands were fulfilled and at least sixty-five
‘agitator-workers’ were expelled from the port,763 ‘Abbūd would consider it as an key moment
whereby the workers gained experience discipline and solidarity, especially between the working
class and the Iraqi masses as a whole.764
The determination of the port workers did not falter as they returned to plan new
strategies and tactics in strike action in their next confrontation soon afterward during the Wathba
uprising of 1948. I will return to the details of the Wathba in Chapter 7, but for now what is
important to note is that a wave of labour strikes, one of which was the K3 oil strike detailed
Ibid.
Ibid, at 53.
759 Ṣawt al-Ahālī, 28 May, 1947.
760 ʿAbbūd, supra, ft. 755, at 513
761 Ibid.
762 Ibid.
763 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 621.
764 ʿAbbūd, supra, ft. 755, at 513.
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earlier, intensified and spread like fire throughout the country during the months of April and
May, including of course throughout Basra.765 An atmosphere of despair was prevalent in Basra
as the working class and common people struggled with the extreme inflation that characterized
the year of 1948 – the prices of necessities continued to rise, while there was a shortage of wheat
and barely.766 This situation was unbearable and its stark effects became more visible when the
Regent visited the city, and a British official wrote, ‘the common people contrasted the
magnificence of the HRH’s reception with the terrible quality of bread they were forced to eat.’767
It was later reported that bread was thrown at his car, while an old lady presented him with a
piece of black bread, which she told him was ‘a specimen of what the poor had to eat in Basra.’768
The Port Workers’ Union once again drafted a signed petition listing their demands and
sent it to the port administration and ultimately the Ministry of Social Affairs.769 Their demands
were similar to what was called for before, emphasizing the application of the labour law to all
workers. They were explicitly opposed to the piecemeal system of employment (nithām al-qitʿa),
whereby workers were hired and paid extremely low wages for specific tasks, such as loading and
unloading cargo.770 The port workers employed by this unfair system were called ʿUmmāl alArṣīfa (‘the workers of the streets’) and were commonly referred to as al-Masālīkh (literally, ‘the
naked ones’) as an indication of their miserable conditions. One of the union’s main and most
consistent demands, therefore, was to address the plight of these most vulnerable workers of the
port and to include them within the protections of the labour law, which was only applied to
certain grades of workers, if at all.
The port administration refused to negotiate or even discuss the workers’ demands as the
Electrical Manager called the police to prevent the electrical port workers from entering the
offices of the administrator.771 The Head of the Dredging Port at Fao was consequently asked
whether he had a response to the petition and he replied, ‘there is no response and whoever does
not want to work should leave immediately’.772 It was this attitude of the port administration that
forced the workers at Fao to come out on strike on April 4, followed by all port workers in Basra

TNA. ‘Basra Monthly Summary’, 18 May, 1948; E 6381/111/93 FO 371/68459
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767 TNA. ‘Basra Monthly Report, 1 March 1948’; E2807/111/93; FO 371/68459
768 Ibid.
769 Ṣawt al-Ahālī, 30 February 1948.
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the next day.773 Only a couple days earlier, the dockworkers of the British shipping company
Gray Mackenzie and Co were on strike, due to their ‘exceptionally low wages’ and the
company’s evasion of the labour law with regards to sick and annual leave.774 Therefore, for the
first time in the history of the Port of Basra, all the port workers of every department were on (a
coordinated) strike and the entire port came to a complete standstill. The workers showed
ingenuity in their organizational strategy when they used a new tactic, namely that of sabotage as
they cut electricity from the port generator, which supplied the entire city.775 The city was
consequently deprived of electricity and water for several hours, forcing the mutasarrif (at times
in defiance of the Director-General of the Port) to end the strike on the same day with the
‘complete capitulation to the workers’ demands’.776 The agreement that was reached included an
all round increase of 50 fils, and the reinstatement of 96 agitators who were dismissed for their
actions in the previous strike.777
The strike ended with a clear moral and tactical victory not only for the port workers, but
the labour movement as a whole, and the port authorities were forced to negotiate with the Port
Workers’ Union and implicitly recognize it as the sole bargaining agent for all port workers. This
triumph however did not last for long, as martial law was declared in May, apparently due to the
termination of the mandate in Palestine and the pending war. 778 This ‘new weapon’ 779 of
emergency law, as one British official called it, and which I will analyze in detail in Chapter 6,
was not only used by the Iraqi government to suppress all opposition, but to arrest all labour
organizers and union leaders.780 By May 2, the Port Workers’ Union was entirely suppressed,
while the search for communists was intensified to the extent that it was described in one report
as ‘taken on the characteristics of a medieval witch hunt’.781 Nevertheless, the deep experience
and knowledge that the port workers gained was ingrained into their consciousness and their
innovative approaches in strike action would be further developed, tried and tested in the port
strike of 1952 and later on in the massive General Strike in Basra of 1953.
TNA. ‘Basra Monthly Summary for April 1948’, (18 May, 1948); E 6381/111/93 FO 371/68459
TNA. ‘Reported Ill-Treatment of Workers by Gray, Mackenzie and Co. Ltd’, 18 May 1948.
E7015/7015/93. FO 371/68482.
775 TNA. ‘Basra Monthly Summary for April 1948’, (18 May, 1948), supra.
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780 The Military Court in Basra sentenced the president of the Port Union and two others to three
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Before moving on, it would useful to summarize some of the insights that arise from the
present narrative of the railway and port workers. It is clear that the workers were learning from
their experiences. While the first strikes in the railways failed, those in the port were eventually
successful. This illustrates the gradual but certain development of the labour movement as a
whole. Furthermore, the manner in which the law was appropriated by the workers in their
demands is a reoccurring theme, but here it happened in a much more cognizant way as semicolonial legality, which was seen as a barrier to the application of Iraqi law as a whole (whether
the Iraqi constitution or the labour law) was specifically confronted.
The port and railway workers (more so than the oil workers) were directly challenging
the semi-colonial character of the Iraqi state. This is considering the fact that the semiautonomous administrations of the railways and port were state-owned institutions that were not
controlled by the Iraqi state. Furthermore, the strategic uses of and references to the labour law
by the workers as the main source of their natural rights, which they saw as having been violated
by the semi-colonial legal structures of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty and its annexures, demonstrates
that the workers were not only concerned with the interpretation of law, but with the overthrow of
a semi-colonial legal order and the establishment of a more just and truly independent one.

VI. Seeing like an expert: trade unionism as subversion & reform as counter-revolution
I will end this chapter with an analysis of the role of British labour experts within the
institutions of the Iraqi state. Despite claiming that they did not have much control or influence, I
will show that this was not the case and that the failure of the Iraqi government in dealing with
the labour problems of the country was not merely due to their authoritarianism or incompetence
as was repeatedly claimed, but rather to the very intervention of these so-called ‘experts’. British
experts refused to admit that it was their presence and the history of British intervention in any
way instigated the ‘labour troubles’ that they were examining. It will be clear that these labour
experts, who were assigned the tasks of addressing the major labour problems and developing
recommendations for the Iraqi government, were not in fact genuinely concerned with the plight
of the workers nor did they have a moderating effect on labour issues, but rather they were
producing top-bottom social reforms to prevent any revolutionary or structural change to emerge
from below. In other words, they were in fact concerned with the maintenance of the status quo of
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British influence in Iraq and that was the reason why their symptomatic recommendations were
ineffective and instead caused the further radicalization of the working class and the eventual
eruption of revolution.
It was after the election of the British Labour Party in 1945 that a strategic shift occurred
in foreign policy concerning the colonies and semi-colonies in the Empire. This new ideological
shift was influenced by the initiative of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who’s aim was to
focus on social and economic development with the intention of countering the influence of
revolution and communism, while maintaining British control in the region.782 As Paul Kingston
has shown, despite the fact that the problems in Iraq were fundamentally structural, Britain was
merely interested in ‘promoting socio-economic development without structural reform’. 783
Although there was a long history of British technical assistance in Iraq before the war, more
emphasis (at least in theory) was now put on serving the plight of the working class, the poor, and
the peasants. The point was to reframe the relationship between Britain and the region in a way
that appears reconciliatory to some nationalist demands, while ensuring that it would remain
within ‘the larger imperial design for the region’.784 In this way, one could argue that there were
in fact fewer differences between the new Labour government and its predecessor in its principal
goal of maintaining an imperial starglehold on the region – the only difference was that it would
now be undertaken under the guise of social development and presented in a favorable light to the
peoples of the region.
It was therefore during this period of late British imperialism, which has been described
as ‘an imperialism of science and knowledge,’ where academic and scientific experts rose to
positions of ‘unparalleled triumph and authority’.785 It was in this context that British labour
experts were appointed to deal with ‘labour questions’ of Iraq; questions that the British
Ambassador considered as ‘the most vital that this country has to face and that on their solution
will largely depend the future of this country’.786 The main concern of course was regarding the
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effects of labour militancy and communist influence on trade unions.787 It was accordingly no
coincidence that soon after the violent Gāwūrbāghī strike in the oil fields of Kirkūk in 1946 that a
serious proposal was made for the need of having a British labour advisor in the Ministry of
Social Affairs of the Iraqi state or as an alternative a permanent labour attaché to the British
Embassy.788 After some discussion on what would be more effective, it was ultimately settled that
a labour attaché789 would become a ‘special agent en mission’ rather than permanently attached to
the Embassy, while the Iraqi government would eventually hire a labour advisor790 who would
work from within the ministry.791 It was noted that only ‘long and sustained pressure’ on the Iraqi
government by an ‘Advisor working inside and an Attaché working outside’ that any results in
implementing reforms would be achieved.792 M.T. Audsley, an official of the Ministry of Labour
and National Service, who was appointed as labour attaché in the British Middle East Office in
Cairo in 1945 where he was based, would later act as the labour attaché to the British Embassy in
Baghdad, frequently travelling there to investigate and write several detailed reports on labour
issues. It was however only after the Wathba by the end of 1948 and following the severe waves
of strikes that a labour advisor (W.J. Hull) was retained by the Iraqi government’s Ministry of
Social Affairs793 – at the time the ministry responsible for all labour issues in the country.794
Before tackling the question of the role of the British expert in Iraqi state institutions and
the limitations of expert analysis, it is important to explore the contradictory aspects of the British
TNA. Killearn to Bevin, 16 Jan 1946. J340/53/16, FO 371/53327.
TNA. Busk (Bagdad) to Baxter (London), 17 August 1946. E7015/3860/93. FO 371/52456.
789 The Labour Attache service developed as a result of the need to tackle the increasingly relevant
questions of labour in Diplomatic Missions abroad starting from 1942. Its role usually entailed
maintaining close contact with the ‘appropriate government departments, associations of employers
and workers, and institutions operating in the labour and industrial fields’. Labour Attaches were
spread throughout the British Embassies in many parts of the world. See Godfrey Ince. The Ministry of
Labour and National Service, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1960), at 57-58.
790 The role of the labour advisor in the Ministry of Social Affairs was detailed by Audsley in his 1948
report ranged over the whole of the living conditions of the people and would include wages; hours
of work; national social insurance; control of prices of essential commodities from the cost of living
angel, land settlement schemes, housing, and the drafting of labour legislation, laws and regulations.
Audsley described the advisor’s overall task as the laying of ‘the foundations upon which a
progressive long-term development could be executed’ by providing ministers with ‘expert guidance’
which they are in dire need of. TNA. FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July,
1948 by M.T. Audsley’.
791 One British official argued that an advisor working from within the Iraqi ministry would be
ineffective unless he retained some executive powers as his reports would be ignored and ‘this could
never be’, and so he concluded only a labour attaché to the Embassy would be a plausible option.
792 TNA. Audsley to Waterlow, ‘Report on Iraq Labour problems’ E12918/77/93. FO 371/68458.
793 The Ministry of Social Affairs was created in 1939 and was responsible for population census,
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expert analysis and its conception of trade unionism in Iraq. If one read the labour reports and
dispatches written by these experts, it would be quite evident that the Iraqi worker was not only
conceived in a certain orientalist manner (very similar to what was described in an earlier
chapter), but that he was essentially erased as an agent from history. That is, for the British
expert, a socially conscious Iraqi working class did not exist – at least not as an organized labour
movement, but instead it was merely a group of illiterate workers who were being manipulated by
subversive outside forces, making it not a genuine representative of the working class.
For that reason, it is quite ironic that the British expert would criticize the Iraqi
government for being so irrationally repressive of labour in the country or quite incompetent in
industrial relations, when he similarly saw the labour movement as a purely political subversive
organization. The British Ambassador, for example, considered Iraqi workers as ‘illiterate
workers’ who were constantly being exploited by ‘crooked lawyers and politicians’, while he
referred to the Iraqi government as ‘a reactionary dictatorship to which the name of labour is
anathema’.795 Even if one did not take into account the fact that the Iraqi state was itself
functioning through the constricting legal structures of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, the British response
towards labour organizing activities in Iraq was quite contradictory in terms and as I have shown
earlier in the context of the railways, port and oil fields, was still repressive and violent.
In one labour report, Hull, the labour advisor to the Iraqi government, wrote, ‘the few
trade unions here are not representative of the wage earners’,796 and in another that, ‘there is no
likelihood of any organized or effective labour movement developing in the near future in
Iraq’.797 These claims were made while he endlessly criticized the Iraqi government for not
having proper (technical) understanding of the concept of trade unionism. As another British
official illustrates this incompetence of the Iraqi government who regarded ‘the movement of
labour as the movement of gangs of low paid workers from one place to another’ without having
any conception of the organization of labour, and considered all trade unions as ‘hotbeds of
communism’.798 The fact is, however, that the British administrators in general as I have shown
above and in previous chapters in a similar manner rejected the legitimacy of the indigenous
(grassroots) labour movement. In other words, it appears that the expert was merely critical of the
TNA. Stonehewer to FO, 25 Oct 1946, ‘Labour Conditions in Iraq’, FO 371/52456,
E10773/3860/93.
796 TNA. Hull to Guildhaume, 26 June 1951. EQ 2181/1. FO 371/91704.
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Iraqi government because its repression was not done through a certain orderly and bureaucratic
system of labour organization. What is interesting about this contradictory line of reasoning is
that Hull as the British ‘expert’ analyzed trade unionism in a similar narrow manner. The only
difference was that he claimed to be an ‘expert’ who had ‘expert knowledge,’ which was
supposedly unbiased, and he was developing a national scheme and labour policy with the main
purpose of maintaining British hegemony in the country.
So, for instance, Hull wrote that there was no freedom of association in Iraq, and that the
executive of the Iraqi state would never relax its control over trade unionism and ‘the right to
combine for any purpose’. He then referred to a conversation he had with someone he referred to
as an ‘astute’ Iraqi banker, who explained to him that this was necessary because no political
parties in Iraq have any real popular support and so ‘a street riot or strike could unseat a
government’.799 Hull continued by arguing, approvingly of such analysis, that trade unionism in
Iraq derives ‘from a conviction of immense power that could be exercised by anyone with only a
few thousand well-organized workers behind him.’800 Hull here seems to be perpetuating (in a
quite tautological manner) the same analysis of trade unionism, of which he was criticizing the
Iraqi government’s incompetence for. His analysis maintained that all trade unionism in Iraq
(whether it was anti-British or nationalist) had its basis on ‘purely political’ foundations and so
was illegitimate and subversive. Furthermore, Hull’s conception of Iraqi workers was one that
completely negated rational organized action and in an orientalist way emphasized Arab
emotional temper; he described ‘the general state of the Iraqi worker as one of apathy’, from
which ‘he could suddenly be stirred into outbursts of uncontrollable violence’.801
In that sense, trade unionism in Iraq (and the region) was not considered akin to trade
unionism elsewhere in the world (particularly in the West), and for this reason could not be
analyzed as such, but rather could only be understood through the lens of an ‘expert’ with unique
‘expert knowledge’ of the local conditions, whatever this maybe. This same line of reasoning was
made by Audsley, the labour attaché, when he wrote, ‘the present “industrial relations” bear no
comparison with the pattern described in books. The Middle East is being shaken to its depth by
the surge of political fanaticism, the fast growing “workers’ demands” and the grinding never-

799TNA.

Hull to Guildhaume, 26 June 1951. EQ 2181/1. FO 371/91704.
Ibid.
801 TNA. ‘Note on a meeting with Mr. Hull, Labour Advisor to the Iraq Government’ EQ2182/3. FO
371/98783 (23 July, 1952).
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ceasing wheels of communism’.802 The quotation marks in this sentence alone reveal more than
anything the manner in which the British expert viewed trade unionism and the working class in
Iraq and the Middle East in general.
The claim that was always maintained was that British experts or advisors in the Iraqi
government did not in fact have any significant influence, but were merely there on a limited
advisory role – that is, to use their ‘expertise’ to advise the minister on any given course of action.
This arrangement was of course quite convenient in that the Iraqi government would always be
blamed if problems persisted. However, if one were to read the records closely, it becomes clear
that these experts actually had much more influence than was admitted. So, for example, Hull, the
labour advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs, demonstrates such deference towards his views
in one episode, whereby he urged the Minister not to interfere with the elections of the tobacco
and carpenter workers, claiming that these unions were harmless.803 The Minister responded with
an Arab proverb – ‘the man who has once been bitten by a snake will start [sic] in fear at the sight
of a piece of rope’. To this Hull replied, ‘there was here not even a piece of string’. The Minister
then conceded that, Hull was the ‘expert’ and he knew better, so he would have to ‘reverse his
view’.804
Reflecting on this episode, Hull wrote the following: ‘I dislike being called an expert but
the title is the very essence of the position of a British official here. It implies if I am not mistaken
an authority whose views may be overridden by other authorities but until they are must be
listened to with respect even if not too much is done about them. These people are impatient of
“advisors” – one must never call oneself that.’805 Hull’s observation reveals the manner in which
British experts prefer not only to do their work out of view, but also to insist that they do not have
any discretionary powers whatsoever. That is, the expert denies and underplays his influence and
role within the ministry and the functions of the Iraqi state, although this was in fact exactly one
of the effects of semi-colonialism and the Anglo-Iraq Treaty.
I will end this chapter by making a few points on why it was that the recommendations
and reforms of both, the labour advisor and attaché, and their attempt at developing an overall
national labour policy was a complete failure in the end.

It was not primarily as it was

TNA. Audsley (Cairo) to Morgan (Ministry of Labour, London), 18 May, 1948. LAB 13/674.
TNA. Hull to Guildhaume, 18 July 1950. EQ 2181/1, FO 371/98783 (3 Sep, 1950).
804 Ibid.
805 Ibid.
802
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consistently claimed because of the incompetence of the reactionary and ‘feudal character’ of the
Iraqi government and state, but it was rather due to the fact that these reforms were useless as
long as the conditions of semi-colonialism existed. That is, as long as the constraining legal
structures of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty were maintained.
The main aim of the overall workings of the advisor and attaché was to counter
revolutionary change (and communism) and maintain British hegemony. It was in other words
devised as ‘reform from above to forestall revolution from below’. 806 Therefore, the
recommendations for social reform which included: the drafting of and application of labour
legislation, the establishing of minimum wages to alleviate the high cost of living, planning
agricultural developments, and the development of what was referred to as ‘a constitutional Trade
Union movement,’ were all means to ensure that British semi-colonial control would not be
faltered.807 It was in other words merely a safeguard against any changes in the legal structures of
the treaty and the semi-colonial legal order. Audsley made this very clear when he wrote that
Iraqi workers should not be encouraged as they have been by the Russians, ‘to rebel against their
government’, but rather to pursue their interests in a ‘democratic manner’:
The Russians have no scruples in this respect, as elsewhere. They are anti-Government, antiBritish, anti-evolution, anti-democratic; their methods of encouraging revolution are well-known…[W]e
are…anti-Communist. We do not preach revolution; the Russians do… We want to see orderly progressive
social betterment of the people, the removal of injustice, better living conditions, freedom to create
democratic workers’ organizations – even if the pace is slow; the Russians do not. Somehow or other we
must convince the Iraq Government…that it is in their hands to pave the way towards bringing order out
the present social chaos…and that they must give encouragement to and secure the co-operation of,
workers’ leaders and other who are hostile to revolutionary methods.808

Here, Audsley does not mince words when he emphasizes the real aim of these labour and social
reforms, and the role of British experts in dealing with the question of labour in Iraq. Even Hull,
the labour advisor, viewed his initiative of developing a new Directorate-General of Labour as
not merely being as ‘an essential service for a modern state’, but specifically because it ‘could do
more than any other to prevent the growth of communism’.809 In that sense despite the fact that
the British viewed themselves as having a ‘moderating influence’ on a ‘reactionary’ government,
they were in fact doing the complete opposite in further radicalizing the working class.810 This is

See Rachel Anne Alexander. ‘Leadership in the National Movements of Egypt and Iraq 1945-1963’,
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Exeter, 2007), at 151.
807TNA. FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July by M.T. Audsley’.
808 Ibid.
809TNA. Hull to Guildhaume, 18 July 1950. EQ 2181/1, FO 371/98783 (3 Sep, 1950).
810 Alexander, supra, ft. 806, at 152.
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probably because Iraqi workers (in the oil fields, railways and port) rather than being illiterates
with no agency were quite conscious of what was being done to their movement.
Furthermore, legal reform, especially in the context of semi-colonialism, could never
bring about real structural change. This was due to the controlling influence of the legal structures
of the Anglo-Iraq treaty (and the effects of semi-peripheral sovereignty), which retarded the
effectiveness of Iraqi law in the first place. However, this was also due to the political question of
semi-colonialism, which concerns the entire order and is not merely one that concerns legality. It
was this fact that was completely ignored in any of the analyses of British experts. As Fahad has
written on such a narrow analytic lens: some (British experts) would soon ‘rise to the moon and
some would sink into the depths of the earth’ before admitting that ‘the main cause of
unemployment in this country is in front of their eyes’: the foreign monopolistic companies that
control the economy.811 Audsley and Hull likewise refused to admit what was in front of their
eyes, which was British semi-colonial intervention, which they were a part of. It was no wonder
that Audsley did not interview a single trade union leader for his investigative reports, supposedly
for fear that his motives would appear suspicious to the government.812 While even when he was
approached by a trade union leader, who conveyed to him the exact concerns of the majority of
the working class, he completely disregarded his statement as too ‘sweeping’:
I remember an Iraq Trade Union official saying to me…that the workers blamed us for everything
that happened in their country; that the Treaty of Alliance which replaced the Mandate in 1932 had not
lessened our interfering influence and that we had something to do with everything major event in Iraq
since then; that if the country had remained backward, if its general standard of life was terribly low and if
the social conditions were appalling the most accepted reason among large sections of the public was that
British policy wanted it to be so…These were sweeping statements and I doubt whether the antagonism
towards us is as general as they imply but they are certainly the ammunition used by the vocal extremists
and political agitators to further their subversive and destructive ends.813

Audsley’s refusal to admit that British semi-colonial intervention in Iraq was a major cause of the
conditions of the Iraqi working class is more than disingenuous, for it was the arrival of British
colonialism and capitalism that permanently destabilized the rural areas and the socio-economic
structures of Iraqi society, establishing underdevelopment, as I have shown in a previous chapter.
Of course, Audsley’s view was also informed by his conception of the Iraqi worker as having a
‘fanatical temperament’ and who was incapable of consciously and deliberately organizing action
against the semi-colonial conditions that oppress him. My narrative of the railway and port
Yūsūf, supra, ft. 305, at 186.
TNA. FO 371/68482. ‘Report on visit to Iraq from 8th June to 10th July by M.T. Audsley’, at 19
813 Ibid.
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workers above exposes the absurdity of such analysis. It was therefore the limitations of the
expert’s analysis and lens (as well as its specific ideological purpose), which prevented any of the
social and labour reforms (no matter how genuine they may appear) from being effective and
failed to prevent the outburst of revolution from below.

VII. Conclusion
This chapter detailed the struggle of the railway and port workers to improve their
conditions and to challenge the legal structures of semi-colonialism that governed their
workplaces. These workers were directly challenging the semi-colonial character of the Iraqi state
and its semi-autonomous enclaves of the railways and port. This was different from their
counterparts at the oil fields who’s struggle had more of a regional and international dimension
in resisting (oil and corporate) imperialism within the specificity of the oil city in the region,
which had more of the characteristics of a colonial rather than a semi-colonial enclave. I have
shown how the railway and port workers slowly but inventively developed their organizational
tactics and strategies in strike action from their first attempt at the railway workshops to their
(pivotal but momentary) victory at the port. The port and railway workers were attempting to
bring structural and normative change into their lives through their actions from below and they
often did this by strategically using and referring to the law as (only) one of their arsenals, hand
in hand, with strike action and sabotage. This was of course the complete opposite of how British
experts used the law in their development of labour and social reforms to supposedly remedy the
ailments of the working class – theirs was an imposed top-bottom and bureaucratic development
for the mere purpose of preventing any structural change. The expert’s approach was merely a
strategy for maintaining British hegemony and the semi-colonial structures in Iraq, which the
workers completely rejected as they considered British intervention as being the main cause of
their miserable conditions.
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Chapter 6: The ‘Magical Weapon’ of Permanent Emergency – A Technique in the
Semi-Colonial Governance of Iraq

The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘emergency situation’ in which we live is not the exception
but the rule.814
~ Walter Benjamin

[Y]our part of the world is likely to make big strides forward…not without struggle perhaps, but nevertheless
in the direction of progress toward a fuller and more secure life, and such [draconian] laws will…become things of the
past to be studied by research students into obscure subjects.815
~ Denis Pritt

I. Introduction

As the previous chapters have shown, it was through the use of emergency law that
labour strikes were suppressed. In this chapter, I will argue that the uses of the emergency
doctrine was a technique of semi-colonial governance in Iraq. This chapter is therefore an
exploration of the interconnection between law and violence in the context of the uses of criminal
law and martial law by the semi-colonial Iraqi state. In other words, I will analyze the manner in
which the Iraqi state used a combination of criminal law, martial law and the doctrine of
emergency to suppress opposition to the social order and to maintain its hegemony. The argument
that will be made here is that the semi-colonial Iraqi state used tried-and-tested British colonial
techniques of governance by constitutionalizing the Crown’s ability to proclaim emergencies to
quell any disorder that it considered as a threat to its order. By delving into the historical origins
of the doctrine of emergency, it would be clear that it was in fact a technique of governance rather
than a temporary response to isolated crises. Martial law was a standard mechanism used to
Walter Benjamin. ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ in Hannah Arendt (ed.), Illuminations:
Essays and Reflections, (New York: Schocken, 1969), at 253.
815 TNA. Letter from D. Pritt to K. Kazanji [i.e. Qazanchi], dated 20 March 1946, enclosed in D. Pritt to
McNeal, 18th July 1947, E6508/771/93, FO 371/61664.
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protect British interests in the colonies, and it was similarly and regularly used by the semicolonial Iraqi state. I will elucidate how this mechanism was ingrained into the institutions of the
Iraqi state and its constitution with the legal advice of British experts. It will be clear that Iraq
was ungovernable (as an ‘independent’ ‘parliamentary democracy’) without these legal
techniques, as revolutionary change was inevitable. It was in a way these colonial (legal)
techniques that helped suspend the advent of the revolution until 1958.
Before turning to the debates surrounding emergency law and briefly focusing on the
Intifāda of 1952 (an attempt to renew the Wathba)816 where the military was called into the
streets for the first time in the history of the country to quell demonstrations, I will begin with a
brief examination of how the criminal law was used to pacify all forms of dissent under the guise
of fighting communism. These laws were in turn essential in a state of emergency. This is clear
when analyzing the amendment to the Baghdad Penal Code of 1938, and its application in the
first trial of the Secretary-General of the ICP, Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf (Fahad). The military courts
relied on the 1938 amendment to imprison thousands, while eventually sentencing ICP leaders to
the death penalty.

II. The uses of the criminal law by the Iraqi state & the criminalization of progressive
thought and action

Even before the institutionalization of emergency with the controversial amendment of
the Iraqi Constitution in 1943, which I will analyze in the second part of this chapter, the Iraqi
government was continuously developing new ways of drafting legislation against what it saw as
the spread of communism and leftist ideology in the country. This would eventually lead to the
passing of an amendment to the Baghdad Penal Code, which would be considered as the harshest
piece of legislation against communism – defined in the broadest possible way – in the entire
Middle East – this was the Law Supplemental to the Baghdad Penal Code No. 51 of 1938.817 I
will analyze this law below, but for now it would be enough to note that it made it a crime to
believe in the ‘doctrines of communism, anarchy and the like, which aim at the change of the
system of government,’ (which was interpreted broadly enough to include anything that called for
I fast forward to the Intifada of 1952 merely because it was the first time that emergency
legislation was invoked on the basis of the controversial constitutional amendment as opposed to
during the Wathba when martial law was already declared on the basis of the Palestine War, which
was in turn used as an excuse to crush the movement as will be shown in the final chapter.
817 Iraq Government Gazette, No. 30, Baghdad, 24th July, 1938, at 475
816
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social reform) and the dissemination of these ideas. This was in essence the criminalization of
thought and it would be consistently used against the opposition and the nationalist movement
throughout the history of the monarchy.
As early as April 1936, the Iraqi government passed a law that amended the Baghdad
Penal Code in a manner that made it more effective in prosecuting those who possessed, printed
or intended to publish through ‘the medium of communist propaganda [and] endeavor[ed] to
create hostility to the established system of government’. 818 Although the definition of
‘communist propaganda’ was already broad, the Minister of Interior approached the British
Ambassador, Archibald Clark Kerr, the next year for advice on the ‘form and scope’ of drafting
‘special legislation’ that would be even harsher, and would essentially ‘make it a crime to be a
Communist’.819 Despite admitting that the Iraqi government were ‘exaggerating the dangers of
the spread of modern political ideas in this country’ by seeking to draft such legislation, Kerr
contacted the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and asked him to send copies of laws
passed in India, which he considered to have been successful in dealing with communism.820 By
September 1937, Ordinance No. 44 for the Prevention of Harmful Propaganda was passed. This
ordinance increased the powers of the government in dealing with ‘communism’ further by
enlarging the scope of the term ‘harmful propaganda’ to the following: (1) ‘Any publication
effected in bad faith…of a nature calculated to arouse: (a) Feelings of hatred or aversion for the
state, or (b) Feelings of aversion or hostility among various classes of the inhabitants. (2) Any
publication effected in bad faith… citing fabricated reports or misinterpreting any true report,
with the object of disturbing public security or good foreign relations.821 This definition of
‘harmful propaganda’ included ‘meetings’ intended on ‘exciting the public against the state or
arousing feelings of aversion or hostility among the various classes of the inhabitants’.822
TNA. FO 624/7. Sgd Archibald Clark Kerr, Bagdad to FO, London, 29 April, 1936. A copy of the law
[Law Amending the Bagdad Penal Code No. 45 of 1936] was enclosed and had similar wording to what
would be drafted later in 1938. The law stated that the following paragraph shall be added to Section
89 of the Code: “Whoever is found in possession of written or printed or any other matter intended
for publication, of which the contents come within the scope of the previous sub-sections, shall, if
found to have come to posses the same with ill intent and with intent to give publications thereto, be
punished with the penalty provided for each offence itself’.
819 TNA. FO 624/9/516. Sgd Archibald Clark Kerr , Minute Sheet, 19, November, 1937.
820 TNA. FO 624/9/516. Archibald Clark Kerr, British Embassy, Bagdad to Sir Herbert Metcalfe, India;
Nov 23, 1937.
821 TNA. FO 624/9/576, Oswald Scott, British Embassy, Bagdad to FO. 18, December, 1937. Enclosed:
Ordinance for the Prevention of Harmful Propaganda No. 44 of 1937. This law was eventually
repealed.
822 Ibid. It is interesting that the term ‘class’ is used, which is of course a reference to the poor
workers and peasants.
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In July 1938, Law Supplemental to the Baghdad Penal Code No. 51 was passed and as
mentioned above made it a crime not only to disseminate ‘communistic’ ideas, but to ‘express
approval’ of these ideas! Article 1 (1) read: ‘Whoever expresses approval of or disseminates by
any of the means of publication mentioned in Article 78 of this Law, any doctrines of
communism, anarchy or the like, which aim at the change of the system of government and the
fundamental principles and status of human society that are guaranteed by the Organic Law, shall
be punished with penal servitude or with imprisonment not exceeding seven years or with fine or
both.’823 Article 1(2) increased the sentence to penal servitude for life or imprisonment for fifteen
years if the ‘expression of approval or dissemination of the doctrines’ was carried out with
violence. Article 1(3) stated that if the latter occurred before more than one member of the
military forces or police, the death penalty would be applied.

Article 5(a) extended these

penalties to anyone ‘who becomes a member of an association the aim or object of which is to
approve or to disseminate’ these doctrines.824
Law No. 51 would be used throughout the period of the monarchy to suppress not only
communism, but also all forms of opposition. It would be particularly useful for the military
courts that were operational when martial law was proclaimed. It is interesting to note that even
the British advisor to the C.I.D. (Criminal Investigation Department) criticized the law for being
drafted in a manner that would undoubtedly bring about hostile comment from the Soviets, who
the advisor said would ‘rightly protest that this law is a Nazi law’.825 He pointed out that the
Baghdad Penal Code was already sufficiently worded to deal with communism and that the
‘institutions of prosecutions against alleged “communists” for their actions as such, and not as
ordinary disturbances of public peace stirring up and propaganding [sic] in a manner intended to
cause hatred and contempt against other sections of the people and against the Government
charged under the appropriate sections of the Baghdad Penal Code, would undoubtedly call forth
hostile comment, if not actual diplomatic protest…’826 The Baghdad Penal Code, he wrote, was
‘strong enough – if applied properly and impartially.’827 This advice was not taken seriously and
instead Law 51 or what would later be dubbed in British reports as: ‘Grobba’s law Against

Ibid.
Ibid.
825 TNA. FO 624/101. CID TO A.H. Ditchburn, Advisor to Ministry of Interior, 30 June 1946.
826 Ibid.
827 Ibid.
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Bolshevik Communists,’828 would be used extensively, especially during the Wathba as a legal
and violent measure to suppress the entire Iraqi nationalist movement.
In fact, by March 1948 (before the proclamation of martial law), Najīb al-Rāwī, the
Minister of Justice, was described in a dispatch by the British Ambassador, Henry Mack, as
‘refreshingly active and vigorous’ in his pursuance of numerous communists, who were
continuously being sentenced under this law in the courts. al-Rāwī directly consulted British
Judge and legal advisor to the ministry, Sir John Prichard in putting together a list of suspected
communists who should be arrested, while suppressing the opposition press, and ensured that
suspected communists were removed from ‘positions important to the security of the state’.829
Furthermore, what was more interesting for our purposes was that other countries in the region
were coordinating to do the same thing. al-Rāwī was in close contact with the Minister of Justice
in Egypt, who was looking to pass similar legislation against ‘communism’ there.830 The head of
the C.I.D. in Egypt visited Baghdad to discuss such measures counterpart there to exchange lists
of suspected communists. He ended up taking with him copies of the Iraqi laws (specifically Law
51). al-Rāwī made similar arrangements with his counterparts in Syria and Lebanon supplying
them with Iraqi laws with the purpose of developing ‘a common Arab League policy against
communism’.831 Mack expressed ‘great pleasure’ at this development.832 The diffusion of these
draconian laws suggests that they were of great benefit in maintaining the semi-colonial orders to
the benefit of imperial powers in the region.833
It was on the basis of Law 51 or Grobba’s Law that Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf aka Fahad, the
Secretary-General of the ICP, along with his close comrade and Politburo member, Zakī Basīm,
were prosecuted after their capture on January 18, 1947.834 They were accused of reliance on
Ibid. A reference to the former (Nazi) German Ambassador in Iraq, Fritz Grobba, who supported
the Rashid Ali Coup of 1941 against the British-sponsored regime.
829 TNA. Minute by Henry Mack, 16 March 1948; FO/624/127.
830 Ibid.
831 Ibid.
832 Ibid.
833 The reworking and redrafting of draconian legislation in such a manner did not end here. By 1954,
a list of ordinances and amendments were passed that were even more draconian. One was
Ordinance No. 17 of 1954 Supplemental to the Iraqi Nationality Law, which basically stripped citizens
of their Iraqi citizenship if they were convicted under the 1938 law above. This rendered
communists or anyone who opposed the regime as stateless. The legal advisor to the British Embassy
found this law completely ‘indefensible’ and contrary to the ‘general principals of international law’.
This practice, which began during the Wathba, was later to be institutionalized in law. See Minutes in
‘Communists in Iraq,’ Oct 14, 1954, VQ 1015/77/G, FO 371/110991.
834 Batatu, supra, ft. 41,at 537.
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‘foreign sources of income’; contacts with a ‘foreign state’ (i.e. the Soviet Union); incitement to
armed insurrection; and the most serious: the propagation of communism among members of the
armed forces.835 All these accusations were flatly denied by Fahad, who eloquently addressed the
judge on each of them, stating that the party was independent in its finances and organization, and
was not intent on overthrowing the monarchy, but rather merely struggling for the people’s
natural rights and the democratic order as defined by the Iraqi constitution.836 It was quite
revealing that he referred to the constitution, especially to argue that Law 51 was
unconstitutional.837 He considered the Iraqi Communist Party – at least for the time being – as in
effect struggling for the protection of the provisions of the Iraqi constitution against the regime’s
‘terroristic’ policies and the ‘imperialist’ 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, which undermined it.838 This
sort of reasoning would be reiterated in nationalist discourse (including by opposition MPs in
Parliament) in the context of martial law and emergency legislation as will be shown later. Fahad
had already referred to Law 51 in his writings, calling it a ‘reactionary fascist law’, that was a
‘weapon in the hands of the Iraqi regime and its police’ not merely to suppress the communist
movement, but also to suppress the labour movement and the nationalist movement in its
entirety.839 He repeated this point to his interrogator the day he was arrested. When asked
whether he knew that propagation of communism is liable to punishment under the penal code, he
responded: ‘The relevant article 89a of the Code…is out of accord with the Iraqi Constitution,
which has conceded the freedom of belief of every Iraqi citizen.’840
Ibid, at 539.
Ibid, at 540.
837 One should keep in mind that this was done in a rhetorical manner and was strategic. In other
words, Fahad, as a communist and adherent of historical materialism, did not actually believe in the
ideal of the rule of law as a source of revolutionary change. However, it was obvious that to struggle
for this ideal had its strategic benefits considering the semi-colonial conditions of Iraq, where the law
was flaunted and democracy was a farce.
838 A public memorandum written by the ICP and addressed to the international community with
reference to the UNO Charter [and international law], emphasized that ‘the demands of our Party
expressed by our National Charter, are … for achieving liberties, for the exercise of the rights
recognized by the Iraqi constitution, for the demand of making the independence of our country a
reality not a word of the mouth. This signifies that our Communist Party does not intend to change
the state system and the fundamental principles and constulates [sic] of the social constitution. On
the contrary, it intends to stabilize the representative, democratic state system and fights to stabilize
the fundamental constulates [sic] recognized in our constitution, such as Iraq as an independent
state. At no time, [did] we make an appeal or carried out a slogan involving the change of state
system. All our slogans and official statements involve the call to fight imperialism, to stabilize the
democratic state system and to accomplish our independence and national sovereignty. We did not
call for an armed revolution as the government accuses us; for no responsible body in our party has
ever issued an appeal for the masses arousing them to armed revolution”. TNA. Translation of
memorandum by ICP dated 5 June 1947, enclosed in FO/624/116.
839 Yūsuf. Kitābāt, supra, ft. 305, at 434-435.
840 As quoted in Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 538
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A public memorandum written by the ICP described the trial proceedings as ‘nothing…
[more]…than a comedy of which the acts were set by the C.I.D.’841 This was not an exaggeration.
The trial proceedings became increasingly farcical when resembling a Kafkaesque subplot, Kāmil
Qazānchī (who would later lead the Coordination Committee of the Wathba movement) at the
time, chief defense counsel, was arrested in the middle of the trial and charged under the very
same law (Law 51) after he made an impassionate plea on behalf of his communist clients! This
of course demonstrates how broadly drafted this piece legislation was and how it was used by the
police and prosecution. Qazānchī was accused of being a communist agent financed by the Soviet
Legation.842 This led the other nine attorneys to resign, and the defendants were left ‘deprived of
the sacred right of defense’.843 Consequently, the police and prosecution in ‘an exposed manner,
was itself conducting the court proceeding, in directing questions and in answering them
sometimes, instead of the accused’.844
The Higher Criminal Court ultimately found Fahad and Basīm guilty, sentencing them to
the death penalty. The ICP memorandum suggested that the verdict was decided in unison with
the government without taking any of the evidence into consideration, abandoning both Iraqi law
and the principles of international law. It was only due to an unexpected regional and
international outcry that the sentences were eventually commuted to penal servitude for life and
fifteen years respectively. One of these appeals came from the British socialist lawyer and MP,
Denis Pritt, who in an intense exchange in the House of Commons, questioned the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, Christopher Mayhew, on the trials: ‘Is the hon. Gentleman aware
TNA. Translation of memorandum by ICP dated 5 June 1947, enclosed in FO/624/116.
British Embassy, Bagdad to FO, London; 4 June 1947, E5041/77193, FO 371/61664. See al-Zamān
newspaper, September 2, 9 and 10, 1947 for details of the court proceedings. Qazānchī’s office was
raided and papers were confiscated that were used as evidence against him. The chief evidence relied
on were letters of correspondence with Labour MP, Denis Pritt, regarding the translation of his books
into Arabic. The prosecution considered Pritt a ‘Communist [British] MP’. Pritt consequently sent
impassionate pleas to the FO asking them to intervene into Qazānchī’s case. See, D. Pritt to McNeal,
18th July 1947, E6508/771/93, FO 371/61664. (The letter used by the prosecution is also enclosed
therein). The appeals court eventually acquitted Qazānchī, and this was probably due to Pritt’s
appeals to the British Foreign Office. Iraqi lawyers and the nationalist movement never forgot Pritt’s
contribution to their struggle. Ironically, after the Revolution, Pritt (this, ‘Communist MP’) would be
greeted from the airplane by a large group of lawyers and half the Cabinet as he recounts in his
memoirs: ‘As I entered the [airport] building itself, I heard an Iraqi bystander say something which
made people smile. I asked what he had said, and was told that it was: “What Englishman could there
possibly be who deserves such a welcome here?” The Autobiography of D.N. Pritt, (London: Lawrence
& Wishart, 1965), at 135.
843 TNA. Translation of memorandum by ICP dated 5 June 1947, enclosed in FO/624/116
844 Ibid.
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that…. [t]hese [Iraqi] gentlemen have, in fact, been sentenced to death for writing pamphlets, in
support of trade unionism?845 Will he, therefore, get our representatives in Iraq to have an
unofficial word with that country? It is controlled by our Army [after all].’ To which Mayhew’s
response was to evoke Iraqi (semi-peripheral) sovereignty to argue that there was no ground for
intervention, while completely denying that the British Army controlled Iraq through the AngloIraq Treaty!846
It was only after martial law was declared during the Wathba did the regime have another
chance to retry and ultimately execute the ICP leaders. I will return to this episode in the final
chapter on the Wathba.

The point for now is that an intricate web of draconian criminal

legislation was developed to complement the violent uses of the doctrine of emergency so as to
maintain the regime’s semi-colonial hegemony.

III. The Magical Weapon of Emergency as a Technique of Governance
The question in the remaining part of this chapter will revolve around the doctrine of
emergency and its uses in the context of the semi-colonial Iraqi state. In other words, why was it
that up to the 1958 revolution the Iraqi state was dominated by continuous states of emergency
and proclamations of martial law? There were a total of sixteen proclamations of martial law in
the 37 years of the existence of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy (between 25 October 1925 until the
eve of the revolution on 13 July 1958). 847 From the seventeen years between the second
occupation of Iraq in 1941 up to the fall of the monarchy in 1958, nearly nine of these years were

Of course, what Pritt meant was that they were sentenced to death merely for their political
beliefs – i.e. for being communists. Although as we have seen Fahad did in fact help in drafting a
significant number of pamphlets for the railway and port unions amongst others.
846 TNA. E 5831/771/93; FO 371/61664. ‘Parliamentary Question’, 30 June 1947.
The British
government continued to claim that there was no ‘locus operandi’ to intervene into the affairs of a
sovereign country. Here it is quite obvious how the discourse of semi-peripheral sovereignty
operated as it allowed the British imperial power to assert Iraqi sovereignty rights, while furthering
their imperial interests. Ironically, a handwritten minute from the FO in London emphasized that, ‘if
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dominated by a state of emergency of some form or another.848 The question therefore is whether
this pattern reveals something of how a semi-colonial state that was considered ‘independent’
under international law still heavily relied on the colonial doctrine of emergency to govern its
population and maintain its social order.
The answer, as will be shown, is that there was a clear pattern, which suggests that it was
partly due to such (legal) technique that the Iraqi regime lasted a decade after the Wathba until it
was finally overthrown. Furthermore, it was with the uses of martial law that the criminal
legislation detailed above was used more effectively and systematically in the military courts. A
good example of the effects of martial law could be found in a monthly report from the Basra
Consulate-General, which in an astounded tone referred to martial law as a ‘new magical
weapon’ of the government. Referring to the declaration of martial law in May of 1948, the report
stated that ‘the situation cleared almost magically’ and that ‘power was now once more in the
hands of government and there were few delusions as to how it would use its new weapon’.849 It
also stated that ‘British popularity soared’ right after the imposition of martial law.850 How and
why was this the effect of martial law?
My aim in this chapter is to explore this ‘magical weapon of governance’ with the hope
of grasping just how it operated and how it affected the organizing efforts of the nationalist
movement and the labour movement. I will begin with a brief historical contextual recounting of
the doctrine of emergency in Britain and its colonies so as to trace its origins. I will then move to
detail the Intifāda of 1952, which was an uprising that led to the call of military forces into the
streets of Baghdad to maintain order. This will lead to an analysis of the legal history of the
doctrine of emergency, specifically focusing on the constitutional amendment of 1943, which
gave the Crown the authority to proclaim a state of emergency whenever the monarchy was
threatened by a ‘crisis’. After tracing the legal history of emergency and the manner it was
institutionalized in the governing and constitutional structures of the Iraqi state, I will look at
some of the debates inside and outside of parliament revolving around this question, especially
focusing on the work of the social democrat, opposition MP and legal scholar, Hussein Jamīl.
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A. The origins & uses of martial law: tracing the history of the doctrine of emergency

If one were to trace the evolutionary and historical development of martial law from
England to the colonies, it would become clear how the doctrine of emergency was used
specifically as a ‘technique of governance and instrument of control, rather than a purely reactive
and temporary response to an isolated crisis’.851 Moreover, as John Reynolds and others have
argued it was not just in the colonies that the doctrine of emergency was diffused, but it was also
distilled into the normative framework of international human rights law, with the derogatory
provisions therein.852 In this sense, in this study, it should be understood broadly in relation to the
semi-peripheral sovereignty granted to Iraq through international law and the mandate system.853
The origins of martial law in England could be traced to the medieval conception of
‘military law,’ which was a system of regulations developed to maintain order and discipline of
the armed forces. From the fourteenth century onwards, the ‘justice of martial law’ was to be
applied not only to soldiers and sailors in wartime, but later extended to civilians, in particular
rebels, traitors, and rioters among others.854 It was unclear what was the exact scope of these
powers under martial law, but it was considered as a ‘summary form of criminal justice’ that was
separate from the ordinary courts.855
There were competing theories as to the foundations and parameters of martial law
amongst English legal scholars. One theory emphasized that martial law operated within the
parameters of the rule of law. A.V. Dicey famously asserted that martial law was, ‘unknown to
the law of England,’ which illustrates, ‘unmistakable proof of the permanent supremacy of the
law under our constitution’.856 Dicey meant that under English law authority would never fully
pass to the military and so martial law remained within the purview of the rule of law. It was in
this sense derived from the common law, ‘right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by
John Reynolds. “The Long Shadow of Colonialism: The Origins of the Doctrine of Emergency in
International Human Rights Law,” (2010). Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy.
Research Paper No. 19/2010, at 4. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/86.
852 See John Reynolds. Empire, Emergency and International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2017).
853 Ibid, at 5. Let us not forget that the ratification of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty in parliament was itself
imposed through martial law. See Chapter 3.
854 J.V. Capua, ‘The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth Century to the
Petition of Right,’ 36:1 Cambridge Law Journal (1977), at 152, 153.
855 Ibid.
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force in the case of invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally of any violent resistance of law’.857
This had its basis on the common law defense of necessity. In other words, as long as the force
used to suppress a riot was ‘necessary,’ it was considered to be lawful.858 An alternative theory
suggested that martial law did suspend ordinary law for military rule, but it was only temporary
and hence still operated within the constraints of the law.859 In other words, the suspension of
ordinary law was similarly done out of ‘necessity,’ and was constrained by the constitution. A
third view stated that martial law was not law, but rather as Lord Wellington’s famous 1851
formulation, in relation to the use of martial law in Ceylon, the ‘will of the General who
commands the army’.860 Here, emergency law is considered as being outside the purview of the
law, merely limited by the General’s practical judgment on the field.
It was not until the mid-sixteenth century that martial law in Britain was extended from
instances of war and rebellion to an offensive measure of governance used in peacetime. It was
during this time that martial law was used as a weapon of class and political repression against,
‘general undesirables with no apparent means of support’.861 During the ‘Pilgrimage of Grace’ in
1537, for instance, Henry VIII instructed his commanding lieutenants to, ‘continue to proceed by
martial law until the country was in such terror as to insure obedience’.862 This use of martial law,
which was first widely used in Ireland, continued in England in certain variations until it was
outlawed by parliament after the passing of the Petition of Right in 1628.863
Although the Petition of Right led to the disuse of martial law in Britain, this was not the
case abroad where its colonial uses proliferated becoming, ‘an essential part of the security
apparatus of many colonies in the empire’.864 Martial law was turned into a mechanism of control
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in the colonial context with the aim of protecting British imperial interests and suppressing any
form resistance from the native population. The proclamation of martial law was therefore
considered a common law right for the maintenance of ‘the safety of the colony’ as Robert Peel
accentuated during the parliamentary debate on the uses of martial law in Ceylon in 1848.865 Any
threat against the established colonial order was deemed to necessitate the use of martial law to
bring back public order and ensure that the uncivilized natives remain obedient. The extremities
of violence that would ensue during a period of martial law would always be justified, as passing
this test of ‘necessity,’ for violent punishment or reprisal were central techniques to the practice
of martial law.866
The codification of martial law into emergency codes was a corresponding part of
colonial governance in the Empire. This institutionalization of martial law became more
expansive as it was practically and widely applicable, for there was no need for the military to
justify its actions under the common law test of strict necessity. As Brian Simpson has shown, it
was in Ireland that Britain first decided to turn martial law into written law. Simpson considered
the 1883 Act for the More Effective Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous
Associations in Ireland, as ‘the ancestor of the modern code of emergency law’.867 This Act,
which gave the Lord-Lieutenant the power to declare a ‘state of emergency’ – suppress meetings,
impose curfews, and try offenders by court martial. Most significantly, ‘nothing under the Act
could be questioned by any court of law’.868 The Act was naturally aimed at crushing the Irish
peasantry’s nationalist struggle. Ireland was therefore turned into a laboratory for experimentation
on emergency law techniques that would later be exported to other parts of the Empire. 869 By the
First World War, the exclusive use of martial law in the colonies ended, and a ‘sharp break from
the centuries old tradition of martial law occurred,’ when the drafting of more comprehensive and

2 and 1865. See Charles Townshend. “Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil
Emergency in Britain and the Empire, 1800-1940,” The Historical Journal, 25, 1, (1982), at 168.
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draconian emergency codes institutionalized emergency powers in Britain.870 Under a series of
Defense of Realm Acts, the executive would make regulations, ‘for securing the public safety and
the defense of the realm’.871 This transformed ‘the executive into the legislature,’ giving it wide
powers and allowing it to surpass parliament. The DORA technique would later be exported to
India, where ‘emergency powers were [to become] a regular feature of the legal system’.872 From
there it was diffused into all corners of the Empire, including the Middle East (particularly
Palestine) and eventually Iraq.

B. The normalization of emergency rule in Iraq

Martial law was already in use during the British administration of Iraq under the
Mandate system. In fact, the subsidiary military agreement to the 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, gave
the British the right to compel the King to declare martial law and entrust its administration to a
British officer.873 In other words, the administration of martial law was exercised by the British
military rather than the Iraqi government. Moreover, as mentioned in a previous chapter, the 1922
Anglo-Iraq Treaty was itself only ratified in Parliament in 1924 when Percy Cox, the High
Commissioner, used this right to proclaim martial law when the king fell ill. This is quite
significant as I will argue, for one must understand the ‘independence’ of Iraq and its ensuing
semi-peripheral sovereignty (as governed by the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty) in relation to the performative functions of martial law and the doctrine of emergency. In other words, semiperipheral sovereignty and the doctrine of emergency came hand in hand. The Iraqi state needed
martial law and emergency law to exercise its semi-colonial sovereignty. A weak sovereignty
could only be (re)imposed over and over to be maintained and its hegemony held together,
especially over its unsatisfied and distressed population.
Even before the controversial 1943 amendment, the Iraqi constitution of 1925 already
contained a provision – Article 120 – that gave power to the King to proclaim martial law. It
stated that, ‘should disturbances occur, or should anything happen indicating the likelihood of the
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occurrence of events of such a character in any part whatsoever of Iraq, or should there be a
menace of hostile attack upon any part whatsoever of Iraq, the King shall have power…to
proclaim martial law…’874 However, this power was subject to the Council of Ministers and
martial law could only be proclaimed ‘provisionally’ in the districts of Iraq ‘exposed to the
danger of disturbances or attacks’.875 The Article goes on: ‘the application of existing laws and
regulations may be suspended by the proclamation declaring martial law in force,’ and Parliament
may pass a law exempting those charged with the execution of the proclamation.876 Finally, it
states that, ‘the method of administration of the places in which martial law has been declared to
be in force shall be prescribed by Royal Irda’ or ordinance. 877 Therefore, despite having the
ability to proclaim martial law, the proclamation was explicitly provisional and limited to ‘a
menace of hostile attack’ implying internal of external threat to the state. This was significantly
altered by the 1943 amendment with the addition of a much wider and flexible power to declare a
state of emergency.
By 1935, Ordinance for Martial Law Administration – No. 18 was passed, which detailed
the manner in which martial law would be administrated.878 The Military Court, for instance, was
to be made up of a (military) president and four members (two military officers and two civilian
judges). The procedures of the military court were detailed therein. The death penalty was the
sentence to be applied to anyone who, ‘uses arms against the government or its military and
police forces’; ‘participates in an armed rebellion against the government or armed forces’;
disrupts the lines of communications; ‘gives assistance to rebels’; ‘spreads propaganda amongst
members of the military or police forces’; or ‘conducts espionage’. Penal servitude was the
sentence for anyone, who ‘gives [sensitive] news or information to rebels;’ ‘encourages the rebels
to continue’ their activities; or ‘spreads false news’. 879 Under this Ordinance, the Officer
Commanding the Military forces had wide powers, including the imposition of curfews;
conducting searches of persons and houses at any time of day; suspending seizing newspapers
and periodicals; preventing or dispersing a public meeting; and making arrests.880
The Iraq Constitution (Organic Law) – March 21, 1925, passed July 10, 1924, as amended July 29,
1925 and October 27, 1943.
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The constitution was amended in 1943 to strengthen the prerogative powers of the King,
one of which was the ability to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve parliament.881 These
major amendments emerged as a result of the 1941 anti-British coup of Rashid Ali, which
threatened the existence of the monarchy and ultimately led to the second British occupation of
Iraq that reinstalled the preceding order.882 The amendments were hence meant to ensure that
such a coup against the monarchy would not reoccur. It did this by ensuring that the executive
remained loyal to the monarchy and accordingly weakened the powers of parliament.
Furthermore, it gave the King the authority to issue royal prerogatives that were upheld as law,
when parliament was not in session, surpassing parliamentary scrutiny.
One of the most significant amendments was to Article 120, incorporating the power of
the crown to declare a state of emergency if he felt the monarchy was under threat.883 The
addition to the article read: ‘upon the occurrence of danger or rebellion or anything which
disturbs the peace, in any part of Iraq, the King may, with the consent of the Council of Ministers,
notify a state of emergency in the whole of Iraq, or in any part thereof. The districts affected by
the notification shall be administered in accordance with a special law, which shall provide for
trial, by Special Courts, of those who commit specified offences, and prescribe the administrative
measures to be taken by specified authorities.’884
This amendment was inserted at the insistence of the British legal advisor to the Ministry
of Justice, Edwin Drower, who was a member of the committee tasked with drafting the
amendment.885 Drower argued that the proclamation of martial law was not enough by itself for
the government to function effectively, especially since the proclamation of martial law could
only be done within the narrow condition of wartime – i.e. if there ‘should there be a menace of
[an external or internal] hostile attack’.886 In other words, in peacetime when this external or
See al-Hasani. Tārīkh al-Wizārāt, Vol. 6, supra, ft. 235, at 121-142; for the details of the
constitutional amendments.
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883 Ibid.
884 Ibid.
885 Kāmil Chādirji. ‘Sin Qānūn al-Tawār’ Yastabqī al-Mamlīka fī Hāla Ahkām ʿIrfīya Dā’īma’ [‘The
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internal threat was not present or unclear, the government would not have a justification for the
proclamation of martial law. What was required was a legal justification for the proclamation of
an emergency, and so Drower insisted that this could only be done by inserting such a power into
the constitution itself – that is by constitutionalizing the executive power to declare a state of
emergency. The majority in the drafting committee were strongly opposed to this suggestion, but
despite this Nurī al-Saīd forcefully inserted this article into the list of amendments ensuring it
would be passed.887 As Kāmil al-Chādirjī argued in Sadā al-Ahāli newspaper, the vagueness of
the phrase, ‘danger or rebellion or anything which disturbs the peace’ ensured that a state of
emergency could be declared in peacetime, and did not have to be provisional as with the
proclamation of martial law in the first part of the Article. That is, it could become a permanent
state of emergency, 888 which was in fact exactly what transpired, in particular after the Intifāda of
1952 and later the Basra General Strike of 1953.

C. The Intifāda of November 1952: the introduction of emergency as a governing technique
Before moving to an analysis of the doctrine of emergency in Iraq, I will very briefly
shift this narrative to the streets by recounting the events of the Intifāda, which once again
brought military rule back to the fore. Some major events at the time shook the entire region and
of course had a major impact on Iraqis; in particular only a few months earlier, the Egyptian
Revolution instigated by the free Officers overthrew the British-sponsored monarchy there, while
a movement for the nationalization of oil in Iran was underway. The Intifāda of November 1952
could be considered as the ‘continuation’ of the Wathba, which will be dealt with in the next
chapter, as it was an attempt to revive the vitality of that emancipatory event. The nationalist
movement and especially the opposition parties became aware that without a properly organized
and unified flank, they would fail to bring any real change to an order that was increasingly
intransigent.
It was this understanding that led the parliamentary opposition (the Independents, the
National Democrats, the United Popular Front), and the communist-dominated Peace Partisans to
negotiate an organized ‘Contact Committee’, with the aim of ‘facilitating the exchange of views
and ensuring uniformity of action.’889 On October 28, the opposition sent petitions to the Regent
Ibid, at 438.
Ibid, at 440.
889 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 667.
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that called for the following: the amendment of the constitution ‘to safeguard the sovereignty of
the people’ by abolishing the power of the crown to dismiss cabinets, the granting of civil
liberties and instituting a direct electoral system. The National Democrats and the Independents
went further calling for the abrogation of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, the eviction of all British
forces, and a limit to landownership. 890 Other significant demands included the end to all
‘reactionary laws’, (a clear reference to the TCCDR and emergency law), the abolition of
feudalism and the freedom to form trade unions.891 The Regents response was that reforms could
only be enacted in a ‘constitutional’ manner, that is through Parliament and the responsible
government in office.892 The opposition consequently decided to boycott the coming elections,
which led the British Ambassador, Sir John Troutbeck, to refer to them in his dispatch as a ‘band
of gangsters’ that must be ‘hit hard’.893
On November 22, demonstrations erupted in Baghdad as students, workers, and street
vendors sprang to action under the guidance of the newly formed committee.894 The shouts
against the Regent were numerous but more significant were the slogans: ‘Anglo-American
Imperialists Leave our Country!’895, and ‘O Allah, O People! Renew the Wathba!’896 Crowds
clashed with armed police, who fired shots, leading to the killing of one person, while fifty-two
others, including thirty-eight policemen were injured.897 On 23 November, the demonstrations
intensified its organizational capacity and quickly broadened, assuming ‘a more distinct plebeian
aspect’.898 The ICP who at that point dominated the rhythm of the streets, led the multitudes the
next morning with the slogan, ‘We Want Bread not Bullets!’ eventually stormed the Qambār Alī
police station.899 The anger intensified when in the afternoon the United States Information
Service library was burned, while another police station was occupied and set ablaze.900 The poet
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Badr Shākir al-Sayyāb would later describe the scene: ‘they burned and looted and destroyed, as
if they were destroying colonialism itself and not tape recorders and burning exploitation rather
than cinema reels’.901 The violence spiraled even further when after police gunfire brought death
to several demonstrators, in an act of vengeance; a policeman was dragged by a mob and set a
light.
By sundown, the army was called into the streets of Baghdad for the first time in its
modern history. Tanks rolled into the squares of the city. A special session was held in parliament
where it was decided that martial law would be proclaimed in Baghdad Governante under Article
120 of the Constitution.902 The application of ordinary laws ceased, and the civil courts shut
down. General Nurī-ud-Dīn Mahmūd, a loyal Royalist officer of Kurdish origin, was given wide
powers to form a new government and rule under military administration. Referring to the
provisions of 1935 Ordinance for Martial Law Administration – No. 18, General Mahmūd issued
decrees that prohibited further demonstrations, dissolved all political parties, arresting their
leaders, suppressed the press, and imposed curfew.903 Despite these measures, demonstrations did
not cease until they were violently crushed when military forces were ordered to shoot into the
crowd.904 Military rule lasted for 318 days until direct elections were called and a civilian
government was formed, but the state of emergency remained in place.
The Intifāda was crushed even more violently than the Wathba before it but similarly
with the use of the weapon of martial law. The process of normalizing the state of emergency in
law now started to materially take pace and reveal itself into the everyday lives of Iraqis. The
doctrine of emergency was clearly a technique of governance, and I would go so far as to argue
that it was an integral part of the structures of the semi-colonial state. I will get to this argument
in due course, but for now it is important to mention that if one read through the parliamentary
records of this period, one would be astounded to find heated debates not only on the
constitutionality of martial law, but the semi-colonial character of the Iraqi state. The
parliamentary opposition openly attacked the government and the British, referring to the Iraqi
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state as a dictatorship disguised as a parliamentary democracy. It considered the prolonging of
martial law and states of emergency as being unconstitutional.
What is more, the opposition was in someway cognizant of the uses of emergency
doctrine as a technique of governance. So, for instance, the foremost social democrat,
Mohammed Hadīd claimed that the government could not govern or even survive without their
uses of martial law.905 Hadīd emphasized that martial law was merely used to ‘protect the ruling
classes’, turning Iraq into a ‘police state’.906 Hussein Jamīl, Hadīd’s colleague, made a similar
point when he wrote in Sawt al-Ahālī that the government used martial law ‘to protect its back’
whenever it needed to.907 In one parliamentary session, Fā’iq al-Sāmurā’ī of the (right-wing)
nationalist Independents stated that, ‘ever since Iraq became a member of the League of Nations
until now, it has been ruled by martial law’ and that we have forgotten what ‘ordinary conditions’
look like and have become ‘accustomed to this type of rule’.908 This was not an exaggeration as I
have shown earlier. In fact, only six months earlier, Nurī al-Saīd was endeavoring to pass another
emergency law through parliament that would bring about such normalization of emergency
before elections took place. This law would be ‘less restrictive than martial law’ and would allow
civil courts to ‘continue to function’ in a state of emergency.909 This sort of normalization was in
fact what would emerge as the next elections occurred when a state of emergency was still in
place to the advantage of al-Saīd’s Constitutional Union Party910 and the ruling class.911
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D. The Rule of Semi-Colonial Law: Hussein Jamīl & the ‘legal aporia’ of emergency

I will now turn to the work of Hussein Jamīl, a social democrat and opposition MP,
lawyer and a brilliant legal scholar, who was one of the foremost critics of the uses of martial law
in Iraq.912 He wrote extensively on the topic and in 1953 published a pamphlet entitled Martial
Law: A Doctrinal Analysis.913 His overall argument was that martial law (and the doctrine of
emergency) did not suspend the law, but rather was governed by the Iraqi constitution and
therefore must be constrained by clearly identified parameters. In other words, he identified
martial law as being rooted in law and therefore could not (legally) override the fundamental
constitutional rights of the Iraqi people.914 Martial law, he wrote, ‘although provisional, is still not
an absolute order, but rather is subject to the law… [as] the constitution being its source…it must
be supervised by the judiciary’.915 Jamīl considered the proclamation of a state of emergency
under Article 120 as creating a ‘political legal order that is based on constitutional rule, by
reference to the constitution,’ and ‘within the limits of the law’.916 Not only was Jamīl an
advocate of subjecting the military courts to appeals after the state of emergency ended, which
would determine the constitutionality of its rulings, he also strongly criticized the composition of

Hussein Jamīl (1908-2002) born in Karbala in 1908, where his father was a judge. He moved to
Baghdad for secondary education, and eventually attended the law college in Damascus, graduating
in 1930. Jamīl was one of the founders of the reputable social democratic al-Ahālī newspaper, and he
was a leader of the National Democratic Party, which was founded in 1946. He was elected to
parliament in 1947, 1948 and 1954, and worked for the Ministry of Justice in 1949-1950. He became
the head of the drafting committee of the Iraqi constitution after the July revolution of 1958. A
prominent member of the Iraqi Lawyers’ Union between 1953-1957, he served as secretary-general
of the Arab Lawyers Union between 1956-1958. He died in Baghdad in 6 January 2002.
913 Hussein Jamīl. al-Aḥkām al-ʿIrfīya: Baḥith Fiqḥī [Martial Law: A Doctrinal Analysis], (Baghdad:
Matbaʿa al-ʿAnī, 1953).
914 Ibid, at 3, 11. Here reference should be made to Article 7 of the constitution (‘There should be no
violation of, or interference with, the personal liberty of any of the inhabitants of Iraq. None of them
shall be arrested, detained, punished or obliged to change their place of residence, or to be placed in
bonds, or compelled to serve in the armed forced, except in conformity with law. Torture and the
deportation of Iraqis from the Kingdom of Iraq are absolutely forbidden”); and Article 12 (“Freedom
of expression of opinion, liberty of publication, of meeting together, and of forming and joining
associations is guaranteed to all Iraqis within such limits as prescribed by law.”), as examples Jamil
refers to of the constitutional rights that were violated by martial law and the military courts.
915 See Abdul Hussein al-Shaʿbān. Jithūr al-Tayyār al-Dimuqrātī fi al-ʿIraq: Qira’a fī afkār Hussein
Jamīl, [The Roots of the Democratic Current in Iraq: A study in the thought of Hussein Jamil], (Beirut:
Bīsān, 2007), at 210.
916Jamīl, supra, ft. 913, at 11.
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the military courts that had a majority of military rather than civilian judges as contravening the
constitution.917
Jamīl, was a social democrat of a liberal (Fabian) variety and so he had a strong affinity
to the notion of the rule of law.918 He referred to the Magna Carta and the writ of habeas corpus
in his pamphlet to emphasize the principles inherent in the Iraqi Constitution that all citizens have
a right to be heard by the ordinary (civil) courts of the land.919 Furthermore, he argued that the
ordinances issued by the military administrators during a state of emergency do not have the
authority of law and cannot remain valid after a state of emergency ends, which was what often
happened in Iraq. 920 In that sense, Jamīl believed that a clearly defined limitation to a
proclamation of martial law and a state of emergency would prevent injustices from occurring.921
Despite his sophisticated legal analysis, Jamīl was limited to a narrow doctrinal analysis,
presenting a legal solution to a non-legal problem. In other words, he refused to grasp the
doctrine of emergency beyond a narrow legal lens by studying it from a historical lens and
grasping its function as a social and political technique of governance in a semi-colonial context.
The question of martial law in Iraq was not a question of legal or constitutional interpretation.922
The semi-colonial state may be obsessed with its constitutionality, but that was merely a façade
for its real intentions – the maintenance of its hegemony and the crushing of anything that would
threaten its order. Jamīl thought that the ideal of the rule of law would solve the problem of
martial law in Iraq.923 However, he did not realize that martial law and the doctrine of emergency
had a specific function in the colonies and semi-colonies. Jamīl underscores more than once in his
pamphlet that, ‘it is not the purpose of martial law to create a dictatorial order in a country which

917Ibid.

See Hussein Jamīl, ‘al-Aḥkām al-ʿirfīya wa Athāruhā fī Idtirāb al- ḥayāt al-‘Āma’ [Martial law
and its effects on public life], Sawt al-Ahālī 9-10-1949.
918 One of his books, Huqūq al-Insān wa al-Qānūn al-Jinā’ī [Human Rights and the Criminal Law],
(Ma‘had al-Bihūth wa al-Dirāsāt al-‘Arabīya, 1972), published in 1972, contained an epigraph by John
Locke on its cover, “Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins”.
919 Jamīl, supra, ft. 909, at 10.
920 Ibid, at 33-34.
921 Jamīl refers to some of these injustices in his pamphlet, illustrating how the military judges would
take on cases that occurred before the date of the proclamation of martial law; while in some cases
extend its jurisdiction to an area that was not under martial law just for the convenience of
constructing the legal prerequisites for a crime. Ibid, at 22.
922 Although the clarification of how law should be applied was important for the masses and that
was his purpose in writing this pamphlet.
923 This was also the argument the National Democratic Party that Jamīl belonged to, who argued that
the manner in which General Nuri used martial law to suspend political parties was unconstitutional.
See al-Hasanī, Tārīkh al-Wīzārāt, Vol 8, supra, ft. 235, at 348.
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is a democracy.’924 However, this was exactly the (performative) function of martial law for the
semi-colonial Iraqi state if one looked at its effects on the ground – the maintenance of a semicolonial order, whether it was dictatorial or even democratic was not an issue.
If one approached martial law as actually being governed by the rule of law of a genuine
parliamentary democracy, then Jamīl’s analysis might arguably have some weight.925 In Iraq,
however, martial law had a very specific function and Jamīl was merely describing what in his
view should be (in law) rather than what was the semi-colonial reality. An important example of
how the doctrine of emergency was used as a technique of governance occurred during the
massive Basra General Strike of 1953,926 propelled on the first anniversary of the Intifāda, it was
organized under the guidance of a Strike Committee, which was led by the renowned Iraqi
communist Salām Ādil.927 The oil workers of the Basra Petroleum Company went on strike and
eventually workers of the entire city joined the strike, including the port workers. The
government at the insistence of the Minister of Interior, Saīd al-Qazzāz, decided that the
proclamation of a state of emergency under the guise of ‘combating communism’ and
reinstituting ‘law and order’ was necessary.928 Police were ordered to violently shoot into a crowd
of striking workers, while newspapers that spread the strikers’ declarations were suppressed and
their journalists arrested.929

Jamīl, supra, ft. 913, at 3.
Even then there are reservations; for one thing, it is not possible to be so clear as to cover all
emergency situations. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, it is impossible ‘to foresee or to define the
extent an variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite.’
This is why most constitutional emergency provisions are in fact broad and flexible as opposed to
Jamīl’s point. See Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain. Law in Times of Crises, supra, at 66.
926 Suʿād Khayrī considered this strike as ‘the Wathba of the workers’ as it contributed to the
‘economic liberation of oil resources from imperial hands’. Khayrī, supra, ft. 562, at 204.
927 Husain al-Radī, aka Salām Ādil (b.1924, Najaf – d. 24 Feb 1963); Ādil was a schoolteacher and
poet, who rose to become a member of the Central Committee of the ICP in 1953. He represented Iraq
in the Second London Conference of the Communist Parties with the Sphere of British Imperialism
the same year. He was heavily involved in the struggles of the labour movement in Basra and
especially the oil workers. He died under torture by the Ba’athists during Black February in 1963.
Batatu, supra, at 712-717. For his biography See ThamĪna Nājī Yūsuf and Nizār Khālid. Salām Ādil:
SĪra Mūnādil [Salam Adil: The Story of a Struggler] (Damascus: Dār al-Madā, 2001).
928 See Abdul Rahmān al-Bayātī. Saīd al-Qazzāz wa Dourihu fī Sīyāsa al-‘Iraq [Said al-Qazzaz and his
role in Iraqi politics], Beirūt: Mu’asasa al- ‘Arabīya lil-Dirāsa wa al-Nashir, 2001), at 92-102.
929 ʿAzīz Sbāhī. Uqūd Min Tārīkh al-ḥizb al-Shīwʿi al-ʿIraqi, al-Juzu’ al-Thāni [Decades from the History
of the Communist Party of Iraq, volume 2], (Damascus: Manshourāt al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda, 2003), at
125-127.
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A massive public outcry ensued against these violent measures and the use of emergency
law against the working class. Only several months earlier one elder statesman, Mohammed
Ridhā al-Shabībī made the argument in parliament that the government was using this technique
to institute hikūm tabaqī (‘class rule’).930 In a sense, this was true, for the use of emergency rule
to deal with economic and labour relations was unprecedented in scale, and certainly revealed a
unique classist dimension – its use by the ruling-class to violently crush the stirring momentum of
the working class movement. In the end, however, it illustrates exactly how a semi-colonial state
functions in its governing capacity. Ironically, Jamīl was not unaware of this, for he wrote an
article in the Saūt al-Ahālī newspaper condemning what transpired in Basra and stressed that this
technique had become ‘the normal response to the everyday affairs of the people’; will an
emergency be proclaimed, he continued, ‘every time a strike occurs…and…every time workers
demand their rights?’931 The rule of law therefore that he claimed could (in theory) constrict a
state of emergency in his pamphlet was rather useless in doing so in reality. The doctrine of
emergency was more a Pandora’s box that was impossible to constrain by the law.
In any case, the fact was that the Iraqi constitution and the legal structures of the Iraqi
state, including its semi-peripheral sovereignty was the product of British [treaty and mandate]
semi-colonialism and imperialism. One could refer to the impassioned speech in parliament by
opposition MP ʿAbdul Razzāq al-Shaikhlī as a case in point. al-Shaikhlī infuriated the Speaker
and others by arguing that it was in fact the constitution itself that ‘denied the rights of the
people,’ as it was put into place by the British.932 He pointed out that the government was
democratic and nationalist only in appearance, while in reality it was pieces of a ‘wooden prop,
which the…colonizer hides behind…,’ manipulating it out of view.933 It was the ‘colonizer’, he
continued, who manufactured Iraq’s independence, which he compared to the idols of pre-Islamic
Jāhilīya that were made of mud. Referring to the constitutional rights of the Iraqi people, he
emphasized that they were given by the government ‘with its right hand and taken with the left’,
as the permanent state of emergency illustrates that Iraq was in fact a ‘dictatorship in its [very]
eye [i.e. in its essence], even if they tell us we live in a democracy’.934 al-Shaikhlī suggested the
redrafting of the entire constitution and the establishment of a nationalist government that truly
served the people rather than the British –i.e. the end of the semi-colonialism and its legal
Muhāthir Majlis al-Nūwwāb, 23rd Session of the years 1952-53, (11-5-1953), at 389.
Ṣawt al-Ahālī, 20-12-1953.
932 Muhāthir Majlis al-Nūwwāb, supra, 15-03-1953, at 54.
933 Ibid.
934 Ibid, at 55.
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manifestations – in a word, an end to imperialism in Iraq. This, he said, was the ‘first step for the
path to a truly democratic rule and towards liberation from the bonds of treaties and unjust
agreements’ and it was the only way to end this interminable conflict between the government
and the people.935
Putting al-Shaikhlī and Jamīl into conversation, the limitations of the latter’s analysis
becomes clear. Of course, Jamīl admits that the constitution was the product of the British
Mandate, but he claims to defend the actual ideals of the constitution and the rule of law, as it
should be.936 This was how much he believed in the ideal of the rule of law. This, however, did
not change the fact that he regarded that there was a centrality to resolving the ‘legal aporia’ of
martial law. That is, that emergency could somehow be constrained even if the structures of semicolonialism remained intact. However, my argument is that the violence of martial law could not
be constrained by the rule of law per se, especially in a colonial and semi-colonial context. It was
after all a manifestation of the semi-colonial Iraqi state. al-Shaikhlī’s speech exposed this fact, for
the mere reform of law in itself would not bring real democratic change in Iraq.
Stephen Morton has emphasized that one needs to distinguish between the violence of
colonial sovereignty and martial law/emergency, as the ‘legal aporia of emergency’ is merely a
‘colonial fiction’ for the colonized, who experiences violence regardless in his or her everyday
life.937 In other words, the issue for the colonized is not that of martial law or emergency per se
nor its legality or constitutionality, but rather the structures of (semi-)colonialism and -political
and economic- sovereignty as a whole. The violence of emergency –and the ‘state of exception’ –
is in this way already ingrained within (semi-)colonial sovereignty or rather (semi-)colonial
sovereignty precedes the normalization of the state of emergency.
We could go further and argue that the legal structures of emergency became even more
important as a technique of governance in the semi-colonial state. Instead of being a mere
‘political strategy’ or even a ‘tool of political management,’ as was the case in the British

Ibid. The president and speaker of parliament was infuriated with al-Shaikhlī’s speech that he
nearly held him in contempt of parliament for breaking his oath of upholding the constitution, stating
that he ‘crossed the line’ with his insulting tone towards the constitution.
936 Jamīl, supra, ft. 913, at 10.
937 Stephen Morton, States of Emergency: Colonialism, Literature and Law, (Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press, 2003), at 9.
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response in its colonies, such as Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus,938 emergency became more legally
entrenched into the very structures of the semi-colonial state, which needed it to survive. The
semi-colonial Iraqi state relied on martial law and the doctrine of emergency to preserve itself,
while it remained obsessed with its own legitimacy and the constitutionality of its actions. As the
late Nasser Hussein has revealed, ‘martial law [in the colony] seeks to effect not just the
restoration of order, but the restoration of the general authority of the state. In doing so, it takes
advantage of the absence of normative constraints on power not just to punish more…but to
punish out of a different logic.’939 It is, in other words, he writes, ‘what is needed to construct the
state all over again…[i.e.] the condition for the possibility of law’s existence’.940
It was consequently these (pre-)conditions of the semi-colonial order which were the
target of the counter-hegemonic movements rather than the actual interpretation of law. The semicolonial Iraqi state continuously used the doctrine of emergency to fracture the possibilities of the
emergence of an alternative counter-hegemonic alternative space. Every time such a space sought
to emerge, it was swiftly and violently suppressed. Hence, one could see the limitations of Jamīl’s
legal idealism, which implied that the struggle between the people and the regime was more
concerning law or its interpretation. As if the demonstrators evoked the rule of law (in their
minds) in such a manner every time they took the streets, and that this was what produced these
revolutionary spaces.
This, however, was not the case. Firstly, what the masses were calling for with their very
actions (whether during the Wathba or later the Intifāda) was a new social and legal order – and
therefore a novel conception of law or what Gramsci referred to as a new ‘usage’ of the law. One
that was free from semi-colonialism and imperialism. Secondly, the conditions for these counterhegemonic spaces emerged because of several intersecting local, regional and international
factors and not (solely) because of the pluralistic uses of law by the movement. This analysis will
become clearer when I closely examine the emergence of the spaces whereby these struggles
occurred – namely when I provide what I refer to as a ‘conjunctural’ analysis of the Wathba
uprising. In this chapter, I have shown the (legal) methods used by the Iraqi state to fracture the
materiality of any potentially revolutionary space so as to re-impose its own hegemonic space and
Frank Furedi. “Creating a Breathing Space: The Political Management of Colonial Emergencies,” in
Robert Holland (ed.) Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945, (London: Frank
Cass, 1994), at 94.
939 Nasser Hussein. The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law, (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2003), at 124.
940 Ibid.
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order. In the next chapter, I will examine the brief counter-hegemonic and revolutionary space
that emerged during the Wathba and analyze its consequences.

IV. Conclusion
This chapter detailed the uses of criminal law and martial law in Iraq before the
revolution. The Iraqi state and the ruling class used the law to violently crush opposition and
safeguard its hegemony. I began by detailing the manner in which the Baghdad Penal Code was
amended in 1938, basically making it a crime to be a ‘communist’ or even a progressive
reformist. This was one of the harshest laws in the region. Moreover, the military courts found it
very useful in sentencing thousands of Iraqis, including the leaders of the communist party. The
fact was that martial law and criminal law came hand in hand as the latter was more effective in a
state of emergency.
In the second part of this chapter, I trace the history of martial law and emergency
doctrine and illustrate its uses in the colonies. I then make the argument that its uses in Iraq
(especially after the Intifāda) had a specific performative function as it allowed the semi-colonial
Iraqi state to reestablish itself and its hegemony. It was therefore a technique of governance that
ensured that the fragmented and weak semi-peripheral sovereignty does not falter. This was clear
in how it was used to deal with labour strikes, such as the Basra General Strike of 1953. My
critique of the liberal views of Hussein Jamīl show that the law could not constrain the
‘magically’ expansive power of the doctrine of emergency as it was only by ending its root cause
– the semi-colonial conditions in place that the permanent state of emergency could finally come
to an end. Returning to Benjamin’s quotation in the epigraph above, it is only by seeing things
from the perspective (or tradition) of the colonial ‘oppressed’ could one grasp how permanent
emergency emerges in the everyday materiality of life. One could add, that this ‘tradition’ also
teaches us that just because the ‘emergency situation’ becomes the ‘rule,’ does not entail that it
could be constrained by their (legal) parameters.
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Chapter 7: The Defeat of the ‘Covenant of the Slave’: al-Wathba as an Anti-Colonial
Conjuncture Against International Law

O Portsmouth Covenant, we as a nation
Reject an alliance with the traitorous enemy
Stay at your border, for Iraq possesses
Tremendous volition to crush any reckless fool. 941
~ Mohammad Sālih Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm

[al-Wathba,] a miracle? No, it was no miracle! If it were not, that would be the miracle. 942
~ Khālid Bakdāsh
It would be apt for the Iraqi people…to take advantage of the critical [geopolitical and strategic] location of their
country to save themselves from the scourge of colonialism and to remember always and forever that their salvation is
dependent on the unity of all peoples of al-Sharq [the East] and the defeat of colonialism in all Eastern countries.943
~ ʿAbdul Fatāh Ibrāhīm

I. Introduction
During the third session of the United Nations General Assembly held in Paris in 1948,
the delegate for the Philippines, Carlos Romula, insisted on a broad interpretation of the
ambiguous Chapter XI of the UN Charter, stressing that ‘the force of history which had brought
about many changes in the British Empire was far stronger than legal or constitutional
barriers’.944 Romula was directly referring to what he called the ‘impetus of revolutionary forces’
that was bringing about transformations on the ground in the Third World, to make a legal
argument.945 This ‘non-juridical’ approach, which was used extensively by the ‘Afro-Asian bloc’
Muhammad Sālih Bāḥr al-ʿŪlūm, Diwan Bāḥr al-ʿŪlūm, (Baghdad: Matbʿa Dar al-Tadāmūn, 1968),
2:129.
942 Khālid Bakdāsh (the prominent Syrian communist leader) in al-Tarīq, as quoted in Sbāhī, ʿŪqūd
(1), supra, ft. 191, at 345.
943 Ibrāhīm, supra, ft. 492, at 238, my emphasis.
944 Quoted in El-Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-Asia, (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), at 35.
945 Ibid, at 34.
941
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in the UN, demonstrates that the anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles unleashed by Third
World peoples at the time could not be ignored and had direct implications on international law
and its interpretation.
In this final chapter, the Wathba will be analyzed as a moment where all the seemingly
confined labour struggles recounted earlier culminated into a much wider nationalist and
internationalist anti-colonial arena. This chapter is concerned with the question of the revolutionary
agency within international legal scholarship relating to the Third World. I will address certain
limitations in the methodology and analysis of the Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL) scholarship by detailing an event of mass working-class agency in the historiography of
anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle in Iraq, situating it broadly within the international
conjuncture of decolonization. The Wathba of 1948 was a great popular uprising of the Iraqi urban
poor and working classes that successfully prevented the imposition of a revised unequal treaty
between Iraq and Britain (the Anglo-Iraq Treaty), sparking the revolutionary process that would
eventually overthrow the British-sponsored monarchy a decade later. The Wathba will be shown to
be one historical manifestation of a wider conjuncture against international law in the Third World.
I will argue that TWAIL must begin undertaking the study of the conjunctures that allowed certain
movements ample room to act within counter-hegemonic spaces and maneuver against the
structures of imperialism of international law. It is only through such an examination that the
present conjuncture can be understood and the future transformed.

II. The limitations of the study of revolutionary agency in TWAIL analysis
TWAIL scholars have been at the forefront of exposing how colonialism and imperialism
are constitutive of the history and discipline of international law.946 They have done so by
reverting to an examination of history to expose the legacy of imperialism in international law. In
fact, it is this particular method of historical analysis that has been said to be ‘the feature most
fundamental’ to TWAIL scholarship;947 one which regards ‘historical perspective’ as the ‘key
technique’ in understanding the current features of international law.948 TWAIL encompasses a
For a good overview of the literature see Gathii, supra, ft. 351.
Karin Mickelson. “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse,”
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 16, No. 2, (1998): 406.
948 Obiora Okafor. “Newness, Imperialism and International Legal Reform in our Time: a TWAIL
perspective,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 43, No.1&2, (2005): 178.
946
947
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political commitment to counter traditional approaches that have disregarded the colonial past and
considered it of trivial concern to international law. Moreover, international law as a discipline
through its positivist predisposition tends to repress this colonial past, constructing and
reproducing the version of the past that is better suited for its hegemonic discourse.949 TWAIL
analysis resists this process, and aims to expose the hidden colonial origins of international law,
and most importantly, emphasizes the continuity of ‘colonial relations’ in the contemporary
structures of international law.950
Despite this radical commitment of the TWAIL analysis, there still appears to be
considerable limitations to it. This is primarily due to the manner in which TWAIL scholars often
approach the question of agency in their analysis. As Owen Taylor has argued, TWAIL scholars
tend to invoke notions of ‘resistance’ (the word most often used to evoke agency) that are highly
selective of the conceptual history of revolution.951 In other words, when TWAIL scholarship
turns from an analysis of the structures of imperialism within international law to address the
issue of agency, it does so in a highly idealized manner that locates the agency of social
movements within a narrative of ‘resistance’ as a ‘re-conceptualization [of law] as an act of will’,
while emphasizing the necessity of ‘radical legal pluralism’ as fundamental to emancipation. 952
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, for example, takes such a position in situating the revolutionary potential
of social movements in ‘non-institutional, non-party, and cultural terms’. 953 This narrow
conception suggests that as long as revolutionary agency or resistance is ‘sanitized’ (i.e.
spontaneous, without central or party organization, and non-violent), then it would bring about
true political and democratic change within the liberal promise of international law, whatever the
state of the structures in question.954
The problem with this approach is that it assumes that law is abstract and can be reconceptualized into an emancipatory plural form, rather than already entrenched (and so
constrained) within certain material social conditions and forms. What this also does is ignore the
connection between agency and structure – i.e. the conjuncture, leading to a fanciful situation

949Anghie,

Anthony. “The Evolution of International Law: colonial and postcolonial realities,” Third
World Quarterly, Vol. 27, (2008): 739-753.
950Ibid.
951 Owen Taylor. “Reclaiming Revolution” “Reclaiming Revolution,” Finnish Yearbook of International
Law (Vol. 22, 2011), at 259-292.
952 Ibid,” 273.
953 Balakrishnan Rajagopal. International Law from Below, supra, ft. 317, at 293.
954 Taylor, supra, ft. 951, at 263.
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whereby ‘any kind of agency’ becomes possible and ‘the structure becomes entirely
contingent’. 955 The reality is that different forms of action are effective depending on the
particular structural conditions pertaining at any given time.956 This chapter is concerned with this
latter disconnect between the notions of structure and agency that is prevalent in TWAIL
scholarship. My argument is that TWAIL scholars should shift their focus to a study of what I
refer to as ‘conjunctural resistance’ or ‘conjunctural agency’ rather than ‘plural resistance’ (or
agency) that is waged against international law at any given time. To do this is to realize that it is
the conjuncture that should be studied to understand agency.
The concept of the conjuncture is derived here from Marxist theory and analysis, in
particular from the formulations of V.I. Lenin and, later, Antonio Gramsci. Louis Althusser
defines the conjuncture as denoting, ‘the exact balance of forces, state of overdetermination of the
contradictions at any given moment to which political tactics must be applied’.957 Referring to
Lenin’s approach in the 1917 Russian revolution, Althusser demonstrates how ‘the history of
imperialism’ was analyzed by Lenin in its current conjuncture as opposed to the typical Marxist
theoretician and historian who was merely concerned with historical knowledge: ‘Lenin meets
Imperialism in the modality of a current existence: in a concrete present. The theoretician of
history or the historian meet it in another modality, the modality of non-currency and
abstraction.’958 He goes on to argue that Lenin’s (conjunctural) approach to the ‘current situation’
at that time was unique as he was concerned with the ‘typicality of the contradictions, with their
displacements, their condensations and the “fusion” in revolutionary rupture that they
produced…[in other words] what makes it possible to act on History from within the sole history
present… not [merely] to demonstrate or explain the “inevitable” revolutions post festum, but to
make them in our unique present…’959 As Stuart Hall makes clear, the conjuncture is the product
of ‘many determinations’, not of one.960 Conjunctural thinking therefore involves ‘clustering’ or
assembling elements into a particular formation.961 In this way, the concept of the conjuncture
can be used as an analytical tool for identifying strategic sites of political action that have
emerged and when used properly would open up possibilities for transformation.

Ibid, at 274.
Ibid, at 271.
957 Louis Althusser. For Marx, (London: Verso, 2005), at 250.
958 Ibid, at 178.
959 Ibid, at 180.
960 Koivisto, ‘J., Lahtinen, M. ‘Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism: Conjuncture, politicohistorical’ Historical Materialism 20.1 (2012) 267-277, at 274.
961 Ibid.
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TWAIL analysis has, for the most part, disregarded the significance of the conjunctures
that allowed for the possibilities of ‘resistance’, and their implications within the context of
international law. By shifting the focus on the conjuncture, TWAIL scholars would become more
attentive to the pressing question of political action. Of course, TWAIL scholarship has often
concerned itself with the question of the agency of Third World peoples, and there have been a
significant number of works that have examined the role of social movements in the development
of international law.962 What I am concerned with here, however, is the necessity of locating
agency conjuncturally within the wider narrative of the imperialism of international law put
forward by TWAIL. My intention in this chapter therefore is to extend certain aspects of the
conjunctural analysis to TWAIL approaches, through this study of Iraqi history, so that one could
more effectively grasp (and more importantly apply the lessons of) the history of revolutionary
action and ‘resistance’ to international law’s imperialism in the present conjuncture.
What follows is a detailed account of the Wathba, a revolutionary event of ‘conjunctural
resistance’ in Iraq, which started out against the extension of the (unequal) treaty between Iraq
and Britain ‘under the guise’ of its revision.963 The Wathba eventually turned into the rejection
of the ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ that was granted to Iraq through the Mandate system in 1932.
I refer to ‘conjunctural resistance’ as a kind of counterweight to TWAILian ‘plural resistance’ to
illuminate the fact that it is the conjuncture that should inform one’s understanding of agency
rather than its plural character. It will be clear from my analysis that resistance could only be said
to be constitutive of international law (if at all) at certain conjunctures and not tout court (as
TWAIL scholarship suggests). I will use the Wathba to illustrate an example of how a
‘conjunctural analysis’ could be undertaken in relation to the history of Iraqi resistance to
imperialism and Iraqi agency within international law. After detailing this narrative, I will return
to the present analysis to tease out the unique conjunctural characteristics of this event by
assessing how working-class agency (through the labour movement) attempted to subvert the
imperialism of international law, eventually situating it more broadly within the conjuncture of
decolonization in the shifting international legal order.

See Pooja Parmar. Indegeneity and Legal Pluralism in India: Claims, Histories, Meanings,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
963 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 546. It should be noted that I am not referring to the ‘event’ here in the
same manner as Alain Badiou does.
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III. The British Empire’s ‘New Clothes of Treaties and Pacts’
al-Wathba (literally, ‘the leap’) was a social uprising initially sparked by news of
negotiations and then the signing of a revised unequal treaty between Iraq and Britain in 1948. In
Chapter 3, I traced the evolution of the unequal treaty and its role in the manufacturing of what I
call Iraqi ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty,’ a form of sovereignty that was particularly unique to the
geopolitical specificities of the semi-peripheral Middle East. The Wathba should be understood
within this context of the history of international law and the Mandate system, so as to appreciate
why the Iraqi masses decided to wage a struggle against it. As I have argued in Chapter 3, the
semi-peripheral sovereignty that was juridically constructed (and threaded in the 1930 Anglo-Iraq
Treaty) to ensure Iraq’s ‘independence’ was in reality made to legitimize and legalize the
extraction, production and transportation of Iraq’s most valuable natural resource (oil) across the
region to the world – to the benefit not only of Britain, but the capitalist world economy. Hence,
international law through the Mandate system produced a unique form of semi-peripheral
sovereignty out of the Iraqi experience. However, this was not possible without the use of the old
colonial instrument of the treaty, which ultimately ensured that the Iraqi state not only appeared
independent but also was ‘independent’ under international law, although in reality it remained
subservient to imperialism.
The semi-colonial Iraqi state was unable to maintain its hegemony because the
sovereignty it was granted constricted it from doing so successfully. Semi-peripheral sovereignty
fragmented the governing capacity of the Iraqi sate. So, fragmentation was present not only, as I
detailed in the Chapter 1, in rural Iraq, where there were two separate legal systems, but also in
the oil fields which were imperial enclaves governed by the concessionary agreement, and the
railways and the Port, which were semi-colonial enclaves. It was this type of fragmentation that
made it very difficult for the semi-colonial Iraqi state to impose its hegemony without the
violence of the emergency doctrine, and this made the counter-hegemonic movements, such as
the illegal underground communist party, very popular with the masses. As will be shown, it was
in a decisive moment in Iraqi history where imperialism schemed to reassert itself under the guise
of international law did all the mini-struggles (of the workers, peasants and students) come
together, and where the counter-hegemonic movement was now in a position to take the
opportunity presented to it by history to wage an overall anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle
against the social order.
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IV. The making of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty & its implications

Once the British and their Iraqi counterparts agreed that they needed to revise the now
visibly outdated and much hated 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, secret negotiations commenced as early
as 1946. The 1930 Treaty was drafted under the Mandate system and League institutions that the
Iraqi government found to be no longer viable in a post-war world. The British government saw
this as an opportunity to update the treaty (redefining their corresponding hegemony) under the
guise of the UN Charter that emphasized the notion of ‘equality’ between nations under
international law. In that sense, rather than actually addressing the limitations of what I have
refereed to as ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty,’ the new treaty merely redefined it in a manner that
appeared to be acceptable for the Iraqis, but more specifically, to be consistent with the newly
emerging post-war international legal order. It was for this reason that throughout the
negotiations, Bevin was insistent that the treaty was being drafted ‘under strict conformity with
the UN Charter’ and emphasized that it was ‘in spirit and in heart’ drafted on the basis of ‘perfect
equality’964 or ‘complete equality in all respects’. Bevin hoped that this new arrangement would
be as much a breakthrough for Iraq (and the region) as the Empire’s settlement with India.965
If one examined the provisions of the treaty closely, it would become clear that although
the treaty promised the eventual withdrawal of British troops and the surrendering of military
bases to Iraq, it gave the British a say in Iraq’s military planning through the establishment of a
Joint Defense Board (JDB), which continued the employment of British military ‘experts’. The
JDB, which was a joint high-ranking military body tasked with the coordination of defensive
plans, had explicit advisory powers under the treaty to make the (expert) decision of when Iraqi
government may ‘invite’ British troops back into the country.966 In other words, the treaty
ensured that the Iraqi government would surrender their bases to Britain in wartime, making it
impossible for a stance of neutrality. Moreover, the treaty made a provision for the continued
access for ‘operational forces’ of the R.A.F. to the Shu‘aybah and Habbaniyyah bases until
withdrawal of the ‘allied armies’ from ‘all-ex-enemy countries’ (a far fetched possibility from

TNA. ‘Minutes of a meeting with the Iraqi Delegation held at the Foreign Office on the afternoon of
7th January, 1948’, E 409/27/93/G, FO 371/68442 [9359]; ‘Minutes of a meeting held at Foreign
Office on January 9th to consider the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty at 2:30 p.m.’, E 409/27/G, FO 371/68442.
965 Ibid.
966 Article 1(b), Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and His Majesty the King of Iraq, Portsmouth, 15th January, 1948, Cmd. 7309.
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the Cold War reality).967 It also safeguarded British influence fifteen years beyond the time limit
of the old treaty.968
The Iraqi delegation, which arrived in London to secretly negotiate and sign the new
treaty, were so overtly concerned with the nitty-gritty legalese and specific wording of the
document that they ignored the larger implications of the treaty, which in fact so clearly
entrenched Iraq further into imperialist control.969 In this way the Portsmouth Treaty as it came
to be known turned out to be no more than an extension of the 1930 treaty couched in ‘newfashioned terminology’ that did not alter much of the old relationship.970 The PM himself was
aware that what was being done was merely cosmetic and a matter of appearances when he
bluntly stated during negotiations that despite the end of the Mandate in 1932, the Iraqi people
considered ‘the present position of their country was that of an occupied country’ […] ‘it was
[therefore] essential for the Iraqi government to show the people the effect of the treaty. The
departure of British forces in Iraq would convince the people that their country had really gained
full independence, even if these units were later invited to return.’ 971 One British official
foreshadowed the troubles that would ensue when he cautioned in a minute that, ‘we should be
careful not to take the line that the above provisions of the treaty cement to our retention of our
strategic hold on Iraq i.e. that we have tricked the Iraqis into letting us continue our military
occupation in practice at the expense of a few concessions’.972 As will be shown, the Iraqi people
were in fact quite aware that the treaty was not merely a sham, but a form of skillful legal trickery
Article 1(d).
Ibid.
969 A good example is when discussion revolved around the word ‘grants’ in the draft of Article 1(d),
which stated, ‘In time of peace His Majesty the King of Iraq grants His Britannic Majesty to station
operations units of the Royal Air Force at the air bases’. The Iraqi delegation preferred to replace the
word ‘grants’ with the words ‘may invite’ instead as they saw a distinction between war, peace and
the current state of neutrality. They did not believe that during a situation of ‘real’ peace that
operational units should be granted access to the bases. The British eventually accepted this draft
reluctantly, as they argued it was the only way to defend Iraq in an emergency. However, despite this
change of wording, the JBD still had the final discretion to decide on whether it was a time of peace or
war. This illustrates the extent of negotiations between the contracting parties as the important
consequences of the treaty were ignored for its legalese or (cosmetic) wording. TNA. ‘Appendix to
Brief for Iraq Treaty Negotiations’ Anglo-Iraq Treaty: Brief for Secretary of State, 16 Jan 1948,
E454/G, FO 371/68442. In any case, as Louis writes, ‘the ground had been so thoroughly laid that the
meetings in London were pensive and sometimes almost festive occasions rather than sessions of
hard bargaining,’ Wm. Roger Louis. The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab
Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) at
333.
970 Batatu, supra, ft. 37, at 550.
971 TNA. Minutes of a meeting with the Iraqi Delegation held at the Foreign Office on the afternoon of
7th January, 1948’, E 409/27/93/G, FO 371/68442.
972 TNA. FO 371/68442. Signing of Iraq Treaty: Publicity. E 541/G, 3 Jan 1948.
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that did exactly that – prolong the imperial and military (semi-colonial) de facto ‘occupation’ of
their country. Consequently, while the revision of the 1930 treaty was clearly meant to ensure the
continuation of British intervention in Iraqi affairs, it was also explicitly meant to be a ‘model’
for the entire region, whereby all such treaties973 were to ultimately be brought together into a
‘common defense system’ in the region.974

V. The ‘Wathba of the people’ takes form
Although Iraqis were continuously resisting the 1930 Treaty and its wide reach into every
aspect of their lives, it was the event of the massive Wathba uprising that was the defining
moment of revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Despite its heterogeneous character, the
working class was the Wathba’s quintessence. It was a robust alliance between workers and
students that led the massive demonstrations on the streets of Baghdad. In the gripping words of
Hanna Batatu, ‘an atmosphere redolent of social revolution enveloped Baghdad’ during the
Wathba, as it was ‘the most formidable mass insurrection in the history of the monarchy … It was
the social subsoil of Baghdad in revolt against hunger and unequal burdens. It was the students
and the Schalchiyyah workers braving machine guns … and dying for their ideas … [I]t was the
political representatives of the various layers of the middle class … resentful of constraints or
plotting for political gains. It was the privileged stratum [of the ruling and landowning classes]
… menaced in their political power and social interests. It was British overlordship shaken, the
Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 sapped, and the Portsmouth Agreement of 1948 abolished’.975
The struggle of common Iraqis against the treaty started the day after the official
announcement of negotiations on January 5, 1948. Mass demonstrations originated at the Law
College of Baghdad. Law students left their classes to demonstrate against the treaty, as well as
the partition of Palestine. 976 The police, taking ‘precautionary measures,’ attempted to disrupt
their plans and prevented them from leaving the college building.977 Stones and bottles were
thrown at police.978 Thirty-nine students were arrested.979 The Iraqi government headed by PM
Sālih Jabr, decided to shut down the law college and launched a ‘criminal’ investigation into the
Such as the (failed) Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1946 and the treaty with Jordan.
TNA. FO 371/68442. Signing of Iraq Treaty: Publicity. E 541/G, 3 Jan 1948.
975Batatu. supra, ft. 41, at 544, 551.
976 Humaīdī. al-Tatwūrāt, supra, ft. 549, at 519-525.
977 TNA. British Embassy, Bagdad to FO, London, 7 Jan, 1948. E 197/27/93; FO 371/68442.
978 Ibid.
979 Ḥumaidī, supra, ft. 549.
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incident.980 This was in reality an excuse to purge the college of those involved in the protest. The
cabinet claimed that the protestors were ‘anarchists’ looking to spread discord on campus.981
Several law professors were suspended and the Dean was transferred to another city. The ensuing
witch-hunt led to numerous sympathy protests in other colleges calling for the release of their
fellow students. Those apprehended were eventually released a few days later, and the law
college reopened.982 The movement at this point had a distinctive student character, and it would
not be an overstatement to claim that the initial dynamo of organizational action originated at the
level of the students’ political party organizations.983 In fact, one participant referred to student
action as the ‘seed’ that led to the unification of Iraqi nationalist movement.984
In no more than ten days, these seemingly circumscribed student demonstrations would
erupt into an unprecedented fervor of discontent, composed of the majority of the underclasses of
Iraq. Following the government clamp-down at the law school, the opposition—in particular the
outlawed but popular Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)—began organizing all workers on the ground.
The “Cooperation Committee” which united most leftist and nationalist parties under its
leadership was formed a few months earlier; now an adjunct ICP-dominated “Student
Cooperation Committee” was created and joined with it.985 These two committees would lead the
movement’s demonstrations and strikes throughout the Wathba.
The illusive stillness of the next week was broken when the official announcement was
made on January 16 that the Portsmouth Treaty had been signed in London the previous day. A
three-day general student strike exploded instantaneously. The students called for the resignation
of the cabinet and the cancellation of the Portsmouth Treaty, eventually heading to the
headquarters of the infamous Criminal Investigation Department (CID), calling for its downfall
and referring to it as the ‘Gestapo of Iraq’986. On January 20, the Schālchīyyah workers and the
famished sarīfa-dwellers (squatters) joined the student protests for the first time, broadening the
event beyond narrow confines of parliamentary politics. It was also the day that police shot into
Ibid, at 521.
Ibid.
982 Ibid.
983 Sbāhī, supra, ft. 191, at 335.
984 Editors, ‘al-Majid lil-Wathba al-Amis, al-Thāfir l’intifāda al-Youm,’ [An interview with participants
of the Wathba on its 40th anniversary], al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda, 193, Issue 3 (35), 1988, at 13.
985 For a detailed account of the role of students in the Wathba, see Fārūq Prwtw, “Min Thikrīyāt alHaraka al-Talābīya fī Wathba Kānūn al-Thānī” [Memories from the student movement during the
Wathba of January], al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda, Issue, 293, Mar/Apr, 2000, at 83.
986 Ḥumaidī, supra, ft. 549, at 523.
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the crowd. The next day, as students carried the dead to their resting place, the police fired shots
in their direction and chased them while they were still on hospital grounds. Two died and
seventeen wounded. Outrage spread throughout the city for what was considered the criminal
actions of the police.987 A student who was shot in the head was carried by his colleagues to the
office of the dean of his school in protest, leading to the dean’s resignation. The resignation of
other deans and professors followed. The masses became bitter but remained defiant.
The street became ‘a symbol of national unity’ as Muslims (Shia and Sunni), Jews and
Christians, joined arms in solidarity.988 Karīm Murūwwa, who would later become one the most
prominent Lebanese communists, participated in the demonstrations, which had an immense
influence on him and further radicalized his political trajectory.989 He described the uniqueness of
these days by revealing that there emerged ‘a kind of democracy [and freedom] that had no
constraint,’ as illegal newspapers were distributed in the streets, while the leaders of outlawed
political parties who lived in the underground for years, emerged from hiding in full view.990
Eventually, more Baghdadis from other walks of life joined the protests. The Wathba rapidly
spread to other parts of the country.991
Overwhelmed, the Regent, against the advice of the British, capitulated, renouncing the
treaty in a public statement, and guaranteed that it would not be ratified against the will of the
people.992 This led to a splintering of the opposition, as some of the right-wing nationalist, as
well as, the national-bourgeois parties recoiled, calling for the end of demonstrations. The left, led
by the communists, refused to retreat, considering the Regent’s statement as a mere tactic. The
ICP and its uncompromising position became the dominant force in the demonstrations, and the
Wathba was transformed into an event of a categorical revolutionary character.993 The protests
were now calling for more than the cancellation of the new treaty, but for the end of British
Ibid. As Kamal al-Chādirjī wrote in an opening of Ṣawt al-Ahāli newspaper, the police contravened
‘…even the laws of war [which] make it illegal for the use of firearms in hospitals and health
organizations…’ Ṣawt al-Ahāli, 9/2/1948.
988 Orit Bashkin. “A Patriotic Uprising: Baghdadi Jews and the Wathba,” in Nelida Fuccaro (ed.),
Violence and the City in the Modern Middle East, (Stanford University Press, Stanford: 2016), 151167at 163.
989 Karīm Murūwwa, Karīm Murūwwa Yatathakar [Karim Muruwwa Remembers], Saqir Abu Fakhir
(ed.) (Damascus: al-Mada, 2002), at 42-43.
990 Ibid, at 42-43.
991 Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 551.
992 Ibid.
993 According to one communist participant, ‘If we had followed the instructions of the national
bourgeois parties [of easing the demonstrations], there would have been no Wathba”, supra, ft. 980,
at 14.
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imperialism and the formation of a truly national democratic government. Their calls were not
merely concerned with ‘political freedoms,’ but at its core were issues relating to economic and
social injustice. This could be especially ascertained by their calls for ‘bread’.994 The Wathba
quickly turned from a demand to replace the cabinet to a call for a profound transformation of the
social and political order.995
The respected social democrat and lawyer, Kamil Qazānchī, who was the head of the
movement’s “Coordination Committee,” addressed the cheering crowd from the roof of the Wadī
Coffeehouse, asserting that, ‘You must declare a great people’s revolution, and struggle to
establish a people’s government that represents these [laboring] classes.’996 The crowds carried
the renowned worker-poet, Mohammad Sālih Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm on their shoulders. Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm
had been reciting his improvised thunderous poetry during the past few days, furiously
condemning the government’s complicity with imperialism, giving voice to the people and
mesmerizing the crowds. That day, he recited his most memorable poem, ‘The People’s Leap’:
O Wathba of the People, rend apart
With your maledictions this stupid treaty
For the Portsmouth treaty is a chain
The fetters of unconditional occupation
O Wathba of the People, send away
The grief and sadness of sheer evil
That descends upon us, for Iraq
Is the death of every shuttering fool
The stronger logic lies in the struggle of the resisting people
So Bevin will be shut up just as the villain Churchill was muzzled!997

In fact, the government of Saleh Jabr was labeled in the protests as ‘the cabinet of black bread,’
referring to the miserable state of bread that was being distributed by the state to the people. alThaqāfa al-Jadīda, 193, Issue 3 (35), 1988, supra, ft. 984, at 15
995 Batatu, Ibid, ft. 41, at 553.
996 Ibid.
997 M. Bahr al-‘Ulūm, Dīwan, supra, at 132-134. For his role in the Wathba and the importance of
poetry in that regard see, Kevin M. Jones. ‘A horizon lit with blood: public poetry and mass politics in
Iraq,’ Social History, 2014, Vol. 39, No 4, 443-461. Translation of Jones.
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Qazānchī’s speech and Bahr al-‘Ulūm’s poem emphasized that the cancelation of the Portsmouth
Treaty (or what he referred to in another poem as ‘the covenant of the slave’998) was in fact more
about the liberation of the country from imperial and semi-colonial rule than the negotiation of
the contents of the treaty. The statement released by the social democratic National Democratic
Party explains this well, plainly stating that ‘the truth of the matter is that the British, since its
occupation of Iraq, intended to make this country a strategic site in the Middle East, for its own
interests … to exploit its resources, and control its markets’. It goes on to argue that the British
were in fact merely ‘dressing up colonial [imperial] control with the new clothes of treaties and
pacts.’ The Portsmouth Treaty was therefore merely ‘a new colonial [and imperial] project … a
blatant attack on Iraq’s very being, its sovereignty and political future,’ and for this reason it
should be resisted by Iraqis with all their might.999
The Wathba came to a bloody culmination in Baghdad on January 27 when intense street
battles were waged between the unarmed multitudes (carrying only canes and rocks) and the
police equipped with machine guns and armored vehicles. A pendulum-like flowing movement
between the two sides became a regular feature of the narrow streets of the city. The urban
geography of Baghdad was taken advantage of by demonstrators, while the police were
overwhelmed given that they had little experience in the tactics of riot suppression and crowd
control.1000 Factories were turned into makeshift infirmaries, where injured demonstrators were
stitched up.1001 A police car was burned and the headquarters of the British-owned newspaper,
Iraq Times (which only weeks earlier described demonstrators as ‘a mob of looters,’ 1002) was set
alight. Baghdad, in the words of one writer, resembled a ‘war zone’.1003 The PM Salah Jabr
transmitted a radio broadcast calling for demonstrators to end their disturbing of ‘the peace and
order or [the] contravene[ing] of laws’ as this would expose people to ‘danger and death’.1004
Police then scrambled to maintain barricades, while others were stationed on roofs and
minarets, and had express orders from their commander to break up demonstrations and shoot to

Ibid, at. 2:130.
For the full text see al-Hasanī. Tārīkh al-Wizārāt, Vol. 3, supra, ft. 235, at 249.
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kill if necessary. Huge crowds gathered on both sides of the entrance of the Ma’mūn Bridge1005
with the intention of meeting at the center of the bridge in defiance of the police. As the crowds
courageously moved forward, police sprayed bullets in their direction. The shots only fell silent
after a fifteen-year old girl (later coined ‘the girl of the bridge’) appeared out of the chaos and
continued towards the midpoint of the old bridge.1006 The police pulled back and the two flanks
of the masses ultimately converged. An estimated 300 to 400 died on the bridge that day. 1007
Bodies hung from the bridge, and others floated in the Tigris River below.1008 This bloody event
led to the resignations of over a dozen ministers, including the Speaker of the Majlis, who
watched the entire incident from the balcony of the Parliament building.1009 The ‘Day of the
Bridge’, as it came to be known endures in the annals of Iraqi history and folklore as the moment
when ordinary unarmed Iraqis gave their lives to rid themselves from the chains of imperial and
semi-colonial rule and expunge the ruling class’ black ink with which the treaty was signed, with
their blood.

After this day the bridge would be renamed as ‘The Bridge of Martyrs’.
Batatu, ft. 41, at 557.
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1008 Sbāhī. supra, ft. 191, at 340
1009 al-Qassāb, Abdul Azīz. Muthakarat Abdul Azīz al-Qassāb [The memoirs of Abdul Aziz al-Qassab],
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Figure 4: Batatu's map showing the location of the Battle of the Bridge. (Batatu, the Old Social
Classes, at 556).

Although the annulment of the Portsmouth Treaty was achieved, the new ‘caretaker’
government headed by Muhammad al-Sadr, a prominent religious leader, ultimately clamped
down on all forms of dissent, declaring martial law, and shutting down newspapers and trade
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unions on the basis of national security. It was moreover on the basis of the proclamation of
martial law on May 15, 1948 during the Wathba that the Iraqi regime had another opportunity to
re-try the leaders of the ICP. A wave of repression spread throughout the land and the military
courts took every opportunity to make use of the Penal Code’s amendment described in the
previous chapter – i.e. Law 51 of 1938- which was referred to in nearly every summary judgment
made to sentence thousands of communists, leftists, nationalists and other Iraqis who participated
in the Wathba demonstrations.1010
On 10 February 1949, Fahad, and ICP Politburo members, Zakī Basīm and Mohammed
Husayn al-Shabībī, were convicted of having led protests from prison and were sentenced to
death once more. This time, however, the sentences were swiftly carried out the next day at dawn.
Executed in three different squares in Baghdad, their bodies were left hanging as a clear warning
to anyone who dared to challenge the semi-colonial Iraqi order. One British official at the scene
vividly described these violent displays of power in the following manner: ‘…ordinary people on
their way to work found still hanging these pathetic objects, each moving slightly as it hung from
its temporary gallows, the rough prison clothes wrapped around the shrunken-looking body, the
ghastly angle of the head behind the mask, the cheap notice describing the crime for which he
suffered…Every man in Baghdad was nauseated by this display…’1011 It was reported in the
communist press that Fahad’s last words were: ‘we are bodies and thoughts; if you destroy our
bodies, you will not destroy our thoughts;’1012 while al-Shabībī kept repeating, ‘it is an honor to
be executed in the same square where the Wathba of the people was launched’.1013 Basīm cried,
‘if I was to return to life for a second time, I would not take any other path but this one, which I
have already taken’.1014 It is unclear whether these statements were actually made. What is
certainly clear was that these executions were meant as the regime’s retribution for what
transpired during the days of the revolutionary Wathba.

See A Secret Encyclopedia Concerning the Secret Iraqi Communist Party (Mawsuʿa sirīyya khāssa
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With these violent acts, however, the ruling class made a grave error. Not only was
communism now, in Batatu’s words, ‘surrounded with a halo of martyrdom,’1015 but the people’s
attempts to renew the emancipatory spirit of the Wathba persevered rather than dissolving into
thin air. Despite the slow strangulation of the movement, it was the Wathba that was the spark
that ignited the revolutionary process that would materialize in the July Revolution a decade later
during the turbulent year of 1958.

VI. The British Assessment of the Wathba & the ‘logic of the resisting people’

The British assessment of the Wathba and its causes was, as would be expected,
considered as anything but a genuine nationalist movement. A detailed report by G.C. Pelham,
the Acting Charge d’Affaires at the time, surprisingly identified the causes of the ‘troubles’ as
having ‘little connection to Anglo-Iraq relations’1016, but rather the peoples’ mistrust of corrupt
government, which he described as an Ottoman legacy. 1017 Refusing to admit that the
demonstrations were anti-British, he saw them solely (and ‘personally’) aimed at Sāleh Jabr and
his cabinet. Mentioning the government’s mishandling of the dire issue of economic situation
during the year, he especially focused on the public outrage against the partition of Palestine as an
underlying cause.1018
It was nonetheless the speed in which the treaty was concluded that he argued intensified
the suspicions of the people. ‘Colour was lent to the accusation’, he wrote, ‘… that the treaty was
made in London and handed ready made to the Iraqi delegation for signature’. 1019 The
unavailability of an official Arabic translation of the treaty further fuelled such suspicion.1020
Pelham’s reference to demonstrators as a ‘mob’ that was menacing ‘law and order’ and his
warning that Iraq was threatened by ‘mob rule,’ illustrates the British view that the Wathba was
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This became the ‘official’ British narrative as Douglas Busk also made a similar argument in his
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1017 TNA. G.C. Pelham to FO, 21 Jan 1948. FO 371/68443 E 880/27/93.
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an irrational event. 1021 He went on to critique Iraqi ‘student thought’, which he saw as
conditioned by the view that ‘any foreign commitment takes away from full national
sovereignty,’ stating that Iraqis suffer from ‘an inferiority complex’.1022 Admitting that the belief
that the government of Sāleh Jabr must fall was ‘all but universal,’ he maintained that although
such a situation would be ‘hopeless in a Europe country’, ‘in an Arab one there is perhaps a
slender chance’ that the British connection would remain unscathed, as it would merely fall back
on the old treaty.1023 This admission was nothing less than the recognition of the imperial
characteristics of the treaty itself.
Finally, one of the most recurrent analyses of the underlying causes of the demonstrations
given by both the British and the Iraqi ruling class (namely the PM himself1024) was that common
Iraqis were too illiterate to even understand the meaning of the treaty. The British blamed the
Iraqi government for not educating the public about the contents of the treaty, going as far as
saying that the population was ‘largely illiterate and…therefore incapable of reading the treaty
itself’.1025 One official claimed that only ‘an ill-intentioned person could have misunderstood the
Treaty’.1026 Douglas Busk wrote, ‘I had heard the vague slogans of the demonstrations in the
streets, but I had not learned from them what were the [legal] points in the treaty to which they
objected…’1027 Putting aside the racist connotations in this overall analysis and the fact that the
organized committees detailed above made their demands quite clear, the very working actuality
of the Wathba illustrates the exact opposite: the emergent consciousness of the Iraqi masses of
how imperialism functions, especially through the law. One of Baḥr al-ʿŪlūm’s poems, entitled
‘The colonial (Portsmouth) treaty,’ which he recited to cheering crowds during the early days of
the Wathba, demonstrates how the masses grasped the meaning of the treaty in their minds (even
if they had not read its every article):
A draft law sent to pave the path for the invader
The propositions of this bill sanctioned invasion
Employing the language of bullets to impose itself
TNA. G.C. Pelham to FO, supra.
Ibid.
1023 Ibid.
1024 See Najda Fathī Sūfwā, Sālih Jabr: Sīra Syāsīya, (London: Dar al-Saqi, 2017).
1025 TNA. Henry Mack, British Embassy, Bagdad to Michael Wright, London, 9 Feb 1948.
E2693/27/93/G, FO 371/68446.
1026 Ibid.
1027 TNA. Douglas Busk, British Embassy, Bagdad to Bevin, FO, London. 6 Feb 1948. E 2611/27/93.
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And compelling co-operation from the barking dogs
While the people prepare for the tribulations of night
A language for understanding the occupation of yesterday1028
Busk’s insistence therefore that the crowd give him a ‘legal argument’ regarding their rejection
of the Treaty misses the point which is that the very existence of a ‘colonial’ treaty that
practically ‘sanctioned occupation’ and prolonged their domination by an imperial power, was the
problem. The contents of the treaty mattered little if the intention of the contracting parties
remained the same—the maintenance of the British connection. As Marx once wrote about the
Paris Commune, ‘the great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence’. In
other words, one should not measure a revolutionary event such as the Wathba based on its ideas
or even law, but rather it should be measured based on its ‘working existence’ on the ground.
Here, it is plain that the movement’s organization and committees – i.e. its very organized actions
– was an indication of the type of social order that was being sought: one that allows for the
participation of the majority of the Iraqi people and especially the working class and the peasants.
It is this that could referred to as the ‘logic of the people’ rather than a legal argument or the logic
of the law.

VII. The Wathba from the lens of the labour movement

Labour Unions, preserve the honorable people
And erect for the workers some triumphal arches
The signs have begun and so their nobility proceeds
In this movement, the Wathba, what a wonderful effect
~ Mohammad Salih Bahr al-ʿUlūm1029

The Wathba has been largely interpreted as a nationalist anti-colonial struggle for the
assertion of the constitutional rights of the Iraqi people, which were infringed and weakened by
the 1930 Treaty.1030 However, it also contains a unique labour narrative underlying its history,

M. Bahr al-ʿUlum, Diwan, supra, ft. 310, at 129.
Ibid, at 2:130.
1030 Al-Chadirjī, Kāmil Mudhakkirat Kāmil al-Chadirjī wa Tārīkh al-Hizb al-Watanī al-Dīmuqrātī [The
Memoirs of Kamil al-Chādirji and the History of the National Democratic Party] (Beirut: Dar al-Tal’ia,
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which had a particular significance to the conjuncture in question, and which I have detailed in
mini-histories in previous chapters. In other words, one way to understand the Wathba is through
the lens of the labour struggle against the semi-peripheral sovereignty and its social and economic
implications on the lives of the ordinary Iraqi working classes. As Eric Davis has emphasized,
workers provided ‘the backbone’ of the Wathba.1031 The Iraqi labour movement was making
strides in their continuous struggle against their British employers of the colossal industrial
enterprises (namely the port, railways and oil refineries). Before the Wathba exploded,
continuous labour strikes in these enterprises were rapidly becoming a concern for the British
authorities.1032 The workers were not merely angered by their wretched conditions, but were also
able, because of their unique location within the semi-colonial system (map) of capitalist
exploitation, to make a direct correlation between their immediate material conditions and the farreaching issue of imperialism.
To understand the role of the labour movement in the Wathba, one must recall the
organizing efforts several years earlier of the railway, port and oil workers, described in previous
chapters. During the years leading up to the Wathba, the workers continuously developed
extensive experiences in organizational tactics and strategies of strike action and protest, which
made all the difference when they were on the ground, hand in hand with their Iraqi brethren
fighting against the Portsmouth Treaty. Moreover, the workers’ cognizance of the direct
relationship between British imperialism and semi-colonialism, and the Iraqi state that they
became gradually aware of during their labour struggles was now embedded into the overall
national consciousness and ‘common sense’ of the majority of common Iraqis. The working class
were after all, as shown earlier, the class that was most effected by the implications of the treaty
and ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ in their everyday lives.
An argument could therefore be made that the unique experiences of the workers and
their movement contributed significantly to the momentum of the Wathba. If the students could
be considered as those who ignited the Wathba, its organizational momentum was surely
maintained by the workers and their concrete experiences, for throughout the months after the
‘Day of the Bridge’, labour strikes intensified like never before. There was, in the words of Sʿuād
Khayrī, an ‘awakening’ within the labour movement.1033 The strikes were so potent that Nurī alDavis, supra, ft. 596, at 293
TNA. British Embassy, Baghdad to Foreign Office, 21 May 1948, enclosing minute on strikes at
IPC [FO 371/68479].
1033 Khayrī, supra, ft. 562, at 171, 173
1031
1032

223

Saīd publically remarked at the time that what he feared the most was not the actual
demonstrations that led to the cancellation of the treaty, but rather the intensification of labour
strikes, which he was afraid would lead to a communist revolution.1034 In that sense, the anticolonial nationalist struggle shifted into the ‘axis of labour’, turning strike action into the ‘beating
heart’ of the Wathba movement.1035 Labour (economic) struggle and anti-colonial (political)
struggle became precisely one and the same at this conjuncture. It was after all throughout these
months that the massive successful Basra Port strike unfolded, and the legendary K3 pumpingstation strike, which carried the ‘liberationary [and solidarity] spirit of the Wathba,’1036 became a
concrete reality. Martial law would ultimately be declared to violently repress these labour
strikes. It is therefore not an overstatement to consider the Wathba as the wider reflection of a
labour struggle against the semi-peripheral sovereignty that gave the juridical and ideological
cover needed for the imposition of the capitalist economic structures on Iraq.

VIII. The wide implications of the Wathba & its contribution to the conjuncture of
decolonization in international law

I will now return to my earlier analysis of TWAIL and its methodology by inserting the
social and juridical implications of the Wathba into my theoretical argument. My contention was
that TWAIL scholars should begin the study of the conjuncture in the history of international law
– connecting their concern for the ‘micro-histories of resistance’ to a much broader understanding
of the conjuncture in question. This would allow for the bridging of all these micro-histories into
an overarching understanding of agency. Consequently, the conjunctural moment, which allowed
anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance to materialize in Iraq cannot be explained without an
attempt to understand the wider conjuncture of decolonization in the region and the Third World.
Decolonization, as Mohammed Bedjaoui reminds us, is by its very definition a ‘structural
revolution on a world scale’.1037 For this reason a conjunctural analysis must begin ‘at the level
of the international itself,’ ascertaining ‘a dominant combination of causes’ while evaluating ‘the
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period characterized by the working out of that combination.’1038 It entails the necessity of
simultaneously ‘looking inwards to examine the detailed movement of a given period and
outwards to locate that period in the longer historical process which it forms a part.’1039
A conjunctural analysis in international law, therefore, would have to be attentive to the
organic movement within this wide scale while analyzing agency, focusing on, using the words of
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, the ‘intersections’ and the ‘accumulation of struggles’ against
international law.1040 Although TWAIL scholars are generally familiar with such an analysis –
one which Gramsci would refer to as the study of the ‘long waves’ of history1041 (for instance
Anghie’s return to the thought of Francisco de Vitoria in the sixteenth century) – what tends to be
missing in general is how this connects to agency (or using TWAIL vocabulary: resistance). The
conjuncture therefore acts as a bridging device for one’s analytic lens in relation to the notion of
agency that could be used in tandem with the study of the imperial structures of international law.
It is nevertheless not merely a matter of contextualization, but rather about continuously being
attentive to the question of agency and action in one’s wide analysis. Before moving to assess
Iraqi working-class agency, I will first address the structural implications of the Wathba on a
variety of different interconnecting and intersecting levels – the Iraqi, regional and international.
On the Iraqi level, the Wathba contained the origins of the revolutionary process that
culminated in the overthrow of the British-sponsored Monarchy by the 1958 July revolution. It
certainly inspired and stimulated the Free Officers to take matters into their own hands to defend
the people from ‘the incubus of injustice that weighed upon them’.1042 I would go as far as to
argue that the Wathba could be considered as the ‘dress rehearsal’ for the 1958 revolution,
especially if one was to consider that the revolutionary process of struggle was sustained
throughout the decade resurfacing as mini-Wathbas – namely, the Intifāda of 1952 and the
Uprising of 1956. In many ways, it was the spark that started the process of the brewing and
making of the revolution. It is in that sense that the Wathba and the revolution were a part of the
same Iraqi conjuncture. The July revolution was a genuine revolution that broke with the ancien
régime. The Proclamation No. 1 that was read out on Baghdad Radio announced the
establishment of a republic, promised that the Iraqi people would participate in shaping their own
Justin Rosenberg quoted in Koivisto, ‘Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism’, at 273.
Ibid.
1040 Michael Hardt, & Antonio Negri. Empire, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), at 263
1041 See Maaurice Finocchiaro. Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), at 164.
1042 Col. Abdul Karim Qassim’s words as quoted by Batatu, supra, ft. 41, at 806.
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future, and established a neutralist foreign policy (explicitly referring to Bandung), ending its
close alliance with the West. 1043 The revolutionary processes began with the drafting of a
Provisional Constitution barely two weeks after the revolution, frustrating the subjugating
structures of the old constitution or Organic Law, which limited popular sovereignty as shown
earlier. Furthermore, the new Agrarian Reform law ended the ‘semi-feudal’ system that was the
foundation of British policy and control, destroying the social power of the landed sheikhs by
finally bringing the countryside under the purview of state law.1044 Finally, the position of urban
workers and the working class were significantly enhanced by the revision and enactment of an
updated progressive labour law for the protection of workers’ rights and their trade unions. As for
the anti-hegemonic impact of the Wathba on the region, it was apparent in how it inspired
countless sympathy strikes and demonstrations in Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo. A revealing
clipping from a Cairo newspaper read, ‘the Iraqi people did not only save itself, but saved the
entire Arab world from remaining under Western colonial subjugation.’1045
To situate the Wathba internationally, one would need to analyze how its revolutionary
impetus was partially successful in striking imperialism by preventing the imposition of a revised
treaty. To do that it would be necessary to understand other regional and international events that
rendered it the appropriate moment to attack (British) imperialism. Here, the weaving of other
events of conjunctural resistance against imperialism and the international legal order that
happened in the Third World that year is necessary to grasp the vulnerability of British
imperialism at that particular moment. Frank Furedi has detailed the conjuncture that emerged
during that unique year of 1948 for anti-colonial and nationalist liberation struggles in the Third
World.1046 He demonstrates how 1948 was a year of widespread panic in Whitehall as a crisis of
imperial rule emerged unexpectedly, where anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance reached its
utmost intensity: ‘No part of the empire seemed immune from what appeared to be an epidemic
of unrest’.1047 Twelve days before the Wathba, Burma rejected Commonwealth membership,
while February saw riots in Accra and in June emergency rule was established in Malaya.1048 Of
course, regionally 1948 was the year that the tragic Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) was
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unfolding, and more than anything else this event represented the injustices of colonialism and
imperialism for the Arab peoples. A focus on the manifestation of the conjuncture on the
international scale would take all of these into account in one’s analysis of this particular moment
of Iraqi agency against the imperialism of international law.
The Wathba could be situated in the conjuncture that was emerging within the
international legal order and which manifested in the signing of the 1960 Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (GA Resolution 1514).1049 The
significance of this document, sometimes referred to as the ‘Magna Carta’ of decolonization,
should not be understated.1050 The UN Charter of 1945 failed to clearly condemn colonialism,
and its imposition of a duty of administration of specific colonies could arguably be construed as
recognizing the legality of colonialism.1051 The fact that the Portsmouth Treaty, as I have shown,
was (legally) drafted in a manner that fully conformed to the UN Charter is evidence of this
limitation. The 1960 Declaration was therefore the first instrument in the history of international
law whereby colonialism and imperialism were deemed unlawful and in contravention of the UN
Charter. As Christopher Quaye observed, the preamble of the Declaration, ‘decried colonialism
… by observing the universal position against perpetuation of colonialism and expressing belief
in liberation from anything that is colonial’.1052 In its words, the declaration: ‘Solemnly proclaims
the necessity of bringing a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and
manifestations’.1053 Despite its significance in international legal history, the Declaration did not
fully accelerate the process of decolonization at a pace corresponding to the hopes of the peoples
under colonial rule, as its implementation had to be continuously fought for by the bloc over the
next few years.1054 Nevertheless, the contribution of the Iraqi anti-colonial and anti-imperial
struggle to this Declaration was clear.
The Wathba and its revolutionary consequences on the Iraqi plane was only one event
amongst a series of similar revolutionary events in other parts of the Third World that had a direct
influence on the way the representatives of the Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N., adhering to the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), G.A. Res.
1514 (XV), UN GAOR, 15TH sess., 947th plen. Mtg, UN Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) (14 December 1960).
1050 Quayson-Sackey, as cited in Quaye, Christopher. Liberation Struggles in International Law,
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).
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Bandung Spirit, were aggressively arguing for the drafting and liberal interpretation of this
Declaration, while maintaining a firm anti-colonial stance.1055 It was clear that legal arguments
were specifically made on the basis of ‘the political weather outside the [U.N.] Headquarters’.1056
In other words, not only was the law rejected as a mechanism for dealing with the question of
colonialism and imperialism, but the wave of events of decolonization on the ground were
considered as necessary sources for the drafting and molding of international law and its
instruments. The bloc continuously insisted that these anti-colonial struggles must be
unconditionally recognized as legitimate – international ‘law should be modified according to
changed circumstances’.1057
The permanent representative of the revolutionary government of Iraq in the U.N., Adnān
Pāchachī took part in the drafting of the 1960 Declaration.1058 The Iraqi delegation ended up cosponsoring, together with a number of Asian and African states, the Declaration when it was
presented to the General Assembly. In an impassionate and eloquent speech to the Assembly, the
new Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hāshim Jawād began by recounting the long history of colonialism in
the Arab World beginning with the first experience of European imperialism with the French
conquest of Algeria in 1830, eventually referring to the Mandate system as ‘a new form of
colonialism’ that was imposed on the peoples of the Middle East.1059 Jawād accordingly directly
rejected the ‘semi-peripheral sovereignty’ that the Iraqi masses attempted to abolish with their
blood, sweat and tears during the Wathba and thereafter. He went on to state that although the
Mandate in Iraq was terminated in 1932, it was replaced by a new relationship that retained for
the former Mandatory Power great influence in the internal affairs of the country, stressing that ‘it
took another twenty-six years and our great July Revolution of 1958 for the people of Iraq to rid
the country finally of the last vestiges of foreign domination and influence. 1060 Jawād then
emphasized how he regarded all struggles for decolonization as interconnected by specifically
referring to the Arab and Iraqi experience:
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I do not think I exaggerate when I say that few nations in the world have suffered as much as the
Arab nation under colonial rule … the Arab people have known colonialism in its worst forms and
manifestations. They have experienced at first hand its oppression and treachery and have suffered from it
physically, materially and spiritually as few others have. This is one of the reasons why we have such a
deep sympathy and understanding for the struggle of the other nations for freedom and independence.1061

He went on to make clear that it was this unique ‘extensive’ and ‘tragic’ experience of (semi)
colonialism in the Arab world in general and in Iraq in particular which solidified his delegation’s
belief in the importance of an unequivocal anti-colonial wording in the Declaration.1062
The Iraqi contribution to the drafting of this document was hence in ensuring that the
semi-peripheral sovereignty that was skillfully weaved into international law in Geneva and
granted to Iraq in 1932, as a recognized form of ‘independence’, would be unequivocally rejected
in the Declaration. International law should instead postulate concrete sovereignty and full
independence. N.M. Perrera, the representative for Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) plainly
explained the meaning of this part of the Declaration when he emphasized that reference to the
‘manifestations of colonialism’ specifically refers to ‘the various methods, procedures and legal
figments which are used by colonial powers to cover the nakedness of rank colonialism’.1063 The
semi-peripheral sovereignty described earlier and which was a significant part of the Iraqi
experience was one of these more sophisticated legal figments that were recognized under
international law. It is in this way that the Iraqi experience of the Wathba and its revolutionary
consequences, in rejecting semi-peripheral sovereignty on the ground, could be linked through a
conjunctural analysis to the wider changes within the international legal order.

IX. The significance of labour & working-class agency to the conjuncture of decolonization
The analysis above has shown how ‘resistance’, or more broadly revolutionary agency,
is conducive within a particular conjuncture that emerges from the structures in question. TWAIL
scholars would traditionally have analyzed the Wathba in isolation of these structures,
concentrating on certain characteristics of agency as being external and not contingent to these
structures (in particular its spontaneity, non-violence, and heterogeneity). However, this narrow
approach differs from the conjunctural analysis that brings agency and structure into one fold,
Ibid.
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while it romanticizes agency, approaching it as a form of resistance that is devoid of any
revolutionary content. Many TWAIL scholars cannot conceive of emancipation without or
beyond the law or the international legal order, despite it being the very target of their
critique.1064 The Wathba, however, emerged for the very reason that the legal mechanisms of the
state that were being manipulated by imperial instruments of international law were inept and
completely dysfunctional. It eventually became (at least for the left) about the subversion of the
law rather than its mere reform. Furthermore, the Wathba demonstrated that the effectiveness of
what I refer to as ‘conjunctural resistance’ in the context of revolutionary action depends on its
organizational capacity. It is not enough to put one’s hopes on the spontaneity of action as
TWAIL scholars tend to do, for despite the unforeseen nature of the Wathba, the movement
spurred at that particular moment because it was able to readily organize into effective steering
committees. This was certainly possible because of some of its participants’ past experiences,
especially those of the workers. In this manner, therefore, romanticizing the spontaneity of
agency ignores the fact that spontaneity and organization must come together within a particular
conjuncture to be effective.
I want to end by briefly returning to the significance of labour to the specific conjuncture
in question. A focus on labour and working-class agency in this analysis demonstrates the strong
affinity between capitalism, imperialism and international law, especially in the semi-periphery.
This is what explains the significant role of labour in countering the manifestations of the
international legal order within the conjuncture in question. I have already shown how semiperipheral sovereignty in the Iraqi context was manufactured as a mechanism to control the semicolonial Middle East. The ‘independence’ of Iraq was more a mechanism to legalize the control
of Iraqi oil and regulate its transportation across the region. While the Anglo-Iraq treaty
maintained this control juridically, Iraqi labour was exploited to superintend the everyday
functioning of this infrastructure of economic dominance. In this way, colonial and racial
relations remained intact after Iraqi ‘independence’, especially in the colossal private enterprises
and factories. The Anglo-Iraq treaty ensured British control of the most important economic sites
of production and trade in the country. As I have shown, the semi-colonial framework of an
‘independent Iraq’ created an atmosphere of racism that was common elsewhere in the Empire.
Iraqi workers, like their counterparts elsewhere in the Third World, embodied the contradictions
See for example, Luis Eslava. and Sundhya Pahuja. “Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and
the Universality of International Law,” 3(1) Trade, Law and Development, 103 (2011); B.S. Chimni.
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of the capitalist system within the (semi) colony, experiencing first hand the effects of
imperialism and racism in their everyday lives, and so it should not be surprising that they would
lead a significant role within the nationalist liberation movement.
Iraqi workers reconstituted the question of labour as an anti-colonial and anti-imperial
one. This is why their rejection of the Anglo-Iraq treaty was a rejection of the entire international
legal and economic order imposed on the region. Fahad reveals the way the workers were
thinking when he wrote: ‘… the working class did not separate the national [political] from the
social [economic] content of liberation…[For them] national liberation is but a starting point of a
fundamental change in the life of the people’.1065 The Iraqi labour movement combined claims of
higher wages and better living conditions with anti-colonial demands of national liberation,
ensuring its ‘full integration into the national movement’.1066 This wide analytic lens was unique
to the international conjuncture in question. It was prevalent at the time in other parts of the Third
World.1067 Furedi characterized this conjuncture as a ‘radical moment in anti-colonial politics,’
where there was a ‘tendency of protests to acquire a more fundamental anti-systemic and antiimperialist orientation, accompanied by increasing erosion of the boundaries between economic
and political demands.’1068 This explains how ‘relatively ordinary demands could mushroom into
a major challenge to imperial authority’.1069 Iraqi workers, therefore, were unable to articulate
their rejection of their social, living and working conditions without at the same time rejecting the
entire international legal and economic order that was imposed upon them.
The British came to the conclusion that there needed to be an extensive development
policy towards labour that would ‘ameliorate the dire labour conditions’ and ‘fend off
Communism’.1070 It is revealing that before the eruption of the Wathba, the British were in the
process of advising the Iraqi government in drawing up ‘regulations for the whole field of labour
in Iraq’ and the establishment of an arbitration procedure that would address workers
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grievances.1071 It is this ultimately unsuccessful policy of development and conciliation that
dominated British policy towards the region in the next decade. In a similar vein, a development
framework manifested within international law and its institutions. The International Labour
Organization for example sent technical assistance missions to advise on labour and social issues
in the Middle East. The ILO’s technical assistance programs were conceived in the context of
constricted notions of social and economic development with the aim of fighting the growing
influence of communism.1072 Moreover, the 1961 Declaration of the United Nations Development
Decade (GA Res. 1710) ensured that the effects of the 1960 Declaration would be limited in that
it ‘bound together decolonization and development with a firm yoke’.1073 This maintained the
subordination of society to the discipline of economics, and led to the continuation of the
development of underdevelopment. 1074 Most importantly, this was what prevented the
materialization of an alternative international economic order from the ‘salt-water’ decolonization
that was won. In this way, the conjunctural shift did not ultimately produce the revolutionary
changes sought after, whether it was within the international legal order or the Iraqi experience,
where revolutionary processes were interrupted by a CIA-sponsored military coup in 1963.

X. Conclusion

The history of the Wathba recounted above is an illustration of how revolutionary action
may be undertaken within a specific conjuncture to subvert the effects of the imperialism of
international law. Although this affirms the transient and provisional nature of the foundations of
international law, it is only in relation to the structures in question that agency could be
evaluated.1075 It is nevertheless important to recall Gramsci’s warning that ‘a common error …
consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is
conjunctural. This leads to… [either]… an excess of “economism” … [or] … an excess of
“ideologism”. In the first case there is an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second an
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exaggeration of the voluntarist and individual element.’1076 It is necessary in the end to find an
accurate correlation between the (organic) structure and (conjunctural) agency in one’s analysis if
one is to correctly evaluate how agency was (or is to be) deployed within the structural constraints
of the international legal, political and economic order. It was after all, on the one hand, the
overly weak hegemony of the Iraqi state and its corresponding semi-peripheral sovereignty that
made it unable to maintain itself or permanently suppress the emerging counter-hegemonic
movements and spaces that continued to arise despite being fractured again and again by the
violent uses of emergency law. The counter-hegemonic, on the other hand, cannot be understood
in isolation of the conditions that make agency possible or at least that make even an initially
unsuccessful attempt at revolution, such as the Wathba, encompass the revolutionary seed and
have a long-term effect on the future than was expected.
The prominent Iraqi poet Mohammed Mahdī al-Jawāhirī recited a celebrated poem
eulogizing those who died on the bridge during the Wathba, his brother amongst them. He begins
with the following line: ‘Are you aware or not, that the wounds of martyrs are a mouth?’ 1077 It is
not only a matter of allowing this ‘mouth’ to speak in one’s scholarship, but rather to focus on the
very conjunctures that allow those who take action to liberate themselves to become ‘wounded
martyrs’. It is, in other words, the opening (or ‘mouth’) of the conjunctures that should be one’s
point of departure.

Gramsci, supra, ft. 295, 178.
Jayyusi, Salma Khadra. Trends and Movements in Modern Arabic Poetry. (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
199.
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Conclusion

While they bring glad tidings
Of the free world, to the slaves
And of the miracles
Of their dollar – the hope of the peoples –
And the giver of life to the dead.
They frighten mothers
And they soak
The banner of your people, my little one, with blood.
…
While behind prison walls
A great people awakens
Destroying its chains, my beloved son,
But you are busy and you do not answer. 1078
~ ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bayātī

Mr. Speaker, the reports out of Iraq these days make 2008 sound an awful lot like 1930. That’s when the
British strong-armed a so-called treaty to take control of Iraq’s oil wealth. And it remained that way for
decades until the people in the Middle East nationalized their oil wealth to end outside control. But western
oil interests and the neocons have wanted it back ever since… [They] want... [Iraq’s oil reserves]…just as
they did 78 years ago. And like 1930, they plan to permanently occupy Iraq… In 1930, they didn’t call it
occupation, they called it a treaty. And they are doing it all over again. 1080
~ Jim McDermott

I. The lines of expansion & contraction of the international legal order

To return to the image of drawing ‘lines’ on maps made in the introduction, this legal
history of Iraq is a history of lines: borderlines, property lines, oil pipelines, railway lines, ports
leading shipping lines…etc. As Cornelia Vismann suggests, the law is itself a line or rather, ‘the
primordial scene of the nomos opens with drawing a line in the soil…[the] very act [of which]
initiates a specific concept of law, which derives order from the notion of space.’1081 This study
‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bayātī, [“A Song for my Son ‘Ali” dated 1955] in Al-Majd lil-Atfāl wal-Zaytūn,
3rd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Kātib al-‘Arabi lil-Tibā‘ah wal-Nashr, 1967), 49-51.
1080 US Congressional Record, House of Representatives, July 9, 2008, H6315. McDermott was
referring to the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement signed in 2008.
1081 Cornelia Vismann. “Starting from Scratch: Concepts of Order in No Man’s Land” in Bernd-Rudiger
Huppauf (ed) War, Violence and the Modern Condition. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), at 46.
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shows how the straight lines of the law in all its scales –international, domestic, transnational,
imperial, semi-colonial– produced and defined certain spaces with the aim of controlling,
regulating and exploiting the strategic sites and the natural resources of the semi-peripheral
Middle East. The Iraqi state itself was established through an amalgamation of legal instruments,
doctrines and methodologies until it was, contrary to reality, proclaimed as independent. The
retracing of these straight lines of the law exposes how imperialism operated to obscure reality,
legitimate and expand its order.
This study however also shows that no matter how straight a line is drawn and no matter
how sophisticated a ruler is used to (violently) draw a line, it could never dominate a map or
surface, which already contains other free-moving, living lines. Tim Ingold, who has written a
fascinating anthropological history of lines, describes the sovereignty of the straight line drawn
by a ruler. He writes, ‘[a] ruler is a sovereign who controls and governs a territory. It is also an
instrument for drawing straight lines. These two usages…are closely connected. In establishing
the territory as his to control, the ruler lays down guidelines for its inhabitants to follow. And in
his political judgments and strategic decisions –his ruling- he plots the course of action they
should take. As in the territory so also on the page, the ruler has been employed in drawing lines
of all kinds.’1082 The analogy above is apt indeed: to draw straight lines is the prerequisite for
imperial control, but to do so you need a ‘ruler’. You need the law. The British at the behest of
international legal institutions drew straight lines on the maps of Iraq and the region – they
installed a ruler in Iraq and with the lines of the law developed a semi-peripheral sovereignty over
this strategic territory, while they maintained their economic interests by drawing more lines –
economic lines of capitalism (physically constructing the infrastructure of oil pipelines and
railway lines).
Ingold contrasts the drawing of straight lines using a ruler with drawing by freehand,
which he shows produces a life-like texture and contains an open-ended freedom as it is a
movement along ‘a path of observation’ rather than the already defined sharp edges of the
ruler.1083 The graceful lines of anti-colonial and anti-imperial agency –of the workers, students,
peasants, squatters, lawyers, and the multitudes – described in this study move in such a
freehanded manner as they struggle to disentangle themselves from the sovereignty of (imperial
and legal) straight lines. As they move, partly in an improvised and partly in an organized
1082
1083

Tim Ingold. Lines: A Brief History (London: Routledge, 2007), at 160.
Ibid, at 166.
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manner, they created their own alternative nomos with their very movements, with the aim of
contracting the imperialism of the existing international legal order. The analysis of the
international conjuncture in international legal history presented in this study could accordingly
be considered as a science of the lines of imperial and anti-imperial movement – their
coordination in relation to space and time, and their expansion and contraction. It is no doubt the
most useful method to understand the manifestation and initiation of agency, and its counterhegemonic spaces in relation to the structures of capitalism, imperialism and international law.
This dissertation makes several contributions to the existing literature that go beyond just
putting law at the center of the modern history of Iraq. First, it substantiates the unique specificity
of the semi-peripheral region of the Middle East in the history of international law. In other
words, it shows that international law approached the semi-periphery quite differently than it did
the periphery in the Third World. From this emerged new juridical formations of sovereignty in
international law, such as what I describe as semi-peripheral sovereignty. These new categories
were in fact attempts to conceal the reality of imperial control, colonialism and capitalist
exploitation of the region. They were also threaded specifically for the Middle East, considering
its important geo-strategic location in the globe, as well as, the valuable natural resources below
its ground. By exploring these unique legal techniques and formulations and their ensuing effects,
international legal scholars would better appreciate the different (subtle) ways in which
international law was deployed to obfuscate reality and to further imperial agendas. It is these
hidden structures of the imperialism of international law that are most interesting to study as their
deconstruction would ensure that they would not reemerge again. It would also add to the lesser
known histories and genealogies of the concept of sovereignty in relation to the Third World.
Secondly, this study contributes to the study of agency in relation to international law by
proposing that with the use of a novel methodological approach relying on the conjuncture, the
history of agency could be better grasped within international legal history. A broader and more
open perspective towards the agency of the ordinary peoples of the Third World illustrates, not
only that international law had a concrete material effect on those living under its guise, but that
their struggles against these forms of control were a significant part of its history, and should be
considered as such.

236

II. The juridical forms of sovereignty in international law & their relation to capitalism and
imperialism
I have recounted this history of Iraq not only to show that the law was continuously
present in the political and socio-economic transformations of the period in question, but
particularly as an attempt to present a historical case whereby it is clear how imperialism and
international law are constitutive of each other. Of course, this study is not only a history of
international law and its institutions (Chapter 3 & 7), but also an illustration of the simultaneous
operations of (British) imperial law (Chapter 1), transnational law (Chapters 3 and 4), emergency
law, criminal law (Chapter 6), and labour law (Chapters 2, 4 & 5). Nonetheless, it was generally
with the structures of international law and the construction of semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq
through the Mandate process that these laws above had the necessary scope to function within the
context of semi-coloniality. Moreover, it was international law, through the provisions of the
1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, which produced and maintained the spaces – the imperial and semicolonial enclaves of the oil fields, railways and the port – described in this study, that allowed for
imperialism to function efficiently and maintain the flow of capital in this geo-strategic region.
The making of semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq was a significant event in that it was
the first time that the necessary juridical ingredients were weaved together to produce a unique
non-European sovereignty through the Mandate process of international law that was reconciled
with the post-war international legal order, and yet preserved the essential processes of
imperialism in the region. As I have shown, there was a spatial and economic specificity to the
semi-periphery that made these legal techniques vital for controlling the region as a whole.
Furthermore, from a regional and international perspective, this experiment with sovereignty was
valuable in that it revealed how far a restrained non-European sovereignty could be overextended
without contradicting the main principles underlying the emerging international legal order.1084
Semi-peripheral sovereignty in Iraq was in essence a skeletal form of sovereignty that ensured
that Iraqi sovereignty was (in theory) complete under international law, but fragmented in reality
– a fragmentation that was evident in the autonomous and semi-autonomous enclaves (of the oil
fields, the port and the railways) that were described in the study, and which also included the
two British (RAF) military bases that remained stationed in Iraq.1085
I have shown that the legal arguments made by the PMC did at times contradict their own legal
principles (especially of the open door), but the point is that the appearance of reconcilement with
international legal doctrine was ensured.
1085 British enclaves were spread out throughout the region (in Egypt, Iran, and the Persian Gulf
states). William Roger Louis recounts Oliver Harvey’s account in his diaries after visiting the RAF
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At its crux this study therefore uncovers the constitutive relation between the juridical
forms of sovereignty and capitalist expansion through imperialism in the region. By tracing the
economic dimensions of Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty and its link to the open door principle,
I show exactly how these forms and processes were molded to further the commercial and
economic interests of the imperial powers and capitalism in general. A close reading of the PMC
discussions on Iraq’s readiness to be independent, with those concerning the oil concessions, and
in turn with the pipeline agreements with the other Mandates in the region, suggests that the
juridical forms embedded in Iraqi semi-peripheral sovereignty were in fact a juridical
manifestation of the expansion and reproduction of capital in the region. I am hence furthering the
argument that sovereignty, as a core concept of international law, has a constitutive correlation
with capitalism and its imperialism. Sovereignty was in other words, not primarily ‘forged out of
the confrontation between different cultures,’ which in turn produced the ‘dynamic of difference,’
but rather it was already embedded in the juridical forms of capitalism.1086 It is the economic
rather than the cultural dynamics of sovereignty and international law that should be underscored
in its history. The grasping of the doctrine of semi-peripheral sovereignty and its processes in Iraq
would, it is hoped, explain its enduring characteristics, its continuities, and in turn its (current)
limitations as a category for Third World states in a post-colonial world.
This historical and legal study of Iraq therefore substantiates China Mieville’s claim that,
‘the imperialism of international law means more than just the global spread of an international
legal order with capitalism – it means that the power dynamics of political imperialism are
embedded within the very juridical equality of sovereignty.’

1087

The socio-economic

transformation of Iraq described here is an illustration of how the legal form of ‘equality’ within
the concept of sovereignty, as it was entrenched in the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, was used not only to
uphold its military dominance there, but also to maintain its corresponding capitalist structures
and processes, ensuring its operation with a certain efficacy. While capitalist relations were
solidified within Iraqi society as we saw in Chapter 1, they were maintained within the
industrialized spaces of oil production, railway and port apparatuses, as detailed in Chapters 4 and
5. By exposing the effects of the juridical forms of semi-peripheral sovereignty and how Iraqi
bases in Iraq during the Second World War, describing them as, ‘a complete bit of England
abroad….football, cinema and a pack of hounds. All very Poona.’ Quoted in William Roger Louis. The
British Empire in the Middle East, supra, at 745.
1086 Anghie, supra, ft. 21, at 311.
1087 Mieville, supra, ft. 25, at 270.
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workers were materially affected by these structures, not only does this study strive to further
ground the history of international law, but in its explicit consideration of anti-colonial and antiimperial (labour) struggle, it aims to move bottom-up to insert the agency of Third World peoples
into its historiography. The hope is, as Upendra Baxi proposes, ‘international law [would no
longer] be further understood merely as the history of the law of nations to the entire exclusion of
the law of peoples.’1088 The actions of Third World peoples would finally be interpreted from the
perspective of international legal transformation rather than its exclusion from this realm.

III. Legality as a question of strategy and tactics in revolutionary struggles
One theme running throughout this work concerns the manner that counter-hegemonic
movements appropriated and referred to the law and its language in their struggles. In Chapter 2, I
show how the labour movement was able to appropriate the (dead) labour law of 1936 on the
books for its own advantage, using it as a reference point in its demands. Although the early
labour movement had confidence in the principles of international law and its institutions (as its
leaders were in direct contact with the ILO for instance), its communist-led successor referred to
the law (whether international law or the labour law of the state) only from the perspective of
strategy and tactics. This did not mean that the law was unimportant for them, but rather they did
not consider legal reform as sufficient for defeating the structures of the semi-colonial order and
ending British imperialism in the country.
The oil workers relentlessly referred to the 1936 labour law in making their demands, in
particular the formation of its independent trade union. However, they were aware of the
limitations of the law and its application, were due to the constricting structures of international
and transnational law imposed on their country. Their experiences after the Gāwūrbāghī strike
and massacre confirmed their views, as not one person was held accountable under Iraqi law for
the murder of oil workers. Similarly, the port workers explicitly fought for the inclusion of the
right to strike into the labour law, which they argued was a part of their natural rights as workers.
These legal demands went unanswered and the workers were forced to move to more militant
tactics of wild strike action and sabotage during the Wathba. The uses of law in the struggle had
some advantages (whether as rhetorical tool or for its educative function), but it definitely had its
Upendra Baxi. ‘What may the “Third World” expect from International Law’ Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 5, pp.713-725, 2006; at 720.
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limits as the overall anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle itself was waged outside the confines
of law.
Does the law in general, then, and international law and its concept of sovereignty in
particular, have an emancipatory potential for counter-hegemonic, anti-colonial and/or antiimperialist movements? A central point that emerges from this study is that the practical
usefulness of law depends entirely on the historical conjuncture in question. It is a matter of
strategy and tactics and should not be pursued for the simple reason that it is law. Consequently,
neither EP Thompson’s claim that the rule of law is an ‘unqualified human good’ in its
malleability as a recourse for the plebian, nor Guha’s categorical renunciation of this statement as
a reflection of the ‘hallucinatory effects of ideology,’ is accurate. 1089 As Pashukanis has
emphasized, ‘legality is not an empty sack that can be filled with a new class content’.1090 In
other words, the forms of (bourgeois) legality ensure its limited potential. Its usefulness,
therefore, for any revolutionary movement is ‘a mere question of tactics’.1091 International law,
including human rights discourse, therefore is not always a useful ‘counter-hegemonic tool of
resistance’ as several TWAIL scholars have argued.1092 The same could be said of the concept of
sovereignty and self-determination, for despite its inherently imperialistic juridical form, it could,
provided the historical conjuncture is taken into account, contribute to a revolutionary struggle. A
legal demand, including that of complete self-determination, in other words, could be made to
further its revolutionary struggle, and this study has revealed how the Iraqi labour and nationalist
movements did exactly that at certain conjuncture

1089E.P.

Thompson, supra, ft. 183; and Ranajit Guha. Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power
in Colonial India, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), at 67. It should be noted that Doug
Hay has clarified Thompson’s often-quoted phrase: ‘If it was anything, the rule of law was for
Thompson an aspiration, a standard that could be used by democrats and socialists in upholding
constitutional protections first imagined by radicals and then achieved by popular politics over a
hundred of years…He was well aware that the law is also a basis of rules…upholding a radically
unequal division of property…[T]hat critique was at the heart of his polemic journalism, and the
other 250 pages of Whigs and Hunters…’ ‘Introduction to the Second Edition,’ in Douglas Hay, Peter
Linebaugh, John G. Rule, EP Thompson and Cal Winslow. Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in
Eighteenth-Century England, London: Verso, 2011), at x1i.
1090 Evgeny Pashukanis. “Lenin and the Problems of Law” in Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet, eds.
Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (London: Academic Press, 1980), at 143.
1091 G. Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness, (Boston: MIT Press, 1990), at 264. For an examination
of this question in detail see, Robert Knox. “Marxism, International Law, and Political Strategy’,
Leiden Journal of International Law, 22 (2009), pp. 413-436.
1092 Balakrishnan Rajagopal. “Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and
Development as a Third World Strategy”, 27(5) Third World Quarterly pp. 767-783.
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IV. Conjunctural analysis & the writing of history for the present

It has already been mentioned that a conjunctural analysis of history in relation to agency
is meant as a modus to grasp the present conjuncture (or in Lenin’s 1917 expression, ‘the Present
Situation’) so as to be able to formulate an organized plan of action today, which would be
decisive. A conjunctural analysis, therefore, is not your typical analytic method for the academic,
merely concerned with the elucidation of the historical past, but rather is meant to identifying
strategic and tactical sites of political action today. So the reader may wonder what was the
purpose of writing and undertaking a study and analysis on the revolutionary history of Iraq. Why
for instance are the past struggles of the oil, railway, and port workers significant to recall? Why
should we study their organized actions and strategies? How could the revolutionary history of
the Wathba be useful for Iraqis today – in an age of US imperialism, and amidst the devastation
of the 2003 invasion, occupation, plunder and disintegration of Iraq? The legendary history of the
Wathba and the vast hopes that came with the 1958 July Revolution seem to hardly register in the
memories for today’s Iraqi youth – or if so are only considered as possibilities that were dashed
by regional rivalries, left disorganization and imperialism – a too brief and turbulent
revolutionary interlude filled with optimism that has long gone.
Although, I do not claim to have substantive answers to these questions, it is certainly
clear that the Wathba was a decisive moment in the modern history of Iraq and that its effects
reverberated beyond the 1958 revolution in many ways. As Hamit Bozarslan has argued the
Wathba’s contemporary relevance in the post-1958 history of Iraq, including the Ba’thist period,
and the region was that it was ‘the bearer of an unprecedented degree of radicalization in the Arab
world,’ and that it was precisely the continuation of this process well after 1958 that ‘created a
paradoxical situation and led to a radical bifurcation both in ideological and axiological
terms’. 1093 This ‘radical bifurcation’ in ideology between Iraqis who were staunchly antiimperialist and favored concrete independence and non-alignment, and those who favored a
connection with the West became permanently entrenched, stirring continuous tension, and this
arguably remained in place throughout the history of Iraq and the region to this day.

Hamit Bozarslan. “Rethinking the Ba’thist Period” in Jordi Tejel, Peter Sluglett, Riccardo Bocco,
Hamit Bozarslan (eds.), Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing), at 144.
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It is apparent then that without undertaking a re-examination of the past with the present
in mind, it would be difficult to act to reconstruct an alternative future for the benefit of Iraq. It is
in this way that one should recollect how Iraqis developed creative and resourceful ways of
organized resistance in their struggles against imperialism and its legal manifestations. What
emerges therefore from this legal and historical study of Iraq is that ordinary working class Iraqis
were able to see through the obfuscation of the legal structures imposed on their country and at
certain points in time organized successfully against them. The reality is that these experiences
remain deeply (even if subconsciously) ingrained in the collective memories of the masses of the
region, and we know this because they tend to remerge without any warning as we saw happen
during the 2011 Arab revolutions. Ordinary Iraqis continue to struggle against similar imperialist
legal structures, organizing in novel ways, despite their portrayals by the media as passive victims
of dictatorship and war. 1094 The oil workers and their contemporary unions, for instance,
undoubtedly following their militant tradition, were (and still are) at the forefront of an intense
struggle against the imposition of an oil law in 2007, which intends to entirely open the oil
industry to foreign investment, sanctioning the interests of foreign companies (with the help of
international investment law), and completely reversing the process of nationalization that started
in 1972.1095
I want to end with a brief remark on the value and the techniques of writing history,
especially of international law. Anne Orford has highlighted the uniqueness of the uses of the
historical analysis by legal scholars, in particular TWAIL scholars.1096 She argues that legal
scholars do not abide by the established methodology of historiography that rejects all forms of
anachronism, emphasizing that everything should be placed ‘in the context of its own time.’1097
Historians on the other hand are expected to solely recover ‘past meanings’.1098 Orford suggests
that since law is inherently genealogical, depending on ‘the movement of concepts, languages and
See Ali Issa. Against All Odds: Voices of Popular Struggle in Iraq, (Tadween Publishing, 2015).
See Greg Muttitt. Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq, (London: Bodley Head, 2011).
Muttitt details the current struggles of the oil union and Iraqi civil society in organizing against this
law. On one of their strikes, he refers to their past militant history and experiences, ‘The new oil
union continued this tradition [i.e. of the communist-led strikes of the 1940s and 1950s and the spirit
of Gawurbaghi], demanding immediate improvements for the workers while raising the long-term
structure of the industry and the economy,’ and an opportunity to have a say on the new oil law.
Muttitt, at 254.
1096 Orford. Anne. “The past as law or history? The relevance of imperialism for modern international
law,” IILJ Working Paper 2012/2 (History and Theory in International Law Series), Finalized June
2012, (www.iilj.org).
1097 Ibid, at 6
1098 Ibid.
1094
1095
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norms across time and even space,’ legal scholars are intuitively capable of breaking from this
hallowed method through contextualizing past concepts, and considering how these concepts
remerge in the present. 1099 In other words, legal scholars find it easier to use history and the past
within the present context, and they do not abide by any stringent method.
Although, Orford is correct in pointing out the affinity between law and history, and the
constructive role of legal analysis in historical methodology, not all historians abide by this
orthodox approach to historiography. In fact, many historians, especially of the left, see their craft
as corresponding to the study of political action and its relation to the present. The writing of
history is considered as a political act – the making of history and its production is therefore a
technique to respond to the present, and is firmly rooted in the ‘possibilities of making
futures.’ 1100

Walter Rodney, for instance, believed that history was ‘a way of ordering

knowledge which could become an active part of the consciousness of an uncertified mass of
ordinary people’ and utilized as ‘an instrument of social change’ to bring about an alternative
future.1101
David Scott suggests a similar view in his rereading of The Black Jacobins, C. L. R.
James’s classic account of the only successful slave rebellion in the Caribbean, the Haitian
Revolution of the 1790s1102: ‘The historical past’, he writes, ‘…is never anachronistic […] [T]he
past is [not] only available through the present […] but […] morally and politically what ought to
be at stake in historical inquiry is a critical appraisal of the present itself, not the mere
reconstruction of the past. The present, then, not the past, is what histories of the present are
supposed to be about.’1103 In this way, Scott considers James’s classic work as an ‘exercise in
writing a history of the present,’ suggesting that James ‘directly challenges us to ask ourselves
what kind of story might be best for the politicohistorical presents within which we now live and
Ibid, at 9. The methodological affinity between law and history in European thought could be
traced back to at least the sixteenth century. François Baudouin and Jean Bodin, for example, argued
that the jurist must be a historian, if he is to avoid errors of interpretation and chronology, and the
historian must be a jurist to set events in their proper political and social contexts. See Grafton,
Anthony. What was History? The art of history in early modern Europe, (Cambridge University press,
Mass., 2007), at 69.
1100 Bill Schwarz. “‘The people’ in history: The Communist Party Historians’ Group, 1946-56,” Making
Histories: Studies in history-writing and politics, Johnson, R. ed. (Hutchinson & Co, 1983), at 95.
1101 George Lamming’s ‘Forward’ in Walter Rodney. A History of the Guyanese Working People, 18811905, (John Hopkins University Press, London, 1981), at xvii
1102 C.L.R. James. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, (NY:
Vintage, 1989).
1103 David Scott. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment, (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2004), at 41
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write.’1104 It is revealing that James was, despite his silence on his initial intentions, it has been
argued, motivated to begin writing The Black Jacobins when he arrived in London from his
native Trinidad, by the US occupation of Haiti (1915-1934).1105 He was consciously weaving
together a particular and romantic history of the Haitian revolution, while meditating on the
underlying revolutionary potential of Africans and the people of the Caribbean, indirectly
addressing the US imperialism of his time, and it’s flaunting of Haitian sovereignty. His hope it
seems was to inspire revolutionary action in the imaginations of the Caribbean people, and to
historically connect the Caribbean anti-colonialism against US imperialism with the revolutionary
struggle of Toussaint L’Overture and the Haitian Revolution for black liberation. It was therefore
no coincidence that his classic study of revolution was written and published during that period,
in 1938.
It is with a similar spirit that this history was written: as a (dare I say, romantic)
reworking of the history and legacy of anti-colonial revolutionary struggle of Iraq for this present
conjuncture of US imperialism, following the 2003 invasion, occupation and domination of Iraq,
the devastating effects of which linger to this day. I would like to think that the conclusion of this
study on the year of the centenary of the 1917 October Revolution (which is the same year of the
British occupation of Iraq) is a nod to this effort.
The British Ambassador to Iraq, John Troutbeck, once wrote in a dispatch that ‘no
country could owe more to imperialism than does Iraq’. One should add that the imperialism that
he was referring to was more specifically the imperialism of international law that we have
detailed in this study. Iraq’s experience with international law and its institutions could be said to
be quite unique. It was a state that was established and granted ‘independence’ through the
mechanisms of the Mandate system and international law, so as to be exploited in ‘peace’ (‘an
organization without occupation’ as one member of the Indian civil service put it1106). It would
later be the target of foreign-backed coups, installed dictatorship, acts of war, bombs, economic
sanctions, invasion, plunder, looting and military occupation – all with the aim of its reintegration into the capitalist world economy and its subjugation into Western hegemony. Iraq’s
modern state and its institutions – once the pride of the international community of the interwar
Ibid, at 57
See Raphael Dalleo. ‘”The Independence So Hardly Won has Been Maintained”: C.L.R. James and
the U.S. Occupation of Haiti,’ Cultural Critique 87, Spring 2014, pp. 38-59.
1106 See Olaf Caroe. Wells of Power: The Oilfields of South-Western Asia, A Regional and Global Study,
(London: Macmillan & Co, 1951).
1104
1105
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period – first developed through the mechanisms of international law, would be entirely destroyed
seven decades later, all under the purview of the same international legal order. This may seem
paradoxical indeed, but this study indicates otherwise. International law as the juridical
manifestation of imperialism is predicated on ‘civilizing’ violence. What is clear is that if Iraq
were to ever gain its full independence and its people their freedom, the entire semi-peripheral
region of the Middle East (including and especially Palestine) would have to be liberated from the
shackles of imperialism and this certainly means the imperialism of international law.
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